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Abstract 
The Arab World has known an Arab nationalist movement since 
the nineteenth century with its aims being focused firstly on 
establishing the existence of an Arab nation and secondly that 
this nation should be politically united in one pan-Arab nation- 
state. However, whereas many nationalist movements achieved their 
goal of establishing a nation-state, the Arab world as a whole 
was one of frustration for the Arab nationalists. 
Since the 1967 defeat in the war with Israel and 
particularly after the deradicalization of Arab politics after 
the death of Nasser and the rise of Arab petrodollar power, the 
hold of Arab nationalism on Arab politics has been waning. The 
event of the Iranian revolution of 1979 had the effect of 
increasing the power of Islamic fundamentalism in the Arab world. 
Consequently Pan-Islamism, which pan-Arabism had been able to 
quieten after the Second World War, returned to compete with Arab 
nationalism. Since then and especially in the 1980s many would 
attest to the premise that Arab nationalism was no longer the 
hegemonic ideology in the Arab world and that raison d'etat was 
dictating the course of Arab politics. Intellectuals began to 
question the validity of the pan-Arab ideal. 
The 1980s are marked by a revived assessment of Arab 
nationalism. There is what may be seen as a new breed of Arab 
nationalist thought in the writings on Arabism. The idea is no 
longer viewed in theological tones. Intellectuals and social 
scientists are examining the Arabist idea not as an ideal but as 
useful if realistically approached. The research presents and 
analyzes Arab thought through the contributions of intellectuals 
in the 1980s. The investigation establishes the continuation of 
intellectual efforts by Arab nationalists to articulate the pan- 
Arab idea. The analysis clearly demonstrates and detects the 
change in the nature of Arab thought as far as Arab nationalism 
and Arab unity are concerned and as compared to the kind of 
thought that was considered dead after 1967. Arab nationalist 
thought and Arab nationalism are being reconstructed and 
rejuvenated to accommodate the developments in Arab society and 
politics since 1967. The debates which Arab thought experienced 
in the 1980s provide evidence that such development was taking 
place. 
The discussion and analysis shows that even though Arab 
nationalism lost its hegemony over Arab politics, Arab thought 
has produced an entirely fresh contribution to the ideas of Arab 
nationalism and Arab unity. The study attempts to qualify 
previous studies and may play a role in qualifying the death 
verdict issued upon Arab nationalism. Therefore the study focuses 
on the debates as far as issues like the Arab nation, Arab unity, 
Arab state, democracy, and minorities are concerned. The analysis 
of the debates and contributions, which are largely unknown in 
the West, determine that a rejuvenation of Arab nationalism is 
taking place. Arab thought on Arab nationalism and Arab unity is 
undergoing a dialectic between its old and the newly emerging 
paradigms. 
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A Note on Transliteration 
The transliteration apparatus has been kept to the minimum. The 
only diacritical mark in the transliteration are 'ayns. The 'ayn 
is indicated by [' ]. Arabic names as those familiar to the reader 
in their Anglicized versions are rendered as such and not in 
transliteration ( e. g. Nasser) . Names of Arab writers who publish 
in English are spelt the way they appear in their own 
publications and therefore discrepancies are available as far as 
these are concerned. The Arabic article ''all' usually only 
appears when reference is first made to the subject in the whole 
of the research. (e. g. M. 'Abid al-Jabiriy). 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
The Arab World has known an Arab nationalist movement since 
the nineteenth century with its aims being focused firstly on 
establishing the existence of an Arab nation, on the contention 
that its national identity is enshrined in the bonds of language, 
culture, history and geography, and secondly that this nation 
should be politically united in one pan-Arab nation-state. After 
the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire Arab nationalism sought the 
liberation of the Arabs from European colonialism. Once this aim 
was achieved realities of Arab politics did not support the 
vision of identity. Arab nationalists therefore pledged 
themselves to ending the state of political fragmentation and to 
building a pan-Arab nation-state that would encompass all Arabs 
under its banner. 
However, whereas many nationalist movements achieved their 
goal of establishing a nation-state, the Arab world as whole was 
one of frustration for the Arab nationalists. Isolationist 
tendencies prevailed, states gave priority to their domestic 
integration rather than to inter-Arab integration. Despite many 
attempts at Arab unity disillusionment ensued. The failure of 
Arab nationalism to materialize a pan-Arab state, even though 
Arab nationalist ideology exercised an ideological power over 
Arab politics in the 1950s and the 1960s, has posed a challenge 
to Arab nationalist thought. 
Since independence Arab states have constituted a living 
1 
contradiction to the pan-Arabist model. Arab states have been 
consolidating their sovereignty and existence. Particularistic 
identities, though not overtly claiming to erode the pan-Arab 
identity, have been able to compete against the wider Arab 
identity. Since the 1967 defeat in the war with Israel and 
particularly after the deradicalisation of Arab politics after 
the death of Nasser and the rise of Arab petrodollar power, the 
hold of Arab nationalism on Arab politics has been waning. 
The event of the Iranian revolution of 1979 had the effect 
of increasing the power of Islamic fundamentalism in the Arab 
world. Consequently pan-Islamism, which pan-Arabism had been able 
to quieten after the Second World War, returned to compete with 
Arab nationalism. Since then and especially in the 1980s many 
would attest to the premise that Arab nationalism was no longer 
the hegemonic ideology in the Arab world and that raison d'etat 
was dictating the course of Arab politics. Intellectuals began 
to question the validity of the pan-Arab ideal. Although there 
has been an obvious tendency in the treatment of Arab nationalism 
to link it inextricably to the pan-Arab aspiration and to view 
it as "synonymous with a broad Arab unity, "1 the "failure to 
distinguish properly between such terms as "unity", "solidarity", 
and "pan-Arabism", meant that the pan-Arab ideal was proclaimed 
dead in the 1980s. 2 
The death verdict was bluntly phrased by F. Ajami in his 
' Henry Siegman, "Arab Unity and Disunity", The Middle East Journal, vol. 16 (Winter 1962) Number 1, p. 48 
2 Roger Owen, "Arab Nationalism, Unity and Solidarity", in Talal Asad and Roger Owen(eds), Sociology of Developing Societies: The Middle East, (New York; Monthly Review Press, 1983) p. 16 
2 
article the End of Pan-Arabism' which appeared in Foreign 
Affairs. He proclaimed the death of pan-Arabism and the victory 
of raison d'etat in Arab politics after the year 1967 which Ajami 
defines as having been the Waterloo of Arab nationalism. Since 
the publication of Ajami's article Western literature on Arab 
nationalism has been evolving on a continuum of arguments that 
essentially repeat Ajami's argument but without any obvious 
further conclusion. 
In Arab literature, however, the debate is far from closed 
on the issue and still open to new contributions. The 1980s are 
marked by a revived assessment of Arab nationalism. The debates 
mainly concentrated on the assessment of the Arab idea. There is 
what may be seen as a new breed of Arab nationalist thought in 
the writings on Arabism. The idea is no longer viewed in the 
theological tones that marked the writings of Arab nationalists 
like al-Husry and 'Aflaq. Intellectuals and social scientists are 
examining the Arabist idea not as an ideal but as useful if 
realistically approached. 
This research focuses on Arab nationalist thought in the 
1980s, a period which saw according to the advocates of the `End 
of Arabism' the striking evidence of the death of Arab 
nationalism. The research proposes to present and analyze Arab 
thought in the contributions of intellectuals in order to 
investigate the continuation of intellectual efforts by Arab 
nationalists to articulate the pan-Arab idea despite the death 
verdict. The analysis is to demonstrate the change in the nature 
of Arab thought as far as Arab nationalism and Arab unity are 
concerned as compared to the kind of thought that was considered 
3 
dead after 1967. 
1-1: Arab Nationalist Thought: The Need For Reassessment 
(i) Literature Review 
Roger Owen notes that academic writing about Arab 
nationalism and Arab unity "has been unusually unsatisfactory. " 
He argues that "little effort is made to understand their 
developments and to explain their role in Arab politics. 113 This 
is related to what Gale Stokes, writing about two decades ago, 
saw as the general undeveloped theory of nationalism. Stokes 
argues that despite the amount of writing on nationalism it is 
surprising how little is the size of literature that deals with 
it theoretically. Stokes confirms this general state of 
literature on the study of nationalism and remarks that 
"nationalism has never received the kind of intellectual 
treatment other ideological problems have enjoyed.,, ' 
During the last years there has been a fresh and an ongoing 
debate on nationalism. Scholars from all disciplines have 
embarked on investigating nationalism in a manner that shows how 
rapidly the field is growing. Attempts have been made by 
historians, political scientists, social psychologists, 
anthropologists, students of international relations, 
linguistics, philosophers and many others to provide theoretical 
answers to issues that nationalism and ethnicity involve. As John 
s Ibid. 
a Gale Stokes, "The Undeveloped Theory of Nationalism" World Politics, 
31; no. 1: (1978) p. 150. 
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Hutchinson and Anthony Smith observe there is a "remarkable 
growth of rich and penetrating works on every aspect of ethnicity 
and nationalism in all parts of the world. ,5 However, the remarks 
made by Stokes are certainly still evident as far as Arab 
nationalism is concerned. ' 
The previous lack of theorising on nationalism is attributed 
by P. Alter to the effects extreme nationalism in Europe, as were 
evident in the Second World War, had on the study of nationalism. 
Alter argues that because of the extremes of Nazism and Fascism 
nationalism was equated with "bellicose aggression, the unbridled 
urge for expansion, and racism. " Having experienced the 
wrongdoing of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy Europeans considered 
nationalism a morally reprehensible phenomenon. 7 
The development of Arab nationalism as an ideology coincided 
with the current of this intellectual and political trend in 
Europe. The European tendency affected the study of Arab 
nationalism. Eric Davis-Willard draws attention to the effects 
of this European attitude on the study of Arab nationalism. He 
comments that 
it is obvious that writings on Arab nationalism have been 
affected by the tendency to view ideology in terms of 
social pathologies. Arab ideologies are seen as irrational 
I John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith(eds), Nationalism, First Edition, 
(Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1994) p. v. 
6 The 1980s and the 1990s have witnessed the appearance of a huge body 
of literature on nationalism and national identity. This reflects the huge 
debate concerning these issues. It is evident that the resurgence of 
nationalist movement and national identity in many parts of the world and 
especially in the ex-Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has led to important 
debates on nationalism. See John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith (eds), 
Nationalism, op. cit., p. 3-13. 
P. Alter, Nationalism, First Edition, Translated By Stuart Mc Kinon- 
Evans (London; Edward Arnold, 1991) p. 27. 
5 
and distortive, having transformed Arab history into myth 
and having twisted the true meaning of Islamic doctrine. 
Davis further argues that Western writings on Arab nationalism 
are descriptive rather than theoretical. These writings are seen 
by Davis as expressing "oriental historiography which has 
stressed religio-legal and philological erudition. " Studying the 
approaches of two of the most prominent western scholars of Arab 
nationalism, E. Kedourie and S. Haim, Davis concludes that 
"Western writings have failed to link Arab nationalist thought 
to its larger social environment in any systematic fashion. je 
This reflects what Aziz Al-Azmeh describes as an old refrain 
in which Arab nationalism is seen as "an irrational an unnatural 
force, suggested by demagogues and tyrants to a credulous and 
primitive demos, which habitually explodes with a primordial 
energy and is invariably rebuffed by reality. " Azmeh argues that 
another refrain is 
struck, and has been constant in negative construals of 
Arab nationalism since the era of Jamal Abd al-Nasser, that 
the desire by Arab nationalists for states larger than 
those presently in existence is in turn somehow unnatural; 
it is an idle passion at best, a sordid excuse at worst. ' 
Azmeh further notes that "hardly a mention is made, more 
than inconsequentially and in passing, of the popularity of this 
desire. " " There seems to be no awareness of Arab social and 
cultural cohesion contained in Arabism. " Azmeh traces this 
attitude to western interests. He explains that "in the recent 
past, as well as during the Nasserite era requirements of the 
8 Eric Davis-Willard, "Theory and Method in the Study of Arab Nationalism", Review of Middle East Studies, 3: (1978) p. 26, p. 18. 
9 Aziz Al-Azmeh, "Nationalism and the Arabs", Arab Studies Quarterly, 
vol. 17; Numbers, 1,2, Winter-Spring (1995) pp. 3-5. 
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moment dictated the reduction of Arab nationalism to only one of 
its aspects, namely aspirations to unity. " Therefore Azmeh puts 
forward the view that "Arab nationalism has generally been 
portrayed, in the west, from the narrow perspective of politics 
of the moment. "10 
This nature of Western writing on Arab nationalism is seen 
by Maxime Rodinson as the composition of a paradigm of Western 
scholarship concerning the Middle East. Rodinson calls this 
paradigm "theologocentrism" that attributes all Muslim produced 
thought as texts of Islamic theology. A wave of writings 
expresses this attitude in which Arab thoughts and actions are 
perceived to be the result of Islamic theology. Accordingly 
nationalism is an alien ideology to the Arabs and it therefore 
can be only the result of borrowing from the West. 11 
E. Kedourie and S. Haim' s treatments of Arab nationalism are 
examples of the kind of treatment it received in Western 
writings. For the most part Arab nationalist ideology is 
presented as essentially lacking any ability to play the role 
nationalism had been able to play in European nationalism. Haim 
and Kedourie systematically "cast doubt upon, if not totally 
undermine, the notion that either religion, language or common 
culture and history serve to qualify Arab nationalism as a 
11 Ibid, pp. 3-5. 
11 Examples of this may be found in many works on Arab nationalism. In 
particular the Arabs are seen as intellectually confined to religious 
theology. see, Edward Rice, Captain Sir Richard Francis Burton, (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1990). David Pryce-Jones, The Closed Circle: An 
Interpretation of the Arabs, (New York; Harper & Row, 1989); Sandra Mackey, 
The Saudis, (Boston; Houghton Miffin Company, 1987); and Raphel Patai, The 
Arab Mind, (New York; Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973) 
7 
genuinely national doctrine. j12 
To move forward in evaluating Western writings on Arab 
nationalism it is clear that most studies, although narrow, 
approach it in a variety of ways. Some would treat it by focusing 
on some of its aspects such as pan-Arabism or its contradiction 
with Islam and therefore overlook the possibility of a larger 
overall context. Other studies impose a ready made preoccupation 
as when looking to the roots of Arab nationalism and its 
intellectual origins in European ideas or by emphasising the role 
of Christian missionaries and the role of Christian Arabs in its 
origin. 
Most studies begin with the assumption that Arab nationalist 
thought originated as a reaction to Turkish nationalism and in 
the Arab experience with European colonisation. This is very 
clear in the contributions of Haim and Kedourie as well as many 
others who were influenced by them. Some Arab writers have echoed 
the same convictions without any reliance on primary material. 
Other Arab studies are narrative in nature and in the nationalist 
tradition are occupied with whether the Arab nation is a 
historical nation that is much older than all European nations . 
13 
12 Eric Davis-Willard, "Theory and Method", op. cit., p. 19. 
13 Bassam Tibi, Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry, Second Edition, 
Translated by M. Farouk-Sluglett and P. Sluglett (London; Macmillan, 1990) p. 
8. Examples of Arab writings that echo the European writings are numerous. To 
name but a few, see, Tariq Ismael , 
The Arab Left: George Habbash and His 
Comrades, (New York; Syracus University Press, 1976), and Elie Chalala, "Arab 
Nationalism: A Bibliographical Essay", in Tawfiq Farah(ed), Pan-Arabism and 
Arab Nationalism: The Continuing Debate, (Boulder, London; Westview Press, 
1987); Hisham Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals and the West, (Baltimore; Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1970); Majid Khadduri, Political Trends in the Arab World: The 
Role of Ideas and Ideals, (London; John Hopkins University Press, 1970); Kemal 
H. Karpat(ed. ), Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East, 
(New York; Praeger Publishers, 1982) and Raif Khury, Modern Arab Thought: 
Channels of the French Revolution to the Arab Middle East, Translated from 
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This, explains Azmeh, is a basic strand of Arab nationalist 
discourse. "Like all nationalisms; it has generally asserted that 
Arabism transcends history and society, that it is a vital force 
on a par with other colossal forces of nature, that it is an 
eternal mission, ... " Criticising this trend and what 
he sees 
as that of the politics of the moment Azmeh concludes that 
both views sacrifice intellectual rigor: the perspective of 
eternity gives itself up to sentimentalism, the mainspring 
of the politics of identity, and the perspective of the 
moment is captive to immediate political lusts. Both regard 
nations and nationalism metaphysically: They are either 
accomplished and consummate, or they are chimerical. In 
either case, they are beyond history and beyond politics. l4 
Although much has been written about Arab nationalism the 
existing literature does little more than confirm the influence 
of Western political thought on Arab nationalism. " Khaled Moh'd 
al-Dmour while confirming that the literature attributes Arab 
nationalism to Western thought without specifying the nature of 
this influence argues that this is 
inadequate, both because it lacks information on the full 
nature of the influence of Western thought, and because 
Arab nationalist ideology, even though it was influenced by 
European thought, was in fact quite fundamentally different 
in important aspects from European theories of 
nationalism. 16 
Arabic by Ihsan Abbas, (Princeton N. J.; Kingston Press, 1983) 
la Aziz Azmeh, "Nationalism", op. cit., p. 5. 
15 Examples may be seen in the following, Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations& 
States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of 
Nationalism, (London; Methuen, 1977); Albert Hourani, al-Fikr al-'Arabiy fiy 
'Asr al-Nahaa: 1798-1939, Translated into Arabic bu Kariym 'Azquwl, Fourth 
Edition(Beirut, Dar al-Nahar lil Nashr, 1986); Leonard Binder, The Ideological 
Revolution in the Middle East, (New York; John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964); 
S. Haim, Arab Nationalism: An Anthology, (Berkeley-; University of California 
Press, 1964): Elie Kedourie, Arabic Political Memoirs, (London; Cass, 1974). 
16 Khaled Moh'd al-Dmour, "The Influence of The German Romantic Theory of 
Nationalism on the Ba'th Theory of Arab Nationalism", Unpublished PhD. 
Dissertation (South Illinois University at Carbondale, 1991) pp. 1-2, p. 20. 
9 
Focusing on the Arab nationalism of the Ba'th (rebirth) Party 
Dmour concludes that "while influenced by German romantic 
theories of nationalism" the Ba'th contribution to Arab 
nationalist ideology "was developed in the Arab milieu. 1117 
Dmour identifies the non-German components of the Ba'th 
theory of Arab nationalism as including the role it allocates to 
religion compared to that the German theory has. In the Ba'th 
theory "Islam was seen as one of the most important parts of the 
Arab culture. " This also applies to the relationship between 
socialism and nationalism. Dmour explains that in Arab 
nationalism there is to be found a "combination of nationalism 
and socialism in a single ideological system. 1118 Most studies, 
Arab or Western, emphasise the European effect. However some Arab 
writers deny this effect and claim originality for Arab 
nationalism in the historical development of the Arabs and in the 
social conditions of the Arabs in the nineteenth century. 
This leaves students of Arab nationalism in doubt, from 
which the existing literature offers no escape. However some 
studies take a more moderate stand on the issue. Anouar Abdel- 
Malik points out that Arab thought has its own content and themes 
that express two main tendencies. First there is the Islamic 
17 Ibid, p. 20. 
to Ibid, p. 20. The same stand is expressed by A. Duri, The Historical 
Formation of the Arab Nation, First Edition (London; Croom Helm, 1987): 'Abd 
al-Ilah Belqaziyz, Ishkaliyyat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya: Khitab al-Raahba wa 
Khitab al-Mumkin (The Problematique of Arab Unity: The Discourse of the Wish 
and the Discourse of the Possible) First Edition(Casablanca; Afriqiyya al- 
Sharq, 1991) Arabic Text(Present Author's Translation: Waliyd Qaziyha, "Fikrat 
al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya fiy Matla' al-Qarn al-'Ishriyyn" (the Idea of Arab Unity 
in the Beginning of the Twentieth Century), in S. Hammadiy etal, Dirasaat fiy 
al-Qawmiyya al-'Arabiyya wa al-Wahda, First Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat 
al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1980) Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) 
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tendency whose essence is a call for the revival of Islamic glory 
and a return to the pure faith in order to reconstruct the past 
glory. Second is the liberal modernist tendency. This tendency 
aims at founding a modern Arab society that resembles the West 
in many ways. Abdel-Malik concludes that arguing for the 
existence of any exclusive trend is not accurate particularly in 
that thinkers advocating a liberal modernist trend include a 
whole range of orientations, from conservative liberalism to 
Marxism. 19 
The Lebanese economist and historian George Corom 
acknowledges the view that Arab nationalism was affected by 
European thought with qualification. He argues that to say that 
Arab nationalism was the work of Christian Arabs and therefore 
must have been under the effect of Europe is to advance a view 
that echoes Eurocentrism. This is to portray Christian Arab 
intellectuals as having been the channel for European thought due 
to their minority situation. This, argues Corom, disconnects the 
writings of Christian Arabs from their social, political, 
economic, and historical contexts. This is because their 
writings, argues Corom, were in fact less Europeanised than the 
writings of many Muslims. There was no firm dividing line between 
Christian and Muslim Arab intellectuals as was evident in the 
thought of this elite as a whole. 20 
19 Anouar Abdel-Malik(ed), Contemporary Arab Political Thought, (London; 
Zed Books, 1980). Abdel-Malik views are well presented in his two-volume work 
entitled: Civilisations and Social Theory, First Edition(New York; State 
University of New York Press, 1981) 
20 George Corom, Uwrubba wa al-Mashriq al-'Arabiy min al- Balgana ila al- 
Labbnana: Tariykh Hadatha Ghyir Mun. iaza(Europe and the Arab East From 
Baiganisation to Lebanisation: A History of An Unaccomplished Modernity) First 
Edition(Bei rut, Dar al-Tali'a, 1990) Arabic Text (Present Author's 
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Apart from these studies which trace the roots of Arab 
nationalism and generally agree on treating it as essentially 
linked to Arab memories of a conceived glorious past, there is 
another aspect of the literature on Arab nationalism which 
started to appear when Nasserism and Ba'thism dominated Arab 
politics. In this direction some studies see Arab nationalism as 
arising during the process of modernisation in the Arab world. 
According to this approach Arab nationalism is an ideology that 
political regimes used to meet the needs introduced by the 
modernisation of the Arab world in the twentieth century. Arab 
nationalism was seen as a functional political tool needed to 
facilitate the transition from the undeveloped to the developed 
state of the Arabs. 
Echoing this approach Tawfiq Farah, for example, concludes 
that Arab nationalism meets the need of the modernisationists. 
As an ideology it can be a vital tool in bridging the gap between 
the secularity that modernisation dictates and the religious 
nature of Arab political identity. Therefore, Arab nationalism 
was an ideology that was the result of the secularisation of the 
elites in order to enable them to avoid being alienated from the 
masses whose identity is based in religion. Ideology in this 
sense helps the elites to "build bridges to the traditional and 
religious masses. "" 
As Islam is commonly viewed by the functionalists as 
hindering modernisation their views on nationalism are compatible 
with this orientation. Hence Richard Pfaff considers that 
Translation) pp. 174-176. 
21 Tawfiq Farah (ed), Pan-Arabism, op. cit., p. xii. 
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nationalism plays the role which Islam is inherently unable to 
play. Echoing this common theme in modernisation studies of Arab 
nationalism Pfaff writes that nationalism plays the role of a 
secular religious structure put side by side with Islam. 
He writes: 
as the Arab moves away from Islamic traditionalism, he 
finds moral guidance in the political religion of Arab 
nationalism ... However, as each particular 
Arab polity 
gains an historical depth of its own, as each develops its 
own peculiar social, economic and political institutions 
... the significance of 
Arab nationalism will surely wane 
... the evolution 
from Islamic community to nation-state 
will have been completed with Arab nationalism handmaiden 
to the process . 
22 
The debate on the death of pan-Arabism referred to earlier 
is within this modernisation analysis. According to this approach 
Arab states had no option but to rely on Arab nationalist 
ideology in their drive for modernisation. But that applies only 
to the early days of the modernisation process when these states 
lacked the sufficient legitimacy needed to implement the 
transition from undeveloped to developed or modern. At that stage 
of modernisation Arab nationalist ideology was an adequate and 
indispensable doctrine that had to be adhered to rigorously. As 
these states consolidated their legitimacy and gained historical 
depth of their own the need to employ the nationalist doctrine 
was greatly reduced. 
As F. Ajami argues, once the state achieved modernization 
22 Richard Pfaff, "The Function of Arab Nationalism", Comparative 
Politics, vol. 2, Number 2, (January 1970) p. 167. Other works adopting the 
modernisation/functional approach and explanation of Arab nationalism include: 
M. Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa, 
(Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1963); M. Hudson. Arab Politics: The 
Search For Legitimacy, (New Haven and London; Yale University Press, 1977); 
and Bruce Borthwick, Comparative Politics of the Middle East: An Introduction, 
(Englewood, N. J.: Printice-Hall, 1980) 
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the ideology of nationalism was replaced by pragmatic issues. 
Although many scholars, like Ajami, accept this view and notice 
the flourishing of Islamic fundamentalism in the 1970s and 
afterwards, they offer no explanation beyond their conclusion 
that state and society have become modern by the help of Arab 
nationalist ideology. The modernists are unable to provide an 
explanation of the persistence of either traditional Islamic 
fundamentalist ideology or Arab nationalist ideology "except as 
something deviant. "" 
This approach received wide criticism as to its evolutionary 
notions in viewing nationalism. 24 The central point of the 
critics has been that modernisation theory's view of nationalism 
is "at best, questionable when applied to the Arab World. If2s As 
Pritchett put it, the functional approach "argues for a 
legitimizing and transitional role for the idea and ends in a 
debate about whether the idea of Arab nationalism has died. "26 
Considered inextricably linked to pan-Arab aspirations Arab 
nationalism is viewed as an idealist model which founds its call 
for an all Arab nation-state on Arab-Islamic history. However 
23 Diane Tuller Pritchett, "The Language of Arab Nationalism and Arab 
Foreign Policy: The Relations of Egypt, Libya and Syria, 1969-1981", 
Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, (Boston University, 1992) p. 54. 
24 For a review of the criticisms, see, A. Smith, Theories of 
Nationalism, (London; Gerald Duckworth & Company Limited, 1971) pp. 45-57 and 
Diane Tuller Pritchett, "The Language of Arab Nationalism", op. cit., pp. 50- 
55. However when it comes to Arab Nationalism Pfaff argues that it is only 
"both a valuable and necessary referent for the emerging "New Man" of the Arab 
world". This is because, he expl ai nes the "quest of the Arab national movement 
for a community with a political dimension is a false quest. " Richard Pfaff, 
"The Function of", op. cit., pp. 158-159. 
25 D. T. Pritchett, "The Language of Arab Nationalism", op. cit., p. 54 
26 Ibid, p. 58. 
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this history is thought to argue against the existence of any one 
Arab state at any time. Moreover, Arab nationalism's concept of 
an Arab identity is thought to contradict the mosaic nature of 
Arab society. The contradiction is brought forward since there 
has never been "a society like Arab society ... so divided, 
fragmented, and polarized in reality. , 27 Arab identity is a myth 
that is seen as inconsistent with the aim of realising yet 
another myth, Arab unity. Hence Western studies have tended to 
use the term `the Arab World' or further still `the Middle East' 
in order to indicate the heterogenous nature of the region . 
2' The 
failure of Arab nationalism is linked to this mosaic nature of 
Arab society which makes the Arabs unable to "respond to the 
27 Shlomo Avineri, "Beyond Sadam: the Arab Trauma", Dissent, 38, no. 1, 
(Spring 1991) pp. 150-151. 
28 Arab nationalists use the term "the Arab homeland". They argue that 
this term indicates the unity of the Arabs in contrast to the term "the Arab 
world" which emphasises its being a world and therefore implying heterogeneous 
nature and multi-ethnicity. There is in Western literature a persistent use 
of the term the "Middle East". This term is linked to the development of 
strategic thought and it was first introduced and used by the American naval 
captain Alfred Mahan. Arab nationalists and indeed many Arab social scientists 
object to this term since it relates to the conception that the area is a 
mosaic of peoples and cultural and national communities. They consider it as 
not denoting a name that meets the particularism and nature of the Arab 
region. In Western studies the Middle East appears as an area of a multitude 
of nationalities, ethnic groups, religions, languages, and peoples and 
nations. Therefore this term ignores the unity of the Arab people and includes 
in the definition non-Arab states like Turkey, Iran, and Israel and excludes 
Arab countries like Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and sometimes Libya 
and Sudan. 
Arab writers attribute this attitude in Western and Israeli studies to 
their rejection of Arab nationalism and the call for Arab unity. Ali E. Hillal 
Dessouki and Jamiyl Mattar, al-Nizaam al-Iglivmiy al-'Arabiy: Dirasa fiy al- 
' Al agaat al -Si vvasi vva al -' Arabi ya (The Arab Regional System: A Study in Arab Political Relations) Fifth Edition(Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al- 
'Arabiyya, 1986) Arabic Text (Present Authors Translation) pp. 29-35, and A. 
Bazzaz, "al-Istiqlaal al-Fikriy lil Ummam"(The Intellectual Independence of 
Nations) Al-'Arabiv, vol . 
44 (July 1962) Reprinted in Muhammad Al-Rumiyhiy(ed), 
Araa wa Dirasaat fly al-Fikr al-Qawmiy al-'Arabiv (Views and Studies in Arab 
Nationalist Thought) (Kuwait; Al-'Arabiy, 1985) Arabic Text (Present Author's 
Translation) pp. 12-15. 
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modern idea of nationalism. j29 
Studies began to concentrate on the mosaic portrait of Arab 
society and highlight the issue of minorities. Considerable 
attention was paid to the conflict between political Islam and 
the conceived contradiction between Islamic doctrine and Arab 
nationalist ideology and indeed nationalism as a whole. In this 
respect, the state of Arab political disunity was used to 
discredit and pronounce dead Arab nationalism. It is presented 
as entirely linked to personalities whose death meant the 
subsequent death of their ideas or the ideology they might have 
employed. 
Discrediting any rationale that may be latent in the idea 
of Arab unity, studies tended to emphasise the supposition that 
nationalism should lead to political unity if ever it was to 
deserve its definition. This is again an indication of the 
tendency to view nationalist movements and indeed Arab 
nationalism in terms of the European model. The only viable 
alternative to Arab nationalism is seen in state nationalism. 
Particularistic nationalism, it is argued, is the true reflection 
of the Western bringing of the winds of nationalism into the 
region. If Arab nationalism is ever to play a role other than 
modernisation a frequent implication is that it is reduced to a 
response to Zionism. 30 Arab nationalism is sometimes reduced to 
being a force for hardening Arab solidarity on the Palestinian 
29 As'ad Abukhalil, "A New Arab Ideology: The Rejuvenation of Arab Nationalism' ', The Middle East Journal 
, vol . 
46, no. 1, Winter (1992) pp. 22-36. 
30 This is for example the view of the Israeli Scholar Yehoshua Porath in his book, In Search For Arab Unity: 1930-1945, (London; Frank Cass, 1986) 
Porath goes further than that in explaining the thoughts of Arab nationalists 
and their actions by the reference to the Palestinian issue. 
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issue even though the history of Arab nationalism is much older 
than the Palestinian issue. 31 
These approaches basically concentrate on the failure of the 
Arabs to achieve political unity and, therefore, fail to 
understand the fundamentals of Arab nationalism. The approaches 
most common in Western, Israeli, and some Arab literature treat 
Arab nationalism and condemn it by using the European nationalist 
experience as a methodological yard stick. This assigns primacy 
to the European model and considers it a global ideal type of 
nationalism that ought to be applied anywhere despite the 
differences in circumstances. Accordingly "Arab nationalism is 
found to be lacking in its ability to play a progressive role in 
the social and political development of the Arab World. 1132 
Since the end of the 1970s which witnessed the obvious Arab 
political disunity there has not been in the West a noticeable 
interest in the study of Arab nationalism and Arab nationalist 
thought. This may be attributed to the prevalence of the (end of 
ideology) thesis which again shows the dominance of Western 
oriented perceptions and methodologies in the treatment of all 
aspects of Arab nationalism. All in all Arab nationalism was 
declared dead as an idea and a political movement. It is clear 
that Arab nationalism is presented as a romantic ideology 
essentially linked to the memories of a conceived glorious Arab 
past that is questionable. If this expresses the idealist 
approach to Arab nationalism, at the functional level it is 
31 P. Alter, Nationalism, op. cit., considers Arab nationalism in this 
view. He even considers pan-Arabism as suffering "the stigma of being only a 
veil for hegemonic ambitions. ", p. 152. 
32 Erick Davis-Willard, "Theory and Practice", op. cit., p. 18. 
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considered to have died since it fulfilled its role as a 
modernising ideology. 
(ii) Hypothesis and Aims of the Study 
This study assumes that to make such conclusions is to 
overlook the fact that Arab nationalist thought and Arab 
nationalism are being reconstructed and rejuvenated to 
accommodate the developments in Arab society and politics since 
1967. The debates which Arab thought experienced in the 1980s 
provide evidence that such development was taking place. Hence 
this study focuses on the contributions of Arab intellectuals and 
social scientists in the 1980s which as will be demonstrated 
establish this premise of development in Arab nationalist 
thought. 
The importance of the study and analysis of Arab. thought on 
Arab nationalism and Arab unity in the 1980s can be explained in 
the light of the "End of pan-Arabism" thesis. Whereas this thesis 
affirms that by the 1970s Arab nationalism was dead, this 
research, in contrast, seeks to show that even though Arab 
nationalism lost its hegemony over Arab politics, Arab thought 
produced an entirely fresh contribution to the ideas of Arab 
nationalism and Arab unity that defy the death verdict. The 
contributions are vitally significant and peculiar since they 
were produced right after the very same period portrayed to have 
witnessed the death of Arab nationalism. 
Furthermore, these contributions, which are the subject of 
this research, involve a fundamentally significant intellectual 
meaning and content. They were made by Arab intellectuals, a 
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large number of whom remain devoted Arab nationalists, amidst a 
hostile and challenging environment wherein issues were 
determined by anti-Arab nationalist trends and policies. They 
testify to the desire and ability of Arab nationalist thought and 
Arab thought in general to produce its own models and affirm its 
distinctiveness. For Arab nationalists who participated in these 
debates the argument is that Arab nationalist thought is as able 
as ever to struggle for its existence. They are eager to 
establish that it represents a viable alternative in its Arab 
context particularly after the rise of political Islam. 
The research also brings into the discussion an entirely new 
dimension of Arab thought and its nationalist variant. Whereas 
Arab nationalist thought before the 1980s was the domain of Arab 
easterners, Mashriqi Arabs, the period of investigation bore the 
evolution and development of a major Maghribi (Arab west) 
contribution to issues of Arab nationalism and Arab unity. 
Although previous studies of Arab nationalism focused on the 
Mashriqi mainstream Arab nationalist thought due to its 
ideological, political and epistemological hegemony, the Maghribi 
trend has not been researched. Consequently Arab nationalist 
ideology was depicted as romantic and the idea of Arab unity 
mythical. This view of Arab nationalism may be apprehended since 
it is based on Arab nationalist thought up to 1967. But to accept 
the conclusions put forward on these bases would amount to 
accepting the premise that ideologies and thoughts are frozen at 
certain points of time and do not allow for the logic of 
evolution. 
This study attempts to qualify other previous studies of a 
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judgemental nature and may play a role in qualifying the death 
verdict issued upon Arab nationalism. This is to be attempted by 
presenting and analysing new contributions and their ideational 
system. Therefore the study will focus on the debates as far as 
issues like the Arab nation, Arab unity, Arab state, democracy, 
and minorities are concerned. The question as constructed here 
has not been subject to any previous major investigation. This 
work is, based on a discussion of the subject from an Arab 
perspective. The principal rationale underlying this research 
lies in its effort to portray and analyze the un-researched Arab 
thought of the 1980s regarding Arab nationalism and Arab unity. 
Particular emphasis is put on the contributions of social 
scientists and the contributions of Maghribi intellectuals that 
broke the hegemony of Mashriqi Arab intellectuals well researched 
before the 1980s. The basic premise that justifies the choice of 
the contributions analyzed is that they are unknown in languages 
other than Arabic. They are fundamentally different from what is 
known in the West about Arab nationalism. Therefore, the death 
verdict cannot indiscriminately be applied to them. 
1-2: Significance of the Study 
The question of establishing its history and content, and 
whether Arab nationalism died both as an ideology and political 
force, remains one of the very contested issues among students 
of Arab politics. This study presents and analyzes contributions 
that have poured into the tide of Arab nationalist thought. The 
concentration on utilizing concepts that prevailed in Arab 
debates in the 1980s is a major departure from the existing 
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literature on Arab nationalism. 
The 1980s as a period of investigation is significant in 
many ways. Though the period witnessed the victory of, as F. 
Ajami maintained, raison d'etat, it also witnessed the current 
of doubt in Arab thought and politics. Attempts were made, 
intellectually and politically, to redirect Arab nationalism and 
consolidate particularism or regionalism. The 1980s also saw the 
establishment of many political unions among a number of Arab 
states, as well as the foundation of three Arab regional 
cooperation entities, the Gulf Cooperation Council, The Arab 
Maghrib Union, and the short lived Arab Cooperation Council. The 
oil power of the Arabs decreased or vanished amidst a process of 
reconstructing the Arab regional system. 
On the intellectual and ideological level the 1980s were 
marked by a growing participation of Arab social scientists and 
the demise of the role played by ideologues in determining the 
direction and the content of the debates Arab thought was 
undergoing. Particular emphasis in these debates is given to the 
evolution of a new breed of Arab nationalist and unitary thought 
which could be identified as realistic compared with the 
romanticism of Arab nationalism which earlier may have justified 
the death prognosis. 
The contributions which the study presents are essentially 
unknown in the West despite the fact that they represent new 
thinking of Arab intellectuals about such issues as the Arab 
nation and Arab nationalism. This would help in understanding 
developments in Arab thought and therefore avoid the trap of the 
`End of Arabism' thesis and the responses it triggered. The study 
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discusses the contributions of the 1980s in order to understand 
how they deal with the issue of the relationship between pan- 
Arabism and the Arab nation on the one hand, and particularistic 
identities and states on the other. 
Of further importance are the contributions these debates 
make regarding questions like minorities and democracy. These 
debates are analyzed to determine whether a rejuvenation of Arab 
nationalism is taking place and whether Arab thought on Arab 
nationalism and Arab unity is undergoing a dialectic between its 
old and the newly emerging paradigms. The research aims to 
establish whether these contributions deserve to be considered 
in terms other than those argued by the advocates of the death 
of Arabism. 
1-3: Methodoloav 
The research is basically carried out through a qualitative 
approach to Arab thought on Arab nationalism and Arab unity in 
the 1980s. Contributions are assessed, critically analyzed and 
compared as to what they argue for regarding the issues of this 
investigation. Although attention is paid to writings by Arabs 
living abroad prominence is assigned to those in Arabic and 
written by intellectuals in Lebanon, Egypt and Morocco. These 
countries have been chosen for ease of academic access, because 
of their Mediterranean locations and histories of Western 
influence and because of their geographical locations in the main 
sub-regions of the Arab world. 33 
33 Although the intention was to conduct field work in those three 
countries the author was not able to visit Lebanon. Therefore all field work 
was restricted to Egypt and Morocco. 
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In addition, Egypt during a considerable time of its 
contemporary history approached the idea of Arabism as part of 
state policy. Indeed Arab nationalist ideology owed much of its 
content and political movement to Nasserism. Lebanon's scholarly 
affiliation with the idea, amidst political fragmentation, 
provides another level of comparison. Egypt and Lebanon have 
known their own brands of particularistic nationalism. Whereas 
in Egypt Arabism gained the upper hand during the Nasserite era, 
in Lebanon competition and contradiction have marked the debate 
between Arabism and Lebanism politically and intellectually. In 
this context, Lebanon still experiences the continuation of this 
phenomenon as a feature of Lebanese politics. 
Egypt after the mid 1970s witnessed the reemergence of 
Egyptian nationalism in a way which the Sadaat regime sought to 
utilize in an attempt to upset all Arabist forces which opposed 
his peace accords with Israel. As a matter of fact the policies 
of SadaatIs Egypt were at the core of the split in the Arab World 
and therefore were used to help prove the arguments behind the 
`End of Arabism' thesis. Morocco has not been associated with 
Arab nationalism on the political level. However studies would 
stress that in Morocco and indeed in the Maghrib context Arabism 
is inseparable from Islam and this was particularly true during 
the struggle against European domination. 
Nevertheless, in Morocco today particularistic nationalism 
is coupled with Islamic overtones. This makes an examination of 
contributions from Morocco carry a significant weight. 
Furthermore, the 1980s witnessed a clear interest of Moroccan 
intellectuals in issues related to Arab nationalism and Arab 
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unity. The contributions of Moroccan intellectuals are distinct 
in many aspects. They reflect the effect of borrowing from 
European thought concepts and methodologies that are used to 
provide a new reading of Arab history, culture and reality. The 
fact that Moroccan intellectuals are more open to European 
contemporary debates gives their contributions the ability to 
utilise these in discussing Arab issues in light of developments 
in philosophical and social science more than do their Arab east 
counterparts. 
The field work is based on interviews and intensive research 
in prominent libraries in Cairo and Rabat. The important task of 
the field trips was to conduct interviews with a number of 
intellectuals and academics in the two field work locations. Each 
chapter provides a summary of approaches in Western literature, 
proceeds to a general disquisition of Arab approaches, and then 
concentrates on the debate within the three countries. 
1-4: Organisation of the Study 
In Chapter Two, `The Evolution of Arab Nationalism', the 
focus is on analysing the intellectual history of Arab 
nationalism. The chapter analyses and explains the historical 
context of the evolution of Arab nationalism. The different 
factors that may have led to the evolution of Arab nationalism 
are evaluated while discussing the environment in which the idea 
was born. As an intellectual history it examines how Arab 
nationalist ideology developed and how the thoughts of one 
generation or author influenced another. The chapter reviews the 
referents and intellectual antecedents of Arab nationalist 
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ideology as well as the ideas that competed with it. 
The focus of identity of early Arab nationalism is also 
discussed to determine whether it was Islamic or secular, 
particularistic or regional, or pan-Arab. The chapter also 
provides a general portrait of the developments of key concepts 
of the ideology itself. Of interest are issues like the changing 
conceptual boundaries and political implications of the nation 
itself. This is done by drawing on the writings of its leading 
articulators. This, however, is undertaken without isolating the 
intellectual content of the ideology from the activity and 
movement associated with it. 
Therefore attention is given to the relationship between the 
ideology of Arab nationalism and the political movements of the 
Ba'th Party, Nasserism, and the Arab Nationalists Movement as 
well as the experiments towards Arab political unification. The 
chapter concludes with remarks that relate to the debates that 
followed the 1967 Arab defeat in the war with Israel and up to 
the 1980s when the pan-Arab ideal was considered dead. 
Chapter Three, `Arab Nationalism and the Idea of a United 
Arab Nation', is an evaluation of the concept of a united Arab 
nation with its single nation-state, which is very central in 
Arab nationalism. This is done in the form of a critical study 
of Arab nationalism and its specific component of pan-Arabism 
i. e. the concept of building a single nation-state that includes 
all Arabs under its banner. 
The discussion explores, defines, and analyzes the 
ideological premises of Arab nationalism as expressed in concepts 
of the Arab nation, Arab identity, and Arab unity. These premises 
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were the result of the period between the end of the Second World 
War and the defeat of 1967. Therefore, they expressed Arab 
nationalism in its greatest moments of political power and 
intellectual fertility. Attention is also given to analysing the 
arguments behind particularistic identities and minorities and 
examining Arab nationalist thought's response to the challenge 
these posed. 
The concentration is on the debates that Arab thought had 
regarding the issues and presents material that is essentially 
in Arabic that hitherto had not been known in other languages. 
The evaluation of these contributions and the ideological 
premises of Arab nationalist ideology presented in chapter two 
is very important in pinpointing the major issues that compose 
the content of the debates till the 1980s. The discussion then 
focuses on providing a critique of these premises as presented. 
The criticisms traditional Arab nationalist thought received are 
distinct in at least two features. First they deal with Arab 
nationalism in a manner that is entirely different from the 
eulogists' point of view. The Arab intellectuals who made these 
criticisms are attempting the reconstruction of Arab nationalist 
thought. Second, these criticisms are an evidence of the 
emergence of a new trend of Arab thought and indeed Arab 
nationalist thought. 
The critique is based on the premise that traditional Arab 
nationalist thought suffers from ideological, conceptual and 
epistemological deficiencies. The critique concentrates on the 
theoretical loopholes of Arab nationalism, in its traditional 
paradigm, as far as issues of identity, culture and state are 
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concerned. The discussion aims at establishing that the 
traditional premises are being questioned to a greater rather 
than lesser degree. They are no longer universally accepted at 
their face value. 
The issues dominating these critiques will be utilised as 
methodological concepts and background for analysing the 
significance of the contributions of the 1980s. The critique is 
employed to make a comparison between the traditional ideas and 
how they were viewed in the 1980s. This provides a background to 
the analysis in chapter four which concerns itself with 
determining the nature of the new paradigm and the content of the 
dialectical relationship it has with the old one. 
Chapter Four, `Arab Nationalist Thought in the 1980s: The 
Dialectic of Old and New Paradigms', presents and analyses the 
contributions of a number of Arab intellectuals in Egypt, Lebanon 
and Morocco. Concepts of the Arab nation, Islam, secularism, 
minorities, and democracy are evaluated. The aim is to establish 
the existence of new approaches to these issues offering a new 
conceptualisation that corresponds to the realities of Arab 
society, history, and the need to view Arab nationalism on a 
realistic basis. 
While the discussion starts with outlining the main theses 
of the old paradigm, it is essentially a comparison between these 
and the new contributions. The discussion seeks to establish that 
Arab nationalist thought in the 1980s was undergoing a process 
of renewal and restructuring. The major task is to establish the 
main features of the new paradigm and trace any residue of the 
old one 
27 
Chapter Five, `Arab Nationalism and the Arab State System', 
takes further the discussion of the dialectical relationship 
between the old and the emerging paradigm. It deals with the 
question of the particularistic territorial Arab state as debated 
in the contributions of Arab thought in the 1980s. Traditional 
Arab nationalist views towards the state system since it emerged 
are discussed. The discussion evaluates the effects the 
consolidation of the Arab state system has had on the development 
of new approaches within Arab nationalist thought towards the 
relationship between the aim of Arab unity and political 
fragmentation. 
The analysis traces the change of attitudes Arab nationalist 
thought has had towards the state in general and the Arab state 
system in particular. The bulk of the discussion is devoted to 
analysing contributions of Arab intellectuals in the 1980s. The 
aim is to establish whether a new approach is clearly evident in 
the contributions discussed that may justify the claim that they 
represent a markedly new paradigm that is more realistic than the 
traditional one. 
In Chapter Six, `Arab Nationalist Thought: The Premises of 
the New Paradigm', the analysis starts by outlining the 
developments the Arab world witnessed in the 1980s. These are 
seen as the underlying factors behind the emergence of the new 
paradigm. The effects these developments had on the intellectuals 
whose contributions are the subject of this study are evaluated. 
This is accomplished through an analysis of the contributions of 
Arab intellectuals towards the issues of Arab nationalism, 
Arabism, Islam, secularism, minorities and democracy. 
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The essential and fundamental premises of the new paradigm 
are underlined. By analysing the premises of the new paradigm the 
chapter concentrates on establishing that in the 1980s Arab 
thought had a new understanding of issues of Arab nationalism and 
Arab unity. The Chapter draws on the discussion and the analysis 
provided in the five chapters. It outlines the findings of the 
research and address itself to establishing the nature of Arab 
nationalist thought in the 1980s in comparison to traditional 
Arab nationalist thought. 
The Conclusion is a summary of the findings of the research. 
It sets out the main features that support the main argument 
behind the hypothesis of the study. The conclusion also employs 
the arguments outlined in the body of the previous chapters to 
suggest further areas of research. 
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Chapter Two 
The Evolution of Arab Nationalism 
To understand and grasp the roots of Arab nationalist 
thought and the movement related to Arab nationalism, there is 
a need to go into its history. This is necessary to provide a 
background to evaluating the circumstances that witnessed the 
birth of Arab nationalism. In addition an historical review of 
the sort proposed here would serve the purpose of understanding 
the debates concerning the issue of the research. 
As scholars do not agree on a determined history of the 
evolution of Arab nationalist thought and Arab nationalism, the 
aim here is to deal with the issue by tracing the content of Arab 
nationalism of modern Arabs who differ from their ancestors in 
their nationalist ideology. Attention is then given to the 
evolution of Arab nationalist thought and its variety of 
manifestations up to the point where an Arab nationalist ideology 
is manifest. ' 
2-1: The Arabs and the Ottoman Empire 
The Arabs came under Ottoman rule in the sixteenth century 
(1516-1556) when the Turks spread their control over the lands 
of the Fertile Crescent, Egypt and later on North Africa. The 
Islamic concept of nation, bound by religion (umma) was prevalent 
at that time and this played a vital role in the success of the 
1 For an assessment of these debates see Mahmoud Haddad, "The Rise of 
Arab Nationalism Reconsidered" International Journal of Middle East Studies, 
12(1994) pp. 202-216. 
30 
Turks in uniting Muslim peoples under their banner. The Arabs and 
indeed other Muslims accepted Ottoman rule as that of fellow 
Muslims. The Arabs accepted the domination of the Ottoman Empire 
since it came after a long period of fragmentation and with the 
hope that it would serve the interests of Islam. 
The Ottomans in their early days were very efficient rulers 
and they maintained for the Empire a favourable international 
position. The Empire was, in the eyes of its subjects, an Islamic 
one that checked the greed of Christian Europe and a state in 
which, theoretically at least, all Muslims were equal subjects. 
The concept of nation enhanced its Islamic substance that does 
not imply ethnic or linguistic nationalism. Other concepts like, 
homeland and Arab were limited to their narrow meanings. The word 
'Arab' was used to differentiate between the Turks and Arabs but 
not in any nationalistic sense. ' 
However, Ottoman rule deteriorated as the later sultans were 
involved in corruption and the government became centralized and 
runing counter to public interests. ' Foreign interests and 
influence were felt at all levels with the introduction of 
foreign concessions and intrusion in the affairs of the Empire. 
On the other hand, while the Ottomans presented their government 
in an Islamic fashion, there was an ever growing realisation on 
2 Aniys Saiygh, Tatuwr al-Mafhum al -Qawmiy 'ind al-'Arab (The Development 
of Arab Nationalist Concept), (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a, 1961) Arabic Text 
(Present Author's Translation) p. 45. 
3 From the end of the seventeenth century the Ottoman Empire began a 
process of weakness: pressures from European powers, esp. the Austrian and 
Russian empires, coupled with rising nationalism in the Balkans escalated its 
decline. Hans Kohn, "Nationalism and Imperialism", in Ruth Nanda Ashnen(ed), 
Mid-East: World-Centre: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, (New York: Harper& 
Brothers Publishers, 1956) p. 286. 
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the part of many peoples, and indeed the Arabs, that this was 
only superficial. 
The Ottoman rule was marked by an attempt to seal off their 
subjects from any ideas that would jeopardise their hegemony. 
This was strongly the case as far as the Arab provinces were 
concerned. Not only did the Ottomans deprive the Arabs of their 
place as the guardians of Islam, but they also stripped them of 
any right to govern themselves. Arabic, which however remained 
the language of theology, lost its prominence and the Arabs 
became second class subjects in their own land. ' 
(i) The Encounter with the West: 
Despite the fact that the Ottoman Empire was heavily 
involved in contacts with Europe, it kept its Arab provinces at 
arms length from what was taking place outside its boundaries. 
Hence, there was no realisation on the part of the Arabs of how 
far behind they were from other civilisations. They maintained 
their traditional view that the world of Islam was the most 
glorious of all worlds. 
However, the close of the eighteenth century brought about 
dramatic developments that paved the way for the realisation that 
the world of Islam was highly stagnant. The extent to which this 
was primarily a result of direct contact with the West is an 
issue of controversy among investigators of the subject. Some 
would maintain that this realisation preceded the Napoleonic 
invasion of Egypt(1798)and was a result of the literary Arab 
renaissance, "nahda", of the nineteenth century and the works of 
4 Aniys Saiygh, Tatuwr al-Mafhum, op. cit., pp. 48-54. 
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Christian missionaries and their schools in the Arab East from 
1748. 
However a close examination of the effects of the Napoleonic 
invasion and subsequent occupation of Egypt would place the 
argument in favour of those who give it prominence. The French 
invasion of Egypt ignited the process of direct cultural contact 
between the Arabs and Europe in modern times. It also opened the 
gates for European intervention in the Arab world and brought the 
interests of other European major powers to the politics of the 
region. -' This played a significant role in bringing to the minds 
of the Arabs the shock of how wide was the gap that existed 
between them and Europe. The Napoleonic invasion of Egypt led the 
Arabs to discover the painful truth of how distorted their world, 
when compared to the real world, was. 6 
The impact of this experience was vital in the emergence of 
the West as the greatest challenge ever faced by Muslim society 
which had only a traditional religious structure to employ in the 
encounter. Not only was the challenge a technological one but it 
also included very strong intellectual and political elements and 
implications. These intellectual and political components had 
several consequences and impacts on the traditional way of life 
of the Arabs. ' 
The interaction of these elements and the reaction they 
I K. S. Al-Husry, Origins of Modern Arab Political Thought, (New York; 
Caravan Books, 1980) p. 3, p. 6. 
6 F. Ajami, The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967, (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1992) p. 56. 
7Shlomo Avineri, "Arab Nationalism", in Eugene Kamenka(ed), Nationalism: 
The Nature and Evolution of an Idea, (London; Edward Arnold, 1976) pp. 101- 122. 
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provoked, in the desire of the Arabs to catch up with Europe, was 
the corner stone and the basis for Arab political thinking in the 
nineteenth century. ' The manifestation of this desire was the 
flourishing of the writings of some intellectuals. They sought 
to defend and revitalize Islam to enable it to resist the 
inroads of the infidels i. e. Christian Europe. Intellectuals 
tried to find an answer to the very question of why Europe 
progressed and Muslims stagnated, and what were the appropriate 
measures to overcome the gap. They tried to find a combination 
between Islam and what they considered acceptable of modernity. ' 
(ii) The Birth of Arab Nationalist Thought 
Recapitulating on what is said earlier, it is possible to 
see the origins of Arab nationalist thought in the crisis that 
Islam faced in the nineteenth century. Islam encountered a 
Western assault in the form of a military attack as well as a 
criticism of its value system. The response was a sincere attempt 
to defend the faith and salvage it. 10 This gave birth to a 
political, social and intellectual movement in the Arab world. " 
But to attribute the birth of Arab nationalist thought solely to 
the effects of contacts with Europe would overemphasize these 
s K. Al-Husry, Origins of Modern Arab, op. cit., p. 3. 
F. Ajami, The Arab Predicament, op. cit., pp. 54-55. 
10 S. Haim(ed), Arab Nationalism: An Anthology, (Berkely; University of 
California Press. 1964) p. 6. 
11 Majiyd Khaduwriy, al-Iti. iahaat al-Sivvasivva fly al-'Alam al-'Arabiy: 
Duwr al-Afkaar wa al-Muthul al-'Ulivva fly al-Sivvasa (Political Trends in the 
Arab World: The Role of Ideas and Ideals in Politics) (Beirut; al-Dar al- 
Mutahida lil Nashr, 1985) Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) pp. 19- 20. 
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effects and underestimate the active role of indigenous factors. 
This refers to the developments that took place in the 
region long before contacts with Europe. The region witnessed an 
Islamic revival that began with movements like the `Wahhabiy' 
reform movement. 12 The reforms of M. All (1805-1848) in Egypt had 
considerable effects on the region. 13 These movements do not, 
according to S. Haim, stand the test of nationalism. Haim 
classifies the Wahhabiy movement as a religious puritanist 
movement whereas she considers M. Ali's attempts at creating an 
Arab empire as an expression of the ambitions of an 
opportunist. 14 Nevertheless, they were in fact independent 
movements that sought the liberation of some Arab provinces from 
the Ottomans. 
Hourani provides an explanation that would classify these 
movements as an expression of Arab feeling but not of Arab 
12 The Wahhabiy movement was the work of Muhammad Ibn 'Abdulwahhab (1703- 
1791)in the Arabian Peninsula to revive Islam. It stressed the vitality of 
going back to the early Islam of the Prophet and his first successors. Though 
this movement had no Arab nationalist ideology it was a rejection of Ottoman 
rule. It was a revolution led by Arabs to deny the Ottomans what it considered 
as Arab natural rights. Also by stressing the old ways of Islam it lent itself 
an Arab character. 
It is important to note that the Wahhabiy movement and its call for 
religious revival had the effect of instigating similar movements; of these 
mention can be made of: 
* The movement of M. Shukaniy in Yemen (1756-1834) 
* The movement of M. AL-Alusiy in Iraq(1802-1854) 
* The movement of M. AL-Sanusiy in Libya (1785-1859). 
Anuwar al-Jundiy, al-Fikr al-'Arabiy al-Mu'asir fiy Ma'rakat al-Taghrivb wa 
al-Taba'ivva al-Thagafivva (Contemporary Arab Thought in the Battle of 
Westernisation and Cultural Dependency), First Edition(Cairo; Maktabat al- 
Angluw al-Masriyya, n. d. ) Arabic Text (Present Authors Translation) pp. 29- 
33. 
13 M. All engineered the modernisation of Egypt and attempted to widen 
his domain at the cost of the Ottomans. He invaded Asia Minor in 1840 but was 
defeated at the hands of European powers. Alan Palmer, The Decline and Fall 
of the Ottoman Empire, (London; John Murry, 1992) pp. 61-62, pp. 107-109. 
14 S. Haim (ed), Arab Nationalism, op. cit., pp. 3-4. 
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nationalism. According to Hourani's analysis, the Wahhabiys were 
a movement that tried to restore Islam in its purist form, and 
that meant a revival of the memories of the Arab period in 
Islamic history. M. Ali's empire was Arab in terms of geography 
and Hourani cites that Ibrahiym Pasha, son of M. Ali, was 
reported to have said that he was an Arab seeking the 
establishment of an Arab state and the maintenance of Arab 
nationalism and political existence. 15 
However the movements of the Wahhabiy and M. Ali were not 
supplementary to each other. On the contrary, they were engaged 
in mutual hostilities and M. Ali proceeded to inflict a heavy 
defeat on the Wahhabiys in military confrontations upon the 
request of the Ottoman sultan. 16 The trend, however, was mainly 
of Islamic character and fundamentalist in tone. This can be 
understood by the fact that fundamentalism (Salafiyyah or the 
ways of ancestors) mixed with Sunni suffism (mysticism) was the 
only living trend of Islam at that time. But the failure of this 
Salafiyyah in checking the enemies of Islam paved the way for the 
reform movement. This was in essence a movement of reformist 
compromise, aimed at countering the Western challenge and the 
state of internal decay. " 
The conclusion that may be drawn from the debate would not 
help in deciding upon the nationalist character of these 
15 Albert Hourani, al-Fikr al-'Arabiy fly 'Asr al-Nahda (Arabic Thought 
in the Liberal Age)Fourth Edition(Beirut; Dar al-Nahar lil Nashr, 1986) Arabic 
Text (Present Author's Translation) pp. 312-313. 
16 F. Sayegh, Arab Unity. Hope. and Fulfilment, (New York; The New Devin 
Company, 1958) pp. 24-25. 
17 A. Alnasrarwi, Arab Nationalism. Oil, and the Political Economy of Dependency, (New York; Greenwood Press, 1991) pp. 7-9. 
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developments. However, the advent of political concepts into the 
Arab region as a result of Western influence was not an easy and 
spontaneous process. Furthermore, prior to the West's intrusion 
into the region, there had been a consciousness among the Arabs 
of some form of identity and affiliation among them. This trend 
can be found in the insistence upon the importance of introducing 
new sciences and imitating Europe. 1' This is obvious in M. Ali's 
attempts at modernization and the revival of Islam and later on 
in intellectual contributions that gave prominence to the revival 
of Arab thought as a vital component of Islamic thought. Writings 
lent an obvious attention to the issue of Arabism. Islam was no 
longer `real' because it had been corrupted by the Turks and 
hence was de-Arabised (lost its Arab essence)in the process. 19 
Therefore, while reform was directed towards the revival of 
Islam, the call for the restoration of the pure religion involved 
the tendency toward a revival of Arab Islam. Thus writers like, 
M. 'Abduh and Al-Afghaniy, for instance, can not be considered 
as Arab nationalists but those who participated in introducing 
Arabism. 20 By the turn of the century the Islamic reform movement 
was spreading in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. This 
movement was in defence of what some writers called the "injured 
self-view" and in the course of its development it played a 
significant role in the early foundation and formulation of Arab 
to K. Al-Husry, Origins of Modern Arab, op. cit., p. 129. 
19 'Abdullah 'Abduldaiym, "al-Idyulujiyya al-Qawmiyya al-'Arabiyya: 
Tatuwruha wa Duwruwha wa Afaaqiyha" (Arab Nationalist Ideology: Its 
Development, Role, and Prospects" Shoun Arabiyya (Arab Affairs) vol. 61, (1990) Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) p. 81. 
20 K. Al-Husry, Origins of Modern Arab, op. cit., pp. 116-118. 
37 
nationalism. 21 
(iii) The Impact of the Nineteenth Century Literary 
Renaissance 
The impact of the nineteenth century literary renaissance 
or `nahda' on the evolution and content of Arab nationalism is 
a major source of controversy in the debate among scholars who 
investigated Arab nationalism. Of interest also, is the role 
played by Arab Christians, mainly Lebanese, in the making of Arab 
nationalism considering their active participation in the 
literary revival. 22 As explained above, the trend of criticising 
the Ottoman government coupled with the encounter with Europe 
resulted in the Islamic revivalism described earlier. This trend 
expressed itself in different ways: the Salafiyyah response as 
in the Wahhabiy movement, and the Westernisation and compromise 
approach of R. al-Tahtawiy, and K. al-Tunisiy. 23 The obvious 
consequence was a new stress on Arabism of some sort. This in 
turn found expression in a literary-linguistic and cultural 
renaissance 'nahda' in the nineteenth century. 
The renaissance was marked by the call for concentration on 
21 William Cleveland, "Sources of Arab Nationalism: An Overview", in M. 
Curtis(ed), The Middle East Reader, (New Brunswik, New Jersey USA and Oxford 
UK; Transaction Books, 1986) p. 3. 
22 R. Khalidi, "The Introduction", in R. Khalidi etal(eds), The Origins 
of Arab Nationalism, First Edition (New York; Columbia University Press, 1991) 
p. xii. 
23 Sa'iyd Muraad, "Usuws al-Hadatha fiy al-Fikr al-Qawmiy: al-Hadatha fiy 
al-Fikr al-'Arabiy al-Hadiyth "(Bases of Modernity in Nationalist Thought: 
Modernity in Modern Arab Thought), in Ma'an Ziyyada (ed), Buhuwth fiy al-Fikr 
al-Oawmiy al -'Arabiv(Reserches in Nationalist Thought) vol. 2.1, First Edition (Beirut; Ma'had al-Innmaa al-'Arabiy, 1985) Arabic Text (Present 
Author's Translation) pp. 282-283. 
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the learning and teaching of Arabic and its promotion, and 
revival of classical Arabic literature. 24 The nahda gathered 
momentum in the 1870s and 1880s. Even though this renaissance 
can, in some aspects, be linked to the modernisation policies of 
M. Ali, its unique characters are the work of a catalogue of 
factors. As stated above the figuring of different issues that 
can be linked to Arabism in the developments examined since the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, should be understood in the 
making of this nahda. However, the establishment of literary, 
scientific and cultural societies played the most important role 
in making the renaissance. 25 These societies stressed the goals 
of nahda and put its waggon on the rails. 
The arrival of Christian missionaries with their schools and 
presses considerably helped in enhancing the role of nahda. 26 
Nevertheless it is important to point out that the missionaries 
did not instigate the process. Even though the Levant had 
received missionaries and their schools since the seventeenth 
century, their activities remained confined to religious 
matters. 27 Therefore when they arrived again in the nineteenth 
century they relied on the help of indigenous people. They 
employed some Arabs as translators and teachers in their schools. 
Till the 1870's their presses had no active role in promoting the 
24 Mahmuwd S. Mansiy, Harakat al-Yagada al-'Arabivva fly al-Sharg al- 
Asivawiv(The Movement of Arab Awakening in the Asian East), First Edition, 
(Cairo; Dar al-Fikr al-'Arabiy, 1972) Arabic Text (Present Author's 
Translation) p. 49. 
25 A. Duri, The Historical Formation of the Arab Nation, (London; Croom 
Helm, 1987) pp. 147-149. 
26 
27 
A. Alnasrawi, Arab Nationalism, op. cit., p. 27. 
Mahmuwd S. Mansiy, Harakat al-Yagada, -Op. cit., p. 44. 
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use of Arabic or the revival of Arabic heritage. 28 
But the arrival of American Protestants in 1820 initiated 
a competition between the missionaries. 29 Arabic became a major 
concern of missionaries and combined with the efforts of scholars 
concerned with renaissance, this had the unintended but vital 
consequence of "revitalising a national culture j30 The nineteenth 
century witnessed this renaissance in the works of a number of 
pioneers who held its banner. Mention can be made of Butrus al- 
Bustaniy (1819-1883) and I. A. Yazijiy (1847-1906) who wrote 
books, published journals and papers and established national 
(i. e. Arab) schools. 
These pioneers called for borrowing from Europe to achieve 
progress. Yazijiy, in particular, was outspoken in his call for 
the revival of the Arab heritage and called for the awakening of 
the Arab nation. Their contribution can be estimated through the 
study of the societies that sprang up in that time. Of importance 
are societies founded in Cairo, and Syria: (The Society of 
Refinement (founded in 1845); the first Arab cultural society 
which dealt with topics of language and literature and the issue 
of patriotism; the Beirut Society of Science and Arts (founded 
1847) ; The Oriental Society (founded 1850) ; The Syrian Scientific 
Society (founded 1857), and the Society of Education (founded 
1868). 
These societies were mainly interested in the promotion of 
science, the reform of the education system and the study of 
28 A. Duri, The Historical Formation 
, op. cit., p. 152. 
29 Mahmuwd S. Mansiy, Harakat al-Yagada, op. cit., p. 45. 
3o A. Alnasrawi, Arab Nationalism, op. cit., p. 27. 
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Arabic. They stressed the need to revive some aspects of Arab 
heritage and in that an induction of nationalist feeling may be 
seen. Although some studies would underplay any relationship of 
this sort, a correlation between the two is theoretically 
logical. Whenever national feeling faced a threat there arose a 
need for a revival of national heritage and vice versa. The 
rediscovery of heritage would induce national feeling and 
crystallise it. 31 
The attack on cultural symbols brings forward the need to 
enhance and protect identity. 32 For the Arabs Arabic has been at 
the centre of their cultural heritage and sense of community. Its 
revival was seen as the appropriate measure to protect the 
identity of the Arabs. The discovery of the national heritage, 
which was the major feature of nahda, involved the struggle 
against the hegemony of the Turks and, thus, was an inducing 
factor behind the early beginnings of Arab nationalist thought. 
However, the literary nahda and the works of its societies would 
not form an Arab nationalist ideology of any kind. Its effects 
can be described as putting a more Arabist ingredient to the 
movement that preceded it. It strengthened the call for a 
distinct position for the Arabs vis-ä-vis the Turks as well as 
the Europeans. 
As the nineteenth century was closing and the next century 
31 Nuriy H. al-Qaiysiy, "al-Fikr al-Qawmiy wa Ihyya al-Turath" 
(Nationalist Thought and the Revival of Heritage), in Saalih al-'Ali etal, 
Tatuwr al-Fikr al-Qawmiy al-'Arabiy(The Development of Arab Nationalist 
Thought) (Seminar Papers) First Edition (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al- 
'Arabiyya, 1986) Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) pp. 84-87. 
32 William Bloom, Personal Identity. National Identity. and International 
Relations, (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1993) p. 146. 
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was approaching, the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were 
witnessing the growth of a national consciousness. This feeling 
was a response to the worsening of their conditions under Ottoman 
suzerainty and the penetration of Europe. The early years of the 
twentieth century were marked by the tightening of the grip of 
the central government, corruption and all illnesses associated 
with bad and dictatorial government. The reign of 'Abdulhamiyd 
(1876-1909) was marked by these illnesses and its relation with 
its subjects deteriorated. 
The backward and authoritarian nature of 'Abdulhamiyd's 
regime was resented everywhere in the Empire. The Arabs in 
particular were outspoken in their opposition. This may be at 
least partly attributed to the impact contacts with Europe had 
in introducing new ideas and ideals to the Arabs and the role 
played by the Islamic revivalist movement. 33 The nature of these 
developments and the direct link they had with the evolution of 
Arab nationalism in the twentieth century will be the subject of 
the investigation below. 
2-2: Turkish Nationalism and Arab Nationalism 
(i) The Islamic and Arab Policies of 'Abdulhamiyd: The 
Failure of Appeasement 
Sultan 'Abdulhamiyd's answer to problems of internal decay 
and external challenge was in maintaining absolute rule. The pan- 
Islamic idea of an Islamic League was the hallmark of his 
initiative to check both his internal enemies and the European 
33 A. Alnasrawi, Arab Nationalism, op. cit., pp. 25-26. 
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menace. 34 In the Arab provinces 'Abdulhamiyd took some steps in 
favour of the Arabs hoping that they would lend him their 
support. 35 The steps taken by 'Abdulhamiyd were met with favour 
in the Arab provinces. A sense of Ottomanism that sought the 
preservation of the Empire as a means to face the European 
challenge was felt in the Arab provinces. 
The existence of such Ottomanism may be attributed to the 
feeling among the Arabs that the Empire was the only device 
available to confront the increasing European invasion. However, 
this is not to say that all Arabs accepted this as an 
indispensable fact. Arab attitudes towards the Ottoman order were 
fragmented. In countries like Egypt and the North African 
provinces, where Western invasion was a fact of the time, the 
stress was on Islamic ties while in other countries, like in the 
Arab East, the emphasis was on Arabism coupled with Islam. That 
meant preserving the Ottoman Empire in a way that would increase 
their share in the government of their provinces without breaking 
away from the Empire. 36 
The attempts the Sultan made towards conciliating Arab 
feelings were outweighed by the centralisation policy he adopted. 
Resentment and opposition were increasing everywhere. The 
resentment was stronger among Christian Arabs who saw in the 
Islamic policies of 'Abdulhamiyd a new threat to their already 
inferior position under Turkish rule. The mushrooming of what is 
known as the Arab Societies heralded a new era in the development 
31 A. Duri, The Historical Formation, op. cit., p. 184. 
35 Mahmuwd S. Mansiy, Harakat al-Yagada, op. cit., p. 66. 
36 A. Duri, The Historical Formation, op. cit., pp. 183-184. 
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of Arab nationalist thought. These were secret societies that 
aimed at reform and, in some cases, independence in the Arab 
province. 
Although the Beirut Society was established by Christian 
Arabs, its members soon realised that the success of their 
efforts would only be accomplished if they had the help and 
participation of the Muslim Arabs. The society's membership, 
hence, was to become of Christian and Muslim composition. This 
trend was later on evident in all societies that were founded in 
different Arab provinces and the Arab Muslims took the lead. " 
(ii) The Young Turks and Arab Nationalism 
The Sultan's attempts were losing strength and in 1908 the 
Young Turks revolted demanding the restoration of parliamentary 
government. Their party, the Committee for Union and Progress 
(CUP), exercised power indirectly through the sultan and his 
ministers under the threat of the army. Parliamentary elections 
were held and 'Abdulhamiyd's orchestrated counter revolution was 
suppressed promptly. Eventually the CUP ousted the Sultan on 29 
April 1909 and it became the actual government. 38 
The CUP embarked on a programme of reform and the 
proclamation of the constitution was met with appreciation among 
the Arabs. The Arabs saw this as an opportunity for a more 
favourable status. These hopes were, however, short lived. 39 The 
37 Mahmuwd S. Mansiy, Harakat al-Yagada, op. cit., pp. 70-74. 
38 A. Duri, The Historical Formation, op. cit., pp. 215-216. 
39 N. Izzeddin, The Arab World: Past. Present, and Future, (Chicago: 
Henry Regnery Company, 1953) p. 92. 
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CUP initiated a policy of Turkification (tattriyk, i. e. the 
attempt to convert all national groups into Turks). In the Arab 
provinces they adopted policies of degrading and humiliating the 
Arabs and their dignity particularly in its cultural 
components. 40 
The policies of the CUP were a manifestation of the 
emergence of Turkish nationalism which underplayed religion and 
called for the superiority of the Turks. " Consequently, the 
Young Turks Revolution was a landmark in Turkish-Arab relations 
which underwent a radical change after the CUP's emphasis on 
Turkification. Initially the Arabs had great hopes in the 
Revolution. Thy were willing even to postpone if not abandon any 
demand for independence. 42 But the interlude was a brief one 
followed by utter disillusionment. 43 The Turkification policy was 
paramount as early as the elections of late 1908. There were only 
60 Arab members of the parliament in comparison to 140 Turks out 
of the 250 seat parliament, and the Arabs saw themselves as the 
major victims of new policies. 
These feelings became more widespread after the humiliating 
defeats the Empire received at the hands of the Italians who 
40 Z. N. Zein, Nushuw al -Oawmivva al -'Arabivva m'a Di rasa Tarivkhivva fiy 
al-'Alagaat al-'Arabiyya al-Turkivya(The Emergence of Arab Nationalism: With 
A Historical Study of Arab Turkish Relations)Fourth Edition(Beirut; Dar al- 
Nahar lil Nashr, 1986) Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) pp. 88-90. 
41 A. Alnasrawi, Arab Nationalism, op. cit., p. 28. 
42 Suliyyman Musa, al-Haraka al-'Arabiyya: Masiyrat al-Marhala al-Uwlaa 
lii Nahaa al-'Arabivva al-Hadivtha(1908-1924) (The Arab Movement: The 
Development of the First Stage of the Arab Modern Renaissance (1908-1924) 
First Edition (Beirut; Dar al-Nahar lil Nashr, 1970) Arabic Text (Present 
Author's Translation) pp. 24-28. 
43 G. Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1980) p. 58. 
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invaded Libya in 1911 and in the Balkan War of 1912-13 which 
paved the way for an increasing sense of despair. 44 As the 
Ottoman Empire was on the verge of dissolution, tensions arose 
in Turkish-Arab relations leading to a dramatic change in its 
direction with the Arab opposition to the CUP. Zein N. Zein 
traces Arab opposition to what he calls the suspicion the Arabs 
had towards the intentions of the Young Turks that expressed 
itself in Turkish nationalism. Zein also cites historical 
evidence to support the hypothesis that Turkification policies 
were perceived by the Arabs as a real danger to their existence 
and a direct attempt to subjugate them. 
This affected the course of Arab nationalist thought and 
resulted in a reaction of a national character that gave birth 
to new thinking. The search for new methods of improving the 
position of the Arabs within the framework of the changing 
circumstances was behind the breed of a number of Arab societies 
that devoted its activities to defending Arabs' rights. 45 
(iii) The Thought of the Arab Societies 
The Arab societies (those like al-Fattaat, al-Qahtaniyya, 
al-'Ahd, The Literary Club and The Decentralisation Party) were 
born after 1909 to indicate the sense of despair and loss of hope 
the Arabs felt after the Turkification policy of the CUP. 46 But 
44 E. Tauber, The Emergence of Arab Movements, First Edition (London; 
Frank Cass, 1993) pp. 57-58. 
45 Z. N. Zein, Nushuw al-Qawmivva, op. cit., pp. 86-90. 
46 For an extensive and elaborate assessment of the Arab societies, see 
E. Tauber, The Emergence of Arab, op. cit., pp. 61-241: Tauber rejects the 
widely held idea that these societies, in general, were advocating the goal 
of a single Arab national movement. (cf. A. Duri, The Historical Formation, 
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were these societies advocating Arab nationalism as understood 
now? Did they call for independence or secession from the Ottoman 
Empire? Had they embraced a nationalist ideology that would set 
them apart from previous trends concerning relations between the 
Arabs and the Turks? 
There is no sound evidence to support the claim that these 
societies propagated a clear cut nationalist ideology. Even 
though scholars agree on the role these societies played in 
expressing an Arab movement of some kind that emphasised reform 
and equality, the societies' main contribution was their advocacy 
of Arabic. 47 The kind of thought they produced was essentially 
bound by two major currents: the Islamic tie between the Arabs 
and the Turks, and the Arabs yearning for a fair share in a 
wished-for democratic Ottoman state. Their foremost ambitions 
were the implementation of reforms and autonomy for the Arabs 
within the framework of the state. 48 
The demands of these societies were confined to the spheres 
of administrative decentralisation, restoration of Arabic as the 
language of government and education in the Arab provinces, and 
did not go so far as independence demands. Even the First Arab 
Congress (Paris 1913) which was meant to coordinate the 
activities of these societies was not, on any account, to go 
op. cit., pp. 219-226; and G. Lenczowski, The Middle East, op. cit., pp. 58- 
59; and George Antonius, Yagadat al-'Arab: Tariykh Harakat al-'Arab al- 
awmi a (The Arab Awakening) Sixth Edition, Translated into Arabic by Nasser 
al-Diyn al-Asad and Ihsaan 'Abaas, (Beirut; Dar al-'Ilm lil Malaaiyyin, 1980) 
Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) pp. 149-163, pp. 183-198. Antonius 
was the first to represent these societies in the manner E. Tauber rejects. 
4' A. Duri, The Historical Formation, op. cit., p. 219. 
48 Mahmuwd S. Mansiy, Harakat al-Yagada, op. cit., pp. 86-87. 
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beyond demands for decentralisation. It is worth noting that its 
political programme was a "programme for Ottoman Arabs. 1149 
In the Paris Congress the participants made no reference to 
the right of the Arabs for the formation of a nation-state. 
George Tarabiyshiy explains this retreat from taking the concept 
of nation to its full meaning of separation as to fear of 
European imperialism. This resulted in abbreviating the concept 
of nation to mere cultural rights instead of political one. " 
Another development that would lend support to this argument is 
that the Ottoman Administrative Decentralisation Party (founded 
in Cairo 1912) which was an umbrella for the majority of the 
societies was, as its name suggests, only a reform oriented party 
that expressed its ideas in the political programme of the Paris 
Arab conference mentioned above. " 
Despite the effects the CUP policies had on the 
establishment of these societies, the Arab movement would still 
advocate local administrative autonomy instead of independence. 
Maxime Rodinson provides an explanation of this phenomenon in 
that "solidarity with the Turks as Muslims and as victims of 
European domination remained a factor even during the struggle 
against the Turks". SZ A. Alnasrawi sees this in the nature of the 
49 Suliyyman Musa, al-Haraka al-'Arabivva, op. cit., pp. 26-38. 
5u George Tarabiyshiy, al-Duwla al-Qutrivya wa al-Nazariyya al-Qawmivva 
(Particularistic State and Nationalist Theory) First Edition, (Beirut; Dar al- 
Tali'a, 1982) Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) pp. 59-62. 
51 Muhammad 'Amarah, al-'Uruwba fiy al-'Asr al-Hadiyth (Arabism in the 
Modern Age) Third Edition (Beirut; Dar al-Wahda, 1981) Arabic Text (Present 
Author's Translation) p. 272; William Cleveland, "Sources of Arab Nationalism" 
op. cit. p. 5; Cleveland argues that the establishment of the Decentralisation 
Party expressed an Arab desire for accommodation. 
52 Cited in A. Alnasrawi, Arab Nationalism, or. cit., p. 29. 
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leadership of the societies and the Arab movement in general. 
This leadership originated almost exclusively from an elitist 
background "who believed that their own economic and social 
interests would be best served by retaining less rigid structural 
affiliation with the imperial authorities. 11S3 
Whatever the explanation may be, the conclusion that may be 
drawn is that these societies, the movement they created and the 
kind of thought they produced lacked a clear cut pan-Arab 
ideology. According to E. Tauber, there existed at least three 
major trends in the societies' thought: Arabism, Syrianism and 
Lebanism. The existence of these orientations would suggest that 
Arabism was not the only theme. 54 Elaborating on the analysis 
provided by E. Tauber, it is not possible to regard the Arab 
opposition against the policies of Turkification as heralding an 
Arab nationalist movement and ideology. This opposition had 
different motives and causes of dismay: they ranged from Arab- 
Islamic, sectarian to particularism. 55 
Another striking feature inherent in the thoughts of the 
societies was the geographic scope and boundaries of the Arab 
nation itself. The boundaries of the would-be state were confined 
to the Arab East (the Fertile Crescent) and did not include Egypt 
or Arab North Africa. 56 This may find explanation in the 
" Ibid. 
The view that Arab nationalism was generally a movement of an elite is shared 
by many scholars. For a discussion of this analysis, see, C. E. Dawn, "The 
Origins of Arab Nationalism", in R. Khalidi etal(eds), The Origins of Arab, 
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proposition that the pioneers of the Arab societies were 
Christian Arabs who essentially sought an end to their minority 
position in the Ottoman Empire. This is not to suggest, as A. 
Hourani explains, that their thinking was not all void of Arab 
elements. They emphasised the Arabic language and history. 
However, most Christian Arab writers were hesitant to extend this 
trend to its political conclusion fearing that Arab nationalism 
might lead to another form of Islamic oppression. They chose to 
mix Arab nationalism with a concept of Lebanism or Syrianism 
while dreaming of an eventual Arab nation, albeit on a secular 
basis . 
57 
The main theme of this movement was centred around the call 
for reform and the democratisation of the Ottoman Empire. In the 
process, the movement came to betoken a revolution of some sort. 
It was a peoples' oriented process in which the concept of a 
nation was developing and slowly gaining political 
significance. 58 It is evident that before the First World war 
there existed indications of an Arab political identity. This 
identity expressed itself in the writings of some intellectuals 
and in the establishment of organisations and societies of 
political reform and Arab rights. Three trends dominating the 
political and intellectual scene of the period can be identified: 
Islamism, Ottomanism and a developing awareness of Arab cultural 
distinctiveness. -59 
The Young Turks pushed the Arabs into developing their 
57 Albert Hourani, al-Fikr al-'Arabiy, op. cit., pp. 331-332. 
58 Eugene Kamenka(ed), Nationalism, op. cit., p. 12. 
59 William Cleveland, "Sources of Arab" op. cit., p. 3. 
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Arabism to become a visible trend after 1908. This is not to 
imply that this trend meant a full-fledged nationalism. Rather, 
it was a kind of proto- nationalism that involved an emphasis on 
Arab elements of identity but not the desire to separate from the 
Turks. 60 In view of this analysis of the current of thought 
dominating the period of the societies, Arabism was a movement 
of opposition to Turkification policies. The Young Turks gave the 
Arab nationalists greater reasons than those during the reign of 
'Abdulhamiyd to be very outspoken. 61 
The main characteristics of Arab nationalist thought prior 
to the First World War were the existence of overlapping Arab and 
Islamic identities and the absence of ideology despite the idea 
of an Arab nation. The current of thought that marked the period 
lacked any developed ideology of nationalism. 62 Even though some 
writers, such as, Afghaniy, 'Abduh and Kawakibiy advocated ideas 
relevant to and can be seen as containing a strong tendency 
towards nationalism, they nevertheless, did not call for the 
establishment of a distinct Arab state. The reformers attempted 
to solve the problem of borrowing from Europe while preserving 
Islam and defending it against Europe. This gave birth to an 
61 R. Khalidi, "Ottomanism and Arabism in Syria Before 1914: A 
Reassessment", in R. Khalidi etal(eds), The Origins of Arab, op. cit., p. 51. 
61 C. E. Dawn, "The Origins of Arab Nationalism", op. cit. p. 16. 
62 A1-Saiyyd Yasiyn, Tahliyl Madmun al-Fikr al-Qawmiy al-'Arabiy: Dirasa 
Istitla'iyya (A Content Analysis of Arab Nationalist Thought: An Exploratory 
Study) First Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1980) 
Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation). A summary of the findings of this 
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Papers) Third Edition (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1984) 
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intellectual problem that bewildered the imagination of the 
following generations who sought a way out of this puzzle. 63 
These questions and the attempts at answering them form the 
outlook of the entire period after the First World War to which 
the next pages will be devoted. 
2-3: The First World War and Arab Nationalism 
The period before the First World war saw the currents of 
three main trends of thought among Arab intellectuals and 
politicians. A religious trend was holding to the ideal of an 
Islamic Caliphate in order to rebuild Islam's glory. A liberal 
tendency was calling for nationalist secular responses to the 
woes of the Arabs. It stressed the ethnic and linguistic 
components of unity. 64 The liberal nationalist trend coupled with 
the nationalist progressive trend eventually paved the way for 
the growth of a nationalist secular tendency that was, for 
example, expressed in the writings of N. 'Azuwriy. 
In his book, 'Yaqadat al-Umma al-'Arabiyya'(the Revival of 
the Arab Nation), 'Azuwriy distinguished the concept of an Arab 
nation from previous traditional Islamic views and firmly 
established it within the nationalist ideal. He argued that 
63 Waliyd Nazmiy, "Malaamih min al-Fikr al-'Arabiy fiy 'Asr al-Yaqada wa 
'Alaqatuhu bi Fikrat al-Qawmiyya al-'Arabiyya" (The Outlook of Arab Thought 
in the Renaissance and its Relation with Arab Nationalism Idea), in S. 
Hammadiy etal, Dirasaat fly al-Qawmivva al-'Arabivya wa al-Wahda (Studies in 
Arab Nationalism and Unity) (Seminar Papers) First Edition (Beirut; Markaz 
Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1984) Arabic Text (Present Author's 
Translation) pp. 122-127. 
64 Halim Barakat, al-Mu. itam' al-'Arabiy al-Mu'asir: Bahth Istitla'iy 
I, itima'iy (Contemporary Arab Society: An Exploratory Sociological Research) 
Second Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1985) Arabic 
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nothing is more liberal than the League of the Arab Home 
Land, it seeks, for the benefits of Islam and the Arab 
nation, first and foremost the separation of religious 
authority from civil authority and the establishment of an 
Arab empire. 65 
However, as Hourani explains, the existence of these trends did 
not mount to the birth of an independence movement nor were these 
trends bringing forward independence in one form or another. 66 
The event of the First World War intensified the debates among 
these trends. It left the Arabs with the difficult task of 
deciding which side they would choose to support. 67 
The War put the Arabs at a very critical juncture wherein 
they had to tackle issues of great importance with the prospects 
of losing every thing or achieving something as yet unclear. The 
decision of Turkey to enter the war on the side of the Central 
Powers and the approach Britain made towards the Arabs promising 
their independence if they fought against Turkey helped 
strengthen the nationalist tendency. Although there remained some 
opinion favouring the support of Turkey against the Allies, the 
Arab Societies which represented the Arab nationalist movement 
of the time chose independence with the implications of fighting 
against Turkey. " 
65 N. 'Azuwriy, Yagadat al-Umma al -'Arabiyva(the Revival of the Arab Nation) Translated into Arabic by Ahmed Melhim, (Beirut; Al-Muasasa al- 
'Arabiyya lil-Dirasaat wa al-Nashr, n. d. ) Arabic Text (Present Author's 
Translation) p. 219. 
66 Albert Hourani, al-Fikr al-'Arabiy, op. cit., p. 342. 
67 Halim Barakat, al-Mu. itama' al-'Arabiv, op. cit., p. 407. 
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(i) The Arab Revolt (1916) and Arab Nationalism 69 
The appeasement of Turks was losing momentum and waned 
particularly after the collapse of the talks between the CUP 
government and the Societies that followed the Paris Arab 
Congress of 1913. The case against the Turks was intense after 
the Turks responded to Arab gestures of conciliation with a heavy 
hand. 70 Shariyf Husiyn, a descendant of the Prophet, the head of 
the Hashimite dynasty and the governor of the Hijaz, was at odds 
with the government of the Young Turks who were plotting against 
him. 71 Husiyn was seeking ways to save his dynasty. On the other 
hand he had good relations with Britain which was looking for a 
suitable Arab leadership with high prestige, among the Arabs, to 
help in its war against the Ottoman Empire, particularly after 
the sultan proclaimed a war of jiyhad against the Allies. 
The Arab nationalists sought Husiyn's leadership with its 
sound religious legitimacy. They entered into discussions with 
Husiyn on waging an Arab rebellion against the Turks and the ways 
69 In western studies the incident of the Arab uprising against the Turks 
is referred to as that of revolt. The connotation the word revolt carries is 
clear in serving the purpose of undermining the significance of this 
historical event. This is probably to echo Lawrence who consistently argued 
that the whole affair was a British made one while the Arabs had no 
significant role to play. In Arab studies, however the incident is seen as 
representing the great Arab revolution against the Turks and therefore 
reflecting the honour of the Arab nation. Although not sharing any of the two 
contending arguments, the term revolt or rebellion is used throughout this 
research only because the English reader is familiar with it. 
70 A. Duri, The Historical Formation, op. cit., p. 314. 
" E. Tauber, The Arab Movements of World War I, First Edition (London; 
Frank and Cass, 1993) p. 69. 
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of establishing an Arab kingdom as the nucleus of the future pan- 
Arab state. The Arab nationalists presented to Shariyf Husiyn a 
plan, known as the Damascus Protocol, outlining their views on 
the future Arab state, and marking its boundaries. 72 This is not 
to suggest, however, that all the Arabs were supporting the 
leadership of Shariyf Husiyn nor were they united in 
understanding the meaning of independence. 73 Local leaders saw in 
his ambitions only its tribal ingredients. 74 However, the 
encouragement Husiyn received from the British facilitated the 
recognition of his leadership. 
Husiyn entered in correspondence, known as the (Hussein-Mc 
Mahon Correspondence), with Sir Henry McMahon, the British High 
Commissioner in Egypt, on the issue of forming an alliance 
between the Arabs and Britain during the war. The basis of the 
alliance was that the Arabs would rise against Turkey and that 
Britain would guarantee the establishment of an independent Arab 
kingdom, with Husiyn its king, after the end of the war. 75 
Despite the ambiguities of the British pledges Husiyn and his 
supporters decided to raise the flag of rebellion against Turkey 
in a development that marked a clear break away from the 
72 Mahmuwd S. Mansiy, Harakat al-Yagada, op. cit., pp. 241-250. 
73 Z. N. Zein, Arab Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab 
Nationalism, First Edition (Beirut: Khayats, 1958) pp. 105-106. 
74 M. al-Najjaar, "Fikr al-Thuwra al-'Arabiyya 1916 wa Istiqlaal al- 
'Arab"(The Thought of the Arab Revolution of 1916 and the Independence of the 
Arabs) Al-Mustagbal Al-Arabi(The Arab Future) No 81 (November 1985) Arabic 
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75 P. Mansfield, "Arab Political Movements", in P. Mansfield (ed), The 
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traditional view of maintaining links with the Ottoman Empire. 76 
The Shariyf-led Arab Rebellion of 1916-1918 is seen by many 
authors as the first Arab rising against the Turks. 77 But this is 
only true as far as its success is concerned. E. Tauber provides 
historical evidence to prove that even during the First World War 
rebellions took place against the Turks. Tauber agrees that the 
Arab Rebellion of 1916 was the only one that reached the stage 
of materialisation but that would not justify the neglect of 
other movements, especially in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon which 
were overshadowed by the Rebellion. 78 Although Tauber's approach 
is one showing the fragility and disunity of the Arab movement 
and the multiplicity of identities among it, his analysis is a 
clear suggestion that the struggle against the Turks was 
spreading in the Arab provinces of the East and that the Arab 
Revolt of 1916 was not a British conspiracy. 
The Rebellion epitomised a break between the Arab 
nationalists and Turkey and played a significant role in 
enhancing their position. 79 The Rebellion marked a step that left 
behind utopian designs and secret organisation to enter the 
spheres of actual politics and war. "' It is striking, as A. Duri 
notes, that the Arab movement had to wait for the occurrence of 
an external factor, the First World War, to move toward adopting 
76 E. Tauber, The Arab Movements, op. cit., p. 10. 
Suliyyman Musa, al-Haraka al-'Arabivva, OD. Cit., pp. 24-28. 
78 E. Tauber, The Arab Movements, op. cit., pp. 10-34, provides an 
extensive analysis of these movements. 
79 Majiyd Khaduwriy, al-Iti. iahaat al-Sivvasivva, op. cit., pp. 33-34. 
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this new thinking and method in seeking independence from the 
Turks. This clearly shows how weak and incoherent the nationalist 
trend had been. It found in the War the justification of Arab 
nationalism in a way that would not contradict Islam. 81 
(ii) The Thought of the Revolt: Islamism or Arabism 
The nationalist content of the Arab Revolt and its identity 
is a subject of scholarly controversy. 82 Arab historians and 
nationalist thinkers consider the Arab Revolt to have been a true 
Arab one. They look at it as a historic landmark in the 
development of Arab nationalist thought and its movement. They 
emphasise the vital role played by the Revolt in furthering the 
Arabs' hopes for revival and national emancipation. 83 Some 
Western authors saw the Rebellion as a consequence of the world 
politics of the First World War in which major powers played the 
decisive role that overshadowed any significance regional or 
local factors could have had. They emphasize the fact that the 
Rebellion was financed and supported by Britain. This view 
concludes that an Arab role in the Revolt is an exaggeration that 
reflects no solid national dimension but a political opportunism 
81 A. Duri, The Historical Formation, op. cit., p. 314. 
82 See, Albert Hourani, "The Arab Awakening Forty Years After", in Derk 
Hopwood(ed), Studies in Arab History: The Antonius Lectures. 1978-87, (London; 
Macmillan in Association with St. Anthony's College, Oxford and World of Islam 
Festival Trust, 1990) p. 28. Cited in Aziz al-Azmeh, "Nationalism and the 
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83 Waliyd Qaziyha, "Fikrat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya fiy Matla' al-Qarn al- 
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in Arab Nationalism and Unity) (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 
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that Shariyf Husiyn deployed to fit his personal ambitions. 84 
These controversies about the nature of the Arab Revolt 
raise the question of the nationalist content of the Revolt. 
Arguing that Arab nationalists of 1917 were men who reluctantly 
became nationalists, Azmeh suggests that " the Arab revolt of 
1917 does not belong to the register of previous or contemporary 
Arab nationalism ... 
it was Arab only in the narrow ethnological, 
pre-nationalist sense. " The Arab revolt therefore was "an Islamic 
rebellion, undertaken in the name of, not the Arabs, but a Meccan 
Caliphate under the Sharif Husayan Ben Ali, who was later to be 
declared caliph. "as 
William Cleveland, who extensively researched Arab 
nationalism, emphasises the Islamic content of the Arab Revolt 
during its first stages. He argued that the protection and the 
revival of Islam was the essential thesis of the Revolt. 
Cleveland concludes that initially the terminology used in the 
`al-Qibbla'(the organ of the revolt between 1916-1924) would not 
permit the labelling of the Revolt as Arabist in character. 86 
There is to be found no implication that the Revolt was 
carried out primarily as a nationalist reaction to the Turks. The 
terminology used reflected transitionary concepts which were an 
amalgamation of religious and nationalist ideals with an eventual 
reliance on Islamic ideology. However, Cleveland is assured of 
J. Kostiner, "the Hashmite Tribal Confederacy of the Arab Revolt, 1916- 
17", in Edward Ingrain(ed), National and International Politics in the Middle 
East, (London; Frank Cass, 1986) p. 127. 
e5 Aziz Azmeh, "Nationalism", op. cit., p. 7. 
86 William Cleveland, "the Role of Islam as Political Ideology in the 
First World War", in Edward Ingram(ed), National and International Politics, 
op. cit., pp. 91-92. 
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the clear nationalist orientation of the thought produced in the 
al-Qibbla in the last stages of the War. References were made to 
the nature of the struggle between the Arabs and the Turks whose 
policies of Turkification were presented as underlying factors 
to the case of the Revolt. 87 
This view is also held by S. Haim who considers the Revolt 
to have had a nationalist Arabist orientation only two years 
after its proclamation when Shariyf Husiyn started looking to 
himself as king of the Arabs. "" The same conclusion is made by 
Hans Kohn who cites a passage from the speech made by Husiyn in 
which he stressed the bond of Arabs' nationality in spite of 
their religious differences. 89 This obvious shift from the 
Islamic impulse to the nationalist impulse calls for enquiry. Why 
had this shift taken place? Shariyf Husiyn emphasised the Islamic 
character of his action in order to justify it before the eyes 
of Muslims. He accused the CUP of betraying Islam and the Muslims 
while making equal claims on behalf of the Arabs who were willing 
to acknowledge the nationalist reasoning as the only legitimate 
alternative. 
Another explanation may be sought in the effects the 
repressive policies adopted by the Turks had on the Arabs. These 
policies impelled the Shariyf to respond to the grief they caused 
as well as to meet the desires and aspirations of Arab 
87 Ibid, pp. 91-92. 
ea S. Haim, Arab Nationalism, op. cit., pp. 34-35. 
89 Hans Kohn, A History of Nationalism in the East, First Edition 
(London; G. Routledge & Sons LTD, 1929) p. 284. 
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nationalists. 90 A. Duri attempts to resolve the controversy. He 
explains that even though the proclamations issued by Husiyn 
emphasised both Islamism and Arabism that was no source of 
contradiction but interdependence. The proclamations 
had an Arab-Islamic attitude, for they set forth the 
interdependence between Arabism and Islam. In the faith 
they see a source of strength for the Arab nation and 
support for Arab nationalism. Similarly, in the Arab 
national awakening they see a source of power for Islam and 
a means for returning to the sacred law. 91 
The focus on Islamism or Arabism in the thought of the 
Revolt reflects the changing circumstances and the reaction each 
stage of the Revolt implied. The call for Arabism and Islamism 
was an expression of the state of transition which marked the 
thought of the period. The call for Arabism and Islamism 
simultaneously was an expression of their compatibility. It is 
clear that the developments that affected the course of the 
Hashimites action were detrimental to deciding the occurrence of 
both ideas. Although the independence of the Hijaz was in the 
forefront of the Revolt aims, the British encouragement and the 
delegation the Shariyf had from the nationalists of the Societies 
were decisive in creating among the Hashimites a sense and a 
belief that they were leading an Arab movement. Hence the 
complementarity of the aim of securing the independence of the 
Hijaz and creating a larger Arab state as the ultimate goal. 
Despite the Shariyf's aim of dynastic hegemony at the 
expense of other dynasties the Revolt had unmistakeable 
nationalist aims that went beyond the attainment of the 
9° E. Tauber, The Arab Movements, op. cit. , p. 
251, p. 97. See also, 
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independence of the Hijaz. However, The Shariyf did not clearly 
show an attachment to secular-ethnic Arab nationalism. 
Nevertheless Husiyn's admission of the Damascus Protocol, which 
set forth the objectives and territorial aims of the Arab 
movement, was an indication of the importance he attached to the 
nationalist trend. 92 
The Revolt was a vital point on the path of the development 
of Arab nationalist thought that is appreciated by the Arab 
nationalists. The Ba'th Party, for example, gives the Revolt 
(Revolution) a prominent place in the history of the struggle for 
Arab unity and liberation. It saw the Revolt giving the Arab 
movement two of its principal aims, freedom and unity. 93 However 
its nationalist idea was vague and incomplete and this meant an 
independent nationalist ideology was absent. Nevertheless, the 
Revolt was a vital development which marked the transition from 
an Ottoman Middle East to a post-Ottoman one, from a world 
attached to the idea of an Islamic caliphate to a world that had 
to restructure itself under the effects of occupation and 
political systems of European origin. 
The War and the Revolt resulted in the defeat of Turkey and 
it brought Turkish rule in the Arab lands to an end. But the most 
important result was that the Arabs fell under European 
domination and the cause of Arab nationalism was betrayed. 94 The 
92 J. Kostiner, "the Hashmite Tribal Confederacy", op. cit. , pp. 127-129. 
9s M. al-Najjaar, "Fikr al-Thuwra al-'Arabiyya", op. cit., p. 147. See 
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Sykes-Picot Agreement, that made for the partition of the Arab 
lands between Britain and France, and the Balfour Declaration, 
which promised the world Jewry a homeland in Palestine, were seen 
by the Arabs as strong evidence of how their allies were now 
turning a blind eye to the cause of Arab nationalism and 
independence. 95 These issues would have a strong impact on the 
making and the content of Arab nationalist thought in the inter- 
war period. 
2-4: Arab Nationalism in the Inter-War Period: From Frustration 
To Romanticism 
By the end of the First World War it was evident that Arab 
aims of independence and unity were greatly weakened. 96 The Arab 
world was occupied by British and French forces. Arab 
nationalism, therefore, was entering a new phase marking it with 
pessimism and frustration and a loss of faith in the promises 
made by the Allies. This led to Arab nationalism becoming a 
movement with anti-Western and anti-imperialist characters. 97 
(i) The Development of Ideology 
The inter-war period witnessed the end of those 
organisations and societies which sprang before 1914- This was 
95 For a brief idea regarding the Sykes-Picot agreement and the Balfour 
Declaration see, L. Snyder, Macro-Nationalisms: A History of the Pan- 
Movements, First Edition (London; Greenwood Press, 1984) p. 271. 
96 M. Shuraydi, "Pan-Arabism: A Theory and Practice", in Hani A. 
Faris(ed), Arab Nationalism and the Future of the Arab World, First Edition 
(Belmont, Mass.; Association of Arab American University Graduates Inc., 1987) 
pp. 96-97. 
97 Z. N. Zein, Nushuw al-Qawmiyya, op. Cit., p. 126, pp. 140-141. 
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an indication that the new circumstances created by the War no 
longer supported the existence of such organisations. The British 
and French occupation resulted in a direct confrontation with 
their imperialism. The confrontation was widening and including 
all the Arab lands particularly during the 1930s. This period 
witnessed the large scale struggle in Palestine which served as 
a stimulus to Arab resistance to foreign rule in general. 98 It 
seemed that Arab nationalism was negative in its conception 
during the inter-war period. This is the result of the preceding 
period wherein there were concepts and ideals around the 
nationalist centre but an absence of a general theory of national 
awakening. 
Therefore, the nationalists faced the new circumstances as 
divided as they previously were. The occupation and the 
boundaries imposed by the mandate system contributed to this 
confusion of ideas. 99 The period saw a competition between the 
religious and the liberal trends. The religious trend was 
stronger in the Western part of the Arab World while the liberal 
trend was stronger in the Eastern part, though it had to argue 
against local and particularistic tendencies which the mandate 
system was encouraging. '°° 
The general trend, however, was now a manifestation of the 
political and cultural identity of the Arabs as expressed by 
those who rejected particularism or Islamism in favour of a 
98 Saiyyd Yasiyn, Tahlivl Madmun, op. cit., pp. 71-74. 
99 William Cleveland, "the Role of Islam", op. cit., p. 6. 
too Halim Barakat, al-Mu. itama' al-'Arabiy, op. cit., pp. 418-421. 
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secular Arab nationalism. 101 The writings of S. Husry are a good 
example of Arab nationalist thought of the period. He made a 
strong case for the idea of an Arab nation through emphasising 
the secular ingredients of the Arab cultural heritage. It is 
worth noting that from this point Husry and Arab nationalists in 
general used the term `Arab nation' to include not only the Arab 
part of Asia but extended it to include the whole of the Arabic- 
speaking North Africa . 
102 
(ii) Arab Nationalism: Unity, Identity and Secularism 
The nationalists were emphasising the role of language and 
a common past to prove that a single Arab state was the best form 
of uniting the Arabs. This reflected a strong ideological 
tendency that sought the crystallisation of the intellectual 
contents of nationalism into what might form an Arab nationalist 
ideology. Although secularism was the label of this kind of 
theorising, a divorce between Islam and nationalism was not 
conceived. Islam was considered vital to the nationalist view. "' 
Hourani attributes this secularism to the attempt by its 
advocates to deprive France of its weapon against the Arabs. He 
also explains it in the existence of religious minorities, Arab 
Christians or non-Arab Muslims, and the need to find a common 
national platform upon which all Arabs could participate in the 
fight against the Zionist programme which posed a threat to all 
101 William Cleveland, "the Role of Islam", op. cit., p. 8. 
102 Bassam Tibi, Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry, Second Edition, 
Translated by M. Farouk-Sluglett and P. Sluglett, (London; Macmillan, 1990) 
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Palestinians, Muslims and Christians alike. 
However, total secularism was not to appeal to the Arabs and 
the majority of the intellectuals who dealt with the issue chose 
to stress Islam and nationalism simultaneously. This meant that 
Islam was seen as a civilisation. As Hourani explained, the view 
that Arab nationalism was a necessary step towards reviving Islam 
gave way to the idea that Islam was the creator of the Arab 
nation and the container of its culture. The main concern of the 
nationalists was to keep alive the aim of Arab unity. Unity was 
threatened by ideas of particularistic nationalism as Syrian, 
Lebanese and Iraqi nationalisms which had some encouragement from 
the occupying powers. "' 
Nevertheless, Arabism was the major political ideal to gain 
widespread approval and appreciation. '°5 But this would not imply 
that an elaborate design was available to bring about any form 
of Arab unity. Nationalist thought was still theorising about the 
existence of Arab national unity and the right for political 
unity. As F. Sayegh explains, the desire for unity was seen as 
a natural outcome of social and cultural unity. The attainment 
of independence was seen as the prerequisite for unity. That this 
was an oversimplification did not alarm the Arab nationalists who 
overlooked the centrifugal forces which were a characteristic of 
the Arab society. They relied on idealistic motives while 
ignoring the realistic aspects of Arab unity. 106 
104 Albert Hourani, al-Fikr al-'Arabiy, op. cit., pp. 352-367. 
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The failure of the Arab Revolt in realising an Arab state 
led the nationalists to stress the existence of an Arab nation 
even though it lacked a nation-state. Bassam Tibi attributes the 
First World War the decisive effect which led to this state of 
thinking. He points to a dramatic change in Arab nationalist 
thought. Tibi sees this in the shift from the French ideal and 
Francophile concept of the nation to the German one. Tibi 
explains that as the nation was not attainable without a state, 
according to the French, the German concept of the nation was 
more appealing. 
Since in the German model, the nation is a cultural 
community, the German model of an underdeveloped nation, a nation 
without a state, was to fit the Arab experience. The borrowing 
of the German concept of the nineteenth century played a vital 
role in marking the nationalist literature with a romantic 
militant nationalism. Tibi attributes to Husry the establishment 
of the tradition of a populist Germanophile Arab nationalism. 
"His nationalism was not mystificatory, fanatic or fascist but 
he laid the foundations for the kind of fanatical nationalism. ""' 
In the 1930s the nationalist intellectuals were engaged in 
arguing for Arab identity and Arab nationalism against 
particularistic nationalisms. This generation of Arabists 
produced an ideology based upon the principle of an Arab nation 
through emphasising the factors of language, culture and common 
history. The imposition of the war settlements created a new 
condition in which unity was no longer available. Hence the 
previous demand for the preservation of the existing unity gave 
107 Bassam Tibi, Arab Nationalism, op. cit., pp. 116-118. 
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way to the desire for the restoration of such unity. In this 
juncture the idea of Arab unity was born and thereafter it became 
an essential element of Arab nationalism. The concept of an Arab 
nation was met with widespread acknowledgement. The basic thesis 
of this concept was that the nation-state was the logical 
expression of nationhood. 10' 
Nationalist thinkers advocated this concept and made it a 
theme of their intellectual contributions. The Lebanese 
historian-pan-Arabist Constantine Zurayq stressed the importance 
of having what he termed a nationalist philosophy. He argued that 
unless the Arabs had an inclusive nationalist philosophy any 
attempt at organising themselves in a nation-state would be 
inadmissible. Although Zurayq assigned prominence to this 
philosophy and to the spiritual components of the Arabs reality 
proved that these factors are not enough to lift the Arabs from 
their backward position. Therefore his main concern became to 
advocate liberal ideas of organisation, rationalism science and 
technology . 
109 
It was Husry, however, who produced a clear cut theory 
encompassing all aspects and premises of nationalism. 110 The 
mandate system and Jewish immigration to Palestine played an 
important role in marking this nationalist concept with a 
revolutionary anti-imperialist stamp. There was strong emphasis 
on the glories and heroism of the Arabs but this was, however, 
108 F. Sayegh, Arab Unity, op. cit., pp. 73-80. 
109 Constantine Zurayq, al -Wa'iv al -Oawmiv (Nationalist Conscious)(Beirut; Dar al-Makshuwf, 1939) pp. 8-9. 
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halted by the event of the Second World War. 13 
2-5: Arab Nationalism During the Second World War 
When the Second world War broke out, the Arabs were somehow 
hesitant to support the Allies. The imposition of the Sykes-Picot 
agreement and the Balfour Declaration was seen by the Arabs as 
a betrayal of their aims by the Allies. The struggle against 
British and French occupation further undermined any belief that 
an Allied victory would be the best way to guarantee the 
achievement of the nationalist goals. 11' 
Arab opinion adopted a wait-and-see attitude while 
expressing some degree of sympathy with the Axis. As the 
British war strategy was to revive British interests in the 
region, Britain was alarmed at the prospect of the Arabs 
taking an anti-Allies stand. This dictated the adoption of 
a policy that would attract the Arabs and win them for the 
cause of the Allies. 113 
Britain announced its support for the idea of Arab unity. 114 This 
policy was designed in anticipation of the goals set forward by 
Arab nationalists. 
On the political level the nationalists were concentrating 
their efforts on achieving an Arab federal state that would 
encompass the whole of the Fertile Crescent. "' Faced with the 
111 P. Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett(eds), The Times Guide to the 
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reality of the European occupation the Arab nationalists had to 
reconsider the situation. They had to work out their ideas and 
plans to allow for the effective mobilisation of all forces at 
their disposal to confront the European assault. 116 
On the intellectual level the Arab nationalists were 
superseding both Islamic and socialist thought. Intellectuals 
went to explain the correlation between Islam and Arab 
nationalism. Constantine Zurayq, for instance, rejected any hint 
of the existence of a contradiction between Arab nationalism and 
any religion, not to mention Islam. Zurayq went as far to 
consider the Prophet the true builder of Arab civilisation, the 
uniter of the Arab people and the man of creed who inspires all 
Arabs. "' 
The Lebanese Edmund Rabbat, took this thesis even further 
by saying that Islam was a national religion. Even though he saw 
nationalism in linguistic and cultural terms, he adopted the view 
that Islam was the essence of political unity. Zurayq and Rabbat 
were not thinking in terms of Islam as a mere religious creed. 
They emphasised the spiritual and ethical value of Islam. It was 
the Iraqi 'Abdulrahman al-Bazzaz, however, who sought to 
establish an inseparable link between Islam and Arab nationalism 
and employed his intellectual abilities to defend the 
compatibility of both creeds. Bazzaz emphasises that Islam and 
Arab nationalism have the same content. This is to view Islam as 
the national religion of all Arabs. Bazzaz's attempt at 
116 Halim Barakat, The Arab World: Society. Culture, and State, First 
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reconciling Arab nationalism with Islam therefore, became the 
most obvious attempt by a Muslim Arab intellectual. 118 
The more secular view of Arab nationalism, as has been 
stated above, was the work of Husry who defended the separation 
between politics and religion. Husry saw nationalism based on a 
linguistic concept of the Arab. An Arab was whoever spoke Arabic. 
He argued that any full fledged national emancipation and 
evolution incorporating language would necessarily lead to the 
transformation of a people into a nation and the nation into a 
united state. 119 Therefore The period in question witnessed the 
appearance of a nationalism which based national identity on the 
linguistic bond along with a cultural appraisal of Islam. 120 
(i) The Spread of Arab Nationalism 
Albert Hourani marks the year 1939 as the landmark of the 
spread of Arab nationalism. Nevertheless, Hourani does not 
suggest that Arab nationalism was the only trend. Arab 
nationalism was closely linked to the idea of an Islamic Umma to 
the point that the nationalism of Christian Arabs was not empty 
of some elements of an association with Islam as a civilisation. 
To this Hourani adds the existence of particularistic nationalism 
such as the call for Syrian unity even though it was included in 
the call for the pan-Arab unity. 121 
308. 
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The fact that this Arab nationalism was the product of 
secular liberalism and Islamic reformism paved the way, explains 
Hourani, for the advancement of secular nationalism. The 
nationalism of this phase did not stress the need for social 
reform nor for economic development as these were thought to be 
left unattended until independence was secured. 122 This reflected 
a gap in the ideology of Arab nationalism. According to 
Alnasrawi, this gap is evident in the indifference towards 
economics which marked the thought of the prominent writers like 
Husry. According to Husry, economic forces are of no importance 
to the nationalist idea and its evolution. Bazzaz also made 
similar arguments which denied the vitality of economic forces 
in uniting the Arabs. Alnasrawi attributes this to the effects 
of foreign domination which made the creation of an Arab nation- 
state the major concern of Arab nationalists. 123 
The ideology formulated was to make room for this situation 
by using the past glories of the Arabs to justify the dreams of 
the present and the future. Arab nationalism was becoming an 
ideology that essentially sought to provide a theory of the Arab 
nation. This theory was a mixture of the urgency of the 
circumstances and the fact that "from the European theories of 
the nation the Arabs borrowed the idea of defending and extolling 
a common language and history, on which they have placed greater 
stress than on territorial ties. 11124 This concept emphasises the 
history of the nation. This led to what Maxime Rodinson depicts 
izz Ibid, pp. 409-412. 
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as creating a "sacred history which exalts the great deeds of the 
Arab people in the past. " History was interpreted to support the 
pan-Arab goal of creating a single united Arab nation-state. This 
resembled a romantic vision that saw in the nation the embodiment 
of the most supreme and sacred value. 12' 
2-6: Arab Nationalism: Independence and Post-Independence 
(i) The Arab State System: A New Challenge To Pan-Arabism 
After the end of the Second World War nationalist thought 
was once again expressing great pessimism and frustration. 
Independence did not satisfy the aspirations of Arab nationalists 
in creating the hoped-for pan-Arab state. The creation of a large 
number of states was to consolidate fragmentation. 126 The creation 
of Arab states brought a new challenge wherein Arab nationalism 
had to compete against the now-emerging state-nationalism. 
Consequently Arab nationalism had to encompass the ideas of 
political unity, anti-imperialism and to accommodate the need for 
provisions for social and political reform. 127 
The ideological debate focused on questions of nation and 
its relationship with the problem of governance and the issue of 
economic development and social welfare. 128 The major task was to 
seek ways of materialising the pan-Arab ideal. Different designs 
for Arab unity were introduced to serve the purpose of proving 
125 Ibid, pp. 105-106. 
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the practicality of Arab nationalism and assert the validity of 
its ideology. This resulted in an intellectual production that 
tried to maintain reasoning for Arab unity in constitutional 
terms . 
129 
The establishment of the League of the Arab States in 1945 
was a sign of hope amidst frustration and disappointment. 130 But 
the fact that the League was only an organisation of independent 
states made it fall short of the ideological aspirations of Arab 
nationalism. In the League state-nationalism became definite and 
institutionalised. '31 The fact that particularistic identities 
have now become enshrined in the Arab state system dealt a heavy 
blow to Arab unity aspirations. From that Arab nationalist 
thought became involved in efforts to respond to the challenge 
posed by the state system. 
(ii) The Palestine Problem: Arab Nationalism Consolidated 
When the state of Israel was established Arab nationalist 
thought embarked on a debate on how to face the problem of having 
an alien state that drove out the Palestinian Arabs . 
132 The debate 
was focused on finding the appropriate measures for confronting 
Israel. 133 The Palestinian problem and the defeat of the armies 
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of the Arab states in the war with Israel in 1948 had 
considerable effect on Arab nationalism. Arab nationalism was 
transformed from a movement emphasising the past glories of the 
Arab nation into a movement with its ideology centred on the 
failures of the present. Ideology became an expression of the 
aspiration and the desire for reform. 134 
A wave of writings on the effects of the defeat on the Arab 
world was evident. Prominent among these was Constantine Zurayq's 
book which he devoted to discussing the meaning of the 
Palestinian problem and the defeat inflicted upon the Arabs by 
Israel, (Ma' na al-Nakba, the Meaning of Disaster) . 
135 In this book 
Zurayq saw the cause of the Arab failure to win the war against 
Israel and restore the Palestinians' rights in the absence of a 
true Arab nation. 136 This was a call for changing the life of the 
Arabs and their way of thinking as the main prerequisite to 
creating a united Arab state that would be able to win the battle 
for the nation. The defeat and the effects it had led to radical 
developments in Arab politics and Arab nationalism. 
2-7: The Radicalisation of Arab Nationalism 
The stage after the war of 1948 was characterised by the 
reformulation of Arab nationalist theory. The Arab nationalist 
discourse following the war of 1948 was moving towards a radical 
134 Tariq Ismael, The Arab Left, op. cit., pp. 12-14. 
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stand. 137 The failure of the Arab regimes and the psychological 
effects of the 1948 defeat opened the doors for the active role 
of new social forces. These new forces were concerned with the 
problems and issues linked to social change and therefore the 
establishment of a new order. The stress was on realising social 
justice and putting the blame on the shoulders of the existing 
regimes . 
138 
The modernising policies of the Arab states and 
developments in the sectors of education, commerce and industry 
and the expansion of the bureaucracy facilitated the growth and 
the infiltration of political institutions and the armies by a 
middle class generation. 139 These developments brought the 
military into politics with old regimes being replaced by army 
officers with nationalist orientations. Military regimes took 
over in Egypt, Syria and Iraq in a development that initiated 
similar changes in many Arab countries. The nature and the 
history of these changes are not of direct relevance to this 
study. Suffice it to say that the most important outcome was the 
inauguration of a new phase of Arab nationalism. Arab nationalism 
in essence was represented by three major movements: the Ba'th, 
the Arab Nationalists Movement, and Nasserism. 140 
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(i) The Ba'th Party 
The Ba'th, or rebirth, Party came into existence in the 
1940s. It was established by some Syrian students for whom their 
prominent figure and ideologist was Michael `Aflaq. 141 Although 
the establishment of the Bath precedes the radicalisation of 
Arab nationalism, it gained importance only after it established 
itself in the military and therefore participated significantly 
in the radical trend. 142 `Aflaq, sought to provide a full-fledged 
Arab nationalist ideology. He argued that the existence of an 
Arab nation or the attributes of Arab nationalism was not a 
sufficient formula. 
The Ba'thists acknowledged the contributions of those 
intellectuals like Husry who sought the validation of the idea 
of an Arab nation to which they added the concept of a historic 
mission. 143 An Arab nation was entrusted in the Ba' th ideology 
with an eternal mission in serving not only national aims but of 
humanity at large. This was compatible with the emphasis they put 
on secularism and on the nationalist interpretation of Islam as 
an Arab civilisation, 144 But the important contribution of the 
Ba' th was in the attention it paid to issues of economic life and 
modernisation. This meant giving Arab nationalism a social 
content through the three principles it devised as the basic aims 
of the Arab nation. These principles were: wahda, hurriyya, 
141 Bassam Tibi, Arab Nationalism, op. cit., p. 199. 
142 Saiyyd Yasiyn, Tahlivl Madmun, op. cit., p. 111. 
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ishtirakiyya, unity, freedom and socialism. 145 
Bassam Tibi considers the inclusion of socialism in the 
Ba'th ideology to have been a significant departure from Husry's 
theory of Arab nationalism. In the addition of socialism, or Arab 
socialism, `Aflaq "sought a synthesis between nationalism and 
socialism within an all-Arab state. il 146 Another contribution of 
the Ba'th can be seen in the introduction of the concept of the 
masses, to mean the people. The masses were entrusted with the 
major role in realising the goal of Arab unity. Although there 
were different interpretations of the nature of the masses, this 
was a new concept that Arab nationalism was acquiring as a sign 
of its radicalisation. 147 
Nasiyf Nasar in his study of the contemporary concepts of 
nation in modern and contemporary Arab thought points to what he 
considers as a general weakness characterising the Ba'th's 
definition of the nation. Nasar attributes this to the effort by 
the Ba'th theoreticians to accommodate the need for political 
national unity as a basic component of the Arab national 
existence. If the aim of the Ba'thists is to create the united 
Arab nation-state and not the validation of Arab national 
existence, the Ba'th ideology, as Nasar explains, is not seeking 
only the transformation of the Arab nation from one situation to 
another. It also gives prominence to the vitality of the 
formative nature of the single state in its relationship with the 
145 Sir James Craig, "Changes in Arab Nationalism: Outsiders View" Arab 
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existence of the Arab nation itself. 148 
The Ba'th is fluctuating between the theoretical reasoning 
that distinguishes national existence from its nation-state and 
the theoretical reasoning that sees in the concept of nation an 
embodiment of the state. Nasar explained the inability of the 
Ba'th ideology to answer the basic question of determining the 
form of existence that a group or community, seen as a nation, 
enjoys while not having its own nation-state. "" 
(ii) The Arab Nationalists Movement 
The Arab Nationalists Movement (ANM) was established by a 
group of students who were studying at the American University 
of Beirut in the early 1950s. Ideologically the ANM differs only 
slightly from the ideas and reasoning provided by Husry. The ANM 
shared with Ba'th the induction of socialist ideas to Arab 
nationalist ideology. '50 The ANM rejected the idea that Arab 
nationalism was a product of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries and did not accept that nationalism, in general, was 
a modern phenomenon. Instead the ANM held that nationalism was 
an expression of God's will. However, the ANM was unable to 
provide historical evidence to support this claim nor to show why 
nationalism and the concept of nation appeared only in the 
nineteenth century despite the availability of God's will prior 
148 Nasiyf Nasar, Tasuwuraat al-Umma al-Mu'asira: Dirasa Tahlivlivva li 
Mafahiyym al-Umma fiy al-Fikr al-'Arabiy al-Hadiyth wa al- Mu'asir 
(Contemporary Concepts of Nation in Modern and Contemporary Arab 
Thought)Second Edition(Beirut; Ammuwaj, 1994) Arabic Text (Present Author's 
Translation) pp. 304-306. 
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to that. 151 
The ANM witnessed a dramatic change of direction in the 
1960s. The change was the result of an ideological debate within 
the ANM itself. The debate was on whether to embrace Marxism and 
the principle of class struggle or to keep an attachment to the 
liberal values and traditions which originally inspired the 
founding members. The debate was a clear indication of the crisis 
the ANM was undergoing. The result was that the movement split 
into right and left wing groups with serious implications for its 
future existence. 152 The ANM flourished when it sided with Nasser 
under whose shadow it survived until 1967. After the defeat with 
Israel the ANM actual existence as an Arab nationalist movement 
ended and it reemerged with Palestinian outlook under the banner 
of the radical Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. 153 
(iii) Nasserism 
The rise of Gamal Abdul Nasser to power in Egypt after the 
1952 revolution marked the reorientation of Egyptian nationalism 
and heralded a new phase in the development of Arab nationalism. 
Nasserism (the thoughts of Nasser and the policies of his regime) 
signalled the end of "the pan-Arabism of the kings" and "the 
beginning of the pan-Arab populism. "ls4 It injected Arab 
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nationalism with new blood and gave it a new dynamism. 155 Nasser 
and Nasserism lent Arab nationalism its popular tone. 
Nasser became the propagator of pan-Arabism using a language 
that the masses would understand and not relying on theoretical 
articulations of the idea. 156 In defining the Arab nation, Nasser 
believed that the Arab nation was not in need of validation or 
theoretical proofing. The nation was seen as reality and a fact 
of common sense. He saw it based on the common past and future 
of the Arabs, Arab language which provides for a common 
mentality, and a psychological and social component that 
supported a common aim. 
Marliyn Nasr identifies the major characteristics of the 
Nasserite concept of the Arab nation as a historical and cultural 
bond in its objective dimension and a bond of struggle in its 
subjective dimension. What signifies the Nasserite concept of the 
Arab nation is, according to Nasr, that while holding the idea 
of a unitary nation, one nation and one nationalism, Nasserism 
accommodates the significance of particular states and their 
peoples which compose the Arab nation. Nasserism acknowledges the 
fact of having different peoples within the Arab nation and their 
importance in enriching the Arab nation. However, Nasr notices 
the sheer absence within Nasserism of any reference to the idea 
of an Arab united state. 157 
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This can be explained at least partially, as Nasr provides, 
by the fact that Arab political thought in general and Arab 
nationalist thought in particular lacks any theory of the state 
or any elaborate theorising about it. 158 This theoretical 
deficiency is interpreted by the Egyptian sociologist Sa'd al- 
Diyn Ibrahiym as the result of the preoccupation of the 
nationalist thought with Arab unity which outweighed the 
importance of the question of the state. Ibrahiym makes the point 
even clearer by noting that Arabic language dictionaries do not 
contain any reference or definition of state, or society for that 
matter, which can be near any definition of the concept in modern 
social sciences. 159 
The Lebanese scholar Radwan al-Saiyyd attributes this to the 
fact that the sequence of political concepts making up the 
equation of Islamic thought would not permit the inclusion of any 
thing similar to the modern nation-state. Whereas Islamic thought 
starts with the community and ends with leadership via justice, 
the European model gives prominence to the individual and freedom 
and then moves to the state. The result is that Islamic thought 
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Islamic Thought) First Edition(Beirut; Dar Iqraa, 1984) Arabic Text (Author's 
Translation) p. 91. 
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However, the Nasserite neglect of the idea of the state 
seems to be, as Nasr explains, that Nasserism considered the 
state of Arab unity to be embodied in an Egyptian state built in 
accordance with the idea of the Arab nation. Egypt and the Arab 
nation support each other and they integrate into one entity that 
would form the nucleus of Arab unity. As for the place of Islam 
in Arab nationalism, Nasserism stopped at interpreting religion 
as having a spirit that was compatible with the aims of the Arabs 
and by emphasising the primacy of the national over the 
religious. Nasserism considered the nation to be the subject of 
modernisation, development and independence well based in the 
realms of democracy, secularism and socialism. 161 
2-8 Arab Nationalism: Ideological Discourse and Political Reality 
(i) Arab Unity: A Hope Frustrated 
Nasserism became the major force in the Arab world and its 
leader Nasser became the hero of Arab nationalism, especially 
after the Suez crisis. 162 Nassim Rajwan described Nasserite Arab 
nationalism as "a living force, not to be justified theoretically 
by marshalling historical or sociological facts, but to be 
embodied in an all embracing creed. "163 Therefore, the power of 
Nasserism led to the creation of the first Arab unity in modern 
times. The Union between Egypt and Syria was proclaimed in 1958 
161 Marilyn Nasr, al-Tasuwar a1-Qawmiy al -'Arabiy, op. cit., pp. 380-384. 
162 Albert Hourani, A History of, op. cit., pp. 365-368. 
163 Nissim Rejwan, "Arab Nationalism: In Search of an Ideology", in Walter 
Laqueur(ed), The Middle East, op. Cit., p. 146. 
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in a single state. However, the unity put Arab nationalist 
ideology in a critical test and it made clear the factors that 
impeded the implementation of its social dimension as in the 
slogan: freedom and socialism. Arab nationalist ideology in its 
Nasserite and Ba'thist forms failed the test of political 
maturity when the union collapsed in 1961.164 This put in question 
the ideology of Arab nationalism and paved the way for a 
relatively long debate on issues of Arab nationalist thought and 
identity in general. 1" 
The period after the collapse of the union between Egypt and 
Syria saw a fierce struggle between Nasserism and the Ba'th. The 
issue at stake was the leadership of the pan-Arab movement. 166 The 
defeat of Egypt, Syria and Jordan in the war against Israel in 
1967 had very severe effects on Arab nationalist ideology. It was 
detrimental in moderating the hegemonic position of both 
Nasserism and Ba'thism. Arab nationalist thought witnessed a 
period of self-criticism which meant the revival and the come 
back of thought and intellectuals after the politicians failed 
in their attempts to lead and be victorious . 
167 The wave of self- 
criticism was an expression of the need to reconsider Arab 
nationalist ideology and indeed the Arab way of life and 
mentality. 168 
'I Abdullah Abduldaiym, "al-Idyulujiyya", op. cit., pp. 83-89. 
165 Saiyyd Yasiyn, Tahlivl Madmun, op. cit., p. 157. 
166 For an extensive treatment of this competition see M. Kerr, The Arab 
Cold War: Gamal Abd Al-Nasir and His Rivals. 1958-1970, Third Edition (New 
York; Oxford University Press, 1971) 
167 
168 
Bassam Tibi, Arab Nationalism, op. cit., p. 206, p. 23. 
Abdullah Abduldaiym, "al-Idyulujiyya", op. cit., p. 89. 
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It is important to note that prior to the defeat of 1967 
some Arab intellectuals warned of the consequences of the Arab 
way of life and organisation. As early as 1963 Constantine Zurayq 
made a sincere appeal that Arabs should adopt rationality, 
science and modern methods of organisation if they wanted to rid 
themselves of their backwardness. 169 Reasserting his views Zurayq 
published a book to which he gave a title similar to a one he 
published in 1948. The book (Ma'na al-Nakba Mujadadan: The 
Meaning of Disaster Yet Again) identified the causes of the 
defeat in the nature of Arab culture and society. He argued that 
unless the Arabs equipped themselves with rationalism and science 
they would still be bound by defeat. Arab culture and society are 
determined by reaction and mythology. The Arab is still led by 
poetic and false conceptions and unless these are done away with 
the Arabs have no hope of securing victory and building their own 
nationhood . 
1'0 
(ii) The 1970s and the Critics of Arab Nationalism 
The death of Nasser and the changes that followed the 
ascendance of Sadaat to power in Egypt were decisive in the 
occurrence of a fundamental shift in Egyptian politics and Arab 
policies of the Egyptian state. They paved the way for the 
dominance of a different set of political concepts that 
169 Constantine Zurayq, Hatha al-'Asr al-Mutafa. iir (This Explosive Age), 
(Beirut; Dar al-'Ilam lil Malaaiyyin, 1963) Arabic Text (Present Author's 
Translation) pp. 10-16. 
170 Constantine Zurayq, Ma'na al-Nakba Mu. iadadan(The Meaning of Disaster 
Yet Again)(Beirut; Dar al-'Ilm lil Malaaiyyin, 1967) Arabic Text (Present 
Author's Translation) pp. 7-17. 
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contrasted with those dominating the Arab world before. 171 The 
process led to the evolution of tendencies critical of Arab 
nationalism and its ideology. 
Many critics emphasised doubts concerning the value and 
essence of Arab nationalism. Among these were the advocates of 
the Marxist trend which argued that nationalism obscured and made 
void the class factor; and an Islamic trend which saw Arabism in 
contradiction to Islam. Other trends maintained that nationalism 
was a mystic ideology that elevated the concept of unity to the 
position of a comprehensive but an indefinite principle that 
lacked any boundary. The criticising trend also included some of 
the intellectuals who were propagating the Arab ideal. They 
considered nationalist thought as an attribute of the past 
because it rejected the Arab state system and by this it belonged 
to the phase of dream, the dream of the past. Some of the Arab 
nationalist thinkers attempted to provide an inclusive Arab 
nationalist theory that would comprehend the facts and basic 
dictates of the unification experience that human history 
provided . 
172 
The oil boom that followed the 1973 war with Israel had the 
effect of raising to the position of power conservative Arab 
regimes like those in Saudi Arabia. and the Arab Gulf states. 173 
In Saiyyd Yasiyn, Tahliyl Madmun, op. cit., p. 160. 
172 This is essentially the thesis of the Lebanese sociologist Nadiym al- 
Biytar. See his, Min al-Ta. izia ila al-Wahda: al-Qawaniyn al-Asasiyya li 
Tajarub al-Tariykh al -Wahdawivva(From Fragmentation to Unity: The Fundamental Rules of Historical Unification Experiments) Fifth Edition (Beirut; Markaz 
Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1986) Arabic Text (Present Author's 
Translation) 
173 M. A. Shuraydi, "Pan-Arabism", op" cit., p. 111. 
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This contributed significantly to the dividing of the Arab world 
between the rich and the poor. The division had the effect of 
giving prominence to local concerns and the supremacy of state 
to state relations and raison d'etat. These developments impinged 
upon the nationalist thought through the prevalence of issues 
linked to pan-Arab identity and particularistic identities, 
regionalism and the major issue of the validity of the pan-Arab 
nationalist concept itself. The result was the retreat of 
populist Arabism and its popular components in the face of 
cooperation and coordination between the sovereign Arab states 
despite ideological differences. 174 At a constitutional level, 
attempts at forging forms of unity flourished throughout the 
1970s and well into the 1980s. 17s 
The 1970s were a critical period in the development of Arab 
nationalism. When Egypt made peace with Israel and signed in 1978 
the Camp David Accord the Arab World was again united in its 
rejection of the deal and went as far as to suspend Egypt's 
membership in the League of the Arab States. The League moved its 
headquarters from Cairo to Tunisia as a sign of the disapproval 
of Egypt's change of heart towards the struggle with Israel. 176 
M. Shuraydi characterizes the 1970s as the period of reactionism 
in Arab politics. He considers it as heralding the eradication 
of Nasserism and the termination of radical Arab politics and the 
174 Saiyyd Yasiyn, Tahliyl Madmun, op. cit., p. 1 62, pp. 188-189. 
175 Muhammad Shiyya, Jadaliyat al-Tafattut wa al-Wahda fiy al-Mashrig al- 
'Arabi y(1970-1990)(The Dialectic of Unity and Fragmentation in the Arab East) 
First Edition (Beirut; Ma'had al-Innmaa al-'Arabiy, 1991) Arabic Text (Present 
Author's Translation) p. 122. 
176 Peter Mansfield, A History of the Middle East, (London; Viking 
Penguin, 1991) p. 302. 
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massacre of the "old dreams of the pan-Arabist movement. " 
However, Shuraydi does not see these developments as an 
indication of the death of Arab nationalism. On the contrary he 
argues that these developments underscored the view that Arab 
nationalism in this period faced an urgent need of reform. 177 
(iii) "The End of pan-Arabism" and the Reopening of the 
Debate on Arab Nationalism 
F. Ajami's article entitled `the End of pan-Arabism' 
heralded a new era in the debate on Arab nationalism. Ajami 
proclaimed that Arab nationalism was "a myth nearing its end if 
it is not already a thing of the past. " He saw the pan-Arabism 
retreat as having started with the 1967 defeat which "marked the 
Waterloo of pan-Arabism" and that the "October War was the event 
that would enable reason of state to challenge the then feeble 
but still venerated pretensions of pan-Arabism. " Ajami concludes 
his analysis by issuing a death verdict to the ideology of Arab 
nationalism. 17' 
The article was a response to a one written by W. Khalidi 
in the previous issue of Foreign Affairs. 179 Ajami's article led 
to the renewal of the debate. L. Snyder supported the death 
thesis by concluding that pan-Arabism is a myth and that to speak 
17 M. A. Shuraydi, "Pan-Arabism", op. cit., pp. 111-113. 
178 F. Ajami 
, 
"the End of Pan-Arabism", in Tawfic Farah (ed), Pan-Arabism, 
op. cit., pp. 96-114. Other articles that proclaim the death of pan-Arabism 
include Abdul Monem al-Mashat, "Stress and Disintegration in the Arab World", 
in Tawfic Farah (ed) Pan-Arabism, op. cit., pp. 165-176. Najim Berzigan, 
"Islam and Arab Nationalism", Middle East Review , 
11(Winter 1978/1979) pp. 
38-44. 
19 Walid Khalidi, "Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian 
State", Foreign Affairs, 56(July 1978) pp. 695-713. 
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of "one Arab nation is a contradiction to the reality of 
conflicts and rivalism. "180 Bassam Tibi accepts Ajami's thesis 
with some qualification. He depicts Arab nationalism as a myth 
but maintains that this can be conceived only in "as much as it 
was oriented toward the utopia of a united Arab state. "-"' Some 
writers were light handed in their judgement on Arab nationalism. 
Carl Lieden argued that "Arab nationalism in a truncated form 
wanders like Pirandello's actors, in search of something, in this 
case a leader... yet the idea is not dead; it still possesses 
force and it is possible that it can be resurrected at some later 
time ... "182 
However, the strongest response to Ajami's thesis came from 
Hasan Nafa who rejected the death prognosis. In Aj ami' s analysis 
Nafa noted the confusion between the idea and its implementation 
and maintained that Ajami confused ideology and its political 
movement . 
183 Nafa affirmed that pan-Arabism is an idea or ideology 
and a political movement at the same time. The claim put forward 
by Ajami that raison d'etat was the basic and fundamental tenet 
of the Arab system was a misunderstanding of the Arab system 
which Nafa considers to be essentially a pan-Arab system. 184 
E. Chalala saw the death thesis as very problematic. He 
180 L. Snyder, Macro-Nationalism, op. cit., p. 158. 
181 Bassam Tibi, Arab Nationalism, op. cit., p. 25. 
182 Carl Leiden, "Arab Nationalism Today", Middle East Review, vol . 11 no. 2, (Winter 1978/79) pp. 34-44. 
183 Hasan Nafa, "Arab Nationalism: A Response to Ajami's Thesis on the 
"End of Pan-Arabism", in Tawfic Farah(ed), Pan-Arabism , op. cit., pp. 133- 151. 
''4 Hasan Nafa, Interview with the Author, Cairo; 29.4.1995 
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questioned the content of the thesis by asking what specifically 
is dead according to Ajami? Is it the nationalist ideology with 
its goal of uniting the Arabs or is it the pragmatic definition 
of Arab nationalism which "may provide a consensus of common 
domination from which Arab policy makers are expected not to 
deviate? j185 Chalala concludes his argument by saying that 
whatever the definition that Ajami may ascribe to, Arab 
nationalism proves to be wounded but not dead. This is because 
Arab nationalism contains cultural, linguistic, historical and 
religious components that defy the death thesis. 18' 
The underlying problem with the death prognosis is that it 
does not take into account that 
the death of ideology, and pan-Arabism in particular, has 
been announced time and time again. Similar statements had 
been made during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, after the 1961 
break-up of the Egyptian-Syrian union, repeated after the 
1967 war, after the death of Nasser, during Sadat's visit 
to Jerusalem and most recently, after Saddam Hussein's 
Kuwait fiasco. 187 
Thomas Mayer supports this analysis in that statements about the 
death of pan-Arabism 
are made in time of crisis or divisions in the Arab world 
and should not necessarily be taken as proof that pan- 
Arabism is dead. As history records, periods when 
statements announcing or predicting the end of pan-Arabism 
appeared, also witnessed an increase in pan-Arab activity. "' 
M. Shuraydi takes the same stand by affirming that if the 
185 E. Chalala, "Arab Nationalism", op. cit., p. 
186 Ibid, pp. 
187 Diane Tueller Pritchett, "The Language of Arab Nationalism and Arab 
Foreign Policy: the Relations of Egypt, Libya and Syria, 1969-1981", 
Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, (Boston University, 1992) p. 12. 
188 Thomas Mayer, "The End of Pan-Arabism", Middle East Review, 16 (Summer 
1984) pp. 31-36 cited in Diane Tueller Pritchett, "The Language of Arab Nationalism", op. cit., p. 12. 
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pan-Arab ideal is in need of further articulation it has not 
"become a hollow claim. j189 Shuraydi agrees with Halim Barakat 
that 
the failure of those seeking political unity to achieve 
their goal so far has not been caused by the ideals they 
set for themselves, but by their inability to devise the 
necessary rational structures and strategies. (That is) the 
problem lies, not in the ideal itself, but in the gap or 
imbalance between this goal and actions designed to achieve 
unity. 190 
Giacomo Luciani and Gassan Salame issued the same verdict in 
stating that "the ideal and the call for the Arab nation refuses 
to die. ""' This argument found empirical support in a study about 
the attitudes of Arab public opinion towards Arab unity. The 
study carried out in ten Arab countries which represent the 
majority of the population of the Arab World made it clear that 
ideas of Arab nationalism, Arab nation, and Arab unity are very 
popular among the Arabs though with less romantic orientation. 192 
The fact that Arab cooperation and coordination in all 
aspects is increasing is seen by J. Craig as a vital proof that 
Arab nationalism is not dead even though it tends to more 
"balance and maturity and moderation. 11193 The event of the Iranian 
revolution of 1979 and its attempt to export the Islamic 
189 M. A. Shuraydi, " Pan-Arabism", op. cit., p. 112. 
190 Halim Barakat, The Arab World, op. cit., p. 4. 
191 G. Luciani and G. Salame(eds), The Politics of Arab Integration, 
(London; Croom Helm, 1988) P. 1. 
192 Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym, "Qiyas Itijahaat al-Raiy al-'Aam al-'Arabiy Nahuww 
al-Wahda: 'Ard lil Dirasa al-Maiydaniyya"(the Measurement of the Attitudes of 
Arab Public Opinion Towards Unity: A Presentation of the Empirical Study", in 
Waliyd Qaziyha etal, al-Oawmivva al-'Arabiyya, op. cit., pp. 191-195. 
193 Sir J. Craig, "Changes in Arab Nationalism", op. cit., p. 9. It is 
important to note that all Egyptian and Moroccan intellectuals interviewed by 
the author agree on their rejection of the death verdict. 
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revolution to the Arabs and the rapid growth of Islamic 
revivalism lent vitality and urgency to questions related to the 
nature of nationalism in the Arab world, Islamic or Arab 
nationalism or a combination of both. In addition, the sheer 
division between the haves and the havenots lent vitality to 
issues like equality, equity and freedom. 194 
The debate was renewed about the relationship between Arab 
nationalism and state nationalism and regionalism. 195 The 
formation of a number of regional cooperation entities in the 
Arab World like the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab Maghrib 
Union opened the door for an active debate concerning issues like 
the Arab nation-state, the particularistic territorial state, the 
Arab nation, the legitimacy of the state system, and Arab unity 
or integration. 196 In the 1980s the debate on Arab nationalism 
attracted new comers and participants with a new wave of 
writings. Of particular importance is the contributions made by 
intellectuals and social scientists whose contributions 
significantly moved the idea of Arab nationalism and unity away 
from the ideological milieu and tried to reconstruct it in a new 
context and with a new content. 197 These debates will be the focus 
of the next chapters. 
6. 
194 Abdul -Monem Al -Mashat, "Stress and Disintegration", op. cit., pp. 5- 
195 The discussions of the issues related to ideas of unity and localism 
are presented in, 'Abd al-Ilah Belqaziyz, Ishkaliyyat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya: 
Khitab al-Raghba wa Khitab al-Mumkin (The Problematique of Arab Unity: The 
Discourse of the Wish and the Discourse of the Possible) First 
Edition(Casablanca; Afriqiyya al-Sharq, 1991) pp. 36-41. 
29. 
196 Muhammad Shiyya, Jadaliyat al-Tafattut, op. cit., p. 123. 
19' G. Luciani and G. Salame(eds), The Politics of Arab, op. cit., pp. 28- 
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Chapter Three 
Arab Nationalism and the Idea 
of a United Arab Nation 
3-1: Arab Nationalism: A Compendium of Ideological Premises 
From the analysis of the intellectual history of Arab 
nationalist ideology presented in the previous chapter it is 
clear that Arab nationalism had originated during a historical 
process. That process was the interaction of three major factors: 
Ottoman centralism and the policies of Turkification; the 
encounter of the Arabs with Europe and the Arabs' experience of 
European colonialism which resulted in the fragmentation of the 
Arab World into a number of sovereign states. These factors led 
to the birth of Arab nationalism and the movement associated with 
it with its aim of uniting the Arabs in a single state. The 
centralisation and Turkification policies of the Young Turks had 
the result of exploding the tensions between the Arabs and the 
Turks and paving the way for the spread of Arab nationalist 
consciousness. 
These factors had the effect of undermining the importance 
of the religious link that had long made the Arabs accept Turkish 
rule under the banner of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire 
relied heavily on the Islamic concept of the Umma in building its 
legitimacy. The Arabs found themselves obliged to compromise 
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their national aspirations for independence and demanded respect 
of their Arab identity based on the distinctiveness of their 
culture and their language. Hence they called for a degree of 
autonomy within the existing structure of the Ottoman Empire 
(decentralisation). 
However, two factors played a major role in transforming 
this shy demand into a political movement that sought an eventual 
breakaway from the Empire. The harsh suppression that Arab 
nationalists received coupled with the failure of the two parties 
to reach a compromise settlement pushed the Arab nationalist 
movement to demand the separation of the Arabs. European 
colonialism was the other vital factor in consolidating this 
movement. The issue of dealing with the `sick man of Europe' was 
at the centre of European powers' policies. These policies 
exploited the forces within the Ottoman Empire, minorities and 
ethnic communities, to further weaken and eventually destroy the 
structure of the Ottoman Empire. 
Therefore, European powers, particularly Britain and France, 
developed contacts with forces within the Arab provinces with 
aims of a nationalist nature. This was fairly evident in British 
encouragement, support, and finance of the Arab Revolt of 1916 
and the French and Russian endorsement and encouragement of 
ethnic and religious minorities in the Fertile Crescent. The 
whole process led to the final breakaway of the Arabs from 
Ottoman rule. It had only to wait until the Turks abolished the 
Caliphate system in 1924. When the Turks adopted secularism in 
political and social organisation a cultural separation between 
the two took place. 
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The Arab World then became under the direct rule of European 
colonial powers. The fact that Arab nationalists felt a great 
discrepancy between the Europe they envisaged (as during Arab 
nahda) and the real European rule they now experienced was vital 
in consolidating Arab nationalism. Arab nationalism became a 
movement of liberation. The fragmentation of the Arabs, as 
planned and implemented according to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, 
and the Balfour Declaration were vital in leading the Arabist 
idea into a new path. The fragmentation of the Arab world made 
the Arabists seek the achievement of unity which was to become 
the corner stone of the nationalist doctrine. ' 
Without repeating the history of Arab nationalism, the 
period between the end of the Second World War and the Arabs' 
defeat in the War with Israel in 1967 is the richest in the 
stages of Arab nationalism. It marked the growth'of the Arab 
nationalist ideology. The significance attached to this period 
is an area of agreement among many scholars of Arab nationalism. ' 
This period saw the coming to power of (esp. in Egypt and Syria) 
regimes that propagated Arab nationalism and took it as their 
official ideology. The period also witnessed the establishment 
of political movements and parties (e. g. the Ba'th Party and the 
Arab Nationalists Movement) that adhered to Arab nationalism and 
1 'Abd Ilah Belqaziyz, Ishkaliyyat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya: 
Khitab al-Raghba wa Khitab al-Mumkin (The Problematique of Arab 
Unity: the Discourse of the Wish and the Discourse of the 
Possible) First Edition(Casablanca; Afriqiyya al-Sharq, 1991) pp. 
14-16. 
2 See for example, Saiyyd Yasiyn, Tahliyl Madmun al-Fikr al- 
Oawmiy al-'Arabiy: Dirasa Istitla'iyva (Arab Nationalist Thought: 
A Content Analysis) First Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al- 
Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1980) pp. 160-162. 
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called for Arab unity. 
More importantly, however, Arab nationalist thought produced 
its major texts which reflected its ideology in the same period. 
This period then showed Arab nationalism in its greatest moments 
of political power and intellectual and ideological fertility. 
As the previous chapter has shown, it is during the period up to 
1967 that the major theoretical premises of contemporary Arab 
nationalist thought are to be found. These ideological premises 
are outlined below: - 
(i) The Arab Nation 
Arab nationalist thought conceives of the peoples living 
from Morocco on the Atlantic to the Yemen on the Indian Ocean as 
one nation. The Arab nation is conceived as being united by bonds 
of language, history and culture. Arabist thought is dominated 
by this concept of the Umma as the only logical content of the 
history of the Arabs. As the previous chapter would have shown, 
Arab nationalists may not agree on a definite historical point 
where this Umma was borne. However "there is always one constant 
element: the notion of an Arab nation. 113 
(a) The Concept of the Umma 
As seen in the previous chapter Arab nationalist thought was 
echoing the German theory of nationalism with the supremacy it 
accords language as the reason for the idea of the nation. It is 
significant to note, as George Tarabiyshiy demonstrates, that 
3 Sa' id Bensa' id, "al-Watan and al-Umma in Contemporary Arab 
Use", in Gassan Salame(ed), The Foundation of the Arab State, 
First Edition (London; Croom Helm, 1987) p. 166. 
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Arab nationalist thought elaborating on the German model makes 
"nation and language as one logical statement of identification 
to the extent of making them equals and identical. 114 Although 
some would consider the Arabs as a nation in being the Arab Umma 
is conceived of as a living entity that has all the credentials 
that would qualify it for a nation's status. 
As the Moroccan intellectual Sa'id Bensa'id observes, the 
concept of an Arab nation is the major contribution of Arabist 
thought. It is the theorising about the reality of this nation 
and its distinctive features that makes the bulk of the Ba'th 
ideology and the most prominent concept within the Arab 
nationalist ideology of Nasserism. s Building a theory of Arab 
nationalism based on linguistic characteristics and on a 
conceived common history of the Arabs was the major concern of 
some prominent Arab nationalist theoreticians. Husry, as 
mentioned in the preceeding chapter, affirms that "Language 
creates the spirit of the nation and history is its memory and 
feelings. ,6 
However, some Arab nationalists, as M. 'Abid al-Jabiriy 
explains, tried to qualify this theory of Arab nationalism by 
4 George Tarabiyshiy, al-Duwla al-Outrivva wa al-Nazariyya 
al-Oawmiyva (Particualristic State and Nationalist Theory)First 
Edition (Beirut; Dar al-Tali'a, 1982) p. 118. 
s Said Bensa'id, al-Idyulu- yya wa al-Hadatha: Oiraat fly 
al-Fikr al-'Arabiy al-Mu'asir(Ideology and Modernity: Readings 
in Contemporary Arab Thought) First Edition(Casablanca; al-Markaz 
al-Thaqafiy al-'Arabiy, 1987) Arabic Text (Present Author's 
Translation) pp. 107-109. 
6 S. Husry, Araa wa Ahaadiyth fly al-Wataniyva wa al- 
Oawmiyya(Reflections on Patriotism and Nationalism) (Beirut; 
Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1985) Arabic Text (Present 
Author's Translation) p. 206. 
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making an intellectual separation between what they saw as the 
"national existence" of the Arabs and the "nationalist theory. " 
According to Jabiriy, this was an attempt at reconstituting the 
theory and reasoning of Arab nationalism. Instead of relying on 
language and history, this school maintained that the Arab 
national existence is based on language-history. This is utilised 
as a convincing power that could produce feelings and substitute 
for history with fantastic and passionate rhetoric. 7 During the 
1950s the slogans of the Ba'th party presented the Arabs as a 
nation that resembled a personified passionate cultural entity. 
All the problems of political fragmentation and the 
particularistic tendencies were considered temporary symptoms of 
an illness. All illnesses would be eradicated once unity was at 
hand. " 
But this emphasis on the centrality of language and culture 
still obliged Arab nationalists to deal with an issue of no less 
centrality. This refers to the appropriate place of Islam in the 
making of this Arab nation of language-history. Arab nationalism 
reflected an ambiguous and complicated relationship with Islam. 
This could be attributed to the absence of a confrontation with 
religious institutions of the kind that took place in Europe. 
Even though some secular aspects were emphasised in countering 
the Ottoman Empire there was not a conflict between Islam and 
' M. 'Abid al-Jabiriy, al-Khitab al-'Arabiy al-Mu'asir: 
Dirasa Tahliyliyya Nagdiyva (Contemporary Arab Discourse: An 
Analytical Critical Study) Third Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat 
al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1988) Arabic Text (Present Author's 
Translation) pp. 101-103. 
8 M.. 'Abid Jabiriy, Interview with the Author, Casablanca; 
2.4.1996 
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Arab nationalism. Arab nationalists did not call for a separation 
between Arabism and Islam. On the contrary Islam was seen in the 
Maghrib countries, for example, as being the content of Arabism. 
Arab nationalism has been attempting to reach some sort of a 
compromise between Islamic tendencies and loyalties amongst the 
majority of the Arabs and the Arabist tendencies and loyalties 
amongst the Arab Christians. ' 
In an attempt to spread loyalty to its doctrines among 
Muslims and Christians, Arab nationalism was hesitating between 
an adherence to Islam or an appraisal of secularism. 10 These two 
forces generate "a sense of identification that cuts across 
boundaries and supersedes, on the ideological level, local 
considerations. "" Nevertheless, Islam maintained its importance 
in Arab nationalism even though it came to refer to Islam not as 
a theology but as national Arab asset and cultural achievement. "Z 
I 'Abudlrahman Muniyf, "al-Qawmiyya, al-Hauwiyya, wa al- 
Thauwra al-'Arabiyya" (Nationalism, Identity and the Arab 
Revolution) in, Isma'iyl Sabriy Abdullah etal, Dirasaat fly al- 
Haraka al-Tagadumiyya al-'Arabiyya (Studies in Arab Progressive 
Movement) First Edition(Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al- 
'Arabiyya, 1987) Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) p. 
79. 
10 Muhammad Shiyya, Jadaliyat al-Tafattut wa al-Wahda fiy 
al-Mashriq al-'Arabiy (1970-1990) (The Dialectic of Unity and 
Fragmentation in the Arab East) First Edition (Beirut; Ma'had al- 
Innmaa al-'Arabiy, 1991) p. 142. 
11 Iliya Harik, "The Origins of the Arab State System" in 
Gassan Salame(ed), The Foundation of the Arab, op. cit, p. 20. 
12 This view dominates the Ba'th ideology. See Iliyas Farah 
"al-Qawmiyya al-'Arabiyya wa al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya min Manzur al- 
Ba'th '' (The Ba'thist View of Arab Nationalism and Arab Unity) in 
Waliyd Qaziyha etal, al-Oawmiyya al-'Arabiyya fiy al-Fikr wa al- 
Mumarasa (Arab Nationalism: Thought and Practice) (Seminar 
Papers) First Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al- 
'Arabiyya, 1980) Arabic Text(Present Author's Translation) pp. 
383-384. 
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This meant, in the 1950s and 1960s, the nationalisation of Islam 
and implied the continuance of the attempt at reaching a 
compromise between Islam and Arabism. 
This hesitation characterised Arab nationalist thought up 
to the 1980s. Particularly important behind this stance were the 
resurgence of Islamic fundamentalist groups and the effects of 
the Iranian revolution on Arab politics. 13 The rise in the power 
of the oil-rich Arab states and its attempts at gaining the 
leading position in the Arab region gave the religious movements 
an incentive using the support and finance they received from 
countries like Saudi Arabia. As George Corom explains, Saudi 
Arabia used Islamic movements, like the Muslim Brotherhood, to 
"impose a sweeping hegemony at the expenses of republican Arab 
countries, nationalism and the new socialism that practised 
hegemony over her [Saudi Arabia] between the 1950s and the 
1970s. j14 How Arab nationalist thought responded to this 
challenge and the ambiguity of the relationship with Islam will 
be the subject of the discussion later on. 
(b) Particularistic Identities 
As has been argued above Arab nationalism rests on the idea 
of a single Arab nation. This nation has a united national 
identity that was the melting pot of factors of language, culture 
13 Halim Barakat, The Arab World: Society, Culture and 
State, First Edition (Berkely; Los Angles; London; University of 
California Press, 1993) pp. 138-139. 
14 George Corom, Uwrubba wa al-Mashriq al-'Arabiy Min al- 
Balaana ila al-Labbnana: Tariykh Hadatha Ghyir Munjaza (Europe 
and the Arab East From Balkanisation to Lebanisation: A History 
of An Unaccomplished Modernity) First Edition (Beirut; Dar al- 
Tali'a, 1990) pp. 205-208. 
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and history. This doctrine rejects the existence of identities 
that are confined to a defined territory of a certain Arab state. 
However, after Arab states gained their independence the question 
of particularistic identities found its political expression. 
Some went as far as providing a reasoning for the existence of 
separate nations such as Lebanese, Egyptian or Tunisian nations. 
In Lebanon there was a call for a Lebanese nationalism that 
despite acknowledging the need for cooperation between Lebanon 
and the rest of the Arab world emphasises the distinctness of 
Lebanese nationalism. 's 
The same applies to the idea of Egyptian nationalism in the 
writings of some intellectuals who denied any importance to 
whatever came after the Pharaohnic civilisation such as 
Arabisation. The late Egyptian famous writer, Taha Husiyn 
(paradoxically enough known as the dean of Arab literature) in 
his early writings emphasised the link between Egypt and Europe 
and overlooked its Arabism. In Tunisia attempts were made at 
building a distinct Tunisian identity. Tunisia's ex-president 
Habiyb Burqiyba insisted on the existence of a Tunisian 
personality that preserved itself even against the process of 
Arabisation. 16 
15 Halim Barakat, al-Mujtama' al-'Arabiy al-Mu'asir: Bahth 
Istitla'iy Ijtima'iy (Contemporary Arab Society: An Exploratory 
Sociological Research) Second Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al- 
Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1985) Arabic text (Present Author's 
Translation) p. 40. 
16 Ibid, pp. 41-43. The debate on the Arabism of Eygpt was 
very intense in the late seventies with intellectuals arguing for 
and against its Arabism. See a record of this debate in Sa'd Diyn 
Ibrahiym, Masr wa al -'Uruwba wa Thauwrat Yuwliyuww(Egypt, Arabism 
and the July Revolution) Second Edition (Cairo; Dar al-Mustaqbal 
al-'Arabiy, 1983) Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) 
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A major part of Arab nationalist discourse in the 1940s and 
the 1950s was assigned the task of refuting the basis of 
particularistic identities, especially with reference to Egypt 
and Lebanon. An example of this occupation with the question is 
that Husry wrote a whole book on the subject. '' Arab nationalist 
thought also rejected claims for the existence of regional 
identities, like the Greater Syrian nationalism advocated by the 
Syrian Nationalist Socialist Party. "' Arab nationalist thought 
was void of any attempt at understanding the issue of 
particularistic identities till the middle of the 1960s. The 
collapse of the union between Egypt and Syria (1961) and the 1967 
defeat had the effect of pushing the Arab nationalist tide away 
from the centre of Arab politics. This brought about a change in 
the doctrinal position toward particularistic identities. 
However, many Arab nationalists still adhered to doctrinal 
orthodoxy and refused to accept the existence of any other 
national identity that would compete with or balance Arab 
nationalist Identity. 
A number of factors highlighted the need for a more 
realistic view. Important among these were the developments that 
followed the 1967 defeat and the division of the Arab states 
between the haves and the havenots. The oil boom after 1973 and 
the failure of attempts of Arab unity were vital in pressing for 
an understanding of particularism. Many Arab writers argued for 
the importance of recognising this particularism. Though a devout 
17 S. Husry, al-'Uruwba Biyna Du'atuha wa Mu'ariduha 
(Arabism: It's Proponents and Opponents) Husry Collected Works 
(Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1985) 
1a Halim Barakat, al-Muitama' al-'Arabiy, op. cit., p. 44. 
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pan-Arabist Constantine Zurayq admitted the fact that the Arabs 
must recognise there multiplicity. He accepts that particularism 
is a natural component of Arab life past and present. He argues 
that even a cause as good as Arab unity should not erode other 
identities. On the contrary, explains Zurayq, these identities 
should be given the chance to flourish and progress so that the 
multiplicity inherent in Arab society may give fruit and be 
enriched by particularisms. 19 
Some would see it the essence of the region's social and 
political order. Arab states were presented not only as "old 
societies but also old states. 112' Arab nationalist thought in an 
attempt to reach a compromise on Arab identity and 
particularistic identities employed the concept of a personality 
system as a device that would provide it with the solution. In 
an article entitled "al-Shakhsiyya al-'Arabiyya: al-Nasaq al- 
Raiyyis wa al-Ansaaq al -Far' iyya"(Arab Personality: the Macro 
System and the Sub-systems), the Egyptian sociologist, Saiyyd 
Yasiyn identified an Arab personality based on history, language, 
and common cultural heritage. Particularistic or regional 
personalities are also seen a fact of Arab society. These are the 
expression of the differences in the social and economic 
evolution of Arab countries. Yasiyn saw no conflict between the 
two systems of identifications. The all- Arab personality is the 
macro system that encompasses the sub-systems without either of 
19 Constantine Zurayq, Nahnuw wa al-Mustagbal (We and the 
Future) (Beirut; Dar al-'Ilm lil Malaaiyyin, 1980) Arabic 
Text(Present Author's Translation) pp. 221-223. 
20 Iliya Harik, "The Origins of the Arab", op. cit., p. 21. 
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the two being closed to the other. 21 
A similar approach, though of a different conclusion, is 
that of the Tunisian sociologist Hisham Djait. He acknowledges 
the existence of an Arab-Islamic personality as the major source 
of identification in the Arab World. But he endorses the 
importance of the role of the particularistic territorial state 
in confirming particularistic identity. Djait confirms that the 
contemporary Arab world is living evidence of the process of 
consolidating the national phenomenon. But this national 
phenomenon is that of the particularistic territorial Arab 
states . 
22 
Although Djait is reflecting on the Tunisian experience, as 
he makes clear throughout the text, he can go as far as depicting 
the concept of an Arab nation as a mere wilful act of raping 
history. He thinks that an Arab nation is not existing and that 
reality proves only an Arab Islamic personality and the 
particularistic personalities. Djait calls upon Arab political 
thinkers to leave aside both personalities altogether, and to 
abandon the ideology that calls for Arab unity on the basis of 
having an Arab nation. He asks Arab thinkers to acknowledge the 
true national factor "associated with the state" and give proper 
21 Saiyyd Yasiyn, "al-Shakhsiyya al-'Arabiyya: al-Nasaq al- 
Raiyyis wa al-Ansaaq al-Far'iyya" (Arab Personality: Macro System 
and Sub-systems) Al-Mustagbal Al-Arabi, vol. 3 (September 1978) 
Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) pp. 145-147. 
22 Hisham Djait, al-Shakhsiyya al-'Arabiyya al-Islamiyya wa 
al-Masiyr al-'Arabia (Arab Islamic Personality and Arab Destiny) 
Second Edition, Translated into Arabic by al-Munjiy al-Saiyydiy, 
(Beirut; Dar al-Tali'a, 1990) Arabic Text (Present Author's 
Translation) pp. 70-75. 
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place to the issues of economy and politics. 23 
These conflicting or overlapping positions are the content 
of the debate on the issue of particularistic identities. This 
dominated Arab political thought in general and Arab nationalist 
thought in particular. Arab nationalist thought had to find 
answers to the challenges this issue brought before it. Till the 
1980s Arab nationalist thought did not reach a conclusion. How 
did Arab nationalist thought in the 1980s attempt to address this 
issue? This will be discussed in the next chapter. 
(c) Minorities 
According to the Egyptian sociologist, Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym 
minorities (ethnic or religious) are a main feature of the Arab 
World. Ibrahiym estimates that 150-8 of the population of the area 
is composed of minority groups. These minorities include groups 
that speak Arabic but do not identify with Arab nationalist 
feelings (e. g. the Maronites in Lebanon), groups that do not 
speak Arabic but are identified as Arabs (e. g. in Somalia, the 
Sudan and North Africa) and groups that neither speak Arabic nor 
identify themselves with the Arabs (e. g. the Kurds, the Berber 
and the Sudanese tribes in the south). 24 
To these may be added the non-Arab groups the oil boom has 
brought to the countries of the Gulf as immigrants from non-Arab 
countries. Studies refer to the fact that about 4201 of the 
23 Ibid, pp. 49-51. 
24 Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym, "Nahuww Dirasa Susiyulujiyya lil 
Wahda: al-Aqaliyyaat fiy al-'Alam al-'Arabiy" (Towards A 
Sociological Study of Unity: Minorities in the Arab Homeland) 
Oadaiyya 'Arabiyya (Arab Issues) Year 3, vol. 3-6 (February-July 
1976) Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) pp. 5-24. 
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population of these countries are not Arabs. 25 Another feature of 
the Arab world is the division of the majority Muslims along the 
lines of Islamic sects of Suni Islam and Shi'a Islam. The 
religious multiplicity of the Arab East where a considerable part 
of the population are Christian Arabs adds to the importance of 
minorities in the Arab World. 26 How did Arab nationalist thought 
deal with the issue of minorities? How did it attempt to 
reconcile plurality and unity? 
Since its inception Arab nationalism recognised the social 
fact of minorities while stressing its humanist nature. As 
chapter two has shown, Arab nationalism was, at some point, 
identified with Christian Arabs. They saw in the nationalist idea 
a way out of their minority position under the millet system of 
the Ottoman empire. However, Arab nationalist thought reflected 
very little on the issue. It dealt with minorities only in a 
manner that would avoid dealing with the problem as if there 
should not be a problem of this kind in the Arab world. 27 This 
view was justified either by reference to Islamic tolerance of 
minorities, or by insisting on the national and humanist nature 
of Arab nationalism and the attempt at providing the secular 
vision of this nationalism however ambiguous it was. 28 
49. 
56. 
25 Halim Barakat, al-Mujtama' al-'Arabiv, op. cit., pp. 48- 
26 Muhammad Shiyya, Jadaliyat al-Tafattut, op. cit., pp. 52- 
27 Ahmed al-Juba'iy, "Utruwhaat Auwaliyya Huwla Tajdiyd al- 
Fikr al-Qawmiy" (Preliminary Theses on the Renewal of Nationalist 
Thought) Al-Mustagbal Al-Arabi, vol. 163 (September 1992) Arabic 
Text (Present Author's Translation) p. 93. 
28 Saiyyd Yasiyn, Tahliyl Madmun, op. cit., pp. 145-146. 
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The attempt by Arab nationalist thought to play down the 
importance of minorities was not in accord with the facts of 
ethnic and religious plurality of the Arab World as depicted 
above. The ethnic minorities are individually relatively small 
in numbers to the extent that the Arab world may be seen as 
homogeneous. But the fact that some minorities tend to be 
concentrated in particular Arab countries and in certain 
geographical parts of some countries makes the issue more 
complicated than seemed to Arab nationalists. 29 It remains to be 
seen how Arab nationalist thought in the period of investigation 
responded to this issue. Was its answer to this challenge a 
distinctive contribution to Arab nationalist ideology? This will 
receive attention later in chapter four. 
(ii) The Concept Of Arab Identity 
As chapter two argued the assertion of Arabs' distinct 
identity is a central concept of Arab nationalist ideology. The 
essence of the idea of the Arab nation is, according to Arab 
nationalist thought, the existence throughout history of an Arab 
identity. This identity is the result of the interaction of the 
elements of shared characteristics among the Arabs. Arab 
nationalism makes this conceived identity the essential 
justification and the logic for Arab unity as the political 
29 Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym, al-Mujtama' wa al-Duwla fiy al-Watan 
al-'Arabiv (Society and State in the Arab Homeland) First Edition 
(Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1988) Arabic Text 
(Present Author's Translation) pp. 241-244. Ibrahiym provides an 
analysis of minorities and compiles tables on linguistic, 
religious(Islamic and other) minorities in the middle of the 
1980s. 
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expression of the existence of the Arab nation. 30 It is mainly on 
the basis of Arabic and a united Arab culture that an Arab 
identity is defined. 
(a) The Primacy of Arabic: One Language-One Nation 
Although Arab nationalism stresses the primacy of Arabic in 
differentiating the Arabs as a nation, that was primarily a 
reflection of its effort at countering the policies of 
Turkification. But this emphasis on the primacy of Arabic became 
a corner stone of Arab nationalism as it went to develop 
ideologically. Arab nationalists like Husry relied heavily on the 
linguistic factor in designing the Arabist ideology. In fact 
Husry went to the extent of ignoring other factors like that of 
economics and geography in the making of Arab national identity. 
Husry considered Arabic to be the spirit of the nation. The same 
kind of argumentation is to be found in the contributions of all 
Arab nationalism theoreticians. They agree on the primacy and 
centrality of Arabic in the making of the Arab nation and Arab 
identity. 31 
When faced with the difficulties in achieving the goal of 
Arab unity Arab nationalists did not see the reason in the 
deficiency inherent in the concept of an Arab identity. They 
tended to ignore or underestimate the multiplicity of identities 
that characterise the Arab. Arab nationalist thought saw the 
30 'Abd Ilah Belgaziyz, Ishkaliyyat al-Wahda, op. cit., pp. 
51-52. 
31 A. al-Duri, "Huwla al-Tatwur al-Tariykhiy lil Umma al- 
'Arabiyyal'(On The Historical Evolution of the Arab Nation), in 
Waliyd Qaziyha etal, al-Oawmiyva al-'Arabiyya, op. cit., pp. 221- 
227. 
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failure to achieve unity not in the multitude of identities, such 
as Islamic identity, particularistic identities and ethnic 
identities, but rather in the lack of independence of the Arab 
countries. Later on after independence the causes were seen in 
the absence of political regimes that shared an adherence to Arab 
nationalism. When the 1950s and the 1960s witnessed the rising 
to political power of such regimes like that of Nasser in Egypt 
and the Ba'thist regimes in Syria and Iraq, Arab nationalist 
thought still stressed the absence of a pan-Arab party that would 
propagate and achieve Arab unity (despite the fact that such a 
party, the Ba' th, existed and gained political power in Syria and 
Iraq) . 
32 
Arab unity still remained a remote possibility and Arab 
nationalist thought was still focusing on the concept of an Arab 
identity based on the linguistic factor. Obviously Arabic was a 
reference to classical written Arabic. But that would not 
accommodate the considerable gap between classical Arabic and the 
Arabic spoken with a variety of dialects in the Arab world. 33 
Arab nationalists faced the challenge related to the gap between 
written and spoken Arabic and more seriously the call for some 
dialects to be upgraded to the level of a national language as 
the case with some proponents of Egyptian nationalism. 34 But 
their position would still emphasise the unity of Arabic as the 
32 Nadiym Biytar, Huwduwd al-Hauwiyya al-Oawmiyya" Nagd 
'Aam( The Limits of National Identity: A General Critique) First 
Edition (Beirut; Dar al-Wahda, 1982) Arabic Text (Present 
Author's Translation) pp. 303-304. 
33 Halim Barakat, al-Mujtama' al-'Arabiy, op. cit., p. 36. 
34 Saiyyd Yasiyn, Tahliyl Madmun, op. cit., pp. 96-98. 
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first and foremost component of Arab identity. That characterised 
Arab nationalist thought till the 1980s. Given this position it 
is important to discover how the contributions of Arab 
nationalist thought in the 1980s would tackle this issue of 
language-identity-nation. 
(b) Cultural Nationalism: A United Arab Culture 
The concept of a united Arab culture is another basic 
component of Arab nationalism's theory of Arab identity. As a 
result of having a single language Arab nationalist thought sees 
the Arabs as sharing all aspects of a united culture that cuts 
across boundaries. The Arabs have a common shared way of life, 
value orientations, beliefs, norms and customs and traditions. 35 
Arab nationalist ideology can only see conformity in all cultural 
aspects that give the Arabs their national distinctiveness. 
As the intellectual history of Arab nationalism outlined in 
chapter two showed, Arab nationalism employed this concept of a 
united Arab culture from its early stages. It was a way of 
countering Turkish attempts to deny the Arabs their identity. 
This concept was employed to give the call for the separation 
from the Ottoman Empire a legitimising tool in opposition to 
Ottoman use of Islamic identity. Ever since the concept of a 
united Arab culture maintained its position at the back bone of 
Arab nationalism up to the period of investigation. 36 
Husry, for example, saw the possibility of achieving Arab 
's George Tarabiyshiy, al-Duwla al-Outriyya, on. cit., pp. 
131-132. 
36 An example can be seen in, A. Duri, "Huwla al-Tatwun" 
op. cit., pp. 221-227. 
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political unity in maintaining and consolidating this cultural 
unity. He believed that: "the unification of culture is one of 
the most important factors of preparing for all other forms of 
unification. I say: give me the unity of culture and I guarantee 
you whatever else of forms of unity. , 37 A. Duri also said that 
Arab nationalism is a cultural nationalism that relies on 
the cultural components of the Arab nation. The [concept 
of] Arab nation had formed around language, Arabisation, 
cultural heritage, and the historical role of the Arabs. 38 
The tendency to concentrate on the unity of Arab culture can 
be explained by the borrowing from the German romantic theory of 
nationalism, in particular the prominence it assigns to the 
cultural factors over the political factors of nationalism. The 
development of this Arab cultural nationalism was to reflect the 
response Arab nationalist thought had to provide in its attempt 
to explain the fragmentation of the Arab world after the Second 
World War. The ideology had to account for the creation of 
separate Arab states that did not correspond with the Arabist 
model of a united Arab state. The cultural tendency of Arab 
nationalism was an attempt at recreating the past which is 
interpreted as that of a glorious and united Arab nation. 
But realities were a living verdict on the defeat of this 
perceived history. Arab nationalist thought retired from the 
political aspects of nationalism and concentrated its efforts on 
building a cultural brand of nationalism. Its aim, as with other 
cultural nationalism, became the "moral regeneration of the 
37 Cited in George Tarabiyshiy, al-Duwla al-Outriyva, op. 
cit., p. 64. 
3e A. Duri, Al-Budhuwwr al-Tarikhiyya lil Oawmiyya al- 
'Arabiyya, (Beirut; Dar al-'Ilm lil Malaaiyyin, 1960) pp. 87-91. 
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historic community, or, in other words, the re-creation of their 
distinctive national civilization. jj39 The dominance of cultural 
Arab nationalism resulted in the negligence of Arab nationalist 
thought to elaborate theoretically on the issue of the state and 
to abhor political boundaries. 40 This seemed, in the language of 
George Tarabiyshiy, like "transforming necessity to virtue. " If 
the Arab is not able to live in a united Arab state then all the 
Arab land becomes his homeland since the united Arab culture is 
able to transcend political boundaries. " 
Arab nationalist thought draws on the idea of cultural 
nationalism in which 
the spirit of community that obtains in a cultural nation 
is founded upon seemingly objective criteria such as common 
heritage and language, a distinct area of settlement, 
religion, customs, and history, and does not need to be 
mediated by a national state or other political form. 42 
Arab nationalism shares the general tendency of cultural 
nationalism to assign a sacred value to the concept of nation. 
This seems to be a static concept of a united culture that defies 
change. Cultural Arab nationalism had entered into endless 
debates and controversies concerning Arab culture itself. 
Of importance was the debate on the place of Islam in the 
39 John Hutchinson, "Cultural Nationalism and Moral 
Regeneration", in John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith(eds), 
Nationalism, First Edition (Oxford; New York; Oxford University 
Press, 1994) pp. 122-124. 
4° Examples of this tendency, or, deficiency, could be seen 
in the attempt at denying any relationship between state and 
nation as made by Arab nationalist thinkers like Husry. This will 
be dealt with some detail in 3-2 below. 
70. 
41 George Tarabiyshiy, al-Duwla al-Outriyya, op. cit., p. 
42 Peter Alter, Nationalism, Translated by Stuart McKinnon- 
Evans, First Edition (London; Edward Arnold, 1989) p. 14. 
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making of this culture. Some Arab nationalists would see Islam 
as the main component of Arab culture seeing it as an Arab- 
Islamic culture. Others would see an Arab culture as dating back 
to the periods before the advent of Islam in the Arabian 
peninsula and beyond it. 43 However mainstream Arab nationalist 
thought until the 1980s would employ the traditional reliance on 
compromise that marks Arab thought in general since its modern 
encounter with Europe. 44 The conclusion it reaches is that Arab 
culture encompasses Islam which is seen as the historical 
accomplishment of the Arab nation. 45 This debate was not only the 
character of Arab nationalist thought but contemporary Arab 
thought in general. 46 It would be interesting to see how Arab 
nationalist thought in the 1980s debated the issue of a united 
Arab culture within the general framework of Arab thought's 
debate on Arab nationalism and unity. 
(iii) Arab Unity 
The goal of uniting the Arabs in one single state has been 
a driving force behind Arab nationalism. The issues of Arab 
43 For a brief discussion see Halim Barakat, The Arab World, 
op. cit., pp. 36-38. 
44 According to Muhammad Jabir Ansariy, Arab thought is an 
expression of intellectual attempts at reconciling Arab Islamic 
heritage and western values. See his, Tahuwlaat al-Fikr wa al- 
Siyyasa fiy al-Sharq al-'Arabiy (1930-1970), First Edition 
(Kuwait; al-Majlis al-Wataniy lil Thaqafa wa al-Fuwnuwn wa al- 
Adaab, 1980) 
45 Saiyyd Yasiyn, Tahliyl Madmun, op. cit., pp. 100-102. 
46 'Ali Umliyl, al-Islahiyya al-'Arabiyya wa al-Duwla al- 
Wataniyya(Arab Reformism and the National State) First Edition 
(Casablanca; al-Markaz al-Thaqafiy al-'Arabiy, 1985) Arabic Text 
(Present Author's Translation) pp. 13-29. 
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unity, its reasoning, its benefits for the Arabs, and the 
handicaps it faces form the bulk of this ideology. 47 Arab unity 
is assigned the greatest value. Arab nationalist thought 
considers Arab unity as a necessity that ought to be achieved if 
the Arab nation is to preserve its national identity. There is 
a continuous effort at defining this concept and defending it. 
The late Egyptian president Nasser confirmed that: 
the Arab nation no longer needs to prove the reality of 
unity amongst its peoples. Arab unity has left this stage 
behind to become the fact of Arab existence par excellence. 
Suffice that the Arab nation owns a unity of language that 
produces unity of thought and reason, that the Arab nation 
owns the unity of history that produces unity of conscience 
and sentiment, and enough that the Arab nation owns unity 
of hope that produces unity of future and destiny. 48 
This emotional intellectual argumentation reflects the 
general outlook of Arab nationalist writings. The text quoted 
above combines the three main factors, language, culture, and 
history, that Arab nationalist ideology employs. It is a 
statement on the importance Arab nationalist thought attaches to 
these factors as the proof of Arab national status. How did Arab 
nationalist thought became occupied with the idea of Arab unity? 
How did it explain the discrepancy between the ideal and reality? 
This is the focus of the discussion below. 
(a) Pan -Arabism: One Nation-One State 
The history of Arab nationalism since after the Second World 
47 Saiyyd Yasiyn, Tahliyl Madmun, op. cit., pp. 54-60, pp. 
89-95, pp. 133-143, pp. 175-186. 
48 Gamal 'Abdul Nasser, Falsafat al-Thauwra wa al-Miythag wa 
Barnamaj Thalathiyn Maris(Philosophy of the Revolution, the 
National Charter and the Programme of 30th March) (Tripoli; Dar 
Maktabat al-Fikr, n. d. ) Arabic Text (Present Author's 
Translation) p. 170. 
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War, and the many ill fated experiments at Arab political unity, 
could be summed up in the prevalence of a dream. The dream and 
quest for Arab unity and the challenge the reality of Arab 
politics represented are basic features of contemporary Arab 
history. As the chapter on the evolution of Arab nationalism 
showed, the idea of uniting the Arabs was the product of Arab 
nationalist thought of the early twentieth century. However the 
idea was then suffering from ambiguities concerning its 
geographical scope and extent. The unclear boundaries of the 
proposed Arab state were an expression of the nature of Arab 
nationalism at that historical juncture. 
Arab nationalism suffered from ideological uncertainties as 
it was born during a process of breaking away from the Ottoman 
Empire. That was reflected in the hesitant position Arab 
nationalist thought took as far as issues of Islamic, 
particularistic, and regional loyalties were concerned. However 
important these developments were, they did not give the idea of 
Arab unity the pan-Arab character it later on developed. The idea 
was reflecting the critical juncture Arab nationalism was going 
through. The colonisation of the Arab world by the European 
powers and its expansion after the Second World War had enormous 
effects on the idea of unity. It was vital and instrumental in 
giving the idea its pan-Arab character. 49 The call for Arab unity 
was a defensive tool that Arab nationalists used in an attempt 
at eradicating the political fragmentation the area suffered at 
the hands of European colonial powers. Unity, which the Arabs 
49 'Abd Ilah Belqaziyz, Ishkaliyyat al-Wahda , op. cit., pp. 14-16. 
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enjoyed some degree of under the Ottoman Empire, was by now no 
longer present. Therefore the achievement of unity was seen as 
a counter-colonial goal. 
Yasiyn's work provides enough evidence to support the 
argument presented here. His study demonstrates that before the 
First World War Arab nationalist thought expressed only a limited 
concern with the external factors as impeding Arab unity (only 
15-06 of the samples analyzed). By contrast external factors 
(colonialism) were highlighted during the inter-war period (29'k 
of the research sample) as the most obvious handicaps to Arab 
unity. European powers (essentially Britain) were blamed as being 
responsible for the political fragmentation of the Arabs. 50 The 
fact that the Arab East was experiencing political fragmentation 
more than were other parts of the Arab World confined the call 
for unity to its limited geographical scope. Arab nationalists 
called for the restoration of the Fertile Crescent's unity 
against colonial fragmentation. However, the call for Arab unity 
was to encompass all the Arab World. The struggle for 
independence, the Palestinian problem, and the establishment of 
Pan Arab political parties were essential for this development. 5' 
Prominent among the pan-Arab political parties was the 
`League for National [i. e. Arab] Action'. The League was 
established in 1933 by a group of Syrian and Lebanese 
intellectuals. Prominent among them was Z. al-Arsuziy who was its 
ideologue. The League disseminated literature emphasising the 
so Saiyyd Yasiyn, Tahliyl Madmun, op. cit., pp. 44-54, pp. 
92-93. 
51 'Abd Ilah Belqaziyz, Interview with the Author, Rabat; 
4.4.1996 
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connection between independence and Arab unity. 52 The Ba' th party 
owes its Arab nationalist ideology to the founders of the League 
of National Action. It is to the Ba'th that the Arab nationalist 
ideology in general and the idea of Arab unity in particular is 
to be credited. As has been demonstrated in chapter two, Arab 
nationalist ideology was to become from the 1950s onwards the 
intellectual domain of the Ba'th and Nasserism. It is in the 
Ba'thist and Nasserite ideologies that the idea of Arab unity was 
to develop in its Arab ideal. 
The establishment of the League of the Arab States in 1945 
was closely linked with the idea of Arab unity. Arab nationalist 
thought is characterised by debates on the nature of the League 
itself, the role British interests had in its establishment, and 
the gap between state-oriented factors and pan-Arab factors in 
its charter. 53 These debates conflict in their estimations on the 
relationship between the League and the idea of Arab unity. 54 
These debates are not of concern here as they go beyond the scope 
of this research. However, the League of the Arab States played 
an important role as an institutional framework for the Arab 
system of states. The League succeeded in implementing many pan- 
52 'Abd Ilah Belqaziyz, Ishkaliyyat al-Wahda, op. it., pp. 
19-20. 
sa See, for example, the collection of papers presented in 
a seminar on the Arab League published in 'Ali Muhafadah etal, 
Jami'at al-Duwal al-'Arabiyya: al-Wagi' wa al-Tumuuh (The League 
of Arab States: Reality and Hope) (Seminar Papers) First Edition 
(Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1989) Arabic Text 
(Author's Translation) 
54 Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, 'tMiythaaq al-Jami'a al-'Arabiyya 
biyna al-Qutriyya wa al-Qawmiyya"(The Charter of the Arab League 
Between Particularism and Nationalism), in 'Ali Muhafadah etal, 
Jami'at al-Duwal al-'Arabiyva, op. cit., pp. 77-95. 
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Arab projects and remained the only viable framework for the idea 
of Arab unity. ss Arab nationalists occupied as they were with the 
concept of an Arab nation, saw the achievement of the pan-Arab 
state as the political embodiment of national identity. 
(b) Pan-Arab State or Particularistic Territorial State 
One clear characteristic of Arab political writings in 
general and Arab nationalist thought in particular is the limited 
space state occupies in its inquiry. Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym sees this 
as the case with Arab political thought until the abolishment of 
the Caliphate system in 1924. After that he identifies an 
interest with the state but only in repeating the traditional 
Islamic concept of state as authority, echoing western literature 
on state, and some attempts at compromising these two 
traditions. 56 Only with some exceptions, Arab studies about state 
are very limited. 57 This phenomenon can be explained, partially 
at least, by the animosity many Arab nationalists have towards 
the Arab state system. This is particularly obvious in the works 
of Arab nationalists in the Arab East. They felt that the states 
of the region were a part of the colonial settlements after the 
First World War and as an imperial device to blow up the idea of 
es Jamiyl Mattar, "al-Tajarub al-Wahdawiyya al-Wadifiyya: 
al-Jami'a al-'Arabiyya" (Functional Unification Experiments: the 
Arab League), in Waliyd Qaziyha etal, al-Oawmiyya al-'Arabiyya, 
op. cit., pp. 485-495. 
s6 Sal d Diyn Ibrahiym, al-Mu-j tama' wa al-Duwla, op. cit., 
pp. 85-101. 
57 Charles Butterworth, al-Duwla wa al-Sulta fiy al-Fikr al- 
Siyyasiy al-'Arabiv (State and Authority in Arab Political 
Thought) Translated to Arabic by M. A. Shuman, First Edition 
(London; Dar al-Saqi, 1990) Arabic Text (Present Author's 
Translation) pp. 5-6. 
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a united Arab state. 58 
The view in the Arab West, Maghrib, is considerably 
different. Writers in the Maghrib view positively the states of 
their region. They credit these states with national legitimacy 
that they acquired during the struggle for independence. 59 They 
do not share with writers of the Arab east their animosity 
towards their states and their writings remained a minority. 60 
Contributions of writers from the Maghrib, however, have 
increased in margin and importance since the mid 1970s. These 
contributions will be given appropriate consideration in 3-2 
below. 
In the Arab east where the mainstream Arab nationalist 
thought originated this hostile attitude towards the state 
resulted in what may be seen as an intellectual or 
epistemological poverty of Arab nationalist thought as far as the 
state is concerned. 61 The insistence of Arab nationalist thought 
to deny Arab states any legitimacy is a basic feature of it. 62 
58 Elbaki Hermassi, al-Duwla wa al-Mujtama' fly al-Maghrib 
al-'Arabiv (Society and State in the Arab Maghrib) First Edition 
(Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1987) Arabic Text 
(Present Author's Translation) p. 38. 
59 This is the view shared by all Moroccan intellectuals 
interviewed by the author of this research. 
60 Elbaki Hermassi, "State Building and Regime Performance 
in the Greater Maghreb", in Gassan Salame(ed), The Foundation of 
the Arab, op. cit., pp. 75-77. 
61 M. 'Abid Jabiriy interview with the author; Kamal 
Abdullatiyf, Interview with the author( Rabat; 8.4.1996). 
62 Mas'uwd Daher, "al-Qawmiy wa al-Qutriy fiy al-Fikr al- 
'Arabiy 'ala Mashaarif al-Tis'iynaat"(the Particularistic and the 
National in Arab Thought at the Door Step of the 1990s)Al-Wahda, 
(Unity) vol. 75 (December 1990) Arabic Text (Present Author's 
Translation) p. 16. 
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Pan-Arabism is then the desire to establish a united Arab state 
that would do away with all these states. Arab nationalism 
considers this hoped-for pan-Arab state as the only legitimate 
form of political organisation. The true and natural state is 
"the national state whose authority is coterminous with the 
nation. 63 
Another aspect of Arab nationalist thought is the conceptual 
ambivalence in the use of terminology that describes the Arab 
states, (in Arabic: al-duwla al-qutriyya) . Sovereign Arab states 
are labelled by Arab nationalists by using terms like: 
territorial state, domestic state, and regional state. These 
references are common in Arab nationalist writings since the end 
of the Second World War. 64 This ambivalence is particularly 
evident in coining a term to define this phenomenon and the 
pointless quibble about terms. The quibble is evidence of the 
centrality of the pan-Arab state in Arab nationalism. It also 
shows the effect of borrowing the concept of the nation-state on 
developing an Arab theory of nationalism. " 
63 Iliya Harik, "the Origins of the Arab", op. cit., p. 20. 
64 Examples are numerous: see George Tarabiyshiy, al-Duwla 
al-Outriyva, op. cit., in which the term territorial is used 
throughout. Bassam Tibi, "Redefining the Arab and Arabism in the 
Aftermath of the Gulf Crisis", in Dan Tschirgi(ed), The Arab 
World Today, (Boulder and London; Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994) 
p. 136. 
65 In order to avoid this it is proposed here to use the 
term "Particularistic Territorial State" in reference to Arab 
sovereign states. This term is coined because it contains three 
essentially bound characteristics of these states: first, it 
meets the need to acknowledge that each Arab sovereign entity is 
a state; second, the adjective: particularistic identifies them 
as insisting on certain characteristics in contrast to the idea 
of pan-Arab state and the word territorial refers to the fact 
they practice jurisdiction over a particular territory in 
contrast to the territorial boundaries of the Arab homeland that 
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If Arab nationalism has no tolerance for the particularistic 
territorial state, then what is the form of this proposed pan- 
Arab state? The question is justified on the grounds that as 
being the ideal of Arab nationalism, the pan-Arab state must have 
a clear political form of organisation and a plan to achieve it. 
The question about the organisation of this hoped-for state also 
finds justification in the fact of Arab political realities. The 
gap between hope and reality has remained unbridgeable since the 
struggle to achieve independence. In the words of Hisham Sharabi, 
"today's sovereign and independent Arab states are the living 
refutation of the goal of Arab nationalism and unity. , 66 The gap 
between dream and reality calls for an examination into the 
design of the pan-Arab state. 
The contribution of Kawakibiy in calling for an Arab 
caliphate was a landmark in the development of Arab nationalism. 
Kawakibiy called for an Arab state and for the Arab independence 
from the yolk of the Turks. He envisaged an Arab state defined 
in federalist terms. The Arab Congress in Paris, 1913, however, 
marked a retreat from complete Arab independence and called for 
the political decentralisation of the Ottoman Empire. Tarabiyshiy 
saw in this what he described as a selective compromising 
interpretation of nationalism. Tarabiyshiy considers the call for 
granting the Arabs limited rights within the Ottoman Empire an 
Arab nationalism employs. 
66 Hisham Sharabi, "Unity, Disunity, and the Fragmentation 
in the Arab World", in Edward Said and Fuad Suleiman(eds), The 
Arabs Today: Alternatives for Tomorrow, First Edition (Ohio; 
Forum Association Inc., 1973) p. 137. 
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attempt to substitute cultural identity for nationalism. 67 
The call for a united Arab state remained unclear before 
Husry made his contribution. Husry was determined in separating 
Islamic unity from Arab unity. He made every effort to theorise 
the idea of uniting the Arabs from the Atlantic to the Gulf. He 
saw in the call for a pan-Arab state an organic relationship 
between nation and state. He thought that such a relationship 
imposes the need for the realisation of a united Arab-state. 68 
The bulk of Arab nationalist thought is echoing Husry's kind of 
argumentation. 69 As to what form this pan-Arab state should take, 
Arab nationalist thought insisted before 1945 on the idea of a 
united federal Arab state. This was clear in the writings of Arab 
nationalists who attributed all the good to this form of 
political organisation. 
However, Arab nationalist thought was void of any detailed 
and defined strategy and stopped short of defining what it meant. 
This was reflected in the many proposed unities between Arab 
states in the 1940s. Among these were projects to unite Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Jordan which was proposed in 1937; to 
unite Syria, Jordan, and Palestine in a greater Syria in 1941; 
and the Fertile Crescent project of uniting Syria, Jordan, 
Lebanon and Palestine. The establishment of the League of the 
Arab States in 1945 and the failure of the unification projects 
to materialise led to a debate on the issue of the constitutional 
62. 
67 George Tarabiyshiy, al-Duwla al-Outriyya, op. cit., p. 
68 Saiyyd Yasiyn, Tahliyl Madmun, op. cit., p. 104, p. 77. 
69 Sa'id Bensa'id, "Al-Watan and A1-Umma", op. cit., pp. 
164-166. 
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framework of Arab unity. The debate concerned the preference to 
either the unionist (indimajiyya) or the federalist options for 
the Arab nation-state. The debate was on whether to opt for the 
first or the second. The first, unionist, option was seen as 
compatible with the dream of a united Arab state. But the 
collapse of the Egyptian-Syrian unity (1958-1961) delivered a 
blow to this idea. 
The federalist option, however, was a point of agreement 
among Arab nationalists. 70 The establishment of the League of the 
Arab States was seen by many Arab nationalists as a development 
hindering the prospects for Arab unity. Arab nationalist thought 
saw the League as a confederation of Arab states that would lend 
legitimacy to the particularistic territorial states. At best the 
League was seen as a project that would only express cooperation 
at face value. 'Aflaq, for instance, saw the idea of 
confederation as beneficial only to colonialism and "a mistaken 
and harmful conception of unity legitimising and consolidating 
fragmentation and developing and widening the factors of 
difference between the Arab countries. t17' This shows the effects 
of the theoretical rejection of the particularistic territorial 
states. It expresses an ideology that "negates the existing Arab 
nation-states. 1172 
However, the short lived Egyptian-Syrian unity obliged Arab 
nationalist thought to consider the shortcomings of its approach 
70 Saiyyd Yasiyn, Tahliyl Madmun, op. cit., pp. 103-104, pp. 
134-135. 
135. 
71 Cited in, Saiyyd Yasiyn, Tahliyl Madmun, op. cit., p. 
72 Bassam Tibi, "Redefining the Arab", op. cit., p. 136. 
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to unity. Arab nationalist thought after 1961 had to recognise 
the need for an evolutionary step-by-step approach to Arab 
unity. 73 The net result of this was that Arab nationalists kept 
the belief that the federalist model was the best option but with 
an obvious tendency to recognise realities. The difficulties 
inherent in the call for federation reflected the weight of the 
realities of Arab politics and the strengthening of the identity 
of particularistic territorial states. 74 
However there remained some Arab nationalists who still 
labelled these states as alien creations. States were seen as a 
phenomenon made in Europe and in collision with "grass-roots 
political culture (based on a `pan' concept. l175 The same applies 
to the issue of uniting a number of Arab countries within certain 
geographical areas of the Arab World. Arab nationalists are 
divided on this issue. Some Arab writers would see the 
establishment of such politically united geographical regions, 
or sub-regions, as a step towards the end goal of Arab unity. 
Some would reject it as impediments to Arab unity. 76 
These debates are focal issues of Arab nationalist thought. 
Evaluating the contributions and the ideological premises of Arab 
nationalist thought before the 1980s is vital in determining its 
nature. The rest of this chapter will, therefore, turn its 
attention at providing a critique of traditional, classical Arab 
73 'Abd Ilah Belqaziyz, Interview with the author. 
74 Saiyyd Yasiyn, Tahliyl Madmun, op. cit., p. 165, p. 179. 
75 Bahgat Korany "Alien and Besieged Yet Here to Stay: the 
Contradiction of the Arab Territorial State", in Gassan 
Salame(ed), The Foundation of the Arab, op. cit., p. 48. 
76 Saiyyd Yasiyn, Tahliyl Madmun, op. cit., p. 140. 
123 
nationalist thought. The critique provided in 3-2 below will 
serve as a background to the issues that will be raised in 
chapter four and as a methodological tool to be applied in 
analysing Arab nationalist thought in the 1980s. 
3-2: Traditional Arab Nationalist Thought: A Critique 
After the 1967 defeat in the war with Israel, Arab thought 
witnessed the growth of a new trend that strongly criticised all 
aspects of Arab life. This critical trend blamed the Arab way of 
life and Arab thought for all woes of Arab politics and held it 
responsible for the defeat. Particular emphasis was put on the 
deficiencies in Arab nationalist thought. The critics saw Arab 
thought in general and nationalist thought in particular as 
essentially not living up to the realities of Arab society. The 
critics concentrated their attack on Arab nationalist thought as 
presented in the works of its main theoreticians. Arab 
nationalist thought up to 1967 was seen by the critics of the 
1970s and the 1980s as suffering from great deficiencies, 
theoretical loopholes, and epistemological and ideological 
problems. 
The critics whilst emphasising these characteristics of Arab 
nationalist thought were seeking the restructuring of this 
thought. They attempted to rid Arab nationalist thought of its 
deficiencies in order to respond to the crisis of Arab politics. 
However most of their arguments did not provide coherent 
alternatives as disagreements remained evident. Although much of 
the criticism presented here dates to the 1980s, all of it is 
concerned with Arab nationalist thought up to 1967. The 
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contributions discussed below are basically of criticism and not 
of solutions to the problems they identified as characterising 
Arab nationalist thought up to 1967. The issues which formed the 
content of these criticisms were to become the subject of the new 
contributions of the 1980s. What is presented here are the issues 
that were the focus of the critical trend in the 1970s and the 
1980s. 
Although the 1967 defeat seemed to have put the Nasserite 
and other Arab nationalist regimes and their brand of Arab 
nationalism on trial, many Arab intellectuals did not look into 
the issue in that way. Rather the critics saw the problem as 
lying in Arab thought and Arab way of life and society. The 
Moroccan scholar 'Abdullah Laroui, in a book that appeared first 
in French in 1967 and was translated into Arabic after the 1967 
defeat, criticised the realities of Arab life and politics and 
ideology. Laroui put forward new questions that dealt with issues 
of historical depth and sought to transcend appearances. Laroui's 
study was an indictment of Arab ideology and culture which he 
considered needed to rid itself of many aspects of its content 
in order to live up to the challenges of modernity. " 
The call for modernity was the essence of the contribution 
of Zurayq. He has been occupied with issues related to 
rationalism and modernity as early as 1939 when he published his 
" 'Abdullah Laroui, al-IdvuluZiyya al-'Arabiyya al-Mu'asira 
(Contemporary Arab Ideology) Third Edition, Translated into 
Arabic by M. 'Itaniy (Beirut; Dar al-Haqiqa, 1979) Arabic Text 
(Present Author's Translation). See also, Adyyib Nassuwr, al- 
Naksa wa al-Khata (The Setback and the Misconception) First 
Edition (Beirut; Dar al-Kaatib al-'Arabiy, 1969) Arabic Text 
(Present Author's Translation) pp. 31-40. 
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book, al-Wa'iy al-Qawmiy. 78 Zurayq complains that the Arabs still 
lack the modern requirements of a modern future. Unless a certain 
degree of progress, cohesion and rationality is achieved Arab 
nationalism would not be able to realise its goals. 79 Zurayq 
believes that all what Arabs need is a rational revolution and 
rationalism that they ought to borrow from the European model. 
Rationalism is the only relevant tool by which the Arabs may 
realise how backward they are and therefore liable to self- 
criticism. 80 Zurayq's call is driven by his sincere desire that 
the Arabs may lead themselves into a new life. He envisages this 
new life as that based on confronting 
whatever may obstruct its way of the chains of both past 
and present or dreams of the future that are solely based 
upon wishful thinking or imagination. These are unable to 
find the path of conscious rational or true science. 81 
The wave of criticism was gathering momentum with the 
participation of intellectuals of different ideological 
orientations. A group of intellectuals called for a breakaway 
with all Arab past, heritage and tradition. They saw the maladies 
of the Arabs as taking root in the way they approached issues of 
78 Constantine Zurayq, al-Wa'it' al-Oawmiy (Nationalist 
Conscious) (Beirut; Dar al-Makshuwf, 1939) pp. 8-9. 
79 Constantine Zurayq, Matalib al-Mustagbal al-'Arabiy: 
Humuwm wa Tasauwlaat (The Requirements of Arab Future: Distresses 
and Inquiries) First Edition(Beirut; Dar al-'Ilm lil Malaaiyyin, 
1983) p. 7. 
80 Constantine Zurayq, "Fiy Ma'rakat al-Hazara" (in The 
Battle of Civilisation), in Ahmed Hasan al-Zaiyyat etal, Oiraat 
fiy al-Fikr al-Oawmiy al-'Arabiy: al-Kitab al-Thalith: al- 
Oawmiyya al-'Arabiyya wa al-Islam wa al-Insaniyya, First Edition 
(Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1994) pp. 298-303. 
81 Constantine Zurayq, "Muwqifuna min Tariykhuna"(the View 
Towards Our History), in Ahmed Hasan Al-Zaiyyat etal, Oiraat fiy 
al-Fikr al-Oawmiy al-'Arabiy op. cit., p. 85. 
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modern life. The Arabs, according to these intellectuals, were 
not capable of adjusting to the modern age because they were 
still attached to their past glories and their traditions. The 
net result was that the present day Arab was living in the atomic 
age but with a mentality of the middle ages. This kind of 
criticism first appeared in a magazine, Mawagif (Standpoints), 
which a group of intellectuals led by the Syrian poet and 
intellectual 'Ali Ahmed Sa'iyd, whose pen name was Adonis, 
launched in Beirut in 1968. Adonis and his colleagues made an 
attack on virtually every thing Arab. Nothing would escape their 
attack: Islam, Arabic language, the record of radical Arab 
regimes and the Arab in his individual capacity. 
The clear answer to the Arab dilemma which they propagated 
was very strong and controversial as well as touching upon the 
very core of Arab culture. The Arabs "must confront (our) 
heritage, (our) tradition; (we) must slay the past (if we want) 
to liberate the present. il B2 Described by F. Ajami as "one of the 
most impressive and controversial pieces in Arabic political 
writing in recent times" a book written by the Syrian thinker 
Sadiq al-'Azm (al-Naqd al Dhatiy Ba'd al-Haziyma, Self-Criticism 
after Defeat), expressed the ideas and thoughts of these 
critics. 83 The manner in which the book dealt with Arab issues 
was described by M. Kerr as "the most scathing of all indictment 
of Arab society and culture. 1184 
82 F. Ajami, The Arab Predicament: Arab Thought and Practice 
Since 1967 (London; Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 32-35. 
83 Ibid, p. 37. 
84 Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd Al-Nasser and 
His Rivals (1958-1970), Third Edition (New York; Oxford 
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'Azm sought to find the real causes of the military defeat 
not in strategy but in the state of Arab society. He found Arab 
society full of political and social practices incompatible with 
the modern age. Religion and particularly Islam was seen by 'Azm 
as hindering any prospect of progress and as responsible for the 
fatalism that made it possible for the Arab to escape individual 
responsibility. Depicting Arab conceptions of politics as 
illogical, 'Azm turns his attention to radical Arab regimes and 
their brand of politics and nationalism. 'Azm heavily criticised 
and indicted them for making popular myths about politics and 
revolution. He saw them as lacking any sense of revolution or 
progress and only producing rhetoric which served no goal of the 
Arabs . 
85 
'Azm showed that all these problems were in fact connected 
to the Arab view of themselves and their failure to abandon their 
past. 'Azm had no doubts that all aspects of Arab life must be 
abandoned. But what was his alternative if all aspects of Arab 
life, heritage, religion and culture were to be overthrown? 
'Azm's answer springs from a Marxist approach that has a very 
strong contempt for tradition. He considers that only the total 
destruction of tradition would lead to the creation of a brighter 
future. These two processes are inseparable: if the first task 
is not accomplished then the achievement of the future is 
entirely impossible and any attempt to ignore this would end in 
futility. 
The same kind of argumentation was repeated by 'Azm in a 
University Press, 1971) p. 135. 
85 F. Ajami, The Arab Predicament, op. cit., pp. 38-44. 
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book entitled, 'Naqd al-Fikr al-Diniy (A Criticism of Religious 
Thought) . In this 
book he rejected any form of religious thought 
as it epitomised metaphysical thought and mysticism. Religion is 
metaphysics that "justified the de facto social, economic and 
political situations and has always been the greatest ever 
fortified castle that stood in the way of those who make efforts 
at revolutionary change. " 'Azm rejected heritage because it 
considered "all the fundamental facts and knowledge that relate 
to human life as being revealed once and for all at a particular 
moment in history ... therefore, the 
believers are always looking 
to the back and past. 1186 
The same line of thought was also followed by Adonis who, 
by utilising his abilities as a poet, looked into some aspects 
of the Arab literary heritage. Adonis's views are best expressed 
in a book entitled, `al-Thabit wa al-Mutahauwil: Bahth fiy al- 
Ibbda' wa al-Ittiba' 'Ind al-'Arab' (the Permanent and the 
Changing: A Study of Arab Conformity and Creativity, 3 vols. ). 
Adonis saw the ills of the Arabs as the result of the 
confrontation and struggle between the culture of the past with 
its insistence on conformity and the culture of change. He 
presented a critical study of Arab thought in politics, political 
movements, and all cultural products of Islam. 
Adonis concluded that all these aspects provide evidence to 
portray Arab culture as a culture of conformity and tradition. 
Arab culture expresses nostalgia with the past, metaphysics, 
separation between discourse and content and a contradiction with 
86 Sadiq 'Azm, Nagd al-Fikr al-Diniv (Criticism of Religious 
Thought) Beirut; Dar al-Tali'a, 1969) Arabic Text (Present 
Author's Translation) pp. 22-23. 
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modernity. This kind of culture is the real cause behind the Arab 
being incompetent and "the personality of the Arab as the case 
with his culture is bound by the past. X87 Adonis concentrated his 
effort on the struggle between the values of the past and the 
values of future change. He called for the rejection of heritage 
and called for secularism. " 
This trend is to a certain degree ignored in Western 
literature about the Arab World. Issa J. Boullata writes of the 
lack of Western attention to Arab intellectuals who are 
"grappling with the idea of modernity, with the Arab desire for 
societal change to bring about social justice. j89 Studies failed 
to notice the struggle between the culture of conformity and the 
new radical trend as represented by intellectuals and writers 
like Adonis, 'Azm, and Laroui. This is particularly clear in the 
case of the small number of studies that deal with how Arabs 
perceive themselves and what they think about their contemporary 
life. 
This trend has been very important in the development of 
critical thinking in Arab culture and intellectual life. It is 
as yet early to say that this trend has won the battle against 
its enemy. But it is evident from the size and number of 
contributions that pour into its stream and from the 
87 'Ali Ahmed Sa'iyd(Adonis), al-Thabit wa al-Mutahauwil: 
Bahth fly al-Ibbda' wa al-Ittiba' 'Ind al-'Arab(The Permanent and 
the Changing: A Study of Arab Conformity and Creativity), 3 
vols., (Beirut; Dar al-'Uwda, 1974) Arabic Text (Present Author's 
Translation) vol. l., p. 31. 
86 Ibid, p. 24. 
89 Issa J. Boullata, Trends and Issues in Contemporary Arab 
Thought, First Edition (New York; State University of New York 
Press, 1990) p. ix. 
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participation of a new generation of intellectuals and social 
scientists that the case for a new thinking is winning over new 
recruits and gathering new momentum. As far as Arab nationalist 
thought is concerned, and in light of the contribution which will 
be presented below, it is evident that the radical trend has 
borne some fruit. This is true, at least, as far as the dialectic 
between the old and the new paradigms of Arab nationalist thought 
is concerned. This dialectic will be the subject of analysis 
later on in this research. 90 
(i) A Nostalgia with the Past 
Arab nationalist thought outlined in the previous chapter 
and in this one, is greatly attached to the past history of the 
Arabs. Arab nationalist thought reads into Arab history a fine 
and glorious past wherein the Arabs were a united nation with a 
united political entity. The disunity and fragmentation of this 
Arab nation is seen as the result of conspiracies and a 
manifestation of the acts of a foreign will. This nostalgia with 
a projected past has been a focus for participants in the 
criticising trend. They consider such claims run counter to 
historical facts and of being a major handicap to an 
understanding of the political realities of the Arabs today. 
The concept of an Arab nation only disunited against its 
will is seen as wishful thinking. The Tunisian writer Hisham 
Bugammrah depicts Arab nationalist thought as "defining itself, 
in most instances, by referring to history and heritage. " This 
90 See the discussion in chapter five and chapter six of 
this research. 
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nostalgia with the past renders Arab nationalist thought out of 
touch with the critical issues of Arab society and reduces it to 
a mere attempt to 
concentrate on literatures that are backward, rhetorical 
and glorifying since it does not found itself on the 
genuine actual heritage of the masses, that live reality, 
but on things that are supposed and said to represent Arab 
glory. 91 
Driven by this nostalgia with the past Arab nationalist 
thought opted for a concept that defined the nation as an entity 
or as "structure that had been accomplished and completed in the 
past. " The Arab nation suffered betrayal at the hands of 
circumstances and was "let down by Gods because it went astray 
and consequently run over by decay which, however, hit its 
superficial form leaving intact its core which if remembered, or 
if souls are reminded of it, would resurrect itself. 1192 
This definition may find its source in the strong desire by 
Arab nationalists to provide the Arabist movement with arguments 
it could utilise against the Turks and European colonialism. This 
can be seen as providing Arab nationalism with a concept of a 
liberating function by mobilising the masses. However Arab 
nationalism still expressed 
a wilful projection that substitutes ego for object, desire 
for reality, and ignoring facts and objectivity ... it is a utopian and romantic project that thinks of the aim only 
from a position of dream not a position of reality, needs, 
and capabilities. 93 
91 Hisham Bugammrah, intervention in the round-table 
discussion "Nagd al-Fikr al-Qawmiy" (Criticism of Arab Nationalist 
Thought) Al-Wahda, vol. 7, (April 1985) p. 74. 
55. 
92 Ahmed al-Juba'iy, "Utruwhaat Auwaliyya", op. cit., p. 90. 
93 'Abd Ilah Belqaziyz, Ishkaliyyat al-Wahda. op. cit., p. 
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This emphasis on the umma and Arab identity as historically 
accomplished reality confined Arab nationalist thought to history 
and heritage and the attempt to retrieve them. But this attempt 
neglected "the political and social dimensions and the present 
historical nature of the issue. " Therefore it received a great 
blow at the hands of reality. However, as Belqaziyz argues, this 
conceptualisation of identity and nation is not only based on a 
reading into a past but also produces its own historicism. It 
argues for an "historic reality that is located in a certain time 
and place. But this time is unhistorical. " It is not open to 
historical probability or bound by a formation process that 
applies to the national phenomenon. This indicates that Arab 
nationalist thought attempted to make the past equal the present 
in a way that "history is stopped or frozen to be substituted by 
an absolute time. 1194 
M. 'Abid Jabiriy attributes this attachment to a projected 
glorious past to the nature of Arab thought in general and its 
nationalist discourse in particular. He sees the problem latent 
in the structure of Arab nationalist discourse. Jabiriy points 
to the romanticism of Arab nationalist thought when it "practices 
politics not as a discourse of actual reality but as a discourse 
searching for another reality. " Jabiriy diagnoses the major 
problem in ignoring the actual reality of the Arabs and "not 
calling for its change or reform through analysing it but by 
ignoring it to provide an alternative either in the `reality' of 
94 'Abd al-Ilah Belqaziyz, al-Oawmiyya wa al- 'Ilmaniyva: al- 
Idyulujiyya wa al-Tariykh (Nationalism and Secularism: Ideology 
and History) First Edition (Rabat; Dar al-Kalaam, 1989) Arabic 
Text (Present Author's Translation) p. 10, pp. 16-17. 
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an Arab Islamic glorious past or in the `reality' present that 
is European. 1195 
Jabiriy considers that the insistence on Arab political 
unity could be explained by this attachment to the past. 
Political unity is seen by Arab nationalists as 
part of the heritage, part of the content of Arab thought 
in itself. It is a possibility that `materialised' in the 
past, and was the principle of progress in the past and an 
indication of it. Therefore, it is a fundamental of 
progress and a prerequisite for it. 
Jabiriy thinks that this kind of theorising gives ideology the 
prominent position; 
the cultural, or let us say the ideological, encompasses 
the political and shapes it to make it part of the 
intellectual reality the Arabs live in and considers it a 
precondition for the realisation of another material 
reality (economic or social). 
The issue, concludes Jabiriy, relates to "the way the Arabs read 
their history, this is part of their culture, and in this history 
which they read a single state lies the cause. j96 
The effects of this strong attachment with the projected 
past and the reading into the history of an eternal nation had 
been enormous on the development of Arab nationalist theory. "The 
task of Arab nationalism's theory became the proving of this 
continuity and this eternity. " The result is that Arab 
nationalist philosophy has no apprehension of "particularism, 
differences, divisions, and contradictions, and puts it remote 
from conscience. The consequence is obstruction of the need for 
9s M. 'Abid Jabiriy, al-Khitab al-'Arabiv, op. cit., p. 59. 
96 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, Ishkaliyyaat al-Fikr al-'Arabiv al- 
Mu'asir (The Problematique of Contemporary Arab Thought), 
(Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1989) Arabic Text 
(Present Author's Translation) p. 79. 
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a search for appropriate solutions. 1l97 
Arab nationalist thought in its occupation with the Arab 
past made great and endless efforts at explaining this history. 
An abundance of historical material was presented in order to 
found the ideal of Arab unity on a historical experience read 
through a nationalist projection. However, what critics point to 
is that this reading into history is a kind of selective history. 
It is a vision that attempts to justify the ideal on the basis 
of selective evidence that does not fit the scientific 
requirements of historical research. 
This is clear in that Arab nationalist thought did not 
assign proper importance to the developments of Arab national 
existence. Among these is the lack of understanding of the 
changes that affected the concept of the Arabs as a people and 
a community. It is obvious that the Arabs' situation after the 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire only relatively resembles their 
situation when they built their state under the banner of Islam. 
Arab nationalist thought is selective in providing historical 
material to prove Arab nationalism even though the ethnic 
composition of the contemporary Arabs is different from the Arabs 
of the earlier Islamic age. They are today composed of Arabised 
populations more than they are original Arabs especially that 
modern Arab states have caused a great shock to Arab identity 
which is suffering from a crisis. "' 
97 Burhan Ghalliyun, al-Mihna al-'Arabiyya: al-Duwla Did al- 
Umma(The Arab Dilemma: State Against Nation)First Edition 
(Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1993) Arabic Text 
(Present Author's Translation) p. 192. 
98 Ibid, pp. 192-194. Ghalliyun argues that Arab nationalist 
thought is selective in its reading of Arab history to justify 
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The new thinking refutes a major premise of Arab nationalist 
thought. The fact that the Arabs had lived in a situation of 
political unity of their own only in a very remote historical 
period is a very powerful argument in the case against claims of 
historical Arab unity. This ideological reading of history was 
a naive conceptualisation of nationalist formation. As such it 
deprived Arab nationalist movements of "understanding the deep 
changes and circumstances that impinged upon the Arab national 
existence without which understanding this existence or changing 
it would not be possible. 1199 
Ghalliyun cites historical evidence to support this argument 
and concludes that even if this historical unity and concept of 
the umma is accepted as a historical fact, which it is not, the 
present day realities belie this conceptualisation. He blames 
this concept of the umma as being responsible for all the 
deficiencies in Arab nationalist theory. He charges Arab 
nationalist thought with providing a "false concept of the 
nation. " This conceived Arab nation "only exists in the mind, and 
completely rules out the real community which is fragmented and 
being infiltrated by every day divisions and new traumas. "loo 
Traditional Arab nationalist thought is faced with questions 
the idea of an Arab nation. He argues that history could also be 
presented to argue for the opposite. This view is shared by many 
Arab writers who claim that Arab history is marked by the lack 
of any Arab single united state. Furthermore Ghalliyun argues 
that the present Arab reality attest to the need to abandon this 
selective history and understand the changes that Arab national 
existence has gone through which differentiate it from the Arab 
society of the Islamic state. 
99 Ibid, p. 192 
ioo Ibid, pp. 202-203. 
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that relate to the realities of Arab politics and society. Any 
attempt at understanding these issues must acknowledge the fact 
that the Arabs of present time are a very complicated societal 
phenomenon. The Arabs of the day are "composed of a number of 
peoples and communities which are relatively distinct on their 
own. 11101 The existence of a multiplicity of minorities makes the 
picture look more complicated than traditional Arab nationalist 
thought would think. This is the main argument of the new 
criticising trend. This new trend does not, however, reject the 
idea of an Arab nation nor does it refuse to accept the need for 
Arab unity. Instead it calls for an understanding of "the nature 
of the sociological and hence the political base upon which Arab 
unity movements attempted to establish projects of political 
unity, with failure up to now; the reason being the fragmentary 
societal structure. 11102 
(ii) A Discourse of Probabilities 
Traditional Arab nationalist thought therefore based its 
ideal of Arab unity on a projection of Arab history in which it 
saw a politically united Arab nation. It does so on the 
assumption of "a nationalist intellectual paradigm that is based 
upon concepts of identity and common history and language. 11103 The 
lol Ibid, p. 93. 
102 Muhammad Jabir al-Ansariy, Takuwiyn al-'Arab al-Siyasiy 
wa Maghza al-Duwla al-Outriyva: Madkhal ila I'adat Fahm al-Wagi' 
al-'Arabiv( Arab Political Formation and the Implication of the 
Particularistic State) First Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al- 
Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1994) Arabic Text (Present Author's 
Translation) p. 182. 
103 Kamal 'Abdullatiyf, Mafahiyym Multabisa fly al-Fikr al- 
'Arabiy al-Mu'asir (Confused Concepts in Contemporary Arab 
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result is that "it builds its vision without proper attention to 
living history with its contradictions and reality. X104 This pre- 
occupation with providing the call for unity with legitimacy is 
not concerned with the tasks of how to realise this ideal. It is 
a form of wishful thinking. By insisting on achieving political 
unity Arab nationalist thought "attached itself to a whole host 
of waitings like waiting for a revolutionary unionist state, 
waiting for the revolution of the masses, and waiting for the 
failure of the particularistic state. 11105 
M. 'Abid Jabiriy thinks that by this inclination towards 
probabilities Arab nationalist thought is suffering from a great 
epistemological problem. He sees it a discourse of "intellectual 
probabilities i. e. a discourse of `meta' Arab present reality. "106 
Analysing Arab thought epistemologically, Jabiriy sees the 
correlation Arab nationalist thought advocates between the 
realisation of unity, socialism and freedom as evidence of this 
problem. It shows an inability to build a nationalist theory that 
would explain reality and not merely confine itself to the sphere 
of probabilities. Jabiriy argues that the conditional correlation 
between unity, socialism and freedom is not susceptible to a 
single coherent theoretical structure. The relationship that Arab 
nationalist thought "builds between these probabilities, or 
between it and reality, remains only confined to the sphere of 
Thought) First Edition (Beirut; Dar al-Tal'ia, 1992) Arabic Text 
(Present Author's Translation) p. 92. 
104 Ibid, p. 92. 
los Ibid, p. 93. 
106 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, al-Khitab al-'Arabiy, op. cit., p. 132. 
138 
the world of probabilities no matter how it is camouflaged in the 
frame of logical necessity. 11101 
Jabiriy explains this "meta-reality" of the "discourse of 
probabilities" in that it occupies itself with the possible or 
probable situation in the Arab world after the current undesired 
situation of disunity ends. Therefore, the idea of, for example, 
making the realisation of socialism conditional upon the 
realisation of unity, or vice versa is seen by Jabiriy as "making 
a probable a condition for yet another probable and the relation, 
therefore, would necessarily be that of a probable 
relationship. 11108 Jabiriy goes into some detail in explaining this 
problem and he cites some evidence from recent Arab history in 
the 1950s and the 1960s. He recalls that even though Arab 
nationalist discourse practised an ideological hegemony in the 
Arab region for a considerable time it was not able to build a 
nationalist theory and remained imprisoned in an impossible 
equation. That equation proved to be a deadlock as neither unity, 
nor socialism nor freedom were achieved. 
Moreover, Jabiriy concludes that these concepts of unity, 
socialism and freedom were attributed a multiple and 
contradictory combination of values. The final result was to let 
Arab nationalist thought and its discourse fall in unsolvable 
contradictions and become a discourse of antimonies. 109 But Arab 
nationalist thought is an ideology that seeks the achievement of 
possible outcomes and, therefore, is naturally inclined towards 
107 Ibid, p. 132. 
los Ibid, p. 134. 
109 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, Interview with the author. 
139 
designing a view that builds its conclusions on the premises of 
a defined introduction. Arab nationalist thought is not acting 
in a way that is not customary to all ideologies and this 
explains its emphasis on what people like Jabiriy see as 
probabilities. 
However Jabiriy, even though acknowledging that a 
revolutionary ideology such as Arab nationalism is aimed at 
achieving the possible or the probable, argues that it is the 
nature of this probable which matters. Jabiriy considers the 
probable to be fit for ideological aims only if it "is permitted 
by objective circumstances"; and what makes a certain probability 
acceptable is that it "responds more to reality and follows its 
direction. "... Apart from relying on probabilities Arab 
nationalist thought is seen by Jabiriy to be lacking an 
understanding of reality. Therefore it has not been capable of 
transforming reality in order to materialise its aims which still 
are probable . 
111 
Jabiriy does not detail enough evidence to support his 
argument as he confines his study not to "ideological 
classification ... not 
ideological analysis of ideas and trends 
but the epistemological criticism of discourse. " Jabiriy's 
analysis is affected by the use of a set of concepts that belong 
to different philosophies or methodologies. He makes use of 
Marxist, Freudian, Althuserian and Foucaultian concepts. He uses 
these conceptual tools in contexts that he himself admits are not 
110 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, al-Khitab al-'Arabiv, op. cit. p. 134. 
111 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, interview with the author. 
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bound by their original referenial frameworks. 112 Jabiriy's 
contribution in the critical trend of Arab nationalist thought 
is more interested in epistemology than in ideology. It is 
concerned not with "what a text says but how it says it . j113 
Accordingly his kind of argument is not treated here as a 
contribution to Arab nationalist thought per se. The significance 
of Jabiriy's effort can be seen as an attempt at understanding 
the mind that produced Arab nationalist thought. Therefore it is 
representative of the new trend in Arab thought where the 
emphasis is said to be on reason and not on tradition. 
(iii) The Metaphysics of Identity 
As has been argued in the previous chapter and earlier on 
in this chapter Arab nationalism strongly emphasises the concept 
of Arab identity and Arab culture. Arab identity is seen by 
traditional Arab nationalist thought as the centre of gravity for 
the Arabs. It is perceived to have kept itself intact throughout 
the ages and stood up against all foreign attempts to liquidate 
it. In keeping with the German theory of romantic nationalism 
Arab nationalists attached the highest value to identity and this 
was clear in the automatic link they saw between identity and the 
realisation of political unity. 
The Lebanese sociologist Nadiym Biytar in a book which he 
entirely devoted to the question of identity saw in the 
attachment to the concept of identity a major weakness of Arab 
nationalist ideology. He criticises the concept of identity as 
112 M. 'Aid Jabiriy, al-Khitab al-'Arabiv, op. cit., p. 12. 
113 Ibid, p. 10. 
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being of a metaphysical nature. For Biytar identity is a concept 
based on a scientific fallacy especially when it envisages 
political unity entrenched in a nation that enjoys one 
language. 114 Biytar argues that history proves that most languages 
used now were not the creation of the nations or peoples who 
speak it. These languages were used by different peoples and 
their use extended from one people to another. Furthermore Biytar 
explains that some peoples abandoned their languages and used 
languages other than their own. The conclusion Biytar draws is 
that to establish a link between language and a stable national 
identity is a scientific fallacy. To argue this fallacy would 
mean that language which is the `spirit of one people' could be 
abandoned and replaced by another language. To argue that a 
people willingly abandons its spirit would be incompatible with 
this kind of conceptualisation. 115 
Languages, explains Biytar, develop and to say that every 
nation has its own psychology would amount to employing rigid and 
static essences and represent only rhetorical and not scientific 
explanations. Biytar considers the nationalist hypothesis that 
language is the spirit and soul of the nation a metaphysical 
concept that lacks evidence. Citing the example of the Italian 
language Biytar concludes that Italian language did not create 
Italian nationalist history. Rather he sees that Italian language 
was the creation and the result of the Italian national history. 
The conclusion from his analysis is that languages do not create 
or make history or nationalism but history and nationalism made 
114 Nadiym Biytar, Huwduwd al-Hauwiyr}a, on. cit., 298. 
lls Ibid, pp. 298-300. 
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national languages. 116 
Many Arab nationalist concepts and ideas that Biytar indicts 
as responsible for the destruction of the attempts at unity in 
the Arab world receive his sentence because they are linked to 
the concept of identity. He gives examples of these as in the 
method Arab nationalist thought considered for the achievement 
of unity, and putting political liberation as a pre-condition for 
political unity. He particularly believes that the absence of 
unity is the work of this concept. This concept is a metaphysical 
one, setting out conditions as though it were carrying a unitary 
content, and imposing itself in a unitary leap towards the united 
pan-Arab state. 117 
This metaphysical tendency is condemned by Biytar as it 
renders Arab nationalist thought "not to know how to approach and 
study realities and social and historical phenomena. "118 This 
leads it into "inventing a priori general theories which always 
-remain infertile" because it "substitute a general ideal for the 
real subject which ought to be explained. " This metaphysics, 
argues Biytar, is "unable to produce an efficient analysis since, 
for it, realities and phenomena are nonexistent. " Biytar explains 
this insufficiency by assuming that metaphysics "instead of 
realities and phenomena and what they reveal, or what 
regularities or conformities dominate them, imposes the external 
ideal into these realities as though realities had no objective 
116 Ibid, pp. 300-301. 
117 Ibid, pp. 303-304. 
118 Nadiym Biytar, "al-Fikr al-Wahdawiy: Naqd 'Aaml'(Unitary 
Thought: A General Critique) Al-Wahda, vol. 7 (1985) Arabic Text 
(Present Author's Translation) pp. 9-14. 
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existence. " Therefore, Arab nationalist thought is seen by Biytar 
as metaphysical philosophy that ignores history and negates the 
effects it has on identity. "' 
Biytar is adamant in his indictment of Arab nationalist 
thought which he denounces for "making perceptions that do not 
represent reality, and working from these perceptions, instead 
of opting for reality. " The hallmark of this abstract thought is 
explicitly "divorced from objective reality and its rules ... 
its 
producer can say what he wants, what he perceives or what haunts 
him from the realm of fallacies; all he needs is rhetoric, fine 
phrases, and an intense fertile imagination. " This metaphysics 
is, according to Biytar, liable to be blamed for the failure of 
Arab nationalist movement in achieving nationalist goals. Arab 
nationalist ideology ignored reality and misapprehended the 
phenomena that could not be "explained in the framework of the 
metaphysical or messianic model. ""' 
Biytar is not concerned, however, with the issue of multiple 
identities in the Arab World. His main concern is to prove that 
the concept of identity itself is an inappropriate conceptual 
device to support or argue for Arab unity. Although Biytar is 
outspoken in his condemnation of the inanity he sees in the 
concept of identity, he is interested in the issue of Arab unity, 
using an approach that relies on what he calls "the unitary 
thesis. " Biytar argues that Arab nationalist thought has failed 
to take into account the existence of "unitary rules" which can 
be applied to any national unity scheme. Unless these rules, 
119 Ibid, pp. 9-14. 
120 Ibid, pp. 9-14. 
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which Biytar imputes to different historical national unification 
as in Italy, Germany and the United States, were utilised Arab 
nationalism remains metaphysical. 121 
This approach, to which Biytar devotes most of his writings, 
introduces a new understanding of Arab nationalism and unity 
which detaches it from the concepts common in Arab nationalist 
thought. Biytar deducts a theory from experiments of unification 
in Europe and the United States. He argues that Arab nationalist 
thought needs this theory of the "unitary thesis" in order to 
realise the goal of Arab unity. This may be seen as an attempt 
by Biytar to distance Arab nationalism from the ethics of unity 
and to link it to what may be seen as the sociology of unity as 
he sees evident in the unitary rules. 122 
The contribution of Biytar is distinct in its concentration 
on political factors such as the role of the base-territory and 
the charismatic leadership and outside threats to a nation in 
achieving its unity. He does not assign any importance to 
language or culture in national formation or unification. When 
he does so he only see language and culture as secondary factors 
that can only be activated if the fundamental factors are at 
work. 123 However important and distinct his contributions are they 
are not of concern now but will be dealt with in some detail 
later on. 
121 Nadiym Biytar, Min al-Tajzia ila al-Wahda: al-Oawaniyn 
al-Asasiyva li Tajarub al-Tariykh al-Wahdawiyya (Fundamental 
Rules of Historical Unifications) Fifth Edition (Beirut; Markaz 
Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1986) pp. 13-14. 
122 Ibid, pp. 13-14. 
123 Ibid, pp. 13-14. 
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If Biytar looks into this in generalised terms, the Lebanese 
writer Iliyas Murqus attempts to provide a specific critique that 
takes the issue of the centrality of Arabic language as an 
example of the metaphysical nature of Arab nationalist thought. 
He considers the emphasis on Arabic as assigning it a "magical 
role in uniting the Arabs, politically, economically, and 
socially. ""' The imputation of a sacred place to Arabic implies 
that the Arab nation is "a kind of an essence and therefore is 
distancing it from the idea of formation or evolution. "... 
MurqusIs analysis is echoing the idea held by many Arab Marxists, 
that the Arabs have not yet reached the nationhood status and 
that they are a nation-in-becoming or in formation. Murqus and 
other Arab Marxists still adhere to this concept. Murqus 
criticises Arab nationalist thought for "confining the idea of 
formation to Arabisation, i. e. the idea of spreading Arabic and 
its adoption by the peoples who lived in the historical Arab 
homeland. X126 
The same applies to the tendency to connect culture to 
language whereas Murqus considers "culture not connected to 
language alone but also to production, relation of man to nature 
and the human spirit which is not exhausted in language and 
differences. 11127 It is clear that Murqus is adopting a Marxist 
analysis that considers language and culture as outcomes of the 
124 Iliyas Murqus, Intervention in the round-table 
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mode of production. Therefore he sees the adoption of language 
and culture as the nuclei of the Arab nation as inadmissible 
unless this nation had common economical interests. Otherwise, 
it remains a superficial and metaphysical idea or at best a 
nation-in-becoming. This argument is widely criticised in Arab 
nationalist circles. Arab nationalists emphasise the importance 
and historical role of Arabisation and that culture and language 
are inseparable. The Egyptian writer Muhammad A. Khalafallah 
criticises Murqus for considering language "a mere tool of 
communication" while language is "a cultural container of the 
nation or people; a device that distinguishes between a nation 
or people and the other. "126 Khalafallah sees no point in arguing 
the contrary since "the boundaries of the nation-state are 
linguistic. "129 
The Egyptian writer Saffuwat Hatim confirms what other 
critics saw in Arab nationalist thought of a metaphysical nature. 
He locates this nature in "theses of unity, fate, nation, and 
essence. j130 This metaphysical content is no clearer, according 
to Hatim, than in the hypothesis and supposition that the Arab 
nation "will resurrect itself to recapture its past essence and 
to live anew. , 131 This hypothesis led Arab nationalists to assume 
that "unity is beyond doubt and definite. " Hatim argues that 
128 Muhammad A. Khalafallah, Intervention in the round-table 
discussion "Naqd al-Fikr al-Qawmiy" Al-Wahda, vol. 7 (April 1985) 
p. 67. 
129 Ibid, p. 67. 
130 Saffuwat Hatim, Intervention in the round-table 
discussion "Naqd al-Fikr al-Qawmiy" Al-Wahda, vol. 7 (April 1985) 
p. 72. 
131 Ibid, p. 72. 
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unity is not bound by fate or wishful thinking but is "a wilful 
act not decided by determinism or dictated by destiny. " As such 
unity is within the human sphere where there is no "superior 
force that undertakes this human action. " The kind of thought 
that relies on any force but human will is metaphysical "offering 
no direct and wilful method of realising Arab unity. "132 
To the Moroccan intellectual, Belgaziyz, Arab nationalist 
thought is not only imprisoned with this concept of identity. 
Despite the existence of linguistic, cultural, and religious 
components which kept the feeling of unity alive among the Arabs 
the problem is that "the talk about identity is, in fact, a talk 
about the absolute, about factors which are beyond time. ý, 133 These 
factors are not sufficient as a base for Arab unity or as 
structural components of it. The call for Arab unity can not be 
based on the cultural-linguistic factors of identity. Arab unity, 
argues Belqaziyz is essentially justified by the present and 
future interests of the Arabs. Therefore Arab identity is not and 
should not be seen as a readily available fact "that materialised 
in the past history but as a project that its realisation is 
sought in the present and in the future. "134 
Belqaziyz rejects the idea that identity is not more than 
"what had descended from the past of cultural factors and other 
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a fall into the trap of a symmetry concept. j135 This trap leads 
to ignoring the dynamics of history and its change as "times 
would be seen similar and identical in a continuous single and 
identical movement. " Belqaziyz argues that the admission of the 
identity concept into Arab nationalist ideology is an admission 
of a "confiscation of the historicity of history. " Belqaziyz 
concludes that this aggravates the problem of past orientation 
in Arab nationalism. The establishment of the idea of unity on 
an identity and its reproduction as a static system is 
"establishing the overall Arabist project on past factors. " In 
this projection identity is a "past fact that, unaffected by 
change, extends into present. " This renders the Arabist political 
design "a past-based construct. 11136 
This argument is similar to that presented by Biytar who 
considers the Arabist concept of national identity destructive 
of any prospect of "new Arab future for it cancels any radical 
renewal of the past or the present. 11137 Biytar argues that to 
establish Arab identity on the basis of a pre-supposed existence 
of its components would be a violation of scientific rationality. 
Biytar criticises the articulation of Arab identity and the 
presentation of an Arab "spirit" rooted in the pre-Islamic period 
of Arab history, bedouin Arab history, and/or in a peculiar 
genius of Arabic as an inadmissible inanity. This articulation 
of these rational constituents, argues Biytar, is to make them 
"incapable of expressing a modern civilisational rationale or of 
13e Ibid, p. 52. 
136 Ibid, pp. 52-53. 
137 Nadiym Biytar, Huwduwd al-Hauwiyya, op. cit., p. 307. 
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materialisation in any creative and productive form at the 
rational level. " 138 
Biytar affirms that the new Arab future is beyond the reach 
of the Arabs unless these metaphysical and irrational 
fundamentals of Arab reason are done away with and replaced with 
a new set of "rational and practical fundamentals. " These are the 
conditions Biytar considers vital in liberating Arab nationalist 
thought and enabling it to play its role in achieving Arab unity. 
Biytar concludes his indictment of Arab nationalist thought by 
a call for its reconstruction. He confirms that 
If national existence does not impose or determine the 
state of unity, since there is no such national entity that 
imposes this state, since unity of national conscience 
dates back to a single historical background, since 
fragmentation means the absence of this background and its 
replacement by a multiplicity of backgrounds that increase 
in contradiction as time passes by, therefore its 
continuance means its consolidation as an entry into 
terminal particularism (fragmentation) which then can not 
be eradicated by any unitary action. 139 
The Syrian sociologist Burhan Ghalliyun examines the effects 
of this metaphysical nature on Arab nationalism. He argues that 
it led to the confiscation of the 
modern concept of nation ... and to the Arabs using the historical concept of the nation (umma), which means the 
foundation of a single political community united by creed 
and religion, and transporting it into contemporary 
political Arabic language to denote the process of forming 
a nation in the modern sense. 14' 
Another aspect of this metaphysical tendency is related to the 
treatment of particularistic identities which Arab nationalist 
thought degrade in favour of an inclusive Arab identity. In 
138Ibid, pp. 307-308. 
139 Ibid, pp. 307-310. 
1ao Burhan Ghalliyun, al-Mihna al-' Arabiyya, op. cit., p. 83. 
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arguing for the aim of achieving the pan-Arab state Arab 
nationalists rely on the idea that every political identity 
should meet cultural identity. The emphasis on this is due to the 
effects the European experience had on Arab nationalism. 
Ghalliyun thinks that the application of this concept falls short 
of making clear the distinction between state and nation. He 
calls for the review of "the European nationalist theory which 
the Arabs borrowed and from which the Arab nationalist movement 
derived its concepts, particularly as far as the relationship 
between nationalism and unity is concerned. j141 
Ghalliyun does not acknowledge the link this theory 
establishes between cultural identity and political identity. He 
sees this as involving mixing up the nation as "a people with 
distinct language and culture, which is one level of nation, and 
the nation as a state that encompasses this people. 113.42 The call 
for the abandonment of the concept of building up political 
identity on the basis of cultural identity is very essential 
since Arab identity is facing the evolution of "particularistic 
identities that run counter to, contradict, and compete with Arab 
identity. " These particularistic identities are establishing 
their legitimacy and struggling from a similar ground. 143 
From the debates presented above it is clear that the 
emphasis assigned to the concept of identity is seen by the 
141 Burhan Ghalliyun, "Ma al-'Amal" (What is to Be Done), in 
A. Duri etal al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya: Talarubuha wa Tauwaqu'atuha 
(Arab Unity: Its Experiments and Expectations) (Seminar Papers) 
First Edition(Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1989) 
Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) p. 1083. 
142 Burhan Ghalliyun, al-Mihna al-'Arabiyya, op. cit., p. 95. 
143 Burhan Ghalliyun, "Ma al-'Aural", op. cit., p. 1084. 
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critics as metaphysical and belied by history and contemporary 
Arab politics. Arab nationalist thought is then deemed to fail 
to lead the Arab cultural identity to the acquisition of its 
political identity in a pan-Arab state. The consideration of the 
umma as a constant, static, and eternal community that transcends 
history prepared the soil for the dominance of this metaphysical 
tendency. The metaphysical conceptualisation of identity is a 
naive and simplified theorisation of national formation that 
obscures the historical developments of the Arabs. 
To conclude, it is clear that the concept of an Arab 
identity has received very strong criticism. The writings of many 
Arab intellectuals refer to it as a metaphysical concept. This 
concept was also seen as hindering any proper understanding of 
the historical process and the realities of Arab society. The 
clear message was that unless it is willing to abandon its 
metaphysics Arab nationalist thought would remain "a hodgepodge 
ideology attempting to gather all contradictions and 
inconsistencies in a compromise. ""144 
(iv) An Imprisonment With the Pan-State: State and Society 
As argued earlier in this chapter, Arab nationalist thought 
lacks the existence of any considerable discussion of the issue 
of state as a social and political phenomenon and form of 
organisation. Contributions to these critical issues have been 
both minor and recent. However, the issue of state or having a 
144 Turkiy al-Hammad, "Takuwiyn al-Duwla al-Qutriyya: al- 
Manzuwr al-Wahdawiy"(The Formation of Particularist State: The 
Unitary Prospective), in A. Duri etal al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, op. 
cit., p. 130. 
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state that includes all Arabs under its banner is a very central 
if under argued theme in Arab nationalist thought. In Arab 
nationalist thought there is what may be seen as an obsession 
with the pan-Arab state despite the fact that any articulations 
on the form or organisation of this hoped-for state are absent 
in the contributions presented so far. This deep occupation with 
the pan-state is explained by Khaiyr al-Diyn Hasiyb as the result 
of the experience the Arab nationalist movement and the political 
regimes attached to it had while being in government. The 
emphasis on a stronger role for the state led to the "increase 
of the ability of particularistic Arab authority [state] and the 
weakness of civil society. "145 
Arab nationalist thought is occupied with the problem of a 
fragmented Arab homeland. It saw political fragmentation of the 
Arabs as the real handicap of Arab society. This dictated a kind 
of thought that concentrated on the state and ignored society and 
the relationship between them. Hence the lack of any articulation 
about democracy or the rights of minorities. This imprisonment 
within the pan-state concept is manifest in that the bulk of Arab 
nationalist thought is about Arab unity and the need to achieve 
it. This hope and the sense of urgency about it dominates Arab 
nationalism which seeks its realisation even if at the expense 
of democracy and equality. 146 
The dichotomies of particularistic territorial state\pan- 
145 Khaiyr al-Diyn Hasiyb, "Ta'liyq"(A Commentary) in Tariq 
al-Bishriy etal, al-Hiwar al-0awmiy al-Diniy: Auwraaq wa 
Munagashaat(The Nationalist Religious Dialogue) (Seminar Papers) 
First Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1989) 
Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) p. 278. 
146 'Abd Ilah Belqaziyz, Interview with the Author. 
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Arab state, and unity\fragmentation are at the centre of 
contributions to the issue of Arab past and future political 
organisation. This meant the neglect of 
socio-cultural aspects of Arab unity whereas unity is not 
a mere project of constitutional gathering of Arab 
political entities into a federal or confederal entity but 
a framework and an expression of a movement of social 
integration . 
14' 
The emphasis on the political aspects puts the state to the fore 
and pushes society to the periphery. This position cannot, in the 
words of Belgaziyz, achieve the aim of "melting the constituents 
of Arab society that leads to the destruction of causes of 
political and civil divisions. "148 
The Egyptian writer, Isma'iyl Sabriy 'Abdullah, finds the 
root of this imprisonment within the state in that Arab 
nationalist thought borrowed indiscriminately from "a capitalist 
European conception of the relationship between state and 
nationalism. " He traces this misconception to the improper use 
of the 
French term nationalite to provide two meanings: the 
belonging to a `community of people who have the unity of 
territory, language, tradition and aspiration as far as 
this community protects its existence or wants to exist as 
a nation', and the belonging to a particular state, or what 
lawyers call nationality. 149 
'Abdullah's approach in criticising Arab nationalist thought 
and its use of the state concept is Marxist-oriented. He rejects 
147 'Abd Ilah Belqaziyz, al-Oawmiyva wa al-'Ilmaniyya, on. 
cit., p. 10. 
148 Ibid, p. 10 . 
149 Isma'iyl Sabriy 'Abdullah, "al-Umma al-'Arabiyya: al- 
Haqiyqa al-'Ilmiyya fiy Muwajahat al-Khalt wa al-Ghalt'll (the 
Arab Nation: the Scientific Fact Against the Wrong and 
Confusion", in Isma'iyl Sabriy 'Abdullah etal, Dirasaat fiy al- 
Haraka, op. cit. p. 120. 
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the principle of associating nationalism and state and calls for 
an association between nationality and civilisation. He argues 
that the nation-state is not the expression of the nation but "it 
is civilisation that is older than the state. " This is to argue 
that language and land are not enough to prove the existence of 
a nation. 'Abdullah emphasises the role of time which allows the 
territorially and linguistically united community to build a 
civilisation in its widest sense. Civilisation transcends the 
"concept of culture (intellectual production and artistic 
innovation) to include values, customs, norms of behaviour and 
feelings that make the common sentiment and the desire to live 
together. "... 
The Egyptian writer, Majdiy Hammad, explains this emphasis 
and the primacy of state in Arab nationalist thought in the 
development of the Arab state system. He argues that the Arabs 
knew the state system as a result of their experience with the 
colonial state. Arabists saw the realisation of a national state 
as their aim by liberating the state from European domination. 
Arabs thought about the state was the result of not a 
relationship between state and society but in the "confrontation 
with foreign domination. 11151 This meant that the emphasis on the 
state was not connected to the "the development in the nature of 
social and political authority and its structure. " The result, 
as Hammad concludes, is that Arab nationalist thought was 
deprived of "understanding the historical dialectic of unity and 
lso Ibid, 122, pp. 111-112. 
151 Majdiy Hammad, "Muqadimah" (The Introduction), in A. Duri 
etal, al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, op. cit., p. 17. 
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therefore the conflicts, interests and the different desires 
which any society or political entity contains. j152 
However if this applies to the eastern part of the Arab 
world, in the western part contributions were closer to 
understanding history while evaluating the issue of 
particularistic territorial state. As Muhammad Jabir Ansariy 
argues 
political consciousness in the Maghrib was closer to 
historical objectivity in its view of the particularistic 
state. It considered it a national unification process and 
not a fragmentation contradictory to inclusive unity. 15' 
This is to argue that particularistic territorial states in the 
Maghrib are not seen as the creation of foreign will but that 
they were attained by the struggle against European colonialism. 
The building of these states in the Maghrib was seen as a 
precondition for the call for unity. '54 
Some Arab writers are defending the argument that the 
particularistic territorial states are examples of unification 
in their own. '55 They were established against a state of societal 
fragmentation. The establishment of central governments in 




Ibid, p. 17. 
Muhammad Jabir Ansariy, Takuwiyn al-'Arab, op. cit., p. 
154 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, 'Abd Ilah Belqaziyz, Sal id Bens' id, and 
Kamal 'Abdullatiyf, Interviews with the Author. 
155 The arguments of these writers are best articulated in: 
Turkiy al-Hammad, "Takuwiyn al-Duwla al-Qutriyya", op. cit., pp. 
129-158. Antuwn Masarrah, "Fiy Mustaqbal al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya: 
al-I'tiraaf bi al-Wualaat al-Tahtiyya: 'Amil Tauwhiyd am 'Amil 
Inqisaam" (On the Future of Arab Unity, Recognising the Sub- 
Loyalties: A Uniting or Dividing Factor) Al-Maialla Al-'Arabiyya 
lil 'Uluwm A1-Siyyasiyya(Arab Political Science Review) vol. l. 
(1986) Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) pp. 37-54. 
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Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco was, according to some writers, an 
important step towards unification in the societal sense. It was 
unification in that it ended or eased the multiplicities, 
confrontations and atomic societal fragmentation which most Arab 
societies were suffering from for centuries. '" 
This is the point of emphasis in Jabiriy's theses in which 
he rejects labelling these states as merely transitional and 
passing territorial units. This he argues does "not correspond 
or match the objective and subjective experiences of the majority 
of Maghribians. 11157 Jabiriy affirms that these political entities, 
no matter how they are detested in the Mashriq, are entirely 
accepted and acknowledged in the Maghrib. The Maghrib states were 
not the product of a foreign will. They had been there before the 
Europeans arrived on the scene. Therefore its building and 
recalling into contemporary time was seen in the Maghrib as "a 
defeat of the will of colonialism. 11158 
Arab nationalist thought is imprisoned within the pan-state. 
Sovereign Arab states are therefore considered illegitimate 
political entities that do not correspond to the idea of the Arab 
nation. This leads to a concentration on this issue rather than 
making attempts at understanding the historical process that 
resulted in this political situation. Arab nationalist thought 
is marked by a strong tendency to provide detailed arguments that 
156 Muhammad Jabir Ansariy, Takuwiyn al-'Arab, op. cit., pp. 
102-126. Ansariy provides historical and sociological material 
to ascertain this view that is divorced from Arab nationalist 
thought's traditional view of particularistic territorial states. 
ls' M. 'Abid Jabiriy, Ishkaliyyaat al-Fikr, on. cit., p. 92. 
158 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, Interview with the Author. 
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pour into the stream of state related issues. It rejects the 
state but it is intellectually bound by it. Arab nationalist 
thought in its endeavour to provide an alternative to these 
`nation-states' is sunk in emphasising the state and its 
predominance again and again in an endless debate. 
These issues have received the attention of many Arab 
thinkers who tried to balance the argument. They consider as 
duplicitous this tendency which on the one hand rejects Arab 
states as `nation-states' denying them nationhood, and on the 
other calls for a single hoped-for nation-state on the basis of 
`experiences' that are open to questioning. This duplicity is 
seen by Belqaziyz as limiting the issue to its political aspect. 
It looks at the issue "as a political issue that can materialise 
depending on the will of a particularistic state to abandon part 
of its legitimacy in exchange for union or an integration with 
another state. "-9 
Belgaziyz argues that this approach does not go beyond the 
fields of the state. Accordingly "the field for the realisation 
of unity is the state as a society of politics with its elites 
and decision-makers ..., etc. " Belqaziyz considers this way of 
establishing unity on the bases of leadership and elite one of 
precluding any link that ought to exist between society and the 
state of unity. Belqaziyz holds this thesis responsible for the 
poverty of Arab nationalist thought and the lack of any 
articulation about society while it is the "civil society which 
is9 'Abd Ilah Belqaziyz, Ishkaliyyat al-Wahda, op. cit., pp. 
53-54. 
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first and foremost, unity concerns. X160 
Arab nationalist thought is depriving civil society of its 
rights and handing them to the state and its elite. This in turn 
has the effect of "diminishing its enthusiasm for unity. " 
Consequently this results in destroying the important link 
between unity and democracy. Arab unity disconnected with 
democracy "will become a despotic action, and this despotic 
nature will not be eased or changed even though it carries a 
noble issue such as unity. " Traditional Arab nationalist thought 
is seen by the Moroccan intellectual as incapable of 
"acknowledging the meaning of such society and its implications 
since it suffers from internal subjective handicaps particularly 
the handicap of fearing democracy. '" 161 
This centrality of the state would be very clear in any 
review of published Arab works on Arab nationalism and Arab 
unity. Such a review would reveal that the majority of 
contributions with Arab nationalist orientations is in fact 
centred round the issue of state, particularistic or pan-Arab. 
Many studies are articulations about the origins, the realities, 
the legitimacy and the future of the particularistic territorial 
state. 162 Other studies are dealing with the contradictions and 
16° Ibid, pp. 53 -54 . 
161 Ibid, pp. 53-54. 
162 Examples are too numerous to register. To mention, but 
a few, the following may be given: Wadah Shararah, Huwla Bald 
Mushkilaat al-Duwla fly al-Thagafa wa al-Mujtama' al-'Arabiyyin 
(Reflections on Some Problems of State in Arab Society and 
Culture) First Edition (Beirut; Dar al-Hadatha, 1980) Mas'uwd 
Daher, al-Mashriq al-'Arabiy al-Mu'aser: Min al-Badawa ila al- 
Duwla al-Hadiytha (Contemporary Arab East From Bedouin To Modern 
State) (Beirut; Ma'had al-Innmaa al-'Arabiy, 1986). 
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the problems facing the particularistic territorial state and the 
effect they have on achieving the hoped-for pan-Arab state. The 
rest is devoted to the issues related to this hoped-for pan-Arab 
state though without any deep articulations of its content, 
composition, form and the way to achieve it. 
The absence of any significant contributions dealing with 
issues of society and, for that matter, the individual is very 
striking. It shows how Arab nationalist thought is obsessed with 
the state phenomenon. This may be explained, partially at least, 
by the effects of employing the classical theory of nationalism 
wherein the state is very central to national unification. Burhan 
Ghalliyun explains this in the effects of European experience on 
Arab nationalism. This he sees as transforming the nation-state 
into a global measure and viewing the history of peoples from a 
European stand. This ignores the particularities of the history 
of non-European peoples and indeed the peculiarities of European 
societies itself. 163 
According to Ghalliyun, Arab nationalism suffers from a 
conceptual deficiency since it relies on the classical concept 
of the nation. Therefore the admission of this concept into Arab 
nationalist thought is viewed by Ghalliyun to have been counter 
productive. It has been used to argue for particularistic 
identities as much as Arabists sought to utilize it to support 
the call for Arab unity. Ghalliyun concludes that this meant the 
failure of the Arab nationalist movement to solve the problematic 
of practically articulating a correspondence between cultural 
163 Burhan Ghalliyun, al-Mihna al-'Arabivva, op. cit., pp. 
99-100. 
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identity and political identity. '" 
The contributions of Nadiym Biytar show a more balanced 
attitude towards the issue of state. His argument is based on 
sociology and history and he engages himself in issues of society 
and the individual. Biytar adopts a similar stand when 
articulating the role of the state in national formation and 
unification. In a study devoted to analysing what he calls the 
unitary rules, Biytar argues for the centrality of the state. He 
employs the arguments presented by Rudolf Rocker that "the nation 
is not the reason of the state but its result. State created the 
nation, and not that nation created the state. 11165 Biytar 
acknowledges that this does not imply that wherever a single 
state is established the outcome would be a single nation. "The 
one single state does not always lead to the creation of a 
cultural, linguistic and historical unity, i. e. a single 
nationalism. " He affirms that the state is "necessary for the 
evolution of this unity and its consolidation. "166 
This line of thought is clearer in Biytar's evaluation that 
the state is the most important factor in realising nationalism. 
Biytar explains that "state was the base of nation and 
nationalism formation. " Belonging to a single state is a 
"fundamental factor in the life of every nationalism. We always 
find the memory of a past state and the aspiration of belonging 
164 Ibid, pp. 198-199, p. 101. 
165 Nadiym Biytar, Min al-Tajzia ila al-Wahda, op. cit., p. 
23. Biytar employs the argument of Rudolf Rocker in the book 
entitled, Nationalism and Culture, Translated by Ray E. Chase, 
(New York; Covici-Friede, 1937) as cited in Biytar. 
166 Ibid, p. 23. 
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to a one single state as seen by nationalism of the modern 
age. 11167 When dealing directly with Arab nationalist thought 
Biytar echoes these arguments. He advises those who seek Arab 
unity to bear in mind the supremacy of the unity state (pan- 
state). Biytar sees the Arabist and the unionist as the one who 
"puts the revolutionary unity state above all; it is the 
yardstick for every revolutionary action, every revolutionary 
step, every transformation, every revolutionary tactic..., etc. " 
The real Arabist revolutionary, argues Biytar, "does not measure 
any thing in the light of pure revolutionary measuring devices 
but in as much as they provide for the one single state. "168 
The above discussion confirms the primacy of the state in 
Arab nationalist thought. Bassam Tibi summarised this 
characteristic of Arab nationalist thought in a manner that best 
describes the situation. Tibi notices the dilemma of Arab 
nationalism amidst the dichotomy and contradiction it sets 
between particularistic territorial states and the pan-Arab 




Pan-Arab ideology is directed against the exact institution 
of the nation-state in the Arab world. In the language of 
pan-Arab ideology, existing Arab states are not described 
and accepted as nation-states. They have been downgraded 
and labelled as al-dawla al-qotria (the domestic state). 
The term Arab nation-state (al-dawla al-qawmia) is reserved 
for the desired pan-Arab state, whose realisation, it is 
argued, remains frustrated by alleged Western conspiracies. 
The pan-Arab ideology, even though it negates the existing 




This occupation with the state concept does not, however, 
Ibid, pp. 23-24, p. 66. 
Ibid, p. 382. 
Bassam Tibi, "Redefining the Arab" I op. cit., p. 136. 
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go beyond the "narrow questions such as those concerning 
religious legitimacy, the economics of the nationalised sector, 
or the role played by colonialism in the shaping of the Arab 
state system. 11170 State as presented in Arab nationalist thought 
is nothing more than authority. This, as Gassan Salame notices, 
makes Arab nationalist thought void of any adequate analysis of 
state as an "actor in the society and its relationship with civil 
society. 11171 The conclusion that can be drawn is that Arab 
nationalist thought before the 1980s is deeply sunk in debates 
and endless discussions about the state. The issues related to 
state dominate, among others, the contributions of Arab 
nationalist writers before the 1980s. They express a strong 
tendency towards state, and the dichotomy of particularistic 
territorial/pan-Arab state marginalizes a "comprehensive analysis 
of the pivotal relation between states and civil societies. 11172 
The following chapters will present and analyse the 
contributions of the 1980s. The purpose of the discussions is to 
see how Arab nationalist thought in the 1980s dealt with the 
concepts of its ideology and was undergoing a process of renewal. 
The essential aim is to establish whether these contributions 
offer enough evidence to support the hypothesis that a new 
paradigm of Arab nationalist thought is emerging. The discussion 
in the next chapters will focus on this issue as well as on 
underlining the premises of the new emerging paradigm. 
170 Gassan Salame, "The Introduction", in Gassan Salame (ed) , The Foundation of the Arab, op. cit., p. 15. 
171 Ibid, p. 15. 
172 Ibid, p. 2. 
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Chapter Four 
Arab Nationalist Thought in the 1980s: 
The Dialectic of Old and New Paradigms 
The critique of traditional Arab nationalist thought 
presented in the previous chapter reflects a realisation on the 
part of Arab intellectuals for a new paradigm. The new paradigm 
is seen essential so that Arab nationalist thought may cater for 
the changes the region underwent. This is clearly evident as far 
as issues of nation, Arabism, minorities and democracy are 
concerned. Arab nationalist thought began to direct itself into 
new paths it hitherto had evaded while sunk in its own 
romanticism. That meant the need for restructuring Arab 
nationalist thought and the contributions discussed here would 
reflect a process of intellectual and ideological restructuring. 
It is clear that a dialectical relationship between the old and 
the emerging new paradigm is very intense. 
4-1: The Essence of the Arab Nation: Unity Amidst Multiplicity 
(i) Pan-Arab Identity: Traditional Views Revisited 
The question of Arab identity has been central to Arab 
nationalist thought since its early days. During the 
confrontation with the Ottoman Empire Arab nationalists opted for 
a new concept of the nation which justified the breakaway with 
the Turks. The European idea of the nation and the nationalist 
164 
movement in Europe affected a choice that was strengthened by 
memories of an Arab past in which the Arabs had their own empire. 
However the idea of an Arab nation underwent many developments 
and the linguistic concept had many variants. From the basic and 
simple one that put the emphasis on language as the sole 
determinant of the Arab identity to the ethnic linguistic concept 
which expressed the desire to separate the Arabs from the Turks 
because of ethnic differences. 
A language-history approach could be traced to the period 
after the Second World War. This notion of the Arab nation based 
its argument on the language and on the common history that bound 
the Arabs together. As explained in chapter two, this definition 
was ideally expressed by Husry who said: "language is ... the 
focal of nationalism and its backbone ... history 
is like the 
consciousness of the nation and its memory. j1 The linguistic 
approach considered that the striving towards building a nation- 
state would not add significantly to the nation. This concept was 
evidence of the effects of the German romantic theory of 
nationalism on the thoughts of Arab nationalists. This continued 
to be the case util the contributions of Ba'th party and 
Nasserism. The Ba'th theoreticians and the Nasserite leaders took 
the goal of achieving political unity as the centre of their 
theory of Arab nationalism. 
The pan-Arab state was considered as the political 
expression of the nation. This idea that emphasised language, 
history and state as the basic factors of the nation was adopted 
' S. Husry, Araa wa Ahaadivth fly al-Watanivya wa al-Qawmiyva, (Beirut; 
Markaz Dirasaat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1985) p. 22. 
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by the mainstream Arab nationalist thought up to the period of 
our investigation. ' Reliance on this concept meant a struggle 
with other concepts that based the nation on either religion, 
territory, or a concept of a nation that attempted to establish 
nations on a regional basis such as that of Greater Syria. The 
result was intellectual and political battles between ideas of 
pan-Arabism, particularism, pan-Islamism and regionalism. 
All in all the question was how to adapt to the issue of a 
nation that had no state, and a nation that could not be 
accomplished without a state, and a state that needed a nation. 
Arab thought went in endless debates. 3 The aim of establishing a 
pan-Arab state that would make the Arab nation a full-fledged 
nation was in line with European nation-states. How did the 
contributions of the 1980s respond to this question of nation? 
(ii) The New Debates: Language, History, Multiplicity, State 
and Sociology 
The contributions of the 1980s were many and different. Some 
new contributions repeated the old ones; some modified the 
previous ideas by adding new factors to the nation's definition 
or ignored some of it. These ideas gave prominence in deciding 
the nation to the complexities of Arab society, history and 
2 Saiyyd Yasiyn, Tahliyl Madmun al-Fikr al-Qawmiy al-'Arabiy: Dirasa 
Istitla'iyya, First Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 
1980) pp. 107-150. 
s Nasiyf Nasar, Tasuwuraat al-Unma al-Mu'asera: Dirasa Tahliyliyya li 
Mafahivm al-Unma fiy al-Fikr al-'Arabiv al-Hadivth wa al-Mu'asir, Second 
Edition (Beirut; Dar Ammuwaj, 1994). Nasar Traces all concepts of the nation 
in Arab thought. He provides a general survey of pan-Arab, Islamic, 
particularistic, and regional concepts of the nation but obviously stops short 
of dealing with the contributions dealt with here. 
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politics and therefore attempted to define the Arab nation in 
line. with the developments in sociological research. This is 
significant since the 1980s experienced a wave of doubt in Arab 
nationalism, Arab identity and a rise in particularistic politics 
and political Islam. 
One obvious point of departure is that the new contributions 
do not ignore the issue of multiple identities in the Arab world. 
Gassan Salame views the Arab world as a multitude of identities 
that the individual is attached to. These extend on a spectrum 
that includes tribalism, sectarianism, particularism (state), 
Arab national identity and Islamic identity. 4 This makes the 
issue complex and makes an idea of an Arab nation based solely 
on one Arab identity an abstract one that realities belie. 
This is also the argument of Ali E. Hillal Dessouki who sees 
the problem of Arab identity and the challenge it faces from 
within and from other identities a constant problem in the Arab 
world. Dessouki argues that three levels of identity existed: the 
individual level where the individual identifies himself with a 
group with its own value system; identity at this level is 
psychological and related to the socialisation process. Then 
forms of organisations or political parties are the level of 
collective political expression, and lastly the levels of 
institutionalising identities whether they take religious or 
legal forms. 5 
4 Gass an Salame, "al-Jami'a wa al-Takatulaat al-'Arabiyya"(The League and 
Arab Blocks), in 'Ali Muhafadah etal, Jami'at al -Duwal a l-'Arabiyya: al-Wagi' 
wa al-Tumuh, (Seminar Papers) First Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda 
al-'Arabiyya, 1983) p. 771. 
5 All E. Hillal Dessouki, "Ta'giyb" (A Comment), in 'Ali Muhafadah etal, 
Jami'at al-Duwal al-'Arabiyya, op. cit., p. 815. 
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Although this three level identity is not meant to imply the 
contradictory nature of its substances, Dessouki believes that 
the institutionalisation of identity does not necessarily confirm 
the existence of a supportive identity at the grass-root level 
with the same intensity. The establishment of such institutions 
might be understood in the attempt to foster an identity. 
Similarly the failure of political projects at governmental level 
or the weakness of political organisations expressing some 
identity would not necessarily imply that the identity they 
express is weak at the individual level. ' 
Salame and Dessouki agreement about the existence of 
multiple identities is on its own a development in Arab 
nationalist thought. Salame goes further to argue that the 
tendency of identities to institutionalise at different levels 
changes the nature of the question which prevailed in the last 
two centuries of Arab history. The question alters from a one 
about the fundamental identity of the individual to a one that 
is a material for everyday politics. The question of identity 
therefore becomes related to self assertion and identity 
assertion at the expense of the others. 
Taken to its extreme Salame's approach would seem to imply 
that the idea of pan-Arab identity lacks the qualities for 
institutionalisation. Even though it could be seen as the 
institution of pan-Arab identity the Arab League is a league of 
states which represent institutions of another identity competing 
with the pan-Arab identity: ' Dessouki argues for the pan-Arab 
6 Ibid, p. 815. 
' Gassan Salame, "al-Jami'a wa a1-Takatulaat", op. cit., p. 773. 
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identity even though it lacks an institution or that the 
institution that may be seen to express it is not efficient. Here 
the argument is supportive of the existence of an Arab nation 
based on an Arab identity. ' 
The ideas put forward by Salame and Dessouki argue that to 
spring from Arab identity without properly acknowledging any 
competing ideas is to ignore reality. Founding the nation on 
identity contradicts the historical facts which vividly makes the 
question of identity very complex. This complexity is clear at 
the broad Arab level. The social, cultural, ethnic, religious, 
and economic realities in each Arab state clearly carries more 
contradictions. These contradictions make it difficult for pan- 
Arab unification based on the idea of an Arab nation and leave 
most Arab states with problems related to national integration. 
This led Salame to question the validity of insisting on the 
existence of an Arab nation and its unification in a single 
nation state. He amply asks why other ways of integration could 
not be considered? Why is integration seen only in light of pre 
existing theological terms of a single nation which must have a 
single state? 9 
This indicates that Arab intellectuals are looking for new 
theories that could explain the diversity or multiplicity of 
identities. This is very significant because the belief in an 
Arab nation does not obscure the existence of centrifugal 
$ All E. Hillal Dessouki, "Ta'qiyb", op. cit., p. 815. 
Gassan Salame, " 'Auwaiq al-Waqi' al-'Arabiy al-Qutriy" (Handicaps of Arab Particularistic Reality) in A. Duri etal, al-Wahda al-'Arabivva: Ta. iarubuha wa Tawaqu'atuha, (Seminar Papers) First Edition (Markaz Dirasat al- Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1989) p. 476. 
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divisions. This is supported by studies that show the 
multiplicity of identities in the Arab world. 10 This is a 
phenomenon that the European concept of the nation may not help 
to explain as the Arabs are made of peoples and many communities 
or groups that are distinct from each other though they share 
common features and identify with an Arab culture and language. 
This multiplicity led George Corom to conclude "how 
misleading is the shallow portrait of a coherent, homogeneous 
Arab society with a common personality. "" The historical process 
and the Arab past before Islam "unveils the existence of strong 
fragmentary factors which bear witness to the existence of a 
variety of local peculiarities. j12 This implies that the Arab 
nation is based on multiplicity and therefore the question of its 
identity can only be solved if "the Arab society regains the 
whole of its history. 1113 
(iii) The Arab Nation: Old and New Concepts 
The contributions of the 1980s attest to the theoretical and 
intellectual efforts of Arab writers on the subject which 
traditional Arab nationalist thought clearly lacked. The new 
contributions concentrate on the historical, sociological aspects 
10 These studies in Arabic are a feature of the 1980s and the 1990s. 
Examples are the studies carried out by Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym on minorities and 
the work of Ibn Khalduwn Centre for Development in Cairo on Minorities and 
sects. 
11 George Corom, Infi. iaar al-Mashriq al-'Arabiy: Min Tamiym Qanaat al- 
Suwivs ila Iltiavvah Lubbnan, First Edition (Beirut; Dar al-Tali'a, 1987) p. 
216. 
Ibid, p. 209. 
13 Ibid. p. 200. 
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of the nation and identity. It is useful to introduce some of 
these contributions to show the changes in the nature of Arab 
nationalist thought. 
Perhaps it would be useful in detecting the change to start 
with the contribution of 'Ismat Saiyf al-Duwla to the debate on 
the nature of the Arab nation. This is because Saiyf Duwla is one 
of the old generation of Arab nationalists and was a contemporary 
of Nasser and 'Aflaq. This helps in evaluating how the changes 
in the Arab world affected his opinion. Saiyf Duwla bases his 
idea of 'the nation on what he sees as the functional role of any 
social formation or structural unit. Saiyf Duwla argues that any 
social formation such as the family, clan, tribe or the 
nation is found because it fulfils certain functions and 
its survival is determined by its efficacy ... every 
structural unit of these was found to undertake the duty of 
fulfilling and making available certain needs which the 
preceding could not accomplish. 14 
Therefore the nation "fulfils an amount of needs greater 
than those tribes could fulfill ... The process of forming social 
units in order to fulfill needs always develops as need arises 
for new structures to fulfill rising needs. " Therefore the nation 
is only a step on this evolutionary process. Saiyf Duwla argues 
that "human progress is open to the appearance of yet more 
advanced and developed social formations. These will be beyond 
the nation and in response to the growth of needs. "5 
Saiyf Duwla assigns importance to 
common territory as a necessary factor so a human group 
forms a nation. Living on a particular territory makes it 
possible for the realisation that they have common needs 
that work as an incentive for developing the right 
14 'Ismat Saiyf al-Duwla, interview with the author, Cairo; 29.4.1995. 
15 Ibid. 
171 
structure, here the nation, for the fulfilment of their 
needs . 
16 
This is an entirely new approach to the nation that Arab 
nationalist thought had not known before. Saiyf Duwla does not 
attribute any significance to factors of language or unity of 
economic life as these, in his opinion, "are not peculiar to the 
nation and may be available to human groups like tribes. , 1.7 
The Arab nation is not, according to this view, eternal and 
will not live forever. When the Arab nation as a social 
structural functional unit "exhausts its capabilities in 
achieving progress the people will proceed to new relations of 
identity. "" Saiyf Duwla investigates Arab history since Islam 
and points to the year 622 when "the Arab nation began to form 
in the womb of the first society (people) made by the 
civilisational Islamic revolution; it was borne in it and was 
accomplished as an Arab nation. "19 
Then the Arab nation is the work of Islam. Accordingly it 
would not have been formed had it not been for 
the coincidence of two factors in the same historical 
period: Islam as a civilisational revolution capable of 
creativity and progress, and the peoples which had not 
developed into nations and therefore it was possible for it 
to be developed and recreated. "' 
That however does not imply the consistency of this with the 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 'Ismat Saiyf Duwla, 'An al-'Uruwba wa al-Islam (On Arabism and Islam) Second Edition (Tunis; al-Buraq lii Nashr, 1990) Arabic Text (Present Author's 
Translation) p. 15. 
19 Ibid, p. 41. 
20 Ibid, p. 45. 
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concept of the umma in the Islamic sense but it is not just as 
well an extension of the peoples that melted in its pot. 21 This 
kind of theorising about the Arab nation is entirely different 
from that provided by traditional Arab nationalist thought. 
Traditional thought argued that the Arab nation had preceded 
Islam and that the role of Islam was to assign it a new mission. 
Saiyf Duwla argues that Islam made the Arabs a nation and 
the relationship between the two is an organic one. 22 This is 
also to reject the view that Islam is the national religion of 
the Arabs and their heritage. Saiyf Duwla considers this a total 
error since the Arab nation had not existed before Islam. Moving 
on it is clear that Saiyf Duwla does not consider the nation "a 
linguistic, cultural or historical concept or category. The 
nation is an objective reality"; it is "a society with a distinct 
civilisation of a certain people settled on a land of its own and 
this people was formed through a lengthy common history. , 21 
Saiyf Duwla also presents a concept of the state based on 
the same idea of historical functionalism. The state is formed 
because the coordination of activities in an integrated way 
needed an organisation. The state here is not an end in itself 
nor does this evolutionary functional process of state formation 
stop at achieving the state. It allows for the emergence of yet 
new forms of organisation. Applied to the pan-Arab ideal Saiyf 
Duwla's approach recognises that the achievement of a united Arab 
state is not a condition for the realisation of the Arab nation. 
21 Ibid, p. 45. 
22 Ibid, p. 46. 
23 'Ismat Saiyf Duwla, interview with the author. 
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"The nation is a historical and accomplished reality that needs 
nothing. " However the pan-Arab state becomes a necessity for the 
Arab people since it "puts at their disposal the potential of 
political, economic and social progress that exceeds these 
available under the state of fragmentation. j124 
It can be seen that there is a strong departure from the 
traditional romantic Arab nationalist thought. The emphasis here 
is not on the vitality and necessity of the state for the 
accomplishment of the nation-state but rather on the functions 
the state could perform for the purpose of organisation. This 
takes the analysis from the sphere of linguistic cultural nation 
to that of political nation and from cultural sociology to 
political sociology. Here the contribution of Nadiym Biytar is 
significant. 
Biytar sociologically defines national identity a "group of 
general characteristics which distinguish a people or a nation 
in a particular historical phase. j25 Biytar considers the people 
and the nation as one category and identity as another one. 
However he traces both of them in history. The characteristics 
are not permanent. They, as well as identity, are "a product of 
history and in a continuous process of change. , 2" This concept of 
identity is what Biytar calls the sociological concept. He puts 
it in contrast to what he terms the metaphysical concept of 
national identity which defines the nation or the people in a 
24 Ibid. 
25 Nadiym Biytar, Huwduwd al-Hauwiyya al-Qawmivva: Nagd 'Am, First 
Edition(Beirut; Dar al-Wahda, 1982) p. 22. 
26 Ibid, p. 32, p. 288. 
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constant static essence isolated from the effects of historical 
circumstances. 27 By applying this concept the nation can be 
understood in terms of "dynamic factors of history such as ... 
crises, social and political conflicts and ideological 
conceptions, etc. 112" Thus national identity has a changing 
nature. 
Biytar defines national identity as "a combination of ways 
of thought, feeling and behaviour which are relatively identical 
and which have a limited and relative control or domination in 
a particular historical period. 1129 How does Biytar explain the 
Arab case with its unitary and fragmentary dimensions? Biytar 
takes into account the relationship between the nation and its 
state. 30 He is also eager to emphasise the role played by 
language in the formation of the Arab nation. 3- However he 
questions that the nation is older than the state and doubts the 
validity of language as the decisive national factor and 
therefore doubts that a fragmented nation must become politically 
united. 
The state is not the definite outcome of nationalist 
aspirations nor it is needed to complete national existence. In 
contrast to the linguistic approach to nationalism Biytar 
27 Ibid, p. 13. 
2s Ibid, p. 18. 
29 Ibid, p. 206. 
3' Nadiym Biytar, Juwdhuwwr al-Iglimi ya al-Jadiyda (The Roots of New Particularism) First Edition (Beirut; Ma'had al-Innmaa al-'Arabiy, 1983) Arabic Text (Author's Translation) p. 19, p. 68. 
31 Nadiym Biytar, Min al-Ta. izia ila al-Wahda: al-Qawaniyn al-Asasiyya li Ta. iarub al-Tariykh al-Wahdawivva, Fifth Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al- Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1986) pp. 373-374. 
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considers language the result of a national unification that 
preceded it. This is to suggest that it is the emergence of the 
state that explains the national phenomenon. The determinant 
factor in national formation is the state. This political factor 
then interacted with other factors such as language or territory 
in making the nation. Nations as linguistic, cultural and 
historical units would not have become nations had it not been 
for the decisive role played by the state. 32 Language may well 
have preceded the state but the state is the determinant and 
decisive factor that defines the boundaries of language and its 
use. 33 
The same applies to culture. Culture and common history 
could not be realised into a national being without a state that 
renders the life of the people a daily experience. 
Being subservient to one state ... imposes on the people a 
common destiny that distinguishes it from other peoples ... It creates organisations and apparatus that make the unity 
of the people a sensed experience. 34 
It is clear that Biytar does not allocate any essential values 
to economics, geography or psychology since they explain the 
nation, a dynamic changing social and historical category, by 
employing static factors such as geography. 35 
But how then does he understand the question of national 
political unification? How does he view a nation's land when it 
is divided among many states as in the case of the Arab nation? 
3z Nadiym Biytar, Huwduwd al-Hauwivva, or. cit., pp. 299-300. 
33 Ibid, pp. 66-67. 
34 Ibid, pp. 66-67. 
35 Ibid, pp. 240-249. 
176 
Here problems arise in his model that may contradict his pan-Arab 
orientation. This is because the state that plays the role of 
forming the nation is either a unitary state or not. The unitary 
state is the one he defines as being the corner stone in the 
national formation process. "The state that created the nation, II36 
and the un-unitary state refers to the "sweeping majority of the 
newly independent countries which made the state first and are 
now trying to build the nation through the state. 1137 
As the first model is central to the concerns of Biytar the 
question is how does the unitary state create the nation? It is 
the same way by which this state becomes a strong and an all 
encompassing one so it is able to organise the society and 
control it. But again, how is this kind of state is reached? How 
is political unity achieved among political units that are 
independent of each other as the case in the Arab world? Biytar 
is essentially occupied with this issue. He criticises Arab 
nationalist thought for not having a theory or approach for 
unity. He provides a theory that reveals some fundamental rules 
that govern the process of unity. Unity is not to be achieved 
unless these objective rules are available along with the 
subjective factors of human will. 3ß 
Having analysed some contributions that deal with the issues 
36 Nadiym Biytar, Min al-Taizia ila al-Wahda: al-Oawaniyn al-Asasiyya li 
Ta. iarub al-Tarikh al-Wahdawivva, Fifth Edition(Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda 
al-'Arabiyya, 1986)p. 23. 
37 Ibid, p. 62. 
38 Biytar allocates a whole book to the explanation of his "unitary 
thesis" and the rules that govern the unification "phenomenon" throughout 
history that may be employed to achieve Arab unity. See his: Min al -Ta. izi aila al-Wahda, op. cit., and also his: Huwduwd al-Hauwiyya, op. cit., p. 113. p. 199, 
p. 298, p. 303, p. 309. 
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of identity, nation and state, the discussion now moves on to 
contributions which attempt to provide a comprehensive approach 
to these issues. The following contributions of Isma'iyl Sabriy 
'Abdullah, Samir Amin and Fawzy Mansour provide an approach that 
emphasise a civilsational conception of the nation. Isma'iyl 
Sabriy 'Abdullah is prominent in this approach. Though an old 
Arab Marxist he attempts to provide an analysis that liberates 
itself from Stalinist dogma. 'Abdullah believes in an Arab nation 
and he does not accept the assumption that Arabism has been dead 
since 1967. He believes that the Arab nation is as alive today 
as it ever has been. 39 
The nation in 'Abdullah's opinion is a historical concept 
that "forms during a long period ... Its circumstances change 
along the path of history. il 40 What he is trying to demonstrate 
here is that the nation is not a past-based concept. "Nationalism 
and the movement of history ... are related ... and either of 
them may not be understood without reference to the other. "41 The 
factors of the nation are " different communities or groups 
settled or moving, which are bound by interests in a definite 
historical phase which dictates their alliance and 
affiliation. "42 
This conception is based on the hypothesis that nation is 
39 Isma'iyl Sabriy 'Abdullah, interview with the author, Cairo; 26.4.1995 
4o Isma'iyl Sabriy 'Abdullah, "al-Umma al-'Arabiyya: al-Haqiyqa al- 
'Ilmiyya fiy Muwajahat al-Khalt wa al-Ghalt", in Isma'iyl Sabriy 'Abdullah 
etal, Dirasaat fi al-Haraka al-Tagadumiyva al-'Arabivva, (Seminar Papers) 
First Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1987) p. 109. 
41 Ibid, p. 110. 
42 Ibid, p. 110. 
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an old phenomenon despite the modern appearance of nationalism. 
From this 'Abdullah criticises the linguistic approach to the 
Arab nation. He argues that language cannot become united and 
complete unless there is "that space on which the nation 
settles. "43 Therefore if language is important for communication, 
"land and the production and the exchange that takes place on it 
are the material base for the nation's existence. " However it is 
essential for the realisation of the nation that "enough time is 
allowed for the united community, in language and land, to build 
a civilisation in the wider sense. " This also includes "values, 
customs, rules of behaviour and the feelings that make up the 
common sentiment and therefore the desire to live together. "44 
Nation is then 
a community of people who live together on an undivided 
land, who speak the same tongue and who historically formed 
a common civilisation and have the desire to live together 
in order to maintain common interests. 45 
But to talk of common interests does not acknowledge Stalin's 
concept of it. 'Abdullah considers that Stalin's concept of 
common economic interests applies only to the actual real 
interests not the potential ones. 46 Therefore the Arabs are a 
nation despite the fragmentation of their interests. This is so 
because the unity of market is a wilful act and the material 





Ibid, p. 111. 
Ibid, p. 111. 
Ibid, p. 112. 
Isma'iyl Sabriy 'Abdullah, interview with the author. 
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to become a reality. j47 
But if common civilisation means the existence of a nation, 
does that imply one nation-state? 'Abdullah's answer is negative. 
He argues that there is no historical determinism that links 
nation and state. The nation is the product of civilisation. 
State becomes the form of organising the nation politically only 
when the majority of the nation believes that "unity under the 
banner of one nation brings benefits and creates material and 
none-material interests. 1148 'Abdullah outlines the idea of the 
Arab nation as having been formed 
through long centuries since the appearance of Islam and 
the spread of Arabs to regions; during these centuries a 
common culture and civilisation, based on unity of tongue, 
were formed. ... This common system was historically linked 
to common interests and was the composite fruit of the 
mixing of the Arabised peoples and their interaction with 
peoples who did not become Arabised even though some of 
them were Islamised. 49 
Clearly, this emphasises that Islam was the driving force 
behind the transformation of the Arabs from having been scattered 
saharan tribes into a nation. This is an outright rejection of 
the thesis of an Arab nation in the process of formation which 
some Arab Marxists still hold. The Arab nation is then an old 
nation that owes Islam its unity since Islam played the essential 
role in building the Arab civilisation and preserving Arabic. 
Turning his attention to the question of Arab unity today 
'Abdullah believes that there is no necessity for building a pan- 
47 Isma'iyl Sabriy 'Abdullah, "al-Umma al-'Arabiyya: al-Haqiyqa", off. 
cit., p. 122. 
48 Isma'iyl Sabriy 'Abdullah, interview with the author. 
49 Isma'iyl Sabriy 'Abdullah, "al-Umma al-'Arabiyya: al-Haqiyqa", op_. 
cit., p. 112. 
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Arab nation-state. The critical and urgent need now is progress 
and development. The road to any form of Arab unity must begin 
with "creating and supporting economic and social forces that 
conceive unity into their interest. j SO This gives enough room for 
the multiplicities evident in the Arab world. And this is in line 
with the nature of Arab civilisation which "accommodated 
multiplicities and particularisms. "sl 
Despite this change of attitudes by Arab Marxists such as 
'Abdullah, other Arab Marxists, like Fawzy Mansour and Samir 
Amin, still argue that the Arab nation is in the process of 
formation. They believe that even though the Arab nation had been 
formed in the past it consequently lost itself and it is now 
going through the process of formation again. S2 Although they 
reject the concept of Stalin's common market factor they still 
echo the same thesis. 53 Mansour and Amin argue that there is no 
Arab nation now even if they provide a different set of 
explanation. It is clear that Amin and Mansour are concerned with 
reforming Marxism and hence consider Stalin's concept 
inappropriate not because it denies the Arabs nationhood but 
simply because it is not in line with how Marxism ought to be 
5o Ibid, p. 123. 
51 Isma'iyl Sabriy 'Abdullah, interview with the author. 
52 Fawzy Mansour and Samir Amin, interviews with the author, Cairo; 
1.5.1995. 
53 It is interesting to note that Constantine Zurayq, a leading liberal 
Arabist, adheres to the idea of the Arab nation in becoming. However his 
thesis is that the Arabs have not yet gone through a process similar to that 
underwent by Europe. Till the Arabs develop through rationalism, science and 
modernity they would not maintain their nationhood. See his, "Huwla Huluwl 
'Amaliyya lil 'Aqabaat Allatiy Ta'tarid al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya", adai a 
Arabiyya, vol. 7, (1980) p. 7. 
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applied in explaining Arab history. " 
Fawzy Mansour starts from the idea that the nation is a" 
historical category" to suggest that a nation can be formed in 
one of three ways: in the first one a nation forms 
around an important natural resource, e. g. a great river. 
A centralised authority is required for the full 
exploitation of its possibilities and to impose voluntary 
or forced cooperation of those whose life depends on this 
resource, such as Egypt in relation to the Nile river. " 
In the second way a nation forms "as a result of interaction of 
sectoral and geographical differentiation and integration 
process. " These are the result of 
the application of the principle of the division of labour 
operating within a politically and socially well defined 
area under autonomous, as contrasted with independent, 
capitalism. The classical example is the formation of 
modern nations in Western Europe. 56 
This approach does not however preclude the importance of 
what Mansour calls the "predisposing conditions such as the unity 
of language, settlement on territory and common culture. 1157 But 
these conditions are not in themselves sufficient to make a 
nation unless they are activated by the economic factor. And 
lastly a nation may form "as a result, given sufficient time, of 
the process of differentiation and integration introduced not by 
market forces but by rational and well balanced economic and 
social central planning. 1158 This last way of nation formation is 
hypothetical but Mansour considers it the relevant model for 
54 Samir Amin and Fawzy Mansour, interviews with the author. 






forming an Arab nation. To the extent that none of the three 
suggested ways was obtained for the Arab world as a whole, it 
seems incorrect to "speak of a fully formed Arab nation. "-59 
But Mansour admits that in the Arab case there exists what 
he calls the predisposing conditions. That makes the Arabs only 
a "potential nation. , 60 Since it lacks the economic factor of 
differentiation and integration the Arab `nation' remains a 
"nation in state of formation and this is a transitional phase 
... the nationhood status may or may not 
be achieved. , 61 The 
outcome of this would depend on other factors but mainly the 
economic factor. Mansour argues that it is uncertain whether this 
nation in the process of formation will develop "into a fully 
integrated nation or whether the forces of fragmentation, 
dispersal or partial regrouping along different lines will have 
the upper hand. "62 
However Mansour is hoping that the factors favouring the 
completion of the process of Arab national formation will win the 
battle against the opposing factors of foreign hostility to Arab 
nationhood, the internal factors of weakness like traditionalism 
and the imbalance in the levels of the development of forces of 
production in the Arab countries. Hence integration or 
unification is conducive to balanced and sustained development 
as well as a necessary condition for the maintenance of 










Mansour a "class project and this was clear in the first way 
where a particular class was the beneficiary from water 
exploitation and also in capitalism where the bourgeoisie class 
pioneered the formation of the nation. il 63 Here the problem of the 
Arabs during the process of forming a nation is the lack of this 
kind of class that can take up the formation process to its 
extreme and establish the Arab nation firmly. 64 
Samir Amin shares the views of Mansour. He considers that 
the nation "may appear in all historical periods. It is not 
necessarily confined to the capitalist mode of production. " The 
nation may appear if 
in addition to the primary conditions of geographic 
proximities supported by the use of a common language..., 
a social class has hegemony over the central apparatus of 
the state and maintains the economic unity of a group of 
people . 
65 
This class, argues Amin, does not have to be the national 
bourgeoisie capitalist class. Arab unity for example was the work 
of "a class of traders-warriors and not a class of aristocracy 
of a feudal type. 1166 This is to reject Stalin's definition of the 
nation. This is because Amin argues that to accept Stalin's 
thesis would restrict the phenomenon of nations to European 
history with the result of rejecting the existence of other 
nations and therefore nations could not form outside the centre 
63 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. Mansour's argument is detailed in his book: The Arab World: 
Nation State and Democracy, First Edition (London; Zed Books, Tokyo; United 
Nations University, 1992). 
65 Samir Amin, al-Umma al-'Arabiyya(the Arab Nation) First Edition 
(Cairo; Maktabat Madbuliy, 1988) Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) 
p. 131. 
66 Ibid, p. 45. 
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of the world capitalist system. 67 
Amin argues that nations are older than capitalism, as in 
the cases of Egypt, China and the Arab nation at some stage. Amin 
agrees in particular with Fawzy Mansour's idea of economic 
differentiation and integration. However, he thinks that 
differentiation is not entirely a proper term as differentiation 
among classes is not integrative but conflictual. 68 Samir Amin 
concentrates on the ideological and political aspect according 
to which he conceives of the nation as having been formed "in 
circumstances, as in Europe, related to the emergence of 
capitalism and the emergence of the ideology of bourgeois 
democracy against feudalism. 1169 The nation in the context of 
ideological struggle may be understood as "a model for the 
restructuring of authority in a certain geographic territory and 
a set of economic capitalist relations. " This ideological 
struggle was manifest in the slogan of the "social contract 
wherein the nation was not historically inherited but a novel or 
new concept resulting from the will of the people (the 
bourgeoisie. j170 
This is very significant since modern nations "evolved, as 
an ideology of bourgeois state-nation, around neglecting or 
marginalising the importance of the past and giving all attention 
to the ideological aspect i. e. social harmony as a base for 
67 Ibid, p. 26. 




modern democracy. j171 Setting his argument in the direction of the 
Arab issue Amin explains that in experiences other than the one 
which was at the forefront of producing capitalism and modern 
bourgeoisie democracy, such as those of the Arabs 
the nation as an inherited past took the place of the 
social harmony or contract in the process of building a 
modern state based on the capitalist relations of 
production. Therefore differentiation and integration were 
not linked with the ideological and political factor, 
democracy and social harmony. 72 
According to Amin this was evident in the German and Italian 
experience where the nation as an "eternal entity, spirit, and 
coupled with language was employed to maintain and sustain 
capitalist relations, but with a degree less than the democratic 
ideology example. il 73 Here "national unity replaced the bourgeois 
revolutions to create the appropriate framework of authority in 
order that market relations flourish and be imposed. 1174 This is 
to say that the European explanation of nationalism is not fit 
for the Arab case. Amin argues that if the Arab world 
had been a nation, thanks to the central role of the 
traders-warriors class, that did not last long. The Arab 
world had been a nation only for a short period of its 
history and then it lost its national character to become 
a mosaic of peoples since the thirteenth century and 
particularly since the sixteenth century. 75 
Amin cites historical evidence to support his idea. He 
argues that a series of great historical events led to the Arab 










Samir Amin, al-Umma al-'Arabi ya, op. Cit., p. 133. 
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the crusades, the Arab cities loss of the central trade 
position to the Italian cities, the fall of Baghdad at the 
hands of Mongols in the thirteenth century, the Ottoman 
onslaught in the sixteenth century, and the change of trade 
routes from the Mediterranean Sea to the Atlantic. 76 
These developments led to what Samir Amin considers to have been 
the loss of the driving force and was behind the Arab nation's 
decline in its power and its effect on the national formation of 
the Arabs. He attributes to these developments the result of 
eventually "the hegemonic class ... became unable to practice 
hegemony at the national level in uniting the economy and 
centralising power. "" 
But if this was the case in the past why has the movement 
of Arab nationalism not been able to repeat the experience and 
form the Arab nation again? Why could a class not play a 
similarly decisive role? Amin's answer is that the nature of 
polarisation in world capitalism did not create the right 
circumstances for the formation of nations at the 
periphery. ... In the peripheries disintegration instead of integration of what would have crystallised into nations 
took place . 
78 
This may be understood in Amin's view from the role of the 
"peripheral bourgeoisie. Naturally it is attached and strongly 
linked to the world capitalist system based on polarisation. 1179 
Arab nationalism therefore failed in forming an Arab nation 
because the ruling Arab classes are linked and conspire with the 
capitalist system and imperialism. 80 
76 Ibid, p. 132. 
Ibid, p. 134. 




The discussion above reveals contributions that are entirely 
new to Arab nationalist thought. However, there are still Arab 
writers who hold to the previous concepts and explanations of the 
Arab nation. Examples of this traditional view can be found in 
the ideas of Muhammad A. Khalafallah and Majdiy Hammad. 
Khalafallah still holds to the linguistic definition of the 
nation stating that "language and the heritage it carries are the 
fundamental factors of the nation. ""' Even though Khalafallah 
acknowledges the difference between this concept of the nation 
and the political realisation of it in a nation-state he confirms 
that in the case of Arab nationalism it was Arabic which aroused 
Arab nationalism. 82 
The same view is to be found in the contribution of Majdiy 
Hammad who grounds his view in the linguistic tradition. He 
distinguishes between national existence, nationalist thought or 
ideology and nationalist movement. 83 Hammad argues that "strong 
links exist among the Arabs such as language" and despite 
minorities the Arab national identity is prevailing. 84 Hammad 
uses the distinction mentioned above to argue that Arabism could 
not die. He believes that Arab nationalist ideology and Arab 
nationalist movement may be considered weak. However this is 
attributed to political factors that followed the 1967 defeat in 
the war with Israel. 85 
81 Muhammad A. Khalafallah, interview with the author, Cairo; 23.4.1995. 
82 Ibid. 




Referring to the rise of political Islam Hammad explains 
that Arab nationalism is not defunct since "what happened after 
1967 was a change in the relative weight of these trends and that 
does not mean the supremacy of any of them at the expense of the 
others. "" Hammad attributes what seemed to be a decline in Arab 
nationalism to the "loss of efficiency at the level of 
nationalist ideology and its inability to understand world and 
regional developments and at the level of political movement that 
failed to realise the goal of unity. "87 
It seems that Hammad's approach, despite its recognition of 
multiplicity within the Arab nation, still focuses on the effects 
of external factors such as imperialism in determining the 
features of the Arab world. The view that gives primacy to 
external factors does not give proper weight to the divisions 
within the Arab world and within each country as well. It does 
not count for the process of fragmentation at the societal level 
that reaches the point of atomization. This can be understood in 
the Arab east in particular where this process of atomization 
involved ethnicity, religion, the value system and politics. This 
impedes integration at the particularist territorial state level. 
But despite the availability of these views of a traditional 
nature there is a consensus among the writers and intellectuals 
interviewed in criticising traditional Arab nationalist thought. 
The common held view is that traditional thought misjudged the 
issue of the Arab nation. It underestimated if not totally 




emphasise the uniting factors of an Arab nation. "" It can not be 
said that the old paradigm of an Arab nation is entirely dead 
since the new paradigm still carries some components of the old 
one. The contributions analysed here reveal a dialectical 
relationship between the old and the new paradigms as far as the 
concept of the Arab nation is concerned. The main feature of the 
new paradigm is its recognition of the multiplicity within the 
Arab world. 
Saiyyd Yasiyn attributes this change of view to the waning 
of the idea that establishes an automatic link between the nation 
and the state. 89 He explains that while the nation is a 
"sociological concept that establishes national entity on 
cultural and historical factors" this does not mean a 
"determinist link between nation and state. 1190 Yasiyn's approach 
does not exclude the importance of the cultural and historical 
factors. He argues that these factors should not disguise the 
"multiplicity involved in this unity. 1191 If factors that define 
the idea of an Arab nation are the outcome of the common Arab 
history, the "social history ... 
is distinctive in each Arab 
country and could not be repeated since it played a vital role 
in defining distinctive particularistic or regional 
personalities. 1192 
88 The majority of Egyptian and all Moroccan Intellectuals Interviewed 










Yasiyn distinguishes according to this view between what he 
terms "the principal system and subsystems. The different Arab 
personalities have common features which make for unity while 
each of them has its own characteristics making for subsystems 
that do not contradict the system. "" The Arab personality 
expresses an Arab nation which is founded on "a principal mode 
of production that evolved and developed in all Arab countries 
in similar phases and a superstructure with its main components 
of common historical experience, Arabic language and common 
cultural heritage. "" 
This does not exclude the existence of "regional or 
particularistic personalities. On the contrary the supposition 
that a principal system exists emphasises the existence of these 
subsystems. 1195 This is not to suggest that these are closed and 
static structures since they "change according to the change of 
the mode of production or the changes in the main ingredients of 
socio-political formation. 1196 Arab personality is a dynamic 
conception of nation and community. It recognises particularism 
and multiplicity, argues for the accident of unity at one stage 
and does not exclude its possibility in another stage. It is a 
conception that "recognises the abundant multiplicity in the Arab 
93 Ibid. 
94 Saiyyd Yasiyn, "al-Shakhsiyya al-'Arabiyya: al-Nasaq al-Raiyyis wa al- 
Ansaaq al-Far'iyya"(The Macro System and the Subsystems), in al-Hauwiyya al- 'Arabivva Biyna a]-Wahda wa al-Tanauww'(Arab Identity Between Unity and 
Multiplicity) Papers presented at the First Gathering of Tunisian and Egyptian 
Members of Faculties, 12-17 April 1978 (Tunis: Markaz al-Buhuwth wa al- Dirasaat al-Ijtima'iyya wa al-Iqtisadiyya, 1979) Arabic Text (Present Author's 
Translation) p. 172. 
" Ibid, p. 173. 
96 Ibid, p. 173. 
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region and keeps it within the general frame of unity in 
Multiplicity. 1197 
From the analysis of the contributions above it is clear 
that Arab intellectuals differ in evaluating the factors that 
make the Arab nation a living entity. Those who emphasise the 
concept of an Arab nation, albeit in rather metaphysical sense, 
do not give proper attention to local particularism and 
concentrate on the common markers of the Arabs. Those who argue 
for multiplicities give prominence to social and cultural factors 
that make the local particularism and the multiplicity of 
identities. They view these as supportive of integration. 
Accordingly cultural multiplicity is a fertilising factor that 
enriches Arab identity. Despite the recognition of the 
multiplicity of identity at the ethnic, religious and cultural 
levels these contributions emphasise the relationship between 
Arabism and Islam. This relationship is seen in dialectical terms 
wherein Arabism is not a racial quality and Islam is not a 
metaphysical quality. This is essentially the view expressed by 
secularly-oriented Arab intellectuals who, like the Egyptian Copt 
Ghaliy Shukriy, allocate to Islam a major role in the formation 
of the Arab nation. 98 
Shukriy argues that there had existed no Arab nation before 
Islam. Islam "was the decisive factor in the formation of the 
Arab nation. 1199 This role is not completely peculiar to Islam. 
Shukriy argues that "Eastern Christianity participated in the 
97 Ibid. p. 173. 
9s Ghaliy Shukriy, interview with the author, Cairo; 30.4.1995 
99 Ibid. 
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making of the Arab nation ... this 
is not to say that religion 
per se, Islam or Christianity, united the Arabs but this is a 
reference to a cultural role and a civilisational role detached 
from religion as a theology. 11100 Assigning religion a role of 
ideology is what Shukriy considers appropriate in assessing the 
role of Islam and Eastern Christianity in forming the Arab 
nation. He explains this in the role played by Eastern 
Christianity and early Islam through their principles of justice, 
equality, dialogue, and rationality. 10' 
But despite the appearance of a new paradigm a general 
survey of the contributions by Arab intellectuals in the 1980s 
reveals that concepts like nation, nationalism, and Arab unity 
have different implications. This was clear in the contributions 
of a large number of participants at a conference of Arab 
intellectuals organised by the Centre for Studies of Arab Unity 
in Beirut on the topic of Arab unity. 102In the conference 
differences regarding the concept of nation and on deciding a 
historical point wherein the Arab nation was formed were very 
wide. 
It could be noted that the literature confuses concepts and 
terms like watan: homeland, umma: nation, sha'b: people, 
wataniyya: patriotism, qutriyya: particularism and qawmiyya: 
nationalism. These are used to denote a variety of meanings. For 
instance watan from which wataniyya is derived is used to imply 
particularistic territorial Arab states which are sometimes seen 
ioo Ibid. 
Ibid. 
io2 A. Duri etal, al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, op. cit. 
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as nation-states, whereas qawmiyya refers to the Arab nation. 
Despite the agreement that there is an Arab nation the 
contributions still contain undefined and ambiguous terms such 
as the Arab peoples, the Arab world, the Arab people, the Arab 
homeland and the Arab states. "' 
This may very well be seen as an indication of the lack of 
a cohesive theoretical framework of nation and state and 
therefore undermines the structure of Arab nationalist ideology. 
Arab intellectuals have difficulties in defining these concepts. 
This may be explained in the possible effects of such activity. 
Clear cut definitions may impose the choice between two 
alternatives: either in rejecting the concept of an Arab nation 
and therefore giving credit to particularist nations within the 
boundaries of each Arab state and assign it the quality of modern 
nation-states, or remaining loyal to an abstract nation. Choosing 
either alternative would either give legitimacy to the idea of 
an Arab world made of human communities that have linguistic and 
cultural ties or reject the concept of particularistic homeland, 
watan, and particularistic people, sha'b, in favour of an Arab 
homeland and an Arab people. 
The concept of an Arab nation is a problematic one. Affected 
by the European concept of the nation Arab intellectuals find the 
Arab nation something that is beyond material sense. It lacks a 
form of political unity despite the spread of the view which sees 
no automatic link between nation and state. This may explain the 
103 This also applies to the official state level. some Arab states call 
their national anthem gawmiy implying nationhood while other states call it 
wataniy implying only their state level. This is also the case with national 
guards, parliaments (where they exist anyway) and economies. 
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widely held view in the 1980s that there are levels of identity 
or the view that argues for the multiplicity of identities. Arab 
intellectuals when dealing with these issues are faced by the 
fact that the particularist identity has become institutionalised 
in a particular state whereas history made a loyalty to the Arab 
nation. But loyalty to an Arab nation lacks a homeland with 
defined boundaries and lacks a state. Therefore it is sometimes 
linked to history, to heritage, to language and nationalist 
feeling or to economic interests. 
There are attempts at resolving this problematic question 
but with no final success so far in transcending cultural and 
linguistic criteria. The dilemma of reconciling plurality, 
multiplicity and unity constitutes the essence of attempts to 
define Arab identity. If treated in a dialectical sense it may 
be possible to argue that the Arabs belong together without being 
the same. The content of Arab identity therefore means that the 
Arabs have a multiplicity of affiliations or identities and a 
sense of belonging. Reconciling these identities is still the 
most challenging task confronting the Arabs. It hinders the 
effort at unity. It stands as an obstacle to achieving aims which 
have occupied a central place in their thought since the attempt 
at nahda, renaissance, in the nineteenth century. 
It is clear from the discussion that the new contributions 
still carry some of the features of the old paradigm. What is 
meant by a dialectic between paradigms? No paradigm loses the 
battle completely. The new paradigm however has new features of 
its own. It is almost free from the simple naive linguistic, 
historical or religious concepts of nation. It is substituting 
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pragmatism for the romanticism and past nostalgia. There is to 
be found clear indications of the new paradigm in the almost 
total rejection of the automatic link between nation and state. 
It is more realistic in understanding the multiplicities in the 
Arab world. Pragmatism and realism are indeed the main features 
of the new emerging paradigm of Arab nationalism. This can be 
further understood in the contributions dealing with issues of 
minorities and democracy as will be explained below. 
4-2: Arabism, Islam and Secularism: The Unsolved Debate 
The assessment of the relation between Arabism, secularism 
and Islam has been central to debates within Arab thought since 
the beginning of this century. The fact that Arabisation and 
Islamisation were taking place simultaneously brought the 
internationalist dimension of Islam and the formation of Arab 
nationalism together into the debates. 104 Arab nationalist thought 
driven by its desire to breakaway from the Ottoman Empire 
stressed that Arabism was compatible with Islam. Arab nationalist 
thought was influenced by the contributions of Islamic 
reformists. The reformists argued that Islam was compatible with 
western ideas and liberal thought. This set the tone for Arab 
nationalist thought which assumed that Arab nationalism could be 
reconciled with Islam. 
(i) Arabism, Islam or Secularism 
Arab nationalists maintained that Arab nationalism was an 
'04 Samir Amin, "Ta'liyq" (A Comment), in A. Duri etal, al-Wahda al- 'Arabivva, op. cit., p. 1041. 
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appropriate way of liberating and advancing one Muslim nation 
i. e. the Arab nation. Islam was considered a cultural component 
of Arabism and a cultural heritage of Muslim and Christian Arabs 
alike. However this emphasise on Islam as a context of the Arab 
nation could not mean a clear cut secularism. When secularism was 
advocated it was only in a very ambiguous terms to avoid 
upsetting the feelings of the Muslim majority. This was 
particularly the case with Christian Arab nationalists. 
Nevertheless, as chapter three shows, the clear call for a 
secular Arab nationalism was made by the Muslim Husry who saw no 
place for religion in the formation of the nation. 
The trend was to underplay secularism and stress the role 
of Islam as the civilisation of the Arabs and their culture. The 
stress on Islam also served the purpose of cementing the struggle 
against foreign domination. This was particularly true in the 
case of the Maghrib where Islam and Arabism were inextricably 
linked. 105 In the Mashriq also the linkage of Arabism and what the 
Arabs saw in their heritage, which could not be separated from 
Islam, was instrumental in the struggle as it was during the 
early Arab nahda of the nineteenth century when the emphasis was 
on Arab culture and heritage. 
The clear indication was that Arab nationalism could not 
isolate itself from Islam and this continued to be the case till 
the period of our investigation. Arab nationalism kept alive the 
secular flavour of Husry and supplemented it by the addition of 
economic factors. 106 Advocating socialist ideas and the 
105 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, interview with the author. 
106 Saiyyd Yasiyn, Tahliyl Madmun, op. Cit., pp. 128-130. 
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justification of this would-be secularism by reference to Islam 
meant that this secularism was only a shy one. 107 Therefore 
traditional Arab nationalist thought while attempting to define 
the relationship between Islam and nationalism often ended where 
it started, i. e. with the glorification of Arabism and the 
neglect of the political aspects of Islam. 
Although the inclusion of Islam in Arab nationalism and 
using it a frame of reference helped regimes such as that of 
Nasser gain wide popular support and strike against Muslim 
fundamentalism, the view towards secularism remained essentially 
ambiguous. The confrontation between Arab nationalist regimes and 
Muslim fundamentalists in the 1950s and 1960s brought the issue 
to the fore. The setbacks of Arab nationalism in the 1970s, the 
failure of development at the state level, the effects of the 
Iranian Islamic revolution and the civil war in Lebanon reopened 
the debate on the relationship between Arabism, secularism and 
Islam and lent it a sense of urgency. "' 
The Islamist trend opened fire at the Arabists. They saw the 
setbacks of Arab nationalists as evidence of the unsuitability 
of secular ideas. The Arabists had to provide a response and to 
take into consideration the rising appeal of political Islam or 
107 Fahmiyya Sharaf al-Diyn, "Makaanat al-Diyn wa Athuruh fiy al-Fikr al- Qawmiy al-'Arabiy al-Mu'asir"( the Position and Role of Religion in Contemporary Arab Nationalist Thought), in Ma'an Ziyyada(ed), Buhuwth fiy al- Fikr al-Qawmiy al-'Arabiy: Ishkaliyyaat Nazariyya, vol. 2, First Edition 
(Beirut; Ma'had al-Innmaa al-'Arabiy, 1985) p. 322. 
108 For an analysis of these factors see: F. Ajami, The Arab Predicament: 
Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967, (London; Cambridge University 
Press, 1992) pp. 60-73, and for an Arab nationalist view see: All E. Hillal 
Dessouki and Jamiyl Mattar, al-Nizam al-Iglimiy al-'Arabiy: Dirasa fly al- 'Alagaat al-Siyyasiyya al-'Arabiyya, Fifth Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al- Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1986) pp. 53-54, pp. 245-257. 
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declare the end of secularism and probably Arab nationalism 
itself. In the circumstances Arab nationalist thought attempted 
to provide a new approach to the issues at stake. No longer could 
the issue of secularism, Arabism and Islam be brushed aside by 
the same old compromise. Arab nationalist thought is required by 
the Islamists to do justice to the political components of Islam. 
The issue that hitherto could be obscured by the achievements of 
Arab nationalism, all history now, has become a political and 
intellectual challenge. 
(ii) The New Debates 
The 1980s saw intense debates of the issues of Arabism, 
secularism and Islam. This serious debate of secularism, explains 
Aziz al-Azmeh, was not hitherto possible because secularism was 
not debated as a problematic issue. 109 This is also because 
secular institutions were not considered as opposing a religious 
project to transform society. However the rise of forces and, 
where applicable, institutions hostile to secularism made 
secularists realise the need to react to the political designs 
of the Islamists who want to restructure Arab society on the 
basis of religious fundamentalism. 110 The following is a 
discussion of some of the contributions to the debates. The aim 
is to see how Arab nationalist thought responded to the new 
challenge? Has it been able to depart from its previous 
standpoint or has it bowed to the Islamist pressure? Has there 
'o9Aziz al-Azmeh, "al-'Ilmaniyya wa Tahuwlaat al-Mujtama'at al-'Arabiyya" 
Dirasaat 'Arabiyya, vol. 11\12, (1994) p. 3. 
"o Ibid, p. 3. 
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been any intellectual renewal of Arab nationalist thought towards 
these issues? 
One of the primary sources of the debate on Arabism, 
secularism and Islam is the conference devoted to these issues 
organised by the Beirut-based Centre for the Studies of Arab 
Unity(Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya). The conference was 
held in 1980 at a time when the Islamists were proud of the 
example set out by the Iranian Islamic revolution. The pan- 
Arabists, however, were frustrated at the retreat of Arab 
nationalism, the rise of particularist and regionalist interests 
and the divisions in the Arab world. 111 The conference was 
indicative of the views of the Islamist and the pan-Arabist 
trends. It was attended by intellectuals who represented a 
multitude of ideological orientations and generations. The 
deliberations of the conference showed the complexities of the 
issue. The obvious result was a great gap between the views of 
the participants according to their ideological attachments. The 
discussion below will give examples of these views. 
The Lebanese writer Jusiyf Mughiyzil considered Arabism 
older than Islam even though it interacted with it during the 
first five centuries of their common history. After this period 
Arabism was affected by many other factors "that come from our 
history like Christianity and from others like liberalism, 
socialism and technology etc. , 112 This view emphasises the 
111 The papers presented at the conference were published by Markaz 
Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya in a huge book of more than seven hundred pages: Muhammad A. Khalafallah etal, al-Qawmivva al-'Arabiyya wa al-Islam, (Seminar Papers) Second Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1982) 
112 Jusiyf Mughiyzil, "Ta'liyq"(A Commentary), in Muhammad A. Khalafallah 
etal, al-Qawmiyya al-'Arabiyya wa al-Islam, op. cit., p. 131. 
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relationship between Islam and Arabism while confining it to the 
realm of heritage. Mughiyzil affirms that Islam is "part of our 
national heritage which we must preserve and maintain without 
ignoring other factors. "... Mughiyzil's approach is a reflection 
of his concerns as a Christian Lebanese. His view is an attempt 
to underplay the role of religion and its relationship to 
Arabism. This is explained by his deep resentment of the 
consequences of religious and sectarian divisions that led his 
country to a devastating civil war. He argues that religion 
should be confined to the realm of heritage and not to loyalties, 
identities and politics. 
The alternative is to secularise society. Secularism is the 
appropriate formula since it is the system of "religious freedom 
and human dignity. ""' Mughiyzil founds his call for secularism 
on the premise that it not only guarantees the separation of the 
spiritual from the temporal but also is a "fundamental condition 
for the realisation of the unity of society. 11115 However his 
approach does not count for the differences in the 
interpretations of religion. He is not clear on what he means by 
Islam or Christianity? The ambiguity concerning these is an 
evidence of the sort of theoretical deficiencies Arab nationalist 
thought suffers from. 
The Lebanese historian Ma'an Ziyyada acknowledges the role 
113 Ibid, p. 131. 
lla Jusiyf Mughiyzil, "al-Islam wa al-Masihiyya wa al-Qawmiyya al- 'Arabiyya wa al-'Ilmaniyya"(Islam, Christianity, Arab Nationalism and Secularism), in Muhammad A. Khalafallah etal, al-Qawmivva al-'Arabivva wa al- Islam, op. cit., p. 382. 
115 Ibid, p. 384. 
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played by Islam in forming the Arab nation. "Islam along with 
Arabic language united the Arab tribes. It melted the Arabised 
groups in the pot of a united entity bound by Arabism. 11116 This 
is to distinguish between Arabism as a historically accomplished 
social formation and Arab nationalism that seeks the 
"establishment of a new society. A society that has its 
legitimacy in the people not in the Islamic Shari'a. " Arab 
nationalism here is seen in secular terms in contrast to an 
Arabism that was marked by a formative role of Islam. "' 
The Egyptian writer Muhammad 'Amarah rejects confining Islam 
to the realm of heritage. He still sees the great potential of 
Islam. Any restriction of Islam to the position of heritage is 
to jeopardize its relationship with Arabism. Heritage should be 
considered "the active and evasive spirit in the mind of the 
nation; its consciousness and sentiment that guarantee its 
continuation. """ Any other view would lead to its contradiction 
with Arab nationalism, a contradiction which is otherwise 
artificially stimulated. Islam is the protector of the Arab 
nation against its enemies. "' 
'Amarah thinks that the confusion surrounding this 
relationship stems from the failure to distinguish between the 
meaning of relevant concepts. He argues that the misuse of the 
116 Ma'an Ziyyada, "Ta'liyq"(A commentary), in Muhammad A. Khalafallah 
eta], al-Qawmiyya al-'Arabiyya wa al-Islam, op. cit., p. 131. 
117 Ibid, p. 132. 
118 Muhammad 'Amarah, "Ta'liyq" (A Commentary), in Muhammad A. Khalafallah 
etal, al-Qawmiyya al-'Arabiyya wa al-Islam, op. cit., p. 137. 
119 Muhammad 'Amarah, "al-Jami'a al-'Arabiyya wa al-Jami'a al- Islamiyya"(The Arab League and the Islamic League), in Muhammad A. Khalafallah 
etal, al-Qawmiyya al-'Arabivya wa al-Islam, op. cit., p. 148. 
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concept of the nation by the Islamists to denote "a concept of 
Islamic nationalism which refers in the Islamist terminology to 
the community of Muslims as a nation and nationalism" confuses 
it with the European concept of the nation. 12' 'Amarah explains 
that the concept of Islamic nationalism does not imply "the 
attribution of the nationalist qualities to the Islamic community 
as the case with the nation in European thought. " Therefore the 
Arabs are "a distinct nation. " 121 'Amarah explains that the 
confusion about this relationship is rooted in the Ottoman 
oppression of the Arabs. Arabists had no option but to underplay 
the role of Islam while trying to assert their identity against 
a government that exploited Islam and the pan-Islamist idea to 
crush their opposition. 122 
How does this approach view secularism? 'Amarah argues that 
Islam is the "eternal message of the Arab nation; the Arab nation 
owes its leading position to Islam and it owes it its thought, 
customs, traditions and psychological composition that 
distinguishes it from other nations. "... Obviously this would give 
no place for secularism. 'Aamrah argues that the adoption of 
secularism into Arab nationalist thought was incidental. It was 
an expression of the Arab desire to be independent from the 
Turks. Secularism was later on stimulated by Christian 
missionaries and colonial powers and by the westernised 
120 Ibid, p. 151. 
121 Ibid. p. 151. 
122 Ibid, p. 162. 
123 Ibid, p. 175. 
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intelligentsia. 124 Given that secularism was an alien idea to Arab 
culture it is therefore not appropriate for Arab progress. 125 
This approach is typical of the Islamist trend which does 
not value the Arab nation out of its Islamic context. The main 
concern of this trend is to locate the Arab nation within the 
Islamic concept of the umma. It attempts to reinterpret Islamic 
history and to inject Arab nationalism with an Islamic content. 
This view is also expressed, though for a different aim, by the 
Lebanese Menh al-Sulh. 126 He sees no separation between Arabism 
and Islam since "the Arab nation was formed and entered history 
as it was making Islam. Islam was born and reached its momentum 
while it was making the Arab nation. 11127 Although Sulh 
acknowledges the occurrence of separation between Arab 
nationalism and Islam during the period when Arab nationalism had 
some secular orientations, he argues that the later emphasis on 
Islam by Arab nationalist thought left no room for 
contradiction. 128 
However, the ambiguity is cleared once it is discovered that 
Sulk's employment of Islam is identical with that of traditional 
Arab nationalist thought. Sulh views Islam as a cultural heritage 
12a Ibid, pp. 167-169. 
125 Muhammad 'Amarah, "al-Islam wa al-Qawmiyya al-'Arabiyya wa al- 'Ilmaniyya" (Islam, Arab Nationalism and Secularism), Shoun Arabivva (Arab 
Affairs) Year 7, vol. 12 (May 1980) pp. 67-92. 
126 Menh al-Sulh, "al-Tamaiyuz wa al-Takamul Biyna al-Qawmiyya al- 'Arabiyya wa al-Islam'' (the Distinctiveness and the Integration of Arab Nationalism and Islam), in Muhammad A. Khalafallah etal, al-Qawmiyya al- 'Arabiyya wa al-Islam, op. cit., p. 223. 
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of the Arabs. Islam becomes void of any political implications. 
It represents for the Arab nation the "most indispensable 
component of national culture of every Arab Muslim and none 
Muslim alike. , 1V' This view echoes the concern of Arab 
nationalists to avoid the sensitivity of religious feeling. 
However, it still cannot answer the question of political Islam. 
It underplays secularism and attempts to portray Islam as a 
revolutionary and progressive culture that accommodates 
nationalist ideology. 13o 
Another view that sees no contradiction between Arabism and 
Islam is that of the Egyptian Ahmed K. Abulmajd. He suggests that 
a contradiction should not exist anyway since Arabism and Islam 
are expressions of two different contents. He explains that 
nationalism is "an expression of an identification with a nation 
. that has common 
feelings of belonging created by common 
qualities such as language. " Therefore, the nation refers to "a 
social and psychological incident of historical root. 1113' As to 
Islam, Abulmajd denies the existence of "any obligatory 
provisions or codes within it that account for social incidents. " 
This is to imply that the inquiry into Islam's stand towards 
nationalism is an "impossible question that should not be made" 
because it would be a problematic one. 132 
Pan-Islamism is "a political call and movement seeking the 
129 Ibid, p. 223. 
130 Ibid, p. 223. 
131 Ahmed K. Abulmajd, Hiwar la Muwa. iaha(A Dialogue Not A Confrontation) 
Second Edition, (Cairo; Dar al-Shuwruwk, 1988) Arabic Text (Present Author's 
Translation) pp. 145-146. 
132 Ibid, p. 146. 
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realisation of religious and civilisational reality of Muslims 
into a political reality ... so 
Muslims are organised in a single 
political association not necessarily implying a single state. 11133 
This is to make a distinction between pan-Arabism and pan- 
Islamism on the basis of their different political goals. If pan- 
Arabism aims at establishing a united state of the Arabs this 
does not contradict the idea of the Islamic umma nor does it 
inflict any harm on Muslim Arabs' association with it. This is 
because the internationalism of Islam is not supposed to "lead 
to the unity of the Islamic umma. 11134 
But this raises the question of the relationship again. How 
does Abulmajd view the relationship between Arabism and Islam? 
Abulmajd considers Islam "the civilisation of the Arabs", but how 
does this view the position of Christian Arabs? Abulmajd 
emphasises that nationalism is "an expression of a being while 
Islam is an expression of oughtness. " Hence, any further 
discussion of their contradiction or compatibility is 
meaningless. However Islam provided this nation with "values, 
principles and ways of life as well as the doctrine itself. " 
Nevertheless, to belong to such a nation is not to impose "the 
admission of all this civilisational content. 11135 Would this then 
allow for secularism? Abulmajd is clearer here. He seeks to "drop 
the call for the secularisation of nationalism. " Though he 
133 Ibid, p. 147. 
134 Ibid, p. 147. 
135 Ahmed K. Abul ma jd, "Nahuww Si gha Jadiyda 1i1 'Ala aqa Biyna al -Qawmiyya 
al-'Arabiyya wa al-Islam"(Towards a New Formula of the Relationship Between 
Arab Nationalism and Islam), in Muhammad A. Khalafallah eta I, al -Qawmiyya a l- 'Arabivva wa al-Islam, op. cit., p. 529. 
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rejects theocratic rule he does see that as consistent with his 
rejection of "the separation of religion and the state i. e. not 
allocating religion any share in social organisation. ""136 
Abdulmajid believes that secularism would "create more 
problems and difficulties than it could solve. " He points out to 
another problem inherent in the implementation of secularism in 
the Arab world. Since the majority of the Arabs are Muslims the 
implementation of secularism, though may be appropriate for the 
Christian minority, would not be neutral towards religions. 
Secularism would, from a Christian point of view, be compatible 
with "render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's and unto God that 
which is God's. 11137 Nevertheless this would lead the Muslims into 
contradiction with Islam. Therefore the application of this 
secularist principle would "favour the view of a religious 
minority at the expense of the majority. "138 
The main thesis of 'Ismat Saiyf Duwla is the difference he 
sees between Islam and Arabism as referring to two different 
identities or attachments. Arabism is as an identification with 
a nation while Islam is an identification with a religious 
doctrine. 139 Saiyf Duwla explains that any contradiction between 
Arabism and Islam is improper. In the Holy Quran, explains Saiyf 
Duwla, the word umma has many different meanings. To restrict the 
umma to that of an Islamic nation is a misinterpretation. He 
explains that the term umma carries within it multiplicity and 
136 Ibid, p. 530. 
137 Ibid, p. 531. 
138 Ibid, p. 531. 
139 'Ismat Saiyf Duwla, 'An al-'Uruwba wa al-Islam, op. cit., pp. 10-15. 
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distinction between a variety of communities. 140 Accordingly 
Muslims are a "nation distinguished from other people by their 
identification and attachment with Islam" while the Arabs are a 
nation "distinctive when compared with other peoples and nations 
by the same criteria that distinguishes other nations from 
peoples and tribes. "141 
Saiyf Duwla makes the relationship between Islam and the 
Arab nation an organic one. He considers that "the Arab nation 
is the creation of Islam. Before Islam there had existed no Arab 
nation. "142 This refers to his concept of the nation discussed 
earlier on. But if this approach helps in making the distinction 
between an Arab and Islamic nation it is still problematic. Since 
that Islamic nation is founded on an identification with Islam 
it surely includes the Muslim Arabs. This dual identification 
creates a problem of identity and loyalty for the Arab. The 
Muslim Arabs would seem obliged to belong to two nations 
simultaneously. Which identity are they to give loyalty and 
priority to? As Muslims are they to strive for the unity of the 
Islamic umma or do they, as Arabs, have only to accommodate pan- 
Arab unity? Therefore this approach leads the argument back to 
square one. How does this approach deal with the issue of 
religious minority and how it views secularism? 
Saiyf Duwla allocates a considerable part of his book on 
Arabism and Islam to a discussion of secularism. However his 
approach to secularism is somehow unique. He starts by denying 
iao Ibid, pp. 15-21. 
Ibid, pp. 21-22. 
iaz Ibid, p. 33. 
208 
any contradiction between secularism and religion. He attributes 
the view that equates secularism with antireligion to the 
misinterpretation of its history in Europe. According to Saiyf 
Duwla secularism "evolved with Christianity as one of its 
doctrines. It then became one of its corner stones and part of 
its theological heritage. 143 Saiyf Duwla explains that secularism 
in Europe established an order that is "secular in its view of 
religion, individualistic towards society, liberal towards the 
state, and capitalist towards the economy.,, 144 
This seems to be a comprehensive view of secularism that 
distances it from being merely antireligion. Therefore Saiyf 
Duwla is dismayed by those who think that secularism would do 
away with religion. Applied to the Arab world how would this 
concept of secularism work? Saiyf Duwla's answer is quite 
unexpected. He sees no need for secularism in the Arab world. He 
does not use any of the arguments other Arab intellectuals use 
in denying the need for secularism. Even though he appreciates 
the existence of the Christian minority he argues that it needs 
no secularism. Both Arab Christianity and Islam have no 
provisions that would imply a need for secularism since they 
establish a firm separation between religion and state. 145 
However Saiyf Duwla provides another argument which in his 
opinion further excludes the need for secularism in the Arab 
case. He considers all Arabs, Muslims and Christian alike, to 




Ibid, p. 119. 
Ibid, p. 145. 
'Ismat Saiyf al-Dauwla, interview with the author. 
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its bearer may be. 11146 To support this argument Saiyf Duwla 
provides historical material and analysis of government in Islam. 
He elaborates on issues related to political and social relations 
according to the main principles of Islam. His aim seems to be 
centred round his pan-Arabist orientation. Therefore he uses the 
material to deny the need for secularism. It seems that Saiyf 
Duwla's approach is concerned with emphasising the unity of the 
Arabs and consolidating the idea of the Arab nation. To him the 
idea of an Arab Islamic personality encompassing Christian and 
Muslim Arabs is more important than the question of minorities 
and secularism. Therefore he considers any call for secularism 
a threat to the Arab nation. 147 
This view is also expressed by the Lebanese Khaliyl A. 
Khaliyl. He calls for the unity of the Arabs regardless of their 
religious differences. He believes that the division of the Arabs 
into "an Islamic majority and a Christian minority is serving 
their enemies. 1114" This is similar to Saiyf Duwla's view and it 
shows that some Arab nationalists are only concerned with 
preserving the cultural unity of the Arab nation. Khaliyl thinks 
that Islam is the most unifying factor of the Arabs. He calls for 
a "cultural Islam that can unite all the Arabs. "149 However 
Khaliyl realises that an argument of this sort is unable to solve 
146 'Ismat Saiyf Duwla, 'An al-Uruwba wa al-Islam, op. cit., p. 245. 
147 Ibid, p. 264. 
148 Khaliyl A. Khaliyl, al-'Arab wa al-Dimugratiyya: Bahth fiv Siyvasat 
al-Mustagbal (The Arabs and Democracy: An Inquiry Into the Politics of the 
Future) First Edition (Beirut; Dar al-Hadatha, 1984) Arabic Text (Present 
Author's Translation) p. 66. 
149 Ibid, p. 66. 
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the problem facing the Arabs. He therefore calls for the 
establishment of a new concept of the Arab nation. 
In this new proposed concept Islam would be the culture 
without any religious implications. The Arab nation would not be 
based on 
an ambiguous ideal of the nation encircled in an inclusive 
religious ideal. This religious ideal is similar to a 
shallow epistemological shell that can no longer be relied 
upon as a fence against political, scientific and 
technological modern knowledge. 150 
Arab nationalist thought is required to produce a new concept of 
"a common Arab nation seeking internal understanding and 
realisation. " This is a call for a concept of an Arab nation, 
based on living experience based on rationality and common 
interests, that would be able to avoid the struggle of 
identities. Although Khaliyl does not explicitly refer to 
secularism it is implicit in the quotations cited above. 151 
Secularism, however it is presented and in any form, is 
totally resented by the Egyptian lawyer and historian Tariq al- 
Bishriy. 152 Despite his appreciation of the alliance between Arab 
nationalism and Islam against their common enemies he still sees 
a reason for their contradiction. The source of this 
contradiction is the secular orientation of Arab nationalism. 
Bishriy explains that had it not been for the secular elements 
in Arab nationalism it would have not been an ideology confined 
to an elite. The masses are Muslims and secularism does not 
15o Ibid, p. 105. 
151 Ibid, pp. 105-106. 
152 Tariq al-Bishriy, interview with the author, Cairo; 26.4.1995. 
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satisfy their needs. 153 
By insisting on secularism Arab nationalism is introducing 
an alien concept into the culture of the masses. 154 Secularism is 
a "western implantation" that attempts to transform Islam into 
a "Protestant Islam confined to the individual's relationship 
with God. " 155Therefore secularism is restricting the 
inclusiveness of Islam which is a religion and state. Although 
secularism does not inflict any harm on Christianity it does take 
away vital components of Islam' s essence. 156 Arab nationalism must 
be decoupled from secularism or it will remain an ideology of an 
elite alienated from the masses. 157 
The contributions discussed above were made in the early 
1980s. They echoed the differences between the Arab nationalists 
and Islamists that marked the 1950s and the 1960s. The clear 
conclusion that can be drawn is that both sides of the debate 
were loyal to their traditions. In substance the contributions 
discussed above show the poverty of the arguments presented by 
both sides. Compared with the ideas of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries these contributions offer nothing new. In the 
words of Constantine Zurayq, the contributions made at the 
conference on Arab nationalism and Islam in 1980 were 
153 Tariq Bishriy, "al-Khulf Biyna al-Nukhba wa al-Jamahiyyr Izaa al- 
'Alaaqa Biyna al-Qawmiyya al-'Arabiyya wa al-Islam" (The Separation Between 
the Elite and the Masses Towards the Relationship Between Arab Nationalism and 
Islam), in Muhammad A. Khalafallah etal, al-Qawmivva al-'Arabivva wa al-Islam, 
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frustrating. "Despite the changes of circumstances the quality 
of the contributions is below those of the pioneers. 11158 
(iii) The Unsolved Debate 
The years right after the convening of the conference 
witnessed many political and intellectual developments. Prominent 
among these developments was the rise and increase in the 
strength of political Islam and the decline of Arab nationalist 
movements. It is important to see how these developments impinged 
on the debates on Arabism, secularism and Islam. The 1980s also 
saw newcomers to the debates. The new participants were Maghribi 
intellectuals who hitherto were absent from the scene. This is 
a very important development since it offers another level for 
analysis and comparison. In the Maghrib there are no religious 
minorities, except for the tiny Jewish community in Morocco, 
therefore the contributions of Maghribi intellectuals are not 
affected by religious divisions particularly since the Maghrib 
belongs to one Islamic sect, Sunni Islam. 159 
The Arabists were trying to reconsider their position in 
light of the experience of the last three decades. They had to 
look for alternatives. That involved an attempt to build bridges 
with the Islamists with whom they shared an affiliation to the 
idea of an Arab nation. The dialogue with those Islamists 
reflected a willingness for compromise on the part of Arab 
nationalists. One of the steps taken was the convening of a 
158 Constantine Zurayq, "Mulahadaat Khitamiyya" (Concluding Remarks), in 
Muhammad A. Khalafallah etal, al -Qawmiyya a l- 'Arabivva wa a1-Islam, op. cit., 
p. 545. 
159 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, interview with the Author. 
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conference of the two trends. The conference, under the name of 
al-Hiwar al-Qawmiy al-Diniy, the Nationalist Religious Dialogue, 
was held in Cairo in 1989. It was designed for establishing the 
common factors that link both trends. 160 The symposium was 
attended by intellectuals and practitioners representing both 
trends. 
The dialogue reflects the desire of Arab intellectuals to 
liberate themselves of what Belqaziyz describes as the 
"psychology of the warriors. , 161 The dialogue was also a 
reflection of the plurality that exists within each trend. It was 
attended by people from different Arab countries and different 
generations. The discussion below will concentrate on some 
contributions from both trends. Emphasis will be on the 
contribution of the leading intellectuals of each trend and in 
particular on those whose earlier contributions were discussed 
above. 
The Islamists rejected secularism as an obstacle hindering 
an alliance between Arab nationalism and Islam. This is the view 
adhered to by Tariq Bishriy and Ahmed K. Abulmajd. Bishriy 
repeated his previously outlined view that secularism is an alien 
implantation to Arab Islamic culture. Bishriy cannot perceive of 
an Islamic society without the implementation of the Shar'ia. 
Therefore the call for secularism widens the gap between Arabism 
160 The papers and discussions of the conference were published in: Tariq 
Bishriy etal, al-Hiwar al-Oawmiv al -Diniv: Auwraaq wa Munagashaat (Nationalist-Religious Dialogue) First Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al- 
Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1989) Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation). 
161 'Abd Ilah Belqaziyz, Ishkaliyyat al-Marga' fiy al-Fikr al-'Arabiy al- 
Mu'asir (The Problematique of The Frame of Reference in Contemporary Arab 
Thought) First Edition (Beirut; Dar al-Muntakhab al-'Arabiy, 1992) Arabic 
Text(Present Author's Translation) p. 110. 
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and Islam. Secularism was a European experience and concept 
associated with a nationalist movement. Hence it is unscientific 
"imposing the same association on a different historical and 
civilisational context. "162 
Ahmed K. Abulmajd also repeated his view that secularism is 
not an integral component of the nationalist principles. 
Therefore, he argues, those who attempt the secularisation of 
Arab nationalism are not honouring the nationalist principle nor 
are they loyal to it. 163 Muhammad 'Amarah deplores the attempt at 
secularising Arab nationalism. He considers secularism a 
"European particularity" that is not fit for the Arabs since "in 
Arab history there existed no contradiction between religion and 
state. 1164 This view is quite a departure from 'Amarah's previous 
view towards secularism. It shows the extent of the influence of 
political Islam on some Arab intellectuals. 
'Amarah had conceived a fusion of Arab nationalism and 
Islam. In his previous writings he attempted to provide an 
interpretation of Arab Islamic history within a nationalist 
perspective. He went as far as to suggest that the Islamic 
reformist movement of Wahabism and Sanusism were Arab nationalist 
in content. The change of heart can be explained in that 
'Amarah's dissatisfaction with the performance of the Arab 
162 Tariq Bishriy, "Huwla al-'Uruwba wa al-Islam" (on Arabism and Islam), 
in Tariq Bishriy etal, al-Hiwar al-Oawmiy al-Diniy, op. cit., p. 38. 
163 Ahmed K. Abulmajd, "Huwla al-Hiwar al-Qawmiy al-Diniy" (On the 
Nationalist Religious Dialogue), in Tariq Bishriy etal, al-Hiwar al-Qawmiy al- Diniy, op. cit., p. 53. 
164 Muhammad 'Amarah, "Huwla al-Hiwar al-Qawmiy al-Diniy"(On the 
Nationalist Religious Dialogue), in Tariq Bishriy etal, al-Hiwar al-Oawmiy al - Diniy, op. cit., p. 121. 
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nationalist movement led him to reconsider his position. 
'Amarah's new stand calls for the desecularisation of Arab 
nationalism and its Islamicisation. He argues that the 
Islamicisation of Arab nationalism means that "the benefits for 
Arabism would be greater. "116s If Arabism was Islamicised it will 
form a step "on the ladder of Islamic identity ... 
its loss will 
be far greater and definite if it is secularised. 11166 'Amarah 
indicts secularism for the "loss of our national independence" 
because it is a foreign principle that seeks the separation of 
the inseparable, i. e. religion and state. The alternative option 
in 'Amarah's view is the implementation of the Shari'a. Shari'a 
serves the needs of Arab society and becomes a "national 
requirement and a task for national revolution. "167 
This is an example of the demands the Islamists are making 
before the pan-Arabists. The Islamists are exploiting the 
weakness of the Arab nationalist movement. Initially they 
emphasised the compatibility of Arabism and Islam and then they 
called for secularism to be omitted from the nationalist 
discourse. Now they call for the desecularisation of Arab 
nationalism and the implementation of the Shari'a. The view of 
Islam as an inclusive social order i. e. a state and religion is 
expressed by all representatives of this trend. The Islamist view 
is clearer in the argument of the Lebanese intellectual Radwan 
al-Saiyyd. Saiyyd argues that Islam is not "a theological law or 
closed rituals; it is a model of life. It is the ecology of the 
165 Ibid, p. 122. 
166 Ibid, p. 122. 
167 Ibid, pp. 200-201. 
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united cultural life. 11168 The nationalist secular trend, 
nevertheless, still maintained that secularism is the appropriate 
response to the situation in the Arab world. They still attempt 
to prove the existence of secularism within Islam itself. They 
argue that Islam does not contradict, but on the contrary, is 
compatible with secularism. 169 
Hasan Hanafiy is proposing a modified version of secularism 
that stops between secularism proper and the Shari'a. He calls 
for the admission of some elements of secularism by realising its 
aims of liberty and progress while realising the demands of 
Shari' a. 170 Hanafiy distinguishes between the Shari' a and the Fiqh 
(jurisprudence). Shari'a is "general principles" while Fiqh is 
an explanation of particular circumstances and how Shari'a could 
be applied to them. 171 Therefore, Shari'a is not changing while 
the Fiqh does so according to the changes in circumstances. This 
leads Hanafi to suggest that Islam does not rule out the 
possibility of designing formulas suitable to the changing 
circumstances even though they contradict Figh. 172 This view 
however suffers from ambiguity since the difference between 
Shari'a and Fiqh is not all that easy. Therefore it seems that 
168 Radwan al-Saiyyd, "al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya: Nazra fiy Idyulujiyyat al- 
Naqaid wa al-Badai1" (Arab Unity: An Overview of the Ideologies of Denial and 
Alternatives), in A. Duri etal, al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, op. cit., p. 630. 
169 Muhammad Khalafallah, interview with the author. 
170 Hasan Hanafiy, "al-'Ilmaniyya wa al-Islam: al-Islam la Yahtaju ila 
'Ilmaniyya Gharbiyya" (Secularism and Islam: Islam Needs No Western 
Secularism), in Jaluwl Faiysal, (ed), Hiwar al-Mashriq wa al-Maghrib (the 
Dialogue of the Mashriq and the Maghrib) First Edition (Cairo, Maktabat 
Madbuliy, 1990) Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) pp. 43-44. 
171 Ibid, p. 45. 
172 Ibid, p. 45. 
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Hanafi's thesis makes the issue more complex than it already is. 
This is even clearer when he uses the same ambiguous phrase of 
secular Islam that needs no "extra secularism extracted from 
western civilisation. il 173 
The secularists still argue that the Islamists miss the 
point when discussing secularism. They argue that secularism is 
not against religion nor is it the submission of religion to the 
state. Secularism is neutral towards religions and therefore 
liberates religion from state domination. They point to the 
secular elements within Islam itself. They reiterate the same 
thesis put forward by 'Ali 'Abdulrazaaq that Islam has no 
provisions for government and that it encourages rationalism and 
puts public interests above all. 174 These views were expressed 
during the interviews conducted by the author of this research 
with a number of Arab intellectuals and particularly Samir Amin, 
Saiyyd Yasiyn, Isma'iyl Sabriy 'Abdullah, Ghaliy Shukriy, Sa'd 
Diyn Ibrahiym and Kamal 'Abdullatiyf. 
Sa'd Din Ibrahiym does not see substance either in the 
argument against secularism nor in the arguments that call for 
the adoption of some secular elements . 
175 He argues that the call 
173 Ibid, p. 45. 
174 The Egyptian writer 'Ali 'Abdulrazaaq was a pioneer in advocating 
these views. His book on government in Islam was met with great hostility to 
the extent it was banned. 'Abdulrazaaq himself was ousted from the Azharite 
'Ulamma Society after a brief intellectual court that would not consider his defence. See his book and the documents explaining the circumstances in 
Muhammad 'Amarah, al-Islam wa Usuwl al-Hukm li 'Ali 'Abdulrazaaq( Islam and Government of 'Ali 'Abdulrazaaq) Second Edition(Beirut; al-Muasasa al- 'Arabiyya lil Dirasaat wa al-Nashr, 1988) Arabic Text (Present Author's 
Translation). 
175 Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym, "Huwla al-Hiwar al-Qawmiy al-Diniy"(On The 
Nationalist Religious Dialogue), in Tariq Bishriy etal, al-Hiwar al-Qawmiy al- Diniv, op. cit., p. 244. 
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for the implementation of the Shari'a is problematic and falls 
short of answering the critical issues of political and social 
organisation. He throws the question at Shari'a advocates. He 
points to their differences in interpreting Shari'a itself. 
Ibrahiym highlights their differences as to the nature, the form 
and the purpose of the political system. He criticises their 
approach towards legislation and who has the right to 
legislate. 176 Since the implementation of the Shari'a would cause 
problems that would aggravate the already existing divisions in 
the Arab world secularism is the positive alternative. Ibrahiym 
believes that secularisation of politics provides the realistic 
answer to these questions. Though secularism may contradict the 
Shari'a it still has lot "in common with Islamic thought. 113.77 
However this sincere call for secularism which Ibrahiym 
shares with many intellectuals like those interviewed by the 
author is not accepted by the Islamists. The Islamists, aware of 
their strengths, still consider it a camouflage of secularism and 
a deviation from the Islamic content of Arab culture. Their 
alternative is the implementation of the Shari'a. 178 The 
Islamists, however, still have to explain what that means in 
detail. They have to provide alternative understanding and renew 
themselves. To stop at calling for Shari'a and rejoice at the 
weakness of Arab nationalist movement would not end the debate. 179 
176 Ibid, p. 244. 
17 Ibid, p. 244. 
178 Tariq Bishriy, Interview with the author. 
179 See examples of this in the comments on Radwan Saiyyd's paper made by: 
Aziz Azmeh, Nasiyf Nasar and Ghaliy Shukriy in A. Duri etal, al-Wahda al- 
'Arabiyya, op. cit., pp. 649-652. 
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To reject secularism would lead to the "establishment of a 
theological state ... There 
is a threat that religious state 
poses for individual freedoms ... the 
dead would govern the 
living. "leo 
The contributions discussed above give the clear conclusion 
that the debate about Arabism, secularism and Islam is not 
settled yet. Secularism in particular was the source of major 
disagreement. Although its advocates somehow bowed to the 
pressure from the Islamists and attempted to reconcile secularism 
with Islam the Islamists still do not accept the offer. Even an 
Arabised formula of secularism is rejected as echoing imported 
solutions that can not win the hearts of the Muslims. The above 
debates, however, represent the efforts of the Mashriqi Arab 
intellectuals to tackle the issue. It is appropriate therefore 
to see how the Maghribi intellectuals dealt with the issue 
liberated from the complexities of religious plurality of the 
Mashriq. The Maghribi contributions will be analysed through the 
writings of Jabiriy and Belqaziyz. 
Jabiriy's approach towards the issue of secularism is 
peculiar to some extent. He considers that the whole debate on 
secularism in the Arab world is irrelevant. -"' This is based on 
Jabiriy's view that secularism is "a false issue since it 
expresses needs in contexts that are incompatible with them. "182 
These needs are those of "democracy that respects minority rights 
and political rationalism ... these are objective needs indeed 
180 Saiyyd Yasiyn, interview with the author. 




but they loose their rationality, necessity and legitimacy 
when expressed in an ambiguous slogan such as secularism. j1183 This 
call is not anti religion or Islam for Jabiriy believes it does 
not imply the exclusion of Islam which is "an essential component 
of Arab existence. A spiritual Islam for the Muslim Arabs and a 
civilisational Islam for all Arabs Muslims and Christian 
alike. "184 
It seems hard to classify Jabiriy's position towards 
secularism. On the one hand he sees it as inappropriate solution 
to the needs of the Arabs. On the other hand he provides a view 
of Islam that is loyal to that of traditional Arab nationalist 
thought on which basis it calls for secularism. In addition to 
this Jabiriy is trying to separate secularism from the concept 
of democracy and rationality which leads his idea into ambiguity. 
This approach may be seen as an attempt to reach a compromise 
between secularists and their counterparts. A compromise can be 
achieved by removing the idea of secularism and probably the word 
itself from the debates. 
This falls in the line of Jabiriy's attempt to restructure 
the Arab mind. 185 Accordingly he calls for the democratisation of 
183 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, "al-Dimuqratiyya wa al-'Aqlaniyya Badal al- 
'Ilmaniyyah" (Democracy and Rationality Instead of Secularism) in Jaluwl 
Faiysal, Hiwar al-Mashriq wa al-Maghrib, op. cit., p. 46. 
184 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, "Min Ajl I'adat Binaa al-Fikr al-Qawniy al-'Arabiy" 
(Towards the Restructuring of Arab Nationalist Thought) in, A. Duri etal, al- 
Wahda al-'Arabi_v. va, op. Cit., p. 793. 
185 Jabiriy's basic intellectual occupation is to try to restructure Arab 
mind and thought. This he attempts to achieve by providing a structural 
reading of Arab heritage and thought. His reading claims to be not based on 
ideology. It is concerned with critical issues of how Arab mind works. How it 
produces knowledge and systems of knowledge? How could the epistemological 
obstacles and crises be overcome? This, if accomplished, argues Jabiriy, would 
make cultural heritage relevant to present. All Jabiriy's works are devoted 
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Arab nationalist thought as a precondition for its victory. It 
is a compromise by which Arab nationalist thought coexists with 
all other trends. Jabiriy considers secularism an alien concept 
to the Arabs. Secularism came to the Arab east when it was 
propagated by Christian Arab intellectuals. Secularism therefore 
was a call for independence and it came to denote "Arabism and 
Arab nationalism. 11186 At that juncture independence, unity and 
secularism meant "the establishment of an Arab state in the east 
independent from the Ottomans. "187 
The call for independence from the Turks was struggling 
against the idea of pan-Islamism which the Ottoman Sultan 
employed to check the separatist tendency among the Arabs. 
Therefore, explains Jabiriy, the call for an Arab state with a 
secular component was directed against Turkish pan-Islamism. 
Arabists did not mean the "exclusion of Islam. " Jabiriy, rightly, 
notes that in the Maghrib and the Arabian Peninsula secularism 
was not conceived of. Secularism was only marginally advocated 
in Egypt. 188 But if secularism was not meant for its own value 
during the early days of Arab nationalism, how then does Jabiriy 
explain secularist ideas after the independence of the Arab 
countries? 
to his project. Particular focus may be found-in his; Takuwivn al-'Agl al- 
'Arabiv: Naqd al-'Aql al-'Arabiv (The Formation of Arab Mind: the Critique of 
Arab Mind) vol. 1, (Beirut; Dar al-Tali'a, 1984); Buniyat al-'Aql al-'Arabiy: 
Dirasa Tahlivlivva Naqdiyya li-Nuzum al-Ma'rifa fiy al-Thakafa al-'Arabivva 
(the Structure of Arab Mind: An Analytical Critical Study of Systems of 
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Jabiriy attributes secularist ideas after independence to 
the fear the Christian minority had towards the idea of a pan- 
Arab state. They feared that this proposed state would be 
dominated by Muslims. Therefore they called for a balancing 
formula that would put them on equal footing with their Muslim 
countrymen. That formula was secularism since it would lead to 
a state "based on rational democratic not religious 
domination. 11189 Jabiriy's argument implies that the call for 
secularism was needed for making a distinction between Arabism 
and Islam. The secular idea was the device the Arabist movement 
employed to reject Turkish rule disguised in Islam while it 
practised policies of Turkification. The debate was not centred 
on secularism in contrast to Islam. Rather the debate was centred 
round the issues of government. "' 
After independence this debate was "transformed into a 
theoretical problem, a problem of entity and identity. 11191 Jabiriy 
argues that lack of democracy and therefore rationality made the 
problem of minorities reflect itself in secular terms. The 
problem of religious minority in the Fertile Crescent was not 
considered a political problem. That eventually led to its 
generalisation to include the whole of the Arab world even where 
such problem had never existed. This, explains Jabiriy, gave 
birth to the problematic pair of Arabism\ Islam. 192 Jabiriy argues 
189 Ibid, p. 796. 
19' M. 'Abid Jabiriy, interview with the author. 
191M. 'Abid Jabiriy, Ishkaliyyaat al-Fikr al-'Arabiy al-Mu'asir, (Beirut; 
Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al'Arabiyya, 1989) p. 105. 
192 Ibid, p. 105. 
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that there is no need to debate secularism in all Arab countries. 
The alternative appropriate debate should be that of democracy. 
Unless Arab nationalist thought rids itself of the irrelevant 
debate on secularism, Arabism and Islam, it will be in a 
continuing chronic crisis. 193 
The thrust of Jabiriy's argument is that the debate on 
secularism is a false one. He separates secularism from democracy 
and rationality. However his argument does solve the problem only 
by ignoring its relevance. This view is not accepted in the Arab 
east where the problem is an essential part of the debate. 
Jabiriy's separation of secularism, democracy and rationality is 
also not shared by many Arab intellectuals of secular 
orientations. For Samir Amin, not only is secularism necessary 
for the Arab world but it is "connected with democracy. 11194 Saiyyd 
Yasiyn' s view is that democracy and secularism are inseparable . 
195 
Ghaliy Shukriy shares the view that secularism is a "mechanism 
of the democratic system. " It plays the role of "respecting the 
citizen's rights, preventing an explosion of the religious 
diversity and realising democracy.,, 196 
Belqaziyz provides an explanation of the debates on Arabism, 
secularism and Islam that falls within the boundaries of 
intellectual history. 191 His explanation traces the root of the 
debates to the difference in the concepts of Arabism and Islam 
193 Ibid, pp. 105-106. 
194 Samir Amin, Interview with the author. 
195 Saiyyd Yasiyn, interview with the author. 
196 Ghaliy Shukriy, interview with the author, (Cairo; 30.4.1995). 
197 'Abd Ilah Belqaziyz, interview with the author. 
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as incompatible identities. The conspiracy-based fear of Arab 
nationalism among the Islamists was sustained during the 
confrontation between Arab nationalist regimes and Islamic 
movements during the 1950s and the 1960s. 19ß The demand of 
securing the rights of minorities was seen by the Islamists as 
a threat to those of the Muslim majority. That led to yet another 
psychological problem. The advocates of minority rights and 
secularism saw the Islamists denial of their rights as a proof 
of Islam's intolerance and oppression. The Islamists considered 
the secularists as agents of foreign powers. Taken together with 
the hostilities between Nasser and the Ba'thists in Syria and 
Iraq on the one hand and the Islamic movements in these countries 
on the other this scenario was the soil in which the controversy 
sprang . 
199 
Belqaziyz argues that the debates on Arabism, secularism and 
Islam are an echo of an old debate. The current debates are a 
breed of the old ones. Despite its acute political appearance the 
controversy is epistemologically linked to Arab nahda and its 
problematique. The nahda was problematic by expressing itself in 
pairs of concepts that carry incompatibilities. This is clear in 
pairs such as those of "we\the other, religion\science, 
authenticity\ modernity, identity\ modernity, etc. j200These pairs 
had potentially involved political problems and the appearance 
of other problematic pairs. Belqaziyz makes the observation that 
198 Ibid. 
199 'Abd Ilah Belqaziyz, al-Qawmivva wa al-'Ilmanivva: al-Idvuluiivva wa 
al-Tarivkh, First Edition (Rabat; Dar al-Kalam, 1989) pp. 30-33. 
zoo Ibid. p. 39. 
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today "we can find something similar to an identification between 
each pair and the pair of Arab nationalism\Islam. " The examples 
are that "Arab nationalism has been identified, in the views of 
nahda and contemporary nationalist intellectuals, with progress, 
modernity, science and modernism. " The same applies to Islam 
which quite often is identified with "ego, authenticity and 
identity in a variety of interpretations. "201 
It is clear from the contributions discussed above that the 
debates of the nahda about Arabism, secularism and Islam have 
been reproduced, though in new political terms. The examination 
of the contributions confirms Belgaziyz's thesis that Arab 
nationalist thought has not been able to maintain or sustain a 
breakaway from its attempt at nahda. There is what he calls a 
continuation of "two moments of the problem: the theoretical 
moment and the political or politicised moment. 11202 But if this 
explains the problem epistemologically what kind of political 
explanation does Belqaziyz offer? Belqaziyz argues that the 
European occupation of the Arab world put political issues at the 
centre of Arab thought. A shift from theory to politics was 
definite and as long as Arab thought was occupied with political 
issues, this prevented any elaboration on the theoretical level. 
The urgency of political or politicised issues during the 
struggle against occupation swept away intellectual productivity. 
All intellectual activities were centred round producing slogans 
of independence and self-determination. 203 
zoi Ibid, p. 39. 
zo2 I bi d, p. 40. 
203 'Abd Ilah Belqaziyz, interview with the author. 
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Belqaziyz argues that after the Egyptian revolution of 1952 
the problematic of nahda was the arena of Arab consciousness. The 
achievements of Nasserism created an illusion because they were 
considered a realisation of nahda's aspirations. 204 This amounted 
to a "psychological impediment barring the Arabs from realising 
the reality about the continuation of the nahda problems. "205 
However when realities hit hard after the end of the heyday of 
the 1950s and the 1960s "problems of the nahda returned as those 
of identity, modernity, Islam, nationalism, etc. il 206 Belqaziyz 
explains this reproduction of the nahda issues in the nature of 
Arab ideology. He sees Arab ideology as an "ideology of battles 
i. e., an ideology of parties thinking on many issues not as 
intellectuals producing knowledge but as party intellectuals who 
produce knowledge according to their interests even if truth was 
sacrificed. 11207 
The discussion above clearly demonstrates the absence of a 
coherent and balanced view of the issues of secularism and Islam. 
Arab nationalist thought in the 1980s seems to have maintained 
the previous views. Despite the apparent existence of arguments 
advocating secularism agreement is still not established. 
Differences are evident as far as the issue of the relationship 
between concepts of Arab nationalism, secularism and Islam is 
concerned. The rise in the power of political Islam obliged Arab 
nationalist thought to give some concessions. However, the 
204 'Abd Ilah Belqaziyz, al-Qawmivva wa al-'Ilmanivva, op. cit., p. 43. 
205 Ibid, p. 43. 
206 Ibid, p. 43. 
211 Ibid, p. 43. 
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Islamists seem not to have accepted this sign of good will. 
Attempts at dialogue have only succeeded in making political 
compromises that are unable to transcend old differences. 
Arab nationalist thought still considers Islam a 
civilisation and culture of the Arabs. Even though it showed some 
understanding of the question of the Shari'a, the Islamists saw 
that a sign of weakness and an attempt to conceal the setback 
Arabist ideology suffered. Arab nationalist thought emphasised 
the historical relationship of Arabism and Islam. But the 
Islamists still refuse to abandon their long-held view that Islam 
is an inclusive way of life. The differences remain unsolved. 
Arab nationalist thought is attempting to solve the dilemma of 
reconciling secularism with Islam. This is seen as an important 
step in order to accommodate the popular appeal of political 
Islam. 
However it seems that the problem inherent in Arab 
nationalist thought is its view of Islam itself. Regarding Islam 
as a culture and a civilisation of the Arabs along with keeping 
alive secular ideas is a sign of the weakness of Arab nationalist 
thought. This implies the existence of a theoretical problem in 
evaluating the political component of Islam. The analysis of the 
1980s contributions clearly demonstrates the need for such 
theorising. It is needed to close the gap in its ideological 
structure. 208 Till this is achieved the debate on Arabism, 
secularism and Islam remains an unresolved one. The new 
contributions are, by and large, the same old wine in new 
2oa Constantine Zurayq, Nahnuw wa al-Mustagbal, (Beirut; Dar al-'Ilm lil Malaaiyyin, 1980) p. 223. 
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bottles. 
4-3: Minorities and Democracy 
(i) Minorities: The New Approach 
The debate on minorities in the Arab world presents some 
conceptual problems. Arab intellectuals are affected by the use 
of the western term of ethnicity since there is no Arabic 
equivalent of this term. 209 Arab writers approach the issue of 
ethnicity by their reliance on terms like minorities, sects, 
'Asabiyya (kinship-based solidarity), and al-Milal (sects) wa al- 
Nihal (ethnicity) wa al-A'raaq (minorities). But these terms do 
not solve the problem. The common way of describing ethnicity is 
either by employing the concept of ethnicity itself or by using 
the term minority. 
This is an evidence of the neglect of the issue in Arab 
thought. Most of the studies on minorities in the Arab world were 
either written not by Arabs or concentrated on the case of a 
particular issue in a particular Arab country. The study of 
Albert Hourani is the greatest effort written by an Arab that 
attempted to be inclusive. 210 However, the study itself was 
written in English and only dealt with six Arab countries. This 
contributed to the insufficiency of knowledge about ethnicity in 
209 Elizabeth Picard, "Nagel Istikhdaam Mafhuwm al-Ithniyya fiy Tahliyl al- 
'Amaliyyaat al-Siyyasiyya fiy al-'Alam al-'Arabiy" (A Critic of the Use of 
Ethnicity Concept in Analysing Political Processes in the Arab World), in 
Niviyn Mus'ad(ed), fiy al-'Alamiyya wa al-Khususiyya fiy Dirasat al-Mantika 
al-'Arabiyya (Internationalism and Particularism in Studying the Arab Region) 
(Papers of the Second Egyptian-French Seminar) First Edition (Cairo: 
University of Cairo, Markaz al-Buhuwth wa al-Dirasaat al-Siyyasiyya, 1991) 
Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) p. 212. 
210 Albert Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1947). 
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the Arab world and made the question of minorities a blackspot 
in Arab thought. This was particularly true of Arab nationalist 
thought which prior to the period of investigation had not dealt 
with the issue at any significant length. 
Arab nationalist thought since its inception displayed 
tolerance and acknowledged the Christian Arab minorities. There 
was no political or intellectual programme or any articulate 
conceptualisation dealing with the issue along the lines of the 
pan-Arabist project. The fact that Arab nationalist thought in 
its early days only showed tolerance and the admission of 
Christian Arabs to the Arab nation may be explained by the 
effects of the Islamic reformists on Arab nationalist thought. 
Reformists saw no contradiction between Arabism and Islam. Islam 
was the spirit of Arabism and Arabism was the body of Islam. 
Therefore, tolerance was seen as an Islamic principle that should 
be applied to all non Muslim Arabs. 
However, this was not able to provide a clear cut answer to 
the problem. It sought to treat religious minorities according 
to the Millet system of the Ottoman Empire. This raised the fears 
of Arab Christians who argued that such a system would make them 
second class citizens. The fact that many Arab nationalists were 
Christians made it possible for Arab nationalism to include this 
basic concept of tolerance. It is also possible to assume that 
Arab nationalist thought in its early days was occupied with the 
issue of establishing the existence of an Arab nation and 
challenging the state of fragmentation. The concentration was on 
Arab unity and avoiding the issue of minorities fearing that it 
230 
might weaken the pan-Arabist idea. 211 
Many Arab writers considered the issue of minorities the 
making of colonialism. They argued that the Arab world had not 
known such a problem before the nineteenth century. 212 Their 
prescription for what they saw as an illness was to advise that 
members of nationalist minorities be relocated and scattered in 
groups in different remote areas. This they considered the ideal 
solution that would weaken the coherence and solidarity of 
minorities and make them easily absorbed in the Arab nationalist 
bag. The secular Arab nationalist excluded religion from the 
nation's criteria and approached the issue differently. 213 This 
trend provided a view of minorities that can, theoretically, 
guarantee total equality on the basis of citizenship. This may 
solve the problem of the non-Muslim Arab religious minorities but 
falls short of solving the problems of other minorities of a 
nationalistic nature, such as the Kurds and the tribes of 
Southern Sudan. 214 
The issue of minorities was not appropriately and 
inclusively approached by the two trends of Arab thought. If the 
Arabist Islamist trend attempted to provide a formula for 
treating Muslim cultural and nationalist minorities who are part 
211 Saiyyd Yasiyn, Tahlivl Madmun, op. cit., p. 84. 
212 Nabiyh Amiyn Faris and Muhammad Tawfiyq Hasan, Hadha al-'Alam al- 
'Arabiy: Dirasaat fly al-Qawmiyya al-'Arabivva wa fly 'Auwamil al-Tagadum wa 
al-Tkhuwr wa al-Wahda wa al-Tafaruq fly al-'Alam al-'Arabiy (This Arab World: 
A Study in Arab Nationalism, Factors of Progress, Decline, Unity and 
Fragmentation in the Arab World)(Beirut; Dar al-'Ilm lil-Malaaiyyin, 1953) 
Arabic Text (Author's Translation) p. 157. 
213 This refers to contributions of Husry, the Ba'th party and Nasserism. 
214 Saiyyd Yasiyn, Tahliyl Madmun, op. cit., p. 145. 
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of the abode of Islam it failed to accommodate that of the 
religious minority. Despite the admission of the concept of 
citizenship in its argument, the Islamist trend still denies 
equality. The secular trend has no provisions for dealing with 
nationalist and cultural minorities. Clearly each trend excludes 
an ethnic group from complete membership of the political 
community. 
On the political level of state-building, Arab states dealt 
with the issue of minorities and identity according to a 
compromising formula. This was facilitated to some extent by the 
short lived experience of liberalism in the Arab world whereby 
social pluralism was approached through political pluralism. But 
the failure of the liberal experience during the 1950s and the 
1960s brought the issue of minorities to the fore again. The 
problem became one of the concerns of Arab nationalist thought 
after the war of 1967 which opened the doors for criticism and 
rethinking about many issues. 
The Egyptian sociologist Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym was one of the 
pioneers of the call for reconsidering the issue of minorities. 
He concentrated his efforts on their deprivation from political 
participation. Ibrahiym argued that to neglect the issue of 
minorities would not only aggravate the problem but also have 
serious effects on the pan-Arabist aim of uniting the Arabs. 215 
The civil war in Lebanon was dramatically effective in bringing 
the issue of minorities to the concerns of Arab writers. The war 
made Arab writers realise the explosive nature of the issue. The 
215 Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym, "Nahuww Dirasa Susiylujiyya lil Wahda: al- 
Agaliyaat fiy al-'Alam al-'Arabiy", Qadaiyya 'Arabiyya, Year 3, vol. 3-6, Feb- 
July 1976, pp. 5-25. 
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contributions discussed below show the nature of the new debates. 
Although the 1980s witnessed the evolution of new thinking 
about the issue of minorities, there are still some contributions 
that keep to the old line of thought. An example of this is to 
be found in the work of ' Ismat Saiyf Duwla. He still does not see 
the importance of the issue of minorities. When he deals with the 
topic he is loyal to the traditional Arab nationalist principle. 
Saiyf Duwla argues that Muslim and Christian Arabs alike are one 
Arab Islamic personality. 216 This approach echoes traditional Arab 
nationalist views on the issue. It conceives only of religious 
minorities that may be accommodated by highlighting the 
civilisational aspect of Islam. Arab nationalist thought in the 
1980s still has to reflect on the issue particularly after the 
problems encountered by countries like Lebanon, the Sudan, Egypt 
and Algeria. These showed that even the conciliatory formula 
applied by Arab states fell short of dealing with the problem, 
especially if lack of political participation is taken into 
account. 
However, the lack of democracy in the Arab world made Arab 
writers focus, when dealing with minorities, on the need for a 
more liberal approach towards political participation. Ali E. 
Hillal Dessouki thinks that the problem of minorities may be 
solved by the implementation of citizenship principles. 21' 
Accordingly any citizen has the right to play a role in the 
political process. The citizenship principle is thought to solve 
the problem of minorities since it provides "equality between 
216 'Ismat Saiyf Duwla, interview with the author. 
217 All E. Hillal Dessouki, "Ta'liyq", op. cit., p. 138. 
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citizens despite their race, religion or language. 112"" But this 
approach to minorities is, according to Jusiyf Mughiyzil, only 
a legal and constitutional formula that does not eradicate the 
problem. He calls for the implementation of secularism to avoid 
the contradictions that Shari'a and Islamic fiqh cause. 219 
This emphasis on democracy is widespread among Arab writers 
who deal with minorities. This is obvious in the contribution of 
Constantine Zurayq. He argues that unless democracy, equality, 
dignity, and other fundamental liberties are guaranteed to all 
Arabs irrespective of their religious, ethnic, economic or social 
origins the problem of minorities and especially that of 
Christian Arabs will be impossible to tackle. Zurayq argues that 
unless these issues are dealt with the Arabs will not succeed in 
building their nation or homeland. 220 Muhammad Faiyq, the 
Secretary General of the Arab Human Rights Organisation, believes 
that the essence of the issue is related to democracy. He makes 
the point that members of minorities are oppressed twice in their 
countries. "First they are oppressed as other citizens are and 
second because they belong to a minority. 11221 
The same emphasis on democracy is held by Radwan Saiyyd. He 
notes that the issue of minorities is over argued and that it is 
becoming unobjectively articulated. The problem of minorities is 
218 Ibid, p. 138. 
219 Jusiyf Mughiyzil, "Ta'liyq"(A comment), in Tariq Bishriy etal, al- 
Hiwar al-Qawmiy al-Diniy: Auwraaq wa Munagashaat, (Seminar Papers) First 
Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1989) pp. 140-141. 
220 Constantine Zurayq, Matalib al-Mustagbal al-'Arabiy: Humuwm wa 
Tasauwlaat, First Edition (Beirut; Dar al-'Ilam lil Malaaiyyin, 1983) p. 81. 
221 Muhammad Faiyq, "Ta'liyq" (A Comment), in Tariq Bishriy etal, al-Hiwar 
al-Qawmiy al-Diniy, op. cit., pp. 158-159. 
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nothing more than the problem of democracy which all citizens 
feel. 222 Even though some Arab writers still consider that 
language and culture are the criteria of the nation they are not 
able yet to apply that to linguistic and cultural minorities. To 
argue that democracy is the solution to all minority related 
problems is to avoid dealing directly with the relevant issue. 
Some Arab writers reject what they consider the "exaggerated 
widening of the concept of minorities.,,... Isma'iyl Sabriy 
'Abdullah thinks that to limit Arabness to Sunni Arab Muslims is 
a misleading idea. This contradicts the principle of nationalism 
which "does not consider religion a condition of nationalism. " 
This argues, 'Abdullah, conceives of Sunni Arabs as a coherent 
homogeneous group, an assumption that runs counter to the fact 
there are many sects within Sunni Islam. 'Abdullah calls for an 
approach that restricts minorities to those "concentrated on a 
particular territory, with a distinctive tongue and a distinct 
civilisation that is more or less different from Arab 
civilisation. 11224 
This is an entirely new development in Arab nationalist 
thought that looks with appreciation on the case of nationalist 
minorities. 'Abdullah goes so far as to suggest that every 
minority has the right to "revive its language and use it in its 
everyday life along with Arabic. Also it has the right to develop 
its civilisational heritage in an atmosphere of inclusive 
222 Radwan Saiyyd, "Ta'liyq" (A comment), in Tariq Bishriy eta I, al -Hiwar al-Qawmiy al-Diniv, op. Cit., p. 156. 
223 Isma'iyl Sabriy 'Abdullah, "al-Umma al-'Arabiyya: al-Haqiyqa", 0. 
cit., p. 123. 
22a Ibid, p. 123. 
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democracy which is the only framework for realising unity. 11225 
However it is clear that his main concern is with Arab 
nationalism. He argues that Arab nationalism "strengthens and 
becomes enriched by the respect of nationalist minorities. "226 
Despite this recognition of the nationalist minorities, 
'Abdullah's approach is still suffering from a loophole. It does 
not offer a coherent approach to the problem of ethnic plurality 
in the Arab world. It concentrates on realising Arab unity 
whereby the rights of minorities are respected within the 
boundaries of the pan-Arab state. Minorities would find it in 
their interest to "remain part of the federal Arab union with its 
particular entity. 11227 This argues 'Abdullah is to view the issue 
of minorities as a "secondary contradiction compared with the 
basic contradiction between the existence of the Arab nation and 
the fragmentation of the Arab land. "228 Even though 'Abdullah 
admits the right of nationalist minorities like the Kurds in 
self-determination, he sees that possible only within a federal 
system that allows it self rule. 'Abdullah's approach is a 
significant development within Arab thought. It accommodates 
nationalist minorities but still falls short of allowing them 
total self determination. However it absolutely rejects the 
existence of any religious minorities. 229 
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in dealing with the issue of minorities. The call for 
democratisation may help in solving some of the problems 
minorities encounter but it is not sufficient to eradicate the 
problem. What needed is a more sincere and honest answer to the 
issue of minorities that considers national self-determination. 
The view of the Egyptian Copt writer Ghaliy Shukriy is central 
to this approach. Shukriy argues that "only national and 
linguistic minorities qualify for the status. Christian Arabs, 
like the Copts, are not minorities since they are as indigenous 
people as their fellow Muslims are. X230 The approach needed to 
tackle the issue of minorities is in what Shukriy calls a 
new Arabism void of oppression. An Arabism that puts 
democracy at the top of its agenda and puts secularism at 
the top of the democratic agenda. Democracy and social 
justice are central to the solution of the problem of 
minorities. 231 
Arab nationalist thought with minor exceptions still 
fluctuates between the Islamist and the secular traditional 
views. The secular trend solves the problem of religious 
minorities by advocating democracy and the respect of citizen's 
rights but it falls short of solving those of national 
minorities. The Islamist trend still represents the best 
available solution for the problems of the nationalist minorities 
of Islamic religion since it considers them ordinary Muslims. Its 
exclusion is based on religion not on national boundaries. 
The contributions of Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym are the most 
distinguished on the issue of minorities in the Arab world. He 
believes that one of the main obstacles to achieving Arab unity 
23o Ghaliy Shukriy, interview with the author. 
231 Ibid. 
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is the deficiency of Arab nationalist thought to accommodate the 
issue of minorities. Ibrahiym considers the neglect of minorities 
as running counter to the belief that Arab nationalism is a 
humanist idea. 232 Ibrahiym argues that minority-based problems 
involve issues of identity, state building, and social and 
economic differences like the shrinking of political 
participation and lack of social equality which negatively affect 
minorities. Ibrahiym considers that dealing with minorities 
requires the restructuring of the pan-Arabist ideal. This can be 
achieved through a strategy that can accommodate ethnic tensions 
and defuse them before they explode. 233 
This strategy consists of consolidating political 
participation and the establishment of a federal Arab state that 
respects civil society. This in Ibrahiym's view would create the 
needed conciliation between the aim of preserving the Arab 
particularistic territorial state's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity and the right of minorities in preserving their culture 
and human dignity. This is to suggest that as far as the 
religious minorities are concerned the solution would be in 
democratisation and reinstating the millet system. Ibrahiym 
argues that, if developed, the millet system, despite its bad 
reputation thanks to the bad reputation of the Ottoman Empire, 
would meet the needs of these groups. 234 The millet system has a 
"spirit of allowing these groups the highest possible degree of 
self-independence within the state. " But when it comes to 




national minorities democratisation is not the only answer. 235 
Ibrahiym goes as far as to admit the right of these minorities 
to independence . 
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To conclude the discussion of the contributions on 
minorities it is important to note that Arab writers are not yet 
entirely divorced from traditional views especially as far as 
linguistic and cultural minorities are concerned. However, the 
contributions of the 1980s reflect a widening interest in the 
issue of minorities. This shows the extent to which Arab 
nationalist thought is eager to restructure itself and open the 
debates on the problems of nationalism. This is particularly 
clear in the existence of some contributions that entertain a 
liberal attitude towards minorities. 
(ii) The Quest For Democracy 
Arab thought discovered liberal democratic ideas and 
institutions after its encounter with the West in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. The encounter with Europe 
led Arab thought to question the reasons behind Western 
advancement and Arab decline. Democracy was seen as the driving 
force behind Europe's progress. Democracy was causally linked to 
progress. Arab reformers argued that democracy equalled reason 
and progress and was against despotism. It was seen a necessary 
tool for ridding the East of its illness. Islamic reformists had 
to find an answer that would preserve Islamic values as well as 




idea by equating it with the Islamic idea of shura 
(consultation). This was considered enough to prove that Islam 
is compatible with reason and progress. 237 
The spread of democratic ideas worldwide after the First 
World War and the occupation of the Arab world by the European 
colonial forces opened the eyes of the Arabs to parliamentary 
democracy and liberal ideas. However, this was not accompanied 
by any theoretical articulation or treatment of democracy. 238 Arab 
nationalist thought remained unconcerned with investigating 
democratic ideas. This may be attributed to the fact that Arab 
nationalism at its early stages lacked any coherent ideology and 
to the supremacy of other issues such as achieving the 
independence of the Arabs. Issues of democracy and social 
equality were postponed until pan-Arab aims will have been 
secured. 
Class composition of the forces behind Arab nationalist 
movement may also have been a reason for this neglect of 
democracy. These forces were mainly drawn from the bourgeois and 
urban notables of the Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire. Their 
class concerns and interests were not in democracy. 239 M. 'Abid 
Jabiriy explains the absence of theoretical treatment of 
democracy by referring to its incompatibility with the pan- 
Arabist idea of the time. Arab nationalists considered employing 
democracy meant allowing for the rights of minorities and if 
237 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, al-Khitab al-'Arabiy al-Mu'asir: Dirasa Tahlivlivva 
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231 Saiyyd Yasiyn, Tahlivl Madmun, op. cit., p. 48. 
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these were given a chance through democracy they would jeopardise 
Arab unity. 240 No matter what the reasons may have been Arab 
nationalist thought before the Second World War lent very little 
attention to the issue of democracy. 
From the early 1950s, however, new social forces emerged and 
began to occupy themselves with issues of democratisation and 
social change. Hence Arab thought began to put forward ideas of 
social justice and democracy. The poor performance of Arab 
regimes on the fronts of development and the failures of the 
short lived experience of liberal democracy significantly paved 
the way for such a development. The defeat of the Arab states in 
the war with Israel in 1948 was also vital in awakening Arab 
thought to the effects of undemocratic government. 241 The era of 
radical Arab politics was marked by a heavy emphasis on 
development and the attempt to achieve Arab unity while combating 
Israel. Therefore Arab thought embraced socialist ideas and 
strongly criticised liberal democracy. This played a major role 
in undermining the debate on democracy. Democracy was thought of 
as the eradication of social and class differences not as 
political and civil rights of the individual. 
The democratic concept of Arab nationalist thought as 
epitomised by the Ba'th party and Nasserism suffered from many 
theoretical and practical loopholes. Arab nationalist thought 
advocated a form of democratic principle in which political 
democracy was seen as a distorted democracy. Nasser stated that 
"there is no sense in political democracy ... without economic 
240 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, al-Khitab al-'Arabiy, op. cit., p. 94. 
241 Sa'id Bensa'id, interview with the author. 
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democracy. 11242 This concept of democracy, however, was not enough 
to solve the problem of democratic rule nor able to provide a 
coherent democratic model. Arab nationalist thought in its 
mainstream Ba'thist and Nasserite trends was unable to design a 
practical formula for this concept. Therefore neither practical 
nor theoretical answers were provided on the balance between 
political and social democracy. 
Thus Arab nationalist thought still lacked any articulate 
concept of democracy that encompassed the political and civil 
rights of the individual. Institutions of civil society had no 
role to play in the political process. The gap between rhetoric 
and actual politics was an indictment of the Arab nationalist 
concept of democracy. The political situation deteriorated as the 
state made great inroads and civil society weakened. 243 After the 
breakup of the Egyptian-Syrian union and the Arab defeat in the 
war with Israel in 1967 a new wave of writings was marked by an 
emphasis on criticising Arab nationalist thought and its 
traditional views towards democracy. Social equality, justice and 
democracy were considered vital to regenerating Arab politics and 
society. Democratisation was looked at as essential for 
eradicating the causes of the defeat. 
The breakup of the Egyptian-Syrian unity and the defeat were 
seen an evidence not only of the negative effects of the lack of 
democracy but also an indication that Arab nationalist thought 
needed restructuring. However, the issue of democracy was not 
242 Gamal Abdul Nasser, Falsafat al-Thauwra wa al-Miythag wa Barnama. i Thalathivn Maris, (Tripoli, Dar Maktabat al-Fikr, n. d. ) p. 119, p. 110. 
las Kamal 'Abdullatiyf, interview with the author. 
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deeply argued in a way that allowed for the incorporation of 
democratic principles into Arab nationalist thought. The concern 
was with the absence of democratic institutions and the 
occurrence of political oppression. The contributions made no 
effort at articulating the concept of democracy. At best 
democracy was advocated as a question of progress and a political 
technique similar to technology. 
The 1980s saw the renewal of interest in democratisation and 
human rights. 244 This interest is expressed by the number of 
books, articles and seminars that Arab writers devoted to the 
issue. The concern with democracy is also evident in the 
establishment of human rights organisations in many Arab 
countries as well as the establishment of a pan-Arab human rights 
organisation in 1983. The 1980s also witnessed an intellectual 
quest for democracy and respect of human rights within the 
framework of civil society. Arab writers began to advocate 
democracy and, as notes Aziz Azmeh, "a prolific body of discourse 
on democracy has thus emerged. " Therefore, the term democracy was 
introduced "into virtually all principal vehicles for the 
dissemination of contemporary Arab political discourse. " "The 
question of democracy has become a major constituent in the 
political vocabulary prevalent in the Arab world today. 11245 
It is important to note how Arab nationalist thought in the 
1980s approached the issue of democracy and how the concepts are 
244 Aziz al-Azmeh, "Populism Contra Democracy: Recent Democratic 
Discourse in the Arab World' in Gassan Salame(ed) Democracy Without Democrats: 
The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, First Edition (London; New York; 
I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1994) pp. 116-118. 
245 Ibid, p. 112. 
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highlighted. The seminar on democracy in the Arab world organised 
by the Beirut-based Centre for Studies of Arab Unity in 1983 was 
one of the most important developments. The seminar was attended 
by representatives of all ideological trends in Arab thought. 246 
After decades of criticising liberal democracy a new discourse 
on democracy is emerging. What caused this significant change? 
Some Arab writers explain this phenomenon by referring to the 
effects of the lack of popular participation and the use of 
violence against the opposition in the past. Other writers 
explain this emerging interest and democratic discourse by the 
failure of the Arab particularistic territorial state. 
Samir Amin believes that the deficiency of the particularist 
territorial Arab state in achieving development explains this 
phenomenon. 247 He argues that the realisation of Arab 
intellectuals of the negative effects of this Arab experience led 
them to appreciate the vitality of democracy. The call for 
democracy and human rights is rooted in the understanding that 
"Arab progressive experiments were no more than an attempt to 
achieve national liberation while remaining within the world 
capitalist system. 1124" Therefore, the issue of democracy is 
evaluated within the context of the issues related to development 
2a6 Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym etal, Azmat al-Dimugratiyya fiy al-Watan al-'Arabiy 
(the Crisis of Democracy in the Arab Homeland), (Seminar Papers) First Edition 
(Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1983) Arabic Text (Author's 
Translation). 
24' Samir Amin, Azmat al-Muitama' al-'Arabiy(The Crisis of the Arab 
Society) (Cairo; Dar al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabiy, 1985) Arabic Text (Present 
Author's Translation) p. 153. 
248 Ibid, p. 153. 
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in general. 249 
The view that explains the issue by reference to the Arab 
state system is also expressed by Kamal 'Abdullatiyf. He 
considers that the system of government the Arabs experienced has 
established anti-democracy norms in Arab culture. 250 The 
concentration of political power in the hands of emirs and imams 
led to the exclusion of principles of institutions and rotation 
of authority. Despite the changes undergone by Arab states, civil 
society has not been established. 251 The essence of 'Abdullatiyf's 
view is that Arab society remains alien to whatever establishes 
civil society because it lacks the social bases of democracy. The 
fact that "the Arab state is a dependent state where democracy 
can not be realised" makes the absence of the national state 
another factor that aggravates the problem. 252 
Samir Amin, All E. Hillal Dessouki, and 'Ali Umliyl 
contributed to the debates during the seminar on the crisis of 
democracy in the Arab world. They concentrated on what they 
considered to be the handicaps to democracy in the Arab world. 
Their analyses significantly differed from those attributing the 
lack of democracy in the Arab world to the incompatibility of 
Arab culture with democracy. They explained the problem by 




Ibid, p. 153. 
Kamal 'Abdullatiyf, interview with the author. 
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252 Kamal 'Abdul latiyf, al-Tawwiyl wa al-Mufaraga: Nahuww Tasivl Falsafi. y 
lil Nazar al-Sivvasiv al-'Arabiy (Interpretation and Departure: Towards A 
Philosophical Establishment of Arab Political Approach) First Edition (Rabat; 
al-Markaz al-Thagafiy al-'Arabiy, 1987) Arabic Text (Present Author's 
Translation) pp. 72-73. 
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the breaking of the dependency link as the decisive factor in 
leading any Arab democratic project into success. 
Dessouki sees democratisation in the Arab world struggling 
against historical difficulties. He defines these in what he 
called the questions of challenge. These are: "how to obtain 
democracy in a dependent state and economy? What is the link 
between the relationship of dependence and political oppression? 
What is the relationship between national independence and 
democracy? 11253 Dessouki also refers to the problems related to 
building a democracy within the framework of capitalism. He also 
questions the principle of rotating political authority within 
a centrally planned economy and public ownership. Dessouki argues 
that democracy is essentially linked with the way these questions 
are answered. There is, in his opinion, a need to free Arab 
thought from being hostage to the relationship that Europe's 
history established between democracy and liberalism. This also 
brings into the debate the problematique of linking democratic 
institutions with civil society while enabling it to express 
national culture and civilisation. 254 
This kind of questions is quite new to Arab nationalist 
thought. It displays an occupation with the theoretical aspects 
of democracy. Despite its obvious tendency toward achieving some 
distinctive form of Arab democracy the originality of such 
contributions is obvious when compared with traditional views 
discussed before. They show the degree of hope of achieving a new 
253 All E. Hillal Dessouki, "Ta'liyq" (A Comment), in, Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym 
etal, Azmat al-Dimugratiyya, op. cit., p. 49. 
25a Ibid, p. 49. 
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democratic model. It is important to note that many contributions 
express the consensus of Arab intellectuals within the Arabist 
tradition on democracy. They show the agreement among Arab 
intellectuals on the importance of democracy, political 
participation and the rotation of political authority. 
However, the concept of democracy still suffers from some 
ambiguity in those writings. This was clearly demonstrated during 
the discussions at the seminar on the crisis of democracy in the 
Arab world mentioned earlier. Some Arab writers still establish 
the conformity of the democratic concept with the Islamic idea 
of the shura. This kind of understanding may be traced to the 
residual strength of traditionalist views in Arab nationalist 
thought. Therefore equating democracy and shura would bring into 
the debate some of the metaphysical elements of this thought. The 
discussions brought back concepts of authenticity, identity, 
distinctiveness and historical continuity. The result was endless 
arguments about these issues which show the degree of 
inconsistency of the new contributions. It shows also that 
democracy is not as yet seen and understood in isolation from the 
religious ethics. Democracy is not yet seen in purely secular 
terms. The result is disagreement on the form and content of the 
hoped for democracy. 255 
As explains Sa'id Bensa'id, the discussions on the 
255 See, for example, the comments and discussions in response to a paper 
by 'Adil Husiyn, "al-Muhadiydaat al-Tariykhiyya wa al-Ijtima'iyya lil 
Dimuqratiyya"(the Historical and Social Determinants of Democracy), in Sa'd 
Diyn Ibrahiym etal, Azmat al-Dimugratiyya, op. cit., pp. 1243-256. See 
particularly the comments of 'Ali Umiiyl and Kamal Abuwdiyb. The views of 'Ali 
Umliyl may be found in his, al-Islahiyya al-'Arabiyya wa al-Duwla al- Watanivva, First Edition (Casablanca; Al-Markaz al-Thaqafiy al-'Arabiy, 1985) 
p. 200. 
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relationship between democracy and the shura show the degree of 
elective affinity Arab intellectuals still have with Islam . 
2S6 It 
also shows the process of reviewing the concepts and the 
relevance of historical experience to contemporary politics. The 
ambiguity concerning the appropriate conceptualisation of 
democracy is an evidence of self-criticism and the search for a 
new ideological structure. The debate about democracy and shura 
brings into mind the occurrence of a similar one during the late 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century. But if the 
reasons behind the old debate may be understood, what may justify 
the reemergence of the same line of thought? 
If equating the shura with democracy was an attempt to 
defend Islam, any similar subsequent attempt cannot be explained 
by providing the same rational. Arab thought may be obliged to 
look for such argumentation to counter the advent of political 
Islam. The attempt to equate democracy and shura may be 
understood as an attempt to make secular ideas like democracy 
acceptable against the Islamic background. However, assuming that 
democracy and shura are identical does away with the particular 
boundaries of each concept. It does not intellectually approach 
the historical conditions of the evolution of each concept. To 
say that shura is identical with democracy is to neglect the 
difference between a concept and a practice. Democracy is a 
concept that is not limited to the techniques of government while 
the shura, as known in Islamic history, was a technique of 
consultation that is bounded by religious principles. "" 
256 Said Bensa'id, Interview with the Author, (Rabat; 8.4.1996). 
257 Kamal 'Abdullatiyf, interview with the author. 
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This approach, explains Kamal 'Abdullatiyf, excludes 
"theorising questions or those that concentrate on the 
philosophical aspects of each concept. "258 This is because shura 
is "a political technique ... but not a 
definite factor of the 
system of Islamic government ... 
it was not part of its 
structure. "259 Whereas democracy is a "system of political 
practice established by the principles of liberal political 
philosophy in the circle of rationalism; it legalises it, and 
socially and historically makes for it the institutions and the 
relative and changing norms. 11260 
M. 'Abid Jabiriy considers equating shura and democracy an 
expression of a "misery of conscience" that Arab thought suffers 
from. 261 The democratic dream shows how torn apart Arab thought 
is. He explains that while dreaming about democracy Arab thought 
has not yet abandoned the idea of the "just despot. "262 Many Arab 
intellectuals still see necessity in having a just despot. His 
mission is to organise government and authority while working for 
the achievement of national unification. While the contributions 
of the 1980s display an attachment to democracy, there is also 
a nostalgia for the appearance of a genius leader who carries the 
task of realising Arab aims . 
263 
258 Kamal 'Abdullatiyf, al-Tawiivl wa al-Mufaraga, op. cit., p. 68. 
259 Ibid, p. 68. 
260 Ibid. p. 68. 
261 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, al-Khitab al-'Arabiy, op. cit., pp. 80-80. 
262 Ibid, pp. 82-83. 
263 Examples of this idea may be found in many Arab nationalist writings 
like those of Nadiym Biytar, Saiyf Duwla, etc., where the memories of Nasser 
are highly valued. However, the Second Gulf War and Iraq's humiliating defeat 
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Jabiriy attributes the occurrence of these themes in Arab 
thought and the lack of any articulate treatment of issues of 
"the form of authority, its origin and the form of the regime 
that will practice it" to the centrality of the just despot 
concept in Arab thought. He also explains Arab thought's silence 
vis-ä-vis "the form of socio-political organisation that 
democracy requires in a society like the Arab society" in the 
existence of the same idea. 264 The just despot is seen by Jabiriy 
as the intellectual theme that structurally impedes Arab thought 
from approaching democracy as a system of governance. This 
structural impediment will remain until Arab thought liberates 
itself from the "the fantasy of the just despot and rationally 
and honestly reorganises the inside relationship between 
democracy as a system of government, on one side, and nationalist 
aims on the other side. º"265 
Arab nationalist thought in the 1980s is surely 
characterised by the spread of discussions on democracy. The 
contributions involve many themes and aspects of liberalism and 
socialism. This may be seen as a sign of the process of renewal 
and self criticism. It also expresses the state of confusion 
towards the issues of political and social organisation. The 
contributions still show some effect of the discussion of the 
relationship between political and social democracy. This 
suggests that the dialectical relationship between the old and 
destroyed, in the words of Sa'id Bensa'id, any "aspiration for a hero 
accomplishing the Arab mission. " Sa'id Bensa'id, Interview with the Author. 
264 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, al-Khitab al-'Arabiy, op. cit., pp. 95-96 
265 Ibid, p. 96. 
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the newly emerging paradigms is intense. 
The discussions about the relationship between democracy, 
socialism and Arab unity also characterises the contributions of 
the 1980s. The occurrence of such discussions provides enough 
evidence to suggest that Arab nationalist thought still values 
highly the pan-Arabist ideas. However, this may also be seen as 
an indication of the inability of Arab nationalist thought to 
tackle democracy as a social order. Democracy in "a society of 
multiple minorities like the Arab society requires a system of 
decentralisation that is incompatible with the aims of unity and 
socialism. jj266 
The ambiguity towards the issue of democracy was clearly 
expressed during the discussions of a paper delivered by Samir 
Amin at the seminar on the crisis of democracy in the Arab world. 
Amin presented a paper on the method of analysing the crisis of 
democracy in the Arab world in which he proposed a programme of 
democratic reform. 267 His proposals and analysis were met with 
many hostile responses that came from all quarters of Arab 
nationalist thought. 268 However, despite the sheer amount of 
criticism to his proposal Amin's treatment of the issue of 
democracy was a clear attempt at liberating himself from his 
266 Ibid, p. 96. 
267 Samir Amin, "Mulahadaat Huwla Manhaj Tahliyl Azmat al-Dimuqratiyya fiy 
al-Watan al-'Arabiy" ( Remarks on the Method of Analysing Democracy in the 
Arab Homeland), in Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym etal, Azmat al-Dimugratiyya, op. cit., 
pp. 307-320. 
268 Participants at the seminar, left, right and centre, criticised Amin' s 
ideas. From the right they included Jalaal Amiyn, Tariq Bishriy and 'Adil 
Hüsiyn. From the left, the most clear attack came from Tahir Labiyb who, 
surprised by Amin's change of position, exclaimed wether this is Samir Amin 
or someone else. See these in Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym etal, Azmat al-Dimugratiyya, 
op. cit, pp. 321-. 
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ideological attachments. He attempted to treat the issue while 
having no sacred values but a sincere urge f or democracy and 
development. The fact that Amin's paper was void of terms like 
imperialism and proletariat shows the degree of self criticism 
and the honest attempts at renewing Arab thought. 
Amin presented a programme for inclusive democratic reform 
that sought a marriage between bourgeois and populist democracy. 
The programme itself expresses some major differences from his 
ideological convictions. Amin argues that the problematique of 
democracy in the Arab case is part and parcel of a wider 
problematique of development. The objective conditions for 
accomplishing democracy are not ripe yet. This applies to either 
bourgeoisie or popular democracy. He argues that neither Western 
models of democracy nor Communist, Soviet or Chinese, models are 
relevant to the Arab case. This is because Amin believes that 
establishing democracy is conditional on the establishment of "a 
society and an economy that benefit from self-independence from 
the hegemonic capitalist system. , 269 Accomplishing democracy, in 
Amin's view, cannot be achieved until the Arab world , and 
indeed 
all developing countries, are independent from the capitalist 
world order. The essence of Amin's thesis is that democracy is 
conditional upon autocentred development that is conditional upon 
delinking from the capitalist colonial system. 270 
However, the programme for democratic reform that Amin 
presented at the seminar on the crisis of democracy in the Arab 
world is a major shift in his thinking. Amin argues that because 
269 Samir Amin, Azmat al-Mu. itama' al-'Arabiy, op. cit., p. 154. 
270 Ibid, p. 147. 
252 
inclusive democracy is hindered by the Arab world's dependency 
it is only possible to look for democratic reform. Amin's 
programme establishes democratic reform on: the respect of 
differing social interests, the linkage between democracy and the 
national problem, the linkage between political democracy and 
social democracy, inclusive political democracy, and that 
political authority results from the free choice of the masses 
and the reevaluation of orders in social life . 
271 The programme 
is a clear indication of the process of self-criticism that Arab 
thought is experiencing in the 1980s. It shows the extent of the 
desire of some Arab intellectuals to free themselves from 
ideological dogmas and the attempt at reaching new formulas. 
The new discourse reflects the Arab writers' dream of an 
inclusive democratic model that emphasises civil society and 
plurality. It establishes the rights and freedoms of the 
individual, which is borrowed from the liberal model, social 
justice, which is borrowed from the socialist model and cultural 
authenticity, which is based in the Islamic model. This reflects 
the ideological struggle within Arab thought and a state of 
selectivity towards the three concerned models. 272 The discussion 
of the contributions of the 1980s confirms what Azmeh rightly 
observes that despite the spread of democratic discourse "there 
has not yet emerged a specific canon of democratic writing to 
which reference is made by the various parties to democratic 
271 Ibid, pp. 147-149. 
272 These ideas were clearly demonstrated by many intellectuals 
interviewed by the author particularly Sa'id Bensa'id, Jabiriy, Belqaziyz, 
Saiyyd Yasiyn and Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym. 
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discourse . "Z'3 
However and as far as Arab nationalist thought is concerned 
the fact that democracy is being debated and became a basic 
ingredient reflects the process of restructuring. Even though the 
discourse does not prove the existence of an inclusive paradigm 
of democracy this should not obscure the significance of this 
development if neglect of democracy within traditional Arab 
nationalist thought is taken into account. The essence of the new 
discourse is the reordering of Arab priorities. Democracy is 
needed before development and this is in itself, a major change 
in Arab nationalist thought. To maintain that democracy should 
not be sacrificed in favour of any cause, even unity, is an 
intellectual and ideological breakthrough. 
The prospect of developing this widening interest in 
democracy into a specific democratic canon will be affected by 
the developments on the front of democratisation in Arab states. 
This democratic discourse is taking place against a background 
of little if any democratisation. Unless supported by a process 
of democratisation this discourse will remain ineffective and 
"less the ground for political consensus. 11274 Arab thought, 
therefore, has to undergo the test of its democratic pretensions. 
The question, as Azmeh put it, is "whether this discourse is 
capable of actually instituting democracy as a permanent feature 
in long-term Arab political language. "275 
The discussion in this chapter has attempted to explain the 
273 Aziz Azmeh, "Populism Contra Democracy", op. cit., p. 112. 
274 Ibid, p. 112. 
275 Ibid, pp. 112-113. 
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dialectic of old and new paradigms in Arab nationalist thought 
in the 1980s. The discussion of the contributions focussed on 
those related to issues of the Arab nation, Arab nationalism, 
Islam, secularism, minorities and democracy. The next chapter 
will address itself to the debates Arab nationalist thought has 
undergone regarding the issue of the particularistic territorial 
state. The purpose of the discussion will be to evaluate to what 
extent they reflect the emergence of a new paradigm. 
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Chapter Five 
Arab Nationalism and the Arab 
State System 
The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War and 
the victory of Britain and France was decisive in bringing about 
radical changes in the political situation of the Arab world. The 
plans the victorious powers negotiated during the war were 
implemented. This meant the division of the Arab world into 
British and French colonies. A number of new states were 
established. Each state was under some form of colonial control. 
The Arabs' hopes for independence and unity were frustrated. The 
Arabs were only to. experience a change of their masters from the 
Ottomans to the Europeans. 
Despite Arab attempts to challenge the situation their 
resistance was quietened and the new order was established. "By 
the mid-1920s the British and the French were the masters of the 
Middle East. "' After that the European colonialists worked 
towards establishing the state structures needed to rule the 
region as efficiently as their interests dictated. Not only did 
Arab hopes became shattered but also they had to deal with new 
realities. As discussed in chapter two Arab movements in the 
inter-war period and during the Second World War had to struggle 
for independence. The goals of pan-Arabism had to be modified and 
1 Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the 
Middle East, First Edition (London; New York; Routledge, 1992) 
pp. 8-11. 
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limited to each individual territory. The fight for independence 
had to be confined to the boundaries determined by colonialism. 
Although solidarity existed liberation movements had to establish 
themselves and fight along the lines drawn by the colonial powers 
in each para-statal territory. 
The aim of Arab unity had to be deferred till independence 
was achieved. This was the thinking of the Arab movement at the 
time and the circumstances that compelled it to do so. This 
meant, despite the existence of solidarity, the fragmentation of 
the pan-Arab movement. Each movement's leaders had to concentrate 
on particularistic issues. When independence was achieved or 
granted pan-Arab unity was not realised. Each independent 
movement, now the leaders of the independence struggle had become 
the rulers of the newly independent states, was occupied with 
consolidating its achievements. Therefore the emerging states 
were being entrenched. Unity was now remote as fragmentation and 
disunity were the order of the day. 
The particularistic territorial not the pan-Arab all 
encompassing state was the reality of Arab politics. Between 
dream and reality a gap existed. Since then the aim of the Arab 
nationalist movement has been to undo the situation and bridge 
the gap. 2 Ever since its foundation the Arab state system has 
been viewed with disdain by the pan-Arabists. They considered the 
state system a creation of a foreign will that contradicted the 
nationalist ideal. Britain and France "determined almost all of 
2 Hisham Sharabi, "Unity, Disunity and Fragmentation in the 
Arab World", in Edward Said and Fuad Suleiman(eds) The Arabs 
Today: Alternatives for Tomorrow, First Edition ((Ohio; Forum 
Associates Inc., 1973) p. 137. 
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the new boundaries. ,3 The borders of the Arab states are seen as 
the embodiment of the political fragmentation of the Arab world. 
Therefore these boundaries were seen to have no logic. 
The essential features of the Arab state system were mainly 
the work of the colonial powers. The boundaries and the 
identities of the new political entities were made either on the 
basis of pre-existing administrative entities or "involved either 
detaching some part of a former Ottoman province (for example, 
Transjordan) or, more usually, adding several provinces together 
(for example, Syria and Iraq) . j4 This 
implied a process of 
carving up, deducting, adding and deducting and adding 
territories to form new political entities. This process "gave 
many of the new states a somewhat artificial appearance. j5 
This historical background of the Arab state system made 
pan-Arab nationalists despise the particularistic territorial 
states. Analysts too took into account this background and 
concluded that "the state was a weak creation, an artificial part 
of a naturally evolving entity called the Arab nation. 116 This 
made the history, legitimacy and durability of the Arab states 
a subject of an intense debate within Arab thought. For the pan- 
Arab nationalists this `artificial' origin of the territorial 
particularistic Arab states and their boundaries was a key 
starting point. They employed this concept for the purpose of 
3 Roger Owen, Power and Politics, op. cit., pp. 11-13. 
Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 William Zartman, "Introduction", in Adeed Dawisha and William Zartman(eds), Beyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab 
State, (London; New York; Sydney; Croom Helm, 1988) p. 2. 
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discrediting these states and to justify the call for their 
withering away before Arab unity. 
As discussed in chapter three traditional Arab nationalist 
thought despised the state system. Pan-Arab nationalism made it 
its task to dislodge the state system and aspire to Arab unity. 
Traditional Arab nationalist thought refused to bestow any 
legitimacy on these states. This was to participate in the lack 
of any sound theoretical treatment of the issue of state. Arab 
nationalist thought while obsessed with the pan-Arab state 
suffered an epistemological poverty as far as the individual 
state was concerned. 
How these deficiencies were dealt with in the contributions 
of the 1980s is the subject of this chapter. Are they to mark a 
significant shift of position towards the state system and 
therefore pave the way for the emergence of a new paradigm? The 
following discussion will devote itself to these issues. 
5-1: The Particularistic Territorial State: From Contempt To 
Discernment 
In traditional Arab nationalist thought the reality of 
political fragmentation is compared with an idealist political 
unity. Although the Arabs had lived in unity only for a limited 
period during early Islam traditional Arab nationalist thought 
ignored this historical fact. The argument that the 
particularistic territorial states represent a unification step, 
in a region where societal and political fragmentation and 
absence of a central authority was the norm, was not an 
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acceptable thesis. The old paradigm ignored and neglected the 
message of Arab history and attempted to jump from a supposed 
historical unity to an aspirational one. This meant the lack of 
a proper understanding of the Arab state system. 
Apart from confirming the alien origin of the state system 
the old paradigm paid no detailed attention to or investigation 
of the state system. However, some Arab nationalists were trying 
to come to grips with the mounting power of the state system. The 
fact that the state system resisted the power of the pan-Arab 
movement and built a strong authority made some of them realise 
the nature of their enemy. 'Ismat Saiyf Duwla, as early as 1968, 
acknowledged the immense material power of the particularistic 
territorial state. He argued that contrary to how Arab 
nationalists viewed them Arab states were not "names on paper but 
they are a full-fledged and complex apparatus. "7 
However this early acknowledgment by a leading pan-Arabist 
intellectual and ideologue was not to stir any relevant response 
from other intellectuals. The general trend remained that of 
discrediting the state and denying it any legitimacy. It is 
interesting to note that Saiyf Duwla himself was not yet to 
develop an entirely different ideological stand. His evaluation 
of the power of the particularistic territorial state seems to 
have been intended only to express fear. 
Saiyf Duwla reveals scorn of this state and invites the Arab 
nationalists to purify themselves from its poisons. He went as 
far as urging the revolutionary pan-Arabists to avoid any 
'Ismat Saiyf Duwla, al-Tariyq ila al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 
(The Road Towards Arab Unity) (Beirut; Dar al-Tali'a; 1968) 
Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation)p. 29. 
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involvement in the governing of the state. His unqualified view 
was that 
under no circumstances should the Arab revolution become a 
particularistic territorial state. In all circumstances the 
revolutionary vanguard should remain, in organisation and 
leadership, away and detached from the state, a system and 
a government. ' 
Therefore traditional Arab nationalist thought was blinded 
by its ideological design and saw no logic in the political 
reality it had to work in. The shock Arab nationalist thought had 
was that the state system was in a process of growth. The state 
system was gaining ground as the dream of Arab unity became more 
remote. Traditional Arab nationalist thought opted for the 
maintenance of its ideological position. This meant dealing with 
the particularistic territorial state in a `puritanic' way that 
reflected an ethical rather than a political stand. 
(i) Arab Nationalist Thought and The State Concept 
As explained in chapter three Arab thought had not 
elaborated on the issue of the state. Its obsession with the idea 
of a united Arab state hindered the treatment of the theoretical 
issue of the state. This theoretical deficiency may be attributed 
to the nature of Arab thought. Arab thought is essentially a 
unity-driven and oriented thought. M. 'Abid Jabiriy considers 
this a result of the centrality of political unity in the Arab 
cultural perspective. Culturally, unity is a part of a heritage 
that had been accomplished in the past and it is the locomotive 
of progress in the past and the future. This implies that the 
issue is related to the way Arabs interpret their history. In 
e Ibid, p. 291, p. 121. 
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this interpretation the cultural or the ideological encompasses 
the political. ' 
Despite differences in the focus of unity, Islamic, regional 
or pan-Arab, the concept of unity is very central. Arabist 
ideology aims at challenging the status-quo. Therefore it 
did not deal with the state issue, the issue of managing 
the different relations and institutions that crystallised 
during a divergent and multiple historic process, within 
territorial, population, legalistic and economic boundaries 
... Therefore, circumstances seemed artificial, remnants of 
a sick past, or a consequence of a present that external 
domination prohibits its true and authentic self- 
expression. lo 
Although Arab thought experienced state powers during the 
encounter with Europe and later on during European colonisation, 
it was not linked to the concept of state itself. The emphasis 
was on cultural sources of power more than on building a strong 
state. Therefore, a state's political foundations were associated 
with the ideal of national, pan-Arab, or religious unity. " This 
is the view of the Moroccan historian 'Abdullah Laroui. He 
explains that Arab thought on the state was influenced by the 
Arabist utopia which denies legitimacy to the particularistic 
territorial state. He considers that Arab thought was centred on 
the utopia of Arabism and Arab society. This resulted in ignoring 
9 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, interview with the author. 
io Wadah Shararah, Huwla Bald Mushkilaat al-Duwla fly al- 
Thagafa wa al-Mujtama' al-'Arabiyyin (On Some Problems of State 
in Arab Culture and Society) First Edition (Beirut; Dar al-Hadatha, 
1980) Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) pp. 82-83. 
11 Gassan Salame, "`Strong' and `Weak States', a Qualified 
Return to the Muqaddimah", in Gassan Salame(ed), The Foundation 
of the Arab State, First Edition (London; New York; Sydney; Croom 
Helm, 1987) p. 26. 
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the need for elaborating on the state phenomenon. 12 
According to Wadah Shararah this intellectual stance is 
natural. He explains that all Arab projects to do with the 
desired state of the Arabs, westernised, Islamist or pan-Arabist, 
are inclusive projects. Therefore the perceived state is the 
inclusive all encompassing one that satisfies the utopian model. 
The intellectual consequence of this is that Arab thought lacked 
any treatment of the state as a philosophical, social and 
political concept. 13 The Moroccan 'Ali Umliyl explains this 
theoretical deficiency in the foreign incidence of the state in 
the Arab world. 14 He goes on to say that for Arabs and Muslims, 
state was not a pure theoretical issue. They experienced the 
state only as a force imposing on their societies and colonising 
their countries later on. Foreign interference and colonial 
pressures were responsible for introducing the state into the 
region . 
15 
State was, however, introduced "not as an integrated but 
dismembered institution. Their [Muslim intellectuals] role was 
limited to reacting to what actually took place. " This is because 
the tanzimaat 
were introduced along scattered periods (relating to the 
army, education or communication, etc. ) and dislinked from 
an integrated apparatus (the state). In addition, there 
12 'Abdullah Laroui, Mafhuwm al-Duwla (the Concept of the 
State) (Casablanca; al-Markaz al-Thaqafiy al-'Arabiy, 1981) 
Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) pp. 17-69. 
13 Wadah Shararah, Huwla Bald Mushkilaat, op. cit., p. 141. 
14 'Ali Umliyl, al-Islahiyya al-'Arabiyya wa al-Duwla al- 
Wataniyya, First Edition (Casablanca; al-Markaz al-Thaqafiy al- 
'Arabiy, 1985) p. 88. 
is Ibid, p. 88. 
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existed no awareness of the full logic (theory of the 
state) . 
16 
Umliyl is referring to the question to which Arab and Muslim 
intellectuals attempted to find an answer during the nineteenth 
century. As discussed in chapter two, Muslims tried to explain 
Europe's strength and their own weakness. The answer they came 
up with allocated a central place to the importance of renewing 
state structures and institutions. The answer to the dilemma of 
countering the West's encroachment was to be found in the West's 
"advancement of its institutions, particularly the institution 
responsible for managing society , i. e. the state. This meant 
that the concept was confined to the formal political level. j17 
The introduction of the state into Arab thought was 
fragmentary and a byproduct of the European pressures on the Arab 
world. This is not to suggest that the Arabs and their thought 
had not known any state articulation prior to the encounter with 
the West as Charles Butterworth implies. "' Arabic Islamic thought 
had dealt with issues and concepts of political authority and 
political organisation not least within Islamic fiqh. What is 
suggested here, however, is that concepts of the state and the 
nation-state are alien to Arab thought. They were introduced in 
the nineteenth century and after. Having borrowed these concepts 
Arab thought did not epistemologically absorb them intact. These 
concepts were the subject of modification and re-articulation. 
16 
17 
Ibid, pp. 88-90. 
Ibid, pp. 88-90. 
is Charles Butterworth, "State and Authority in Arabic 
Political Thought", in Gassan Salame(ed), The Foundation of the 
Arab, op. cit., pp. 91-110. 
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Umliyl explains how the concept of the state underwent a 
process of modification and re-articulation. Underlying the 
effects on the thought of Muslim intellectuals Umliyl explains 
the source of their theoretical deficiencies. He says that 
concepts related to the national state acquired a content 
different from what they had while in their original 
environment. Perhaps the untrue awareness of the social 
history behind the evolution and development of the 
national state in Europe ... was one of the main causes of 
their political thought. 19 
Umliyl concludes his analysis by emphasising the effects of 
the imposition of a modern state organisation on Arabs through 
colonialism. He thinks that the basic effect was the "unclear and 
disintegrated apprehension of the theory of modern state. 1120 
Whereas in Europe state was identified with the nation the Arabs 
were confronting a "relationship of contradiction between state 
and nation. 1121 This explains the frustration of the pan-Arabists 
and their disdain of the Arab state system. 
The state system contradicted two fundamental ideas. It 
contradicted and destroyed the Ottoman Empire and the concept of 
the umma that, however ambiguous, accompanied it. It also 
contradicted the very idea that accompanied it, namely that of 
nationalism and that state and nation ought to be identical. 
Therefore it contradicted both the classical and the new concepts 
of the nation. Arab nationalist thought faced a dilemma. It had 
to cater for seemingly contradictory ideas. The idea of Arab 
nationalism only gave credit to an Arab nation within one state. 
106. 
19 'Ali Umliyl, al-Islahiyya al-'Arabiyva, op. cit., pp. 97- 
20 Ibid, pp. 97-106. 
21 Ibid, p. 106. 
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The nation-state idea credited the Arab state system and lay the 
doors open for the development of many nations within their 
respective states' boundaries, independent from both the Islamic 
and Arab concepts of umma. 
What made the situation for Arab nationalist thought more 
complicated was that the pan-Arabist idea suffered from the 
absence of the pan-Arab nation-state while the particularistic 
territorial states lacked the nation factor. Since the Arab 
nationalist movement failed in realising its aim of uniting the 
Arabs in one state, the establishment of the Arab state system 
marked a defeat of this aspiration. Thus the antagonistic stand 
Arab nationalist thought maintained towards the state system. 22 
This hindered serious elaboration on the issue of the state. 
Until the 1980s Arab nationalist thought essentially repeated its 
old thesis about the state system and lacked any treatment of 
state related issues. It is the task of the following discussion 
to determine whether the 1980s contributions are significantly 
different and in what way. 
(ii) The Consolidation of the State System 
Contrary to the assumption of traditional Arab nationalist 
thought Arab states have, so far, consolidated their existence. 
Claims that these states were of foreign origin and their 
boundaries were cartoonic failed to destabilise them. The Arab 
state system has demonstrated a strong desire and ability to 
22 Sa'id Bensa'id, "al-'Aql al-'Arabiy wa al-Wahda: Nihaiyat 
al-Khitab al-Qawmiy al-Klasiykiy" (Arab Reason and Unity: the End 
of the Classical Nationalist Discourse) Al-Wahda(Unity) vol. 
46\47 (1988) Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) p. 50. 
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withstand the animosity of pan-Arabism. 
Pan-Arabism has failed to achieve its aim of dislodging and 
dismantling the state system. Despite the hegemony of its 
ideological paradigm during the 1950s and the 1960s the loud 
rhetoric of Arab nationalism has not managed to eliminate its 
perceived enemy, the particularistic territorial state. 23 The 
record of Arab politics since independence suggests that not only 
have states consolidated their entities and structures, it also 
shows that raison d'etat prevailed in many incidents. Inter-Arab 
conflicts were a recurring phenomenon and armed conflicts were 
a fact of inter-Arab relations. 24 
The Moroccan thinker M. 'Abid Jabiriy affirms that Arab 
states have become a fact of "definite and defiant reality. "25 
Not only has the particularistic territorial state displayed 
durability, but also, as Jabiriy explains, "its internal 
apparatus and external links display defiance and objection. It 
23 Gassan Salame, " 'Auwaiq al-Wagi' al-'Arabiy al-Qutriy" 
(the Impediments of Arab Particularistic Reality), in A. Duri 
etal, al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya Tajarubuha wa Tawaqu'atuha (Seminar 
Papers) First Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al- 
'Arabiyya, 1989) pp. 469-471. 
24 Ahmed Yuwsif Ahmed, al-Sira'aat al-'Arabiyya al-'Arabiyya 
(1945-1981) : Dirasa Istitla'iyya (Inter-Arab Conflicts(1945- 
1981): An Explorative Study) First Edition (Beirut; Markaz 
Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabia, 1988) Arabic Text (Present Author's 
Translation). This book is a pioneering study of inter-Arab 
conflicts. It is an example of the emergence of a new paradigm 
in Arab nationalism. Not only does this study spring from the 
particularistic territorial states as the reality of Arab 
politics, it also attempts employing social sciences' methodology 
in their study. 
25 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, "Mustaqbal al-Fikr al-'Arabiy wa 
Ishkaliyyat al-Taqadum wa al-Wahda"(the Future of Arab Thought 
and the Problematique of Progress and Unity) Shoun Arabiyya (Arab 
Affairs) vol. 51, September 1987, Arabic Text (Present Author's 
Translation) p. 16. 
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also has established and consolidated social and psychological 
structures in the body of its society. 1126 The particularistic 
territorial state, whether paying only a lip-service or devoted 
to Arab nationalism, has not withered away. It has persisted 
"without fusion, secession, reconstitution or dissolution into 
a large pan-Arab unity. 1127 
As time lapsed particularistic territorial states underwent 
a process of state-building. Like any new state, Arab states were 
keen to succeed in establishing themselves as nation-states. They 
attempted to acquire all the qualities that would make them 
`real' legitimate and sovereign states. Despite their lack of the 
many prerequisites of nation-state status, Arab states behaved 
as if having these qualities. They carried on programmes of 
building political structures and embarked upon the process of 
creating national identities and local histories in order to 
facilitate the national integration of their communities. 28 
Even though Arab states have not fully accomplished their 
aim of building nation-states, they remain, nonetheless, 
committed to this aim. The creation of state structures was 
challenged internally by a complex of social, political, economic 
and ethnic factors and the existence of primordial loyalties. 
They have also been challenged by pan-Arabism or, albeit 
26 Ibid. 
27 William Zartman, "Introduction", op. cit., p. 1. 
28 Many Arab states' constitutions claim nationhood for 
their communities. See, Nasiyf Nasar, Tasuwuraat al-Umma al- 
Mu'asira: Dirasa li Mafahiyym al-Umma fly al-Fikr al-'Arabiy al- 
Hadiyth wa al-Mu'asir, second Edition (Beirut; Dar Ammuwaj, 1994) 
pp. 489-535. Nasar provides an analysis of Arab constitutions 
regarding this matter. 
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nominally, by pan-Islamism. Nevertheless Arab states appear to 
have "overcome them without being severely wounded or 
weakened. 1129 The particularistic territorial state appears to be 
"continuously gaining new ground and progressing, imperceptibly 
perhaps, but no doubt solidly. 1130 
The consolidation and consistency of the state system posed 
a serious challenge to Arab nationalist thought which had to 
provide an appropriate response to this challenge. This is where 
the contributions of the 1980s appear significant and realistic 
in contrast to the traditional paradigm. Arab intellectuals in 
the 1980s attempted to provide an understanding of the issues in 
a way that detached itself from rigid ideology. They sought to 
explain the dichotomy between what had been thought as the 
sweeping power of Arab nationalism and the enhancing power and 
entity of the state system. Pan-Arab thought in the 1980s 
confirms that realities of fragmentation and Arab disunity are 
more complex than romantics had thought. This is clear in the 
contributions analysed here. 
Nadiym Biytar's contribution is one of the outstanding 
efforts made during the 1980s. 31 He addresses the issue and 
underlines its serious challenge to Arab nationalism. His 
contribution signifies and acknowledges the need for 
restructuring Arab nationalist thought in order to survive the 
29 William Zartman, "Introduction", op. cit., p. 2. 
30 Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, "Introduction", in 
Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani(eds), The Rentier State, First 
Edition (London; New York; Sydney; Croom Helm, 1987) p. 1. 
ai Nadiym Biytar, Juwdhuwwr al-IgliymiXya al-Jadiyda, First 
Edition (Beirut; Ma'had al-Innmaa al-'Arabiy, 1983). 
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challenge. This challenge is a different one from that which Arab 
nationalism encountered during the 1920s and the 1930s. In the 
first decades of this century Arab nationalist thought had to 
tackle the issue of defining the Arabist idea itself. Arabism 
then had to be defended against external threats in the form of 
foreign rule. Now, Arab nationalism has to struggle against 
internal forces. The challenge, as Biytar explains, is "how to 
get out of a particularistic territorial ghetto. 102 
What makes the challenge more difficult is that this ghetto 
is the "product of internal trends and forces ... what we now 
face is not to prove our national existence as a nation ... now 
the fundamental problem is how to transform from fragmentation 
to unity. 1133 What Biytar is emphasising here is that the 
realisation of Arab national existence is no longer the task of 
Arab nationalist thought. It is an established thesis and this 
implies that traditional Arab nationalist thought had played its 
role and is no longer suitable for the new challenges. The old 
paradigm is a spent force that cannot deal with the consolidation 
of the state system. The message is that there is a need for a 
new paradigm to replace the old one. 
The new paradigm would be assigned the task of doing away 
with the situation of fragmentation. This means the need for 
appropriate concepts and methodological tools necessary to 
perform a new task. Biytar's views on this issue are an example 
of the emerging paradigm in Arab nationalist thought. His 
contribution is one of the most coherent and systematic attempts 
32 Ibid, p. 20. 
33 Ibid, p. 20. 
270 
in the study of the particularistic territorial state. Therefore 
the bulk of the discussion here will focus on Biytar's effort. 
Other contributions also will be alluded to whenever relevant. 
this will serve the purpose of identifying the new trend in Arab 
nationalist thought as well as making comparisons between 
contributions. 
Biytar's analysis of the way the Arab state system 
consolidates itself starts by rejecting the traditional cartoonic 
nature theory. He points to a number of factors contributing to 
the process of state consolidation. 34 These are identified as 
related to history, identity, ideology, politics and economy. 
Through its employment of mechanisms derived from these factors 
the particularistic territorial state consolidates itself. Given 
its durability since independence the state has been able to rely 
on making history of its own. Not only has the state survived 
against competing notions, it also has been able to manipulate 
history. 35 
By becoming the force dictating history within its borders 
the state has been able to interpret history the way it deems 
suitable to credit its existence. Time has been on the side of 
the state. It allowed it to interpret and also to become the 
controller and manipulator of history. j36 While becoming a 
political and historical reality the particularistic territorial 
34 Nadiym Biytar, "Duwr al-Duwla al-Qutriyya fiy Tarsiykh 
al-Tariykh al-Qutriy" (the Role of the Particularistic Territorial 
State in Consolidating Particularistic History) Al-Wahda (Unity), 
vol. 42 (1988) Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) 
3s Ibid, pp. 29-39. 
36 Ibid. 
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state succeeds " unconsciously in crystallising common feelings 
into an identity. 1137 The lapse of time allowed the state to 
create "a psyche that implies an acceptance or a supposition that 
it is legitimate and real. j138 
From this quotation a recognition of the particularistic 
territorial state and the development of particularistic 
identities is clearly visible. Here a remarkably new approach is 
provided. Contrary to traditional views the effects of 
contemporary history and the role of state mechanisms are 
acknowledged in bringing in another identity. No longer is 
identity only seen in its pan-Arabist level but also at its 
particularistic level. Identity here is not the work of 
metaphysical factors but the result of social, economic, 
political and historical process. 
A devout pan-Arabist who believes in the necessity and 
virtue of Arab unity, Biytar conceals no fears of the emerging 
particularistic identity. He consider what he calls the 
"psychological mechanism" the most dangerous of all state 
mechanisms. This is because it represents the most ever enormous 
challenge to Arab identity and Arab unity. If the call for Arab 
unity and indeed Arab nationalism finds its focus in Arab 
identity then a competing identity poses a great danger to this 
aim. Biytar identifies the threat state identity presents to Arab 
nationalism in that it eventually will do away with Arab identity 
itself. He explains that the continuation of particularism 
gradually weakens Arab identity and may eventually cause "a final 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid, pp. 29-39. 
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eradication of unity qualities. The continuation of particularism 
and the state in its existence transform the belief in unity into 
a surficial shell. 1139 
Biytar's view becomes clearer when he tackles the issue of 
particularistic history. He considers the state's desire to 
interpret and invent a national history of its own as the corner 
stone of having a distinct identity and entity. This has been 
done in almost all Arab states, those who are particularistic in 
ideology or those who are pan-Arabist alike. Every state has 
realised the importance of having a distinctive history in order 
that the legitimacy of the state is not questioned since it 
springs from this history. This has been done to "consolidate and 
separate its history as a particularistic history. "40 
Designing a state ideology is important for welding 
legitimacy to the state. Since Arab states view themselves as 
sovereign entities they require all the qualities needed for 
statehood. The creation or even the invention of national history 
and national myths reflects this need. Arab states are undergoing 
two processes simultaneously. State-building and nation-building 
processes go hand in hand and they reveal the urgency these 
states feel in face of the circumstances. Not only do Arab states 
have to convince other states (Arab or none-Arab) they qualify 
for statehood but also have to make themselves look so in the 
eyes of their own citizens. 
The stability of the political regimes also has to rely on 
this ideology of state legitimacy. Political stability is based 
39 Ibid, p. 34. 
40 Ibid, pp. 34-35. 
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on the legitimacy of regimes and states particularly if the lack 
of ethnic homogeneity is taken into account. However, this is not 
to suggest that the endeavour to establish the identity of the 
particularistic territorial state contradicts that of Arabism. 
Particularistic identifies are also based on Arabism, Islam as 
well as on particularistic history. However, Biytar rightly 
observes that "the existence of particularistic territorial state 
in itself means a particularistic mechanism based on itself 
despite the supreme aims that accompany it. ""41 
This is the central point in the analysis of Sa'd Diyn 
Ibrahiym. He points out that state-building process 
consolidated the existence and durability of the state, 
externally and internally. It bestowed upon it a de facto 
legitimacy' in the face of others (Arab and foreign states) 
and its own citizens some of whom may initially have 
hesitated in recognising its de jure legitimacy. 42 
Therefore, the state-building process and the building of 
modern state institutions increased the states' ability to 
control and dominate most aspects of societal life. Therefore 
they were. able to consolidate their entities. Despite Arab 
nationalism the state managed to "consolidate its particularistic 
identity to the point it became accepted by its citizens. j43 
Other writers confirm the role of state-building in the 
consolidation of particularism. What Biytar calls the mechanism 
of economics is seen by other writers as having "worked to 
41 Ibid, pp. 29-39. 
42 Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym, al-Muitama' wa al-Duwla fly al-Watan 
al-'Arabiv, First Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al- 
'Arabiyya, 1988) pp. 177-183. 
43 Ibid, p. 299. 
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diversify and consolidate existing states. jj44 However, Biytar 
assigns great importance to the role played by economic factors. 
He notices that the role of economic factors in consolidating the 
state is a manifestation of a "particularism mechanism of 
multiple dimensions that consolidate this existence once and for 
all. if 45 This mechanism is a danger for Arab unity since it is "an 
end to any unification work and the idea of unity itself. "46 
Therefore, the logic of the particularistic territorial 
states is to be found in many factors. As Gassan Salame observes 
the survival and continuation of these entities have a 
renewed spirit of continuity. The passage of time confers 
legitimacy on them that springs from their successful 
resistance to factors challenging their existence. " 
From the discussion above it is clear that Arab nationalist 
thought is attempting a new understanding of the state system. 
The content of this new attempt evidently departs from the 
traditional romantic ideological views. The consolidation of the 
state system has obliged Arab nationalist theory to reconsider 
its position. The new approach is more realistic and politically 
rather than ideologically oriented. 
However, Arab nationalist thought, when acknowledging the 
consolidation of the state system, is not relinquishing its goal 
of Arab unity. Arab unity, in one form or another, remains very 
central to Arab nationalism. The realities of Arab politics make 
44 Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (eds), The Rentier 
State, op. cit., p. 1. 
38. 
45 Nadiym Biytar, "Duwr al-Duwla al-Qutriyya", op. cit., p. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Gassan Salame, " 'Auwaiq al-Wagi' al-'Arabiy", op. cit., 
p. 473. 
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it more realistic and pragmatic for Arab nationalism to work in 
conjunction with old enemies. Particularistic territorial states 
have been the norm of the day and Arabs find no embarrassment in 
identifying themselves with the state. Arab nationalist thought 
is coming to terms with the state system. However, it still 
relies on the current of Arabism at grass-root level. 
Arabism remains a central fact in culture at grass-root 
level. 48 From this perspective the proclamation by F. Ajami that 
Arabism is dead may only be considered as overemphasising the 
ability of the Arab states to consolidate themselves inspite of 
Arabism. This is to suggest that, in the words of Roger Owen, 
"the power of the individual states to resist pan-Arab appeals 
had become much greater. 1149 But Arabism "remained a central fact 
of Middle Eastern life whatever else might be going on. 1150 Roger 
Owen sharply remarks that "what Ajami is trying to describe is 
not the end of Arabism itself but an important change in the way 
it was interpreted and put into political use. "51 
The new contributions in Arab nationalist thought recognise 
the fact of the state and no longer underestimate the implication 
of the institutionalisation of particularistic identities. 
Nevertheless, this does not go as far as to register Arab 
48 This seems in line with the shift Arabist ideas underwent 
at the grass-root level. The survey of Arab public opinion 
attitudes towards Arab unity highlighted that the aim of 
achieving Arab unity became more realistic and pragmatic. Sa'd 
Diyn Ibrahiym, Itijahaat al-Raiy al-'Aam al-'Arabiy Nahuww 
Masalat al-Wahda: Dirasa Maiydaniyya, Third Edition (Beirut; 
Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1985) p. 119. 




nationalism a spent force. Nor does this imply that the pan-Arab 
idea is abandoned since the new paradigm suggests no outright 
contradiction between pan-Arabism and particularism. " 
(iii) The Indigenous Origins of The Arab State System 
Realising that the state system has consolidated itself, and 
contrary to traditional views, the new contributions seek to find 
appropriate historical, social and political explanations to this 
phenomenon. Though convinced that the Arab state lacks the full 
qualities of the nation-state Arab intellectuals in the 1980s 
began to explore the issues behind its stability. The 1980s 
witnessed the emergence of a new debate on the origins of the 
Arab state system. The new debates attempt to provide a balanced 
and documented history of the Arab state system. 
The debates are significant since they reflect the widening 
participation of Arab academics, historians and social 
scientists. There is in these debates a clear decrease in the 
role played by ideologues and a marked reliance on scientific 
methodology rather than strict ideological dogma. The new trend 
clearly distinguishes between the ideological disdain of the 
state system, associated with traditional views, and the need for 
its objective study. This stems from the obvious observation that 
since the state system is the reality of Arab politics any 
attempt at changing the status quo must begin with its objective 
study. 
The following is a discussion of some contributions of Arab 
52 This view is widely shared by intellectuals interviewed 
by the author such as: Hasan Nafa, Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym, Saiyyd 
Yasiyn, Jabiriy and Bensa'id. 
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intellectuals regarding the origins of the Arab state system. The 
contributions that attempt to provide a new look at the origins 
of the Arab state system are numerous. To discuss all of them is 
beyond the scope and limits of this research. The discussion will 
be selective. The selection is centred on the contributions from 
the three countries of the study, Lebanon, Egypt and Morocco. The 
contributions discussed here are, however, representative of the 
general trend and the debates within each country. They will 
also include some contributions of Arab intellectuals living 
abroad(i. e. in Western countries) and contributions of few Arab 
writers other than those living in the field work countries since 
their contributions are seen vital in detecting and evaluating 
the change in Arab thought. 
The contributions discussed here are the work of some of the 
most prominent Arab intellectuals who enjoy a wider Arab 
audience. They were also discussed by gatherings of Arab 
intellectuals at conference and seminar levels. They all deal 
with the origins of the Arab state system. They no longer accept 
the traditional thesis that this system was wholly transplanted 
by foreign powers. Rather, they attempt to portray it as one of 
indigenous roots as well. 
Gassan Salame argues that despite the foreign origin of some 
entities, foreign will was not completely arbitrary. He explains 
that foreign powers took care that every entity be founded around 
solid nuclei (a tribe, sect or family) . Salame' s approach focuses 
on internal and indigenous circumstances in explaining the 
origins and the consolidation of the Arab state system. The Arab 
state system was the interaction of internal and local forces and 
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not the work of aliens. 53 
Particularistic territorial entities reflect the local 
social solidarities. These solidarities are linked by a 
common affiliation, sectoral, local, tribal. They gradually 
got the state apparatus under their control. these groups, 
with its distinctive rural origins, benefited from the 
foundation of modern entities. They, somehow freely, 
migrated to live in the city, to get free education, enlist 
in modern parties and join the armed services, without 
having to abandon their traditional rural solidarity. 54 
Salame rejects traditional Arab nationalist views on the 
role of colonialism in the formation of the Arab state system. 
He refutes as unrealistic the accusation of colonialism being 
responsible for the creation of an identity problem in the Arab 
world. What colonialism did, according to Salame, was to 
deal, as interests dictated, with a fragmented society. The 
essential effect of colonialism was to seize the decisive 
moment in the history of the region between the 
disintegration of the Ottoman sultanate and the freezing of 
geography according to new categorisation. Ever since world 
order has been a faithful guardian of the new geographic 
status quo. ss 
Similar views are also, albeit in more detailed 
articulation, provided by the Lebanese Iliya Harik. Harik's 
thesis is that "contemporary Arab states are the product of 
indigenous and regional forces mostly unrelated to European 
colonialism, and in most cases predate it. j56 Using the term 
53 Gassan Salame, al-Muitama' wa al-Duwla fiy al-Mashriq al- 
'Arabiv (Society and State in the Arab East) First Edition 
(Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1987) Arabic Text 
(Present Author's Translation) pp. 20-22. 
sa Ibid, p. 22. 
ss Ibid, p. 66. 
s6 Iliya Harik, "The Origins of the Arab State System", in, 
Gassan Salame(ed), The Foundation of the Arab, on. cit., pp. 21- 
39. 
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state to refer to "an established authority which enjoys 
jurisdiction over a core territory and people for an extended 
period of time, stretching over at least three generations" Harik 
remarks that Arab states are not only "old societies but also old 
states. j57 Applying this definition to Arab states Harik argues 
that "most of these states were locally rooted and enjoyed 
legitimacy in the eyes of their people. " These states "had 
recognised boundaries, or at least, a core territory where their 
authority endured through the vicissitudes of time. 1158 
Harik credits Arab states with old foundation. With the 
exception of those of the Fertile Crescent which "emerged at the 
hands of the colonial powers" all Arab states "go back to the 
nineteenth century or a much earlier period. " Harik argues that 
only Fertile Crescent states conform to "Arab nationalist theory 
about the emergence of the state system. " Harik explains the fact 
that Arab nationalist theory adopted this thesis because the 
Arabist ideology itself "emerged in the Fertile Crescent. 1159 
Harik provides a classification of Arab states based on the 
variations in their origins. He identifies their structures, 
power bases, legitimacy and traditions. This allows him to 
identify five different types of states: the imam-chief system 
(e. g. North Yemen, Oman, Morocco); the chiefs and imams alliance 
system (e. g. Saudi Arabia); the traditional secular system 
wherein authority is based upon a dynasty with no religious 
attributes (e. g. Lebanon and the Gulf states); the bureaucratic- 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid, pp. 21-39. 
59 Ibid, pp. 21-39. 
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oligarchy type where authority basically lies in the hands of 
urban garrison chiefs employing an extensive bureaucracy (e. g. 
Egypt and North African states) ; and the colonially created state 
system (the Fertile Crescent with the exception of Lebanon). In 
the first four types Harik explains that a certain local 
mechanism and power structure were the essential decisive factors 
in establishing the nucleus of a state. This state will then be 
recognised by the foreign powers in the nineteenth century. 6o 
Harik admits that 
colonialism affected the boundaries of Arab states, but it 
did not , with the exception of the Fertile Crescent cases, 
create these states. Colonialism gave more definitive form 
to the indigenous states and introduced elements of modern 
administration to them. 61 
Therefore while Harik traces the origins of the Arab state system 
to indigenous factors he also cannot ignore the role played by 
colonialism. By introducing modern state organisation and 
centralised government colonialism participated in the 
complexities of the Arab state system. This is understood since 
colonialism was decisive in the emergence of "the nationalism of 
the state system by introducing a centralised system of 
administration in most countries under their control. " 62 
While Salame and Harik are concerned with bringing to the 
fore the vital and decisive role of the indigenous forces, Bahgat 
Korany subscribes to a position that maintains the primacy of 
6o Ibid. 
61 Ibid, pp. 22-39. 
62 Ibid, pp. 22-39. 
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external factors. 63 This is not to suggest an outright 
association with traditional views of the foreign transplantation 
of Arab states. Rather Korany's view is from the perspective of 
international relations. He argues that rules of world order and 
regional order designed the Arab states. These rules were the 
creation of the dominant Western powers. 
The basic assumption here is that "external factors 
predominated in the territorial definition of Arab states. "64 
Though this seems close to traditional views Korany's analysis 
while emphasising the role of external factors does not, as do 
traditional views, preclude the existence of indigenous factors. 
Korany's approach is distinct in its attempt to explain the 
interaction of the dynamic forces that led to the foundation of 
the contemporary Arab state system. 
Defining the state as the "establishment of an organised 
political authority in a recognised territory" Korany establishes 
a link between concepts of territory, sovereignty and formal 
government. Considering the legal level of the definition of the 
state an alien concept to "grass-root political culture (based 
on a `pan' concept, whether Islamic or Arab)" Korany considers 
the Arab territorial state system "a phenomenon made in Europe. " 
What Korany views as alien is a "foreign political culture based 
on the territorial concept. " Accordingly, he establishes his 
thesis that the Arab state system was "imported from Europe. "65 
63 Bahgat Korany, "Alien and Besieged Yet Here to Stay: The 
Contradiction of the Arab Territorial State", in Gassan 
Salame(ed), The Foundation of the Arab, op. cit., pp. 48-52. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid, pp. 48-52. 
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Korany views the Arab state system as a "part of a global 
process, of the expansion of international society or global 
rift. " He explains that the 
intrinsically European system became universalised to the 
rest of the world. In the Arab region it did so in 
successive stages: the co-optation of the Ottoman empire 
into the European balance of power in the eighteenth 
century, the fragmentation of this empire and its 
replacement by the mandate system during and after World 
War I, and the present inter-state Arab order following 
World War II, shaped by the mandate system. 66 
From the discussion it is clear that the role played by 
local forces in the foundation of the Arab state system is 
emphasised. External factors are not, however, excluded but they 
are reinterpreted. Apart from this the common view in the 
contributions of the 1980s is that the state system is not 
entirely of foreign origin. Colonialism is credited with playing 
the role of uniting some previously fragmented territories. 67 
This view is exceptional and new in Arab nationalist thought. It 
is important, therefore, to discuss it in some detail. 
The discussion is based on the contribution of Sa'd Diyn 
Ibrahiym whose contribution is indicative of the emergence of a 
new paradigm in Arab nationalist thought. Ibrahiym's analysis of 
the birth of the particularistic territorial state stems from the 
actual existence of particularism in the Arab world. Though 
believing all parts of the Arab world "belong to one nation with 
one primary culture. "" 
66 
67 
Ibid, p. 57. 
Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym, interview with the author. 
68 Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym develops his views in a pioneering 
Arab nationalist study on state and society: al-Mujtama' wa al- 
Duwla, on. cit., p. 170. 
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Ibrahiym confirms the existence of 
particularism of the great Arab regions within this general 
unity. Also there is territorial particularism within every 
region (the Maghrib, the Nile valley, the Mashriq, and the 
Arab Peninsula). Moreover, there are particularisms within 
each individual country. 69 
While recognising the unifying role of Arabisation and 
Islamisation in the formation of the Arab nation, Ibrahiym refers 
to the fact that this process took place among peoples of 
extensive diversity. He explains that the Arabs, Islam and Arabic 
language interacted with these different factors in a historical 
dialectical process. This process resulted in the few centuries 
after the seventh century in bringing about the factors unifying 
the Arab land in one Arab homeland. 70 
This implies that particularism lived and continued 
alongside the unifying factors. This coexistence between 
civilisational particularisms and commonalities explains the 
"divergent development among the regions of the Arab homeland, 
even before Western infiltration. " Western infiltration played 
the role of introducing factors that "consolidated, intensified 
and, in most cases, spoiled this divergent development among 
regions of the Arab homeland, and inside the parts of every 
region. "71 
Turning his attention to the issue of the origins of Arab 
states Ibrahiym provides a typology that distinguishes between 
three groups of states according to the role played by indigenous 
or external factors in their foundation. The first group of 
69 Ibid, p. 170. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid, P. 171. 
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states includes those that were 
existent entities, with independent and quasi-independent 
political authority (under the Ottoman Empire). Western 
colonialism dominated these and uprooted the local 
political authority or marginalised it and took its place 
during occupation. It did not significantly alter its 
boundaries. These are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt. 72 
The second group are states that were "entities that were 
divided or had lost some parts or had parts added to it. " This 
category is mainly manifest in the Mashriq region. The Mashriq 
was reordered and divided according to the British-French plan 
into 
Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan. Parts of Syria were 
deducted and added to Mount Lebanon (Tripoli, Beqa' and 
Sidon) to create "Grand Lebanon", the size of which was 
doubled twice by an administrative decree of the French 
mandate authority in 1920. Another part of north-western 
Syria was cut and handed to Turkey, another part became 
part of a new political entity, Jordan. The latter was, 
framed by a British decision, from three parts that were 
deducted from neighbouring entities. 73 
Iraq also belongs to this group. It became an entity with its 
present borders after the First World War. "It was an amalgamation 
of three previous ottoman districts (wilayyaat). " The same 
applies to Libya and Mauritania. 74 
And the third group consists of present Arab states that had 
not experienced direct colonialism. These are Saudi Arabia, Yemen 
and countries of the Gulf (the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, 
Bahrain and Kuwait). However, these countries were 
affected by British colonialism during the last century in 
at least two basic aspects: ... the demarcation of their 
present boundaries and the imposition of a minimum level of 
respect, not necessarily acceptance, of these boundaries 
72 Ibid, pp. 171-172. 
73 Ibid, pp. 172-173. 
74 Ibid. 
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... the consolidation of the present ruling dynasties in 
power, and the advising of them on external affairs , and 
some of their internal affairs till complete formal 
independence in the 1960s and 1970s. 75 
In summary, Ibrahiym considers the boundaries of Arab states 
as having been the product of "direct or indirect interaction 
with colonial experience and western domination during the last 
two centuries and particularly during the inter-war period. " This 
thesis is a significant development in Arab nationalist thought. 
It amends the previously held view that colonial designs 
shattered and fragmented the Arab world. Ibrahiym believes that 
"colonial design reordered the Arab homeland and divided it 
according to its aim and interests. " This is to say that the Arab 
world was not united before the advent of colonialism. Political 
fragmentation was the norm not only at the general Arab level but 
also at the regional and local levels. 
Ibrahiym confirms that even though colonialism 
actually fragmented some Arab regions as in the case of the 
Fertile Crescent, Yemen and Somalia, the aims and interests 
of colonial states required in other cases that they 
`unite' and `add' existing entities to each other as the 
case with the Sudan and Libya. 76 
Ibrahiym concludes his analysis by presenting an evaluation of 
the effects of Western colonialism on the evolution of the Arab 
state system. He explains that the Arab world had known a 
situation of disarticulation prior to Western colonialism. This 
disarticulation manifested itself in the existence of 
particularism that spread all over the Arab land. What Western 
colonialism did was not to invent disarticulation but to 
75 Ibid, pp. 171-174. 
76 Ibid, p. 175. 
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transform disarticulation, that was the liquid state in 
Arab history till the eighteenth century, into 
fragmentation. It bestowed on it the appearance of 
stability by creating particularistic territorial legal and 
institutional frames in the fragments. " 
As can be noted from the contributions outlined above a new 
explanation of the origins of the Arab state system is being 
introduced. This more balanced view is gaining ground among Arab 
intellectuals. Arab nationalist thought, however, still held 
colonialism responsible for the institutionalisation of 
fragmentation in the form of the state system, though it is 
providing a fresh approach to the question. No longer is the Arab 
state system seen as a mere creation of a foreign will. 78 
Arab states originated through a process of interaction 
between external and indigenous forces where the latter had the 
upper hand. The indigenous forces are more likely to help explain 
the durability and the consolidation of the state system. 79 How 
do the contributions of the 1980s explain the relationship 
between the aim of Arab unity and the reality of the state 
system? This is the subject of the discussion below. 
5-2: The Dialectic of Unity and Fragmentation 
As alluded to earlier states were considered a foreign 
creation and therefore contradicting the living Arab nation. The 
particularistic territorial states were seen as obstacles 
standing in the way of Arab unity. It was argued that any project 
77 Ibid, p. 53. 
78 This is a widely held view by intellectuals interviewed 
by the author during the field trips to Egypt and Morocco. 
79 Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym, Interview with the author. 
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for Arab unity must start with doing away with these states. This 
view is no longer appreciated by the new thinking. Having 
acknowledged that Arab states had indigenous origins Arab 
intellectuals in the 1980s began to elaborate on the complex 
issue of the relationship between the state system and the aim 
of Arab unity. 
In the contributions discussed below a new paradigm is 
emerging. It is entirely different from traditional views in its 
evaluation of the functions of the state system and its future 
role in realising any form of Arab unity. The contributions of 
the 1980s question the traditional view that the Arab nation was 
politically united prior to colonialism. It also question the 
view that colonialism destroyed that unity. Arab history is 
reinterpreted wherein Arab unity is no longer seen as the only 
actual fact that had characterised this history. The 
contributions start with the basic assumption that Arab unity had 
its ups and downs. Though unity had been sometimes achieved 
throughout Arab history, no longer is the idea romanticised and 
idealised. 
The new contributions see Arab history as that of a series 
of movements of unity as well as fragmentation. This historical 
realist view of Arab history is the essence of Arab nationalist 
thought in the 1980s. It is based on an interpretation in 
dialectical terms. Arab history was a dialectic not a static 
process. Centrifugal and centripetal forces together had been at 
work. This explains both incidents of unity and disunity in Arab 
history. Here a significant departure from romantic Arab 
nationalism may be detected. 
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Though the new thinking still holds the concept of the Arab 
nation as fundamental it emphasises the independence of the 
nation from the state. The new contributions no longer establish 
an automatic link and compatibility between the nation and the 
state as its political realisation. Therefore, a new 
interpretation of the dichotomy of Arab politics is provided. 
Here the foundation and the consolidation of the Arab state 
system is not considered as refutation of the Arab nation. A 
nation may be united without it having a single nation-state or 
even if it has many states seeking the loyalty of individuals. 
Arab unity may be achieved without necessarily destroying these 
states. Unity has many forms that do not necessitate the 
withering away of particularistic territorial states. Since Arab 
history itself involved both incidents of unity and disunity, 
therefore the state system is not by definition a handicap to 
Arab unity. 
In his treatment of the issue of unity and fragmentation in 
the Arab world Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym rejects traditionalist views 
of Arab nationalism. He deems untrue the thesis that "the unity 
of Arab homeland, historically, was since the eighth century the 
norm and disunity and fragmentation were the exception. jB° 
Ibrahiym also rejects the claim that "present, and maybe 
previous, fragmentation is the work of foreign forces. " 
Nevertheless, he does not accept the counter thesis that 
the unity of what is known as the Arab homeland was the 
exception that did not last more than two centuries of the 
last fourteen centuries and that fragmentation was the norm 
that predominated during most of the other twelve 
80 Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym, al-Mujtama' wa al-Duwla, op. cit., 
pp. 50-51. 
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centuries . 81 
Having rejected both contending projections of Arab history, 
Ibrahiym puts forward his interpretation. He argues that "dealing 
with the issue in the form of absolute theses describing a static 
case is beyond reason. It negates the logic of history and human 
sociology. " Ibrahiym calls for an evaluation of the issue in a 
"comparative dialectical form. To view Arab history and 
contemporary Arab reality as a dynamic process. I'll Ibrahiym 
states that the dialectic of unity and fragmentation or 
disarticulation has governed Arab history. This is because the 
Arab world did not remain in an 
inclusive state of unity in most of its history (which 
began with Arab-Islamic advances). It was politically 
united during the whole of the reign of Caliphs Othman, 
Ali, the Ummyads, the first century of the Abbasides.... 
The period is approximately two hundred years. 83 
However, Ibrahiym adds that 
the Arab homeland did not remain fragmented during the rest 
of the last fourteen centuries. The following twelve 
centuries saw the emergence of small entities that soon 
were subject to annexation and political integration into 
larger entities. These may not have included all parts of 
the Arab homeland but they definitely were bigger than 
contemporary particularist territorial units. " 
From this springs the thesis that "unification as a political 
societal process represented a continuous historical trend and 
that fragmentation as a political societal process represented 
a counter historical trend. jBS 
8i Ibid, pp. 50-51. 
82 Ibid, pp. 50-51. 




But how did the relationship between the two indigenous 
processes of unity and fragmentation and external factors 
develop? How did the incident of colonialism intervene with this 
indigenous process? Ibrahiym identifies a relationship between 
this indigenous dialectic and external factors. He believes that 
since fragmentation was a historical process independent of 
colonialism the latter is not to blame for present day 
fragmentation of the Arab world. 
Ibrahiym explains the role of foreign factors by the change 
of the borders it imposed. He makes the observation that 
before the last colonial invasion, that began two centuries 
ago, internal boundaries between the regions of the Arab 
homeland had not impeded the movement of people, goods or 
ideas. The concept of political authority had not 
necessarily carried a spiritual or nationalist loyalty nor 
imposed a legal obligation on the sons of the Arab 
homeland. Processes of unification or disintegration were 
not subject to legitimacy as a legal or international 
concept. The only active legitimacy, ... was civilisational 
religious and cultural legitimacy supported by military 
force in order to secure the requirements of justice. " 
Having confirmed that fragmentation is not an alien concept 
to the Arab world Ibrahiym provides a view that departs from 
traditional views that hold colonialism totally responsible for 
the state of fragmentation in the Arab world. Ibrahiym concludes 
that colonialism did "transform the disarticulation, that existed 
up to the nineteenth century like a mercurial case in Arab 
history, into fragmentation. " When colonialism created 
institutional and legal frameworks for particularistic 
territorial states it lent them consistency and stability which 
later became embodied in legal and international legitimacy. 87 
86 Ibid, pp. 52-53. 
87 Ibid, pp. 52-53. 
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From Ibrahiym's analysis it is clear that the contributions 
of the 1980s are no longer satisfied with traditional Arab 
nationalist thought's hostile attitude towards the state system. 
The foundation of the Arab state system is no longer seen as an 
act of a foreign will. Arab history involved both incidents of 
unity and fragmentation. Although Arab nationalist thought 
considers unity part and parcel of Arab history and heritage, 
this unity was only one such part of that heritage. It is a 
possibility that was realised in the past. 88 However, the fact 
remains that fragmentation is not an alien concept to the Arab 
world. The "dialectic of unity and fragmentation is a fundamental 
factor of Arab culture. "" 
A close look at Arab literature in the 1980s would reveal 
the emergence of a new approach towards explaining the issue of 
fragmentation. Some Arab intellectuals even consider the concept 
of fragmentation inaccurate and call for its abandonment. Jabiriy 
criticises what he calls the "ambiguous misleading concept of 
fragmentation that Arab nationalist thought sees as the direct 
contradiction of unity. j90 Jabiriy argues that to view 
fragmentation as a contradiction of unity and its negation is to 
impose an ambiguous conceptualisation of unity. This ambiguity 
only reveals one aspect of the complex Arab reality. " 
88 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, Ishkaliyyaat al-Fikr al-'Arabiy al- 
Mu'asir, (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1989) p. 
79. 
89 Gassan Salame, " 'Auwaiq al-Wagi' al-'Arabiy", op. cit., 
p. 471. 
90 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, interview with the author. 
91 Ibid. 
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Jabiriy explains that fragmentation negates unity at the 
language level and only if judged at the level of linguistic 
counterparts but at the level of Arab reality the concept of 
fragmentation is insufficient. It can not reflect the rich and 
complex content that forms the identity of the particularistic 
territorial state which is the real and true contradiction of 
unity. 92 Here a new understanding of the conceptual pair of unity 
and fragmentation is provided. Jabiriy calls for a sincere 
attempt at criticising misleading concepts like that of 
fragmentation. There is a need to call things by their true and 
appropriate names. Therefore, the concept of particularistic 
territorial state should replace that of fragmentation. 93 
Obviously, this is a realisation that Arab nationalist 
terminology ought to be amended and this is a significant aspect 
of the new debates. 
(i) The Crisis of the Particularistic Territorial State 
While recognising the legitimacy of the state system Arab 
intellectuals have in the 1980s begun to show interest in the 
nature of the phenomenon. The literature in the 1980s attempted 
to fill the gap that previously existed as far as the 
investigation of state-related issue is concerned. The new 
contributions now deal with the issue in an intellectual rather 
than ideological manner. It is clear that the consolidation and 
95. 
92 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, Ishkaliyyaat al-Fikr, op. ci. t, pp. 94- 
93 Ibid, pp. 94-95. 
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the durability of the state system obliged Arab intellectuals to 
reconsider the issues. 
However, the state system is undergoing a crisis. The 
nature, causes and aspects of the crisis form a major part of the 
content of the contributions that are the subject of the 
discussion below. The crisis of the particularistic territorial 
state is echoed in the nature and magnitude of the problems the 
state has been unable to overcome. Primary among these are 
problems of identity, political and social integration of the 
ethnic groups and legitimacy. 94 Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym thinks that 
these problems are inseparable. These problems would emphasise 
the crisis of legitimacy the particularistic territorial state 
is facing. Not only that its legitimacy is in question but also 
that the state's ability to remain solid and viable is being 
tested . 
95 
Ibrahiym argues that developments in the Arab world since 
1973 reveal that the state is facing a crisis. He outlines the 
events he considers have demonstrated the crisis of the state. 
These include events of: the civil war in Lebanon (1975 and 
after), the Sudanese civil war (1983 and after), the hostile 
action of non-Arab countries on the Sudan, Somalia and Iraq, the 
eruption of inter-Arab armed conflicts, as between the two Yemen, 
Egypt and Libya, Morocco and Algeria and Qatar and Bahrain, the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Israeli raids on Tunisia 
331. 
94 Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym, al-Mujtama wa al-Duwla, op. cit., p. 
9s Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym, "al-Duwla al-Qutriyya wa Sinariyuhaat 
al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabiy"(Particularistic Territorial State and 
the Scenarios of Arab Future), Al-Wahda (Unity), vol. 48 (Sept. 
1988) Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) pp. 6-7. 
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and Iraq, and the popular uprisings in many Arab states. These 
events, explains Ibrahiym, reveal the deep crisis of the 
particularistic territorial state. 
In addition the state has been encountering problems of 
preserving its independence, independent economic development, 
social justice and in widening popular political participation. 96 
However, The problem of identity is by and large the major one 
threatening the particularistic territorial state. Ibrahiym 
traces this problem in the period when the state was founded. He 
refers to the competing identities that were at work when the 
Arab state system emerged. As alluded to earlier all 
particularistic, pan-Arab, regional and Islamic identities, 
though not necessarily contradictory, were available when the 
system was founded. The implicit or explicit choice of any of 
these identities would have meant problems at the internal or 
regional levels. 97 
Arab particularistic states that opted for 
emphasising or creating final national identity (Tunisian, 
Algerian, Egyptian, Sudanese, or Kuwaiti) collided and 
clashed with feelings of a large sector of its citizens who 
aspired towards affiliation to a wider political and 
civilisational association such as the `Arab nation' or the 
`Islamic nation'. Also, some states collided or were hit by 
the reality of the narrowness of the particularistic 
resources base needed to build a modern state. 98 
Those states that opted for the 
Arab identity (pan-Arab) as its final identity and 
96 Ibid, pp. 6-8. This is also the view of other Arab 
writers interviewed by the author. e. g. M. 'Abid Jabiriy, Hasan 
Nafa and Sa'id Bensa'id. 
331. 
97 Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym, al-Multama wa al-Duwla, op. cit., p. 
98 Ibid, pp. 331-332. 
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considered its particularism a transitionary stage imposed 
on it and not wilfully its own choice (e. g. Syria, Iraq, 
Jordan and Yemen etc. ) collided with the feelings of non- 
Arab ethnic formations inside its borders (e. g. the Kurds 
of Iraq, the tribes of south Sudan). 99 
The same kind of problem was encountered by states that opted for 
an Islamic identity, such as Saudi Arabia and the Sudan 
during the reign of Ga'far al-Nimiyriy, and some Gulf 
countries. In some of these states, where there are none- 
Muslim religious minorities, the option collided with the 
feelings of non-Muslims. 100 
This analysis makes it clear that particularistic 
territorial Arab states, no matter what identity option they went 
for, have been facing the problem of building an inclusive 
national identity. Clearly, identity is very central to the idea 
of nation-state and to achieving integration. But, as Ibrahiym 
explains, all Arab states have not so far succeeded in overcoming 
the problem. 101 In reality, however, states attempted, in the 
words of Ibrahiym, to "foul the problem of identity or postpone 
its resolution by relying on rhetorical conglomeration. 1"102 
99 Ibid. 
... Ibid, pp. 331-332. 
... Syria, for example, has had two different concepts of 
Syrian identity: one based on the idea of Great Syria that 
includes the Fertile Crescent, and that of a Syria as a part of 
the Arab nation. As Elizabeth Picard explains, none of these 
would establish a Syrian particularism or a Syrian nationalism 
since according to the first concept Syria would naturally extend into Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan and Iraq, and according to the 
second concept it would be a part of the Arab nation. Therefore, 
Syria's national boundaries are not clear and its realistic 
identity is not defined. Elizabeth Picard, "Naqd Istikhdaam 
Mafhuwm al-Ithniyya fiy Tahliyl al-'Amaliyyat al-Siyyasiyya fiy 
al-'Alam al-'Arabiy", in Niviyn Mus'ad(ed) al-'Alamiyya wa al- 
Khususivva fiv Dirasat al-Mantika al-'Arabiyya (Cairo; Cairo 
University, Markaz al-Buhuwth wa al-Dirasaat al-Siyyasiyya, 1991) 
pp. 215-217. 
332. 
102 Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym, al-Mujtama wa al-Duwla, op. cit., p. 
296 
The problem of identity is aggravated by that of socio- 
political integration of the ethnic formations in some Arab 
states. Many states face the issue of ethnic diversity. The 
experience reveals that integration has yet to be achieved. Lack 
of integration was clearly evident in the incidents of social 
crises like the civil wars that a number of states have gone 
through. This reflects the strong link between identity and 
integration since "the choice between competing identities 
implies the exclusion or the alienation of one sector of the 
population or social formation from the main flow of public 
political life. 11103 
Legitimacy is also a major problem facing Arab states. This 
is particularly the case where "a majority of present Arab 
countries experienced the birth of a state's institution for the 
first time this century. " This implies, explains Ibrahiym, that 
the "consolidation of the state's institutions and historical 
legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens is shaky and doubted. 11104 
This is even harder when state legitimacy is linked to the 
continuous deterioration in the legitimacy of political regimes. 
The fact that, despite Arab regimes' employment of all measures 
to generate legitimacy, their failure makes the legitimacy issue 
a hard one to resolve. 105 
The contribution of Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym discussed above is 
103 Ibid, P. 334. 
104 Ibid, p. 334. 
105 Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym, "Masadir al-Shar' iyya fiy Anzimat al- 
Hukm al-'Arabiyya"(Sources of Ruling Regimes' Legitimacy in the 
Arab World), in Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym etal, Azmat al-Dimugratiyya 
fly al-Watan al-'Arabiy (Seminar Papers) First Edition (Beirut; 
Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1983) p. 403. 
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an indication of the new trend in Arab thought. Not only does 
this trend appreciate the Arab state system, it also attempts 
investigating the different issues that impede the development 
of this system into a wider one. The particularistic territorial 
state has become a central topic of study and analysis. The state 
system is now a reality that has to be reckoned with. The new 
trend also assigns a realistic function to this system in future 
Arab projects. 
The pioneering research project carried out by a large group 
of Arab academics and intellectuals under the auspices of the 
Beirut-based Centre for Arab Unity Studies is another indication 
of the new trend. The project is a prospective analysis of the 
Arab world that was the product of an effort of Arab 
intellectuals who share a pan-Arabist orientation. Therefore, it 
is important to treat its findings and underlying arguments to 
evaluate the originality of the new trend»°' 
Although the prospective study project foresaw three basic 
probable scenarios of a future Arab world, the centrality of the 
state system in all of them may not be missed. The focus of the 
scenarios is to establish the necessity and urgency of Arab unity 
or integration in one form or another. However, the three 
scenarios, a more fragmented Arab world, co-operation and co- 
ordination driven Arab states, and a politically united Arab 
world, all reflect an acknowledgement of the central role of the 
106 The project entitled, "Istishraaq Mustaqbal al-Watan al- 
'Arabiy" (the Arab world: A Prospective Study), includes four 
aspects: the Arabs and the World, Arab Economic Development, 
Society and State, and the overall systematic model of economic, 




None of the three scenarios see the possibility of the state 
withering away. In fact the scenario of a more fragmented Arab 
world foresees more fragmentation of some existing Arab states 
and hence the appearance of yet more states. Despite their clear 
advocacy and preference for the third scenario, i. e. the 
foundation of a pan-Arab state, contributors to the study do not 
negate the probability of the state system acting as a catalyst 
for Arab unity. There is an affirmation that the particularistic 
territorial state may be a vehicle for unification. This is clear 
since they foresee a pan-Arab state composed of states or 
regional federalism or even confederalisms. lo' 
This reflects the essence of the new trend in Arab 
nationalist thought. Arab states are here to stay and despite 
their deepening crisis it is difficult to eliminate or liquidate 
them. The fact that the Arab states have been able to withstand 
the pressures has affected the nature and orientation of Arab 
nationalist thought. The new paradigm is no longer hostile to the 
state system. Political reality forced Arab nationalist thought 
to abandon its romantic goal of an inclusive Arab political unity 
(indimajiyya) that requires the withering of the state. 
Federalism or even confederalism is now accommodated since it 
serves the purpose of preserving the particularistic interests 
of each Arab state . 
'°8 
107 Khaiyr Diyn Hasiyb, Mustagbal al-Umma al-'Arabiyya: al- 
Tahadiyyat wa al-Khaiyyaraat (The Future of the Arab Nation: 
Challenges and Options) First Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al- 
Wahda al-Arabiyya, 1988) 
108 During the seminar on Arab unity the proposal outlined 
in a paper presented by the Lebanese 'Isaam Nu'maan on "Mashruw' 
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5-3: Particularistic Territorial State: A Catalyst for Arab Unity 
The new contributions argue that the state system is not, 
by definition, a contradiction of the Arab nation, Arab unity or 
Arab nationalism. Therefore, the Arab state system is not 
automatically an obstacle impeding the prospect of Arab unity but 
may be its catalyst and the vehicle of a pragmatically feasible 
Arab unity. This is to underline a new ideological view that 
stems from a theoretical thesis. This is to argue that there 
should be no "automatic identification between nationalism and 
unity. 11 09 
The new position is best put forward by the Lebanese 
historian Iliya Harik. While confirming that "the universalist 
principle of Arab nationalism is not entirely dead", Harik sees 
the possibility of its "working in conjunction with 
particularistic trends towards a new order, whereby the sovereign 
states permit the growth of supra-national institutions leading 
to a future federation of some sort. " Harik's thesis is based on 
his view that the "state system is not necessarily a negation of 
Arab nationalism. " He articulates the view that the state system 
"may well be the fundamental pillar upon which a federated Arab 
Distuwr a-Itihaad al-'Arabiy"( A Proposal for an Arab Union's 
Constitution), arguing for federalism was very welcome by the 
participants. This reflects the change in Arab nationalist 
thought as far as the form of Arab integration may be. See the 
discussion of Nu'maan's proposals in A. Duri etal, al-Wahda al- 
'Arabiyya, op. cit., pp. 847-888, pp. 904-932. 
. 109 Ahmed Yuwsif Ahmed, "al-Qawmiyya wa al-Wahda al- 
'Arabiyya"(Nationalism and Arab Unity), Al-Fikr Al-'Arabiv(Arab 
Thought), vol. 1, nos. 4,5 (Sept-November 1978) Arabic Text 
(Present Author's Translation) p. 323. This view is shared by 
Hasan Nafa and Muhammad Saiyyd Saiiyd, Said Bensa'id, Jabiriy, 
Belqaziyz and Kamal 'Abdullatiyf. Interviews with the Author. 
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state may develop. 110 
The new contributions put forward an entirely fresh approach 
to the state system. It acknowledges the fact that the foundation 
of some Arab states was a step towards societal integration and 
unity. These states put an end to situations of fragmentation at 
the societal level while attempting the realisation of 
integration. This, argues Antuwn Masarrah, raises the need for 
a new approach towards the state system. He calls for "the 
establishment of a new science of unification that does not 
spring from general principles of a need for unification. "111 This 
call has been met with a considerable response in the 1980s. Many 
Arab writers have come to the view that there is no inherent 
contradiction between the state system and the aim of Arab unity. 
"There is no unavoidable and final contradiction between the 
two. 11 12 
There is an unmistakable tendency in the contributions of 
the 1980s to elaborate on the possibility of the state system 
working in conjunction with Arab nationalism. The experience of 
European integration has lent Arab thought a more pragmatic and 
less romantic approach. The fact that Europe has been able to 
maintain high levels of integration led Arab intellectuals to 
question the validity of the traditional Arab nationalist views 
45. 
iio Iliya Harik, "the Origins of the Arab", op. cit., pp. 44- 
111 Antuwn Masarrah, "Fiy Mustaqbal al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya: 
al-'Itiraaf bi al-Wualaat al-Tahtiyya: 'Amil Tawuhiyd am 'Amil 
Inqisaam", al-Maialla al-'Arabiyya lil 'Uluwm al-Siyyasiyya, vol. 
1,1986, p. 37-54. 
112 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, "Mustaqbal al-Fikr al-'Arabiy wa 
Ishkaliyyat al-Tagadum wa al-Wahda", Shoun Arabiyya, vol. 51, 
September 1987, p. 17. 
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that saw unity only in political form. A considerable body of 
literature emerged in the 1980s that attempted to understand the 
logic and the underlying factors behind the European success. It 
sought to find ways of applying the lessons of the European 
experience to the Arab situation. 113 
The new trend considers restructuring Arab nationalist 
thought a necessity if any future form of Arab unity is to take 
off the ground. This is seen by the Lebanese historian Mas'uwd 
Daher as vital if Arab nationalism is ever to realise its goals 
in a pragmatic fashion. It is necessary that 
Arab nationalist thought abandons its old thesis and view 
of the particularistic territorial state. It ought to 
understand this particularism and attempt to integrate the 
theoretical with the practical and the particularist with 
the nationalist(pan-Arab) and to prevent their collision. 114 
Contributions of the 1980s reveal the emergence of a new 
trend in evaluating the dichotomies of unity and fragmentation, 
states and state, and reality and hope. Even though this trend 
may be detected in contributions from all parts of the Arab 
world, it is even clearer in the contributions of the Maghribi 
intellectuals. As discussed earlier in this study the Maghribi 
intellectuals have been more appreciative of the state system 
113 Many Arabic studies are concerned with this issue. A body 
of functionalist literature is available to witness to this 
trend. Examples are numerous: They include to name a few: Jamiyl 
Mattar, "al-Tajarub al-Wahdawiyya al-Wazifiyya: al-Jami'a al- 
'Arabiyya", in Waliyd Qaziyha etal, al-Oawmiyya al-'Arabiyya fiy 
al-Fikr wa al-Mumarasa (Seminar Papers) First Edition (Beirut; 
Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1980); al-Saiyyd Yasiyn, 
al-Tagriyr al-Istratijiy al-'Arabiy 1988, (the Arab Strategic 
Report 1988) (Cairo; Muasasat al-Ahraam, 1988); Muhsin Mu'auwad, 
"Muhawalaat al-Takamul al-Iqlimiy fiy al-Watan al-'Arabiy", in 
A. Duri etal, al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya Tajarubuha wa Tawaqu'atuha, 
op. cit. 
114 Mas'uwd Daher, "Ta'liyq" (A Comment), in A. Duri etal, 
al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, op. cit., p. 1061. 
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than their Mashriqi counterpart. This is because the state in the 
Maghrib region had not been a product of a foreign will. The 
Maghribi states had been there before the advent of European 
colonialism. 
Intellectuals interviewed explain the absence of the hostile 
attitude towards the state in the Maghrib. They refer to the 
period of struggle against French colonialism in the Maghrib 
countries as having been the background of this attitude. In that 
period the primary goal of the independence movements was to 
reclaim the particularistic territorial state, its re-foundation 
and consolidation. Hence, the Maghribi intellectuals consider the 
state a national not a particularistic territorial one. This is 
because the Maghribi states had been independent entities 
isolated from the reach of the Ottoman Empire and therefore only 
colonialism ended their independence. "' 
While in the Arab Mashriq the call for Arab unity implied 
the liquidation of the state system, in the Maghrib context it 
was quite different. As Jabiriy explains, unity meant defending 
particularism and territoriality. Therefore, the nature of the 
call for unity in the Maghrib was based on the concept of a 
national state that was lost because of colonialism. Any unity 
meant the "defence of national state and the affirmation of its 
entity. , 116 This distinction is important in evaluating the 
content and nature of the Maghribi contributions. However, the 
Maghribi contributions exemplified by Jabiriy do not necessarily 
115 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, Sa'id Bensa'id, Kamal 'Abdullatiyf and 
'Abd Ilah Belqaziyz, interviews with the author. 
93. 
116 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, Ishkaliyyaat al-Fikr, op. cit., pp. 91- 
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imply satisfaction with the territorial particularistic 
territorial state. They also consider the state as undergoing a 
crisis. The crisis is reflected in the state's inability to 
achieve the aim of economic development and popular political 
participation. 
The Maghribi contributions consider that the state is in a 
position that no longer allows it to perform the tasks a modern 
state must undertake to achieve the social, political and 
economic goals of its society. Nevertheless Moroccan 
intellectuals interviewed by the author affirm that to say the 
state is in a crisis does not mount to ignoring that it is a 
reality that may not be jumped over. Not only has the state been 
the realisation of liberation aspirations but also the 
actualization of the objective condition for the possibility of 
realising any Arab unity. The particularistic territorial state 
is a precondition for Arab unity. This is because, explains 
Jabiriy, it was 
impossible to achieve Arab unity during the Ottoman rule 
and colonial period. It was, practically, impossible to 
move directly from colonialism to unity in the Arab world. 
It was practically impossible to establish unity between 
the newly independent states; states that had to 
concentrate on building their entities and realise 
themselves . 
11' 
But if the particularistic territorial state is the 
objective condition of Arab unity, as argues Jabiriy, how then 
could Arab unity be achieved? Jabiriy argues that the 
particularistic territorial state may allow and work for Arab 
unity. This may take place only when the state reaches the stage 
117 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, "Min Ajl I'adat Binaa al-Fikr al-Qawmiy 
al-'Arabiy", in A. Duri etal, al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, op. cit., 
pp. 790-791. 
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of "satisfaction. " This suggests that Arab unity is a two-step 
plan. First; the state is established, and consolidated. Second; 
the state must satisfy itself of itself (i. e. no longer feels 
the hunger) or reaches a stage where it is no longer hungry for 
affirming stateness. This is to suggest that a state is not 
willing to embark upon any project that would compromise its 
sovereignty or existence while it is yet to affirm these aspects 
of stateness. 11e 
This is to say, in the words of Jabiriy, that the state is 
only prepared to forego its stateness or parts of it and become 
part of a larger entity if its stateness is firmly established. 
The state will favour unification or integration if it "satisfies 
its need for self-affirmation and enters history on one hand, and 
feels historical incompetence and inability on the other hand. 11119 
Jabiriy argues that the record of the Arab states shows that they 
have realised these goals. Therefore, they become functionally 
unemployed. This is expressed in the deepening crises of Arab 
states in the last two decades. They suffer a self-inflicted 
disability. They are no longer able to carry on with asserting 
their existence. They are unable to protect their own 
independence by their sole reliance on their own resources. 120 
This is to suggest that the state system is now a spent 
force. It cannot realise its own aims and it has to work for a 
different formula. Arab unity in one form or another is the 





Ibid, p. 791 
M. 'Abid Jabiriy, interview with the author. 
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done away with once and for all? Jabiriy argues that the crisis 
of the Arab states may only be overcome if a form of a union 
between them is achieved. Not only is this union necessary for 
development and progress but also is the sole true respiration 
for the suffocated Arab state. 121 
This is not to express an ideological belief in the 
political unification in one single state as contrived in the 
traditional paradigm. Jabiriy sees Arab unity as only possible 
when it recognises "the peaceful coexistence between the Arab 
states. 11122 But how may this be perceived? How could the peaceful 
coexistence of Arab states be achieved and what is the relevant 
strategy for that? Jabiriy puts forward the view that assigns 
Arab culture a functional role in achieving this desired 
situation. He argues that Arab culture has played the role of 
uniting the Arabs, spiritually, rationally, and ethically. A 
consolidation of this historical role is needed in order that 
Arab culture assume its unifying function despite political 
fragmentation. This is an important development regarding the 
function of Arab culture as perceived by Arab nationalist 
thought. Arab culture is not only seen as the base of the Arab 
nation but it is considered a relevant appropriate tool of 
transcending fragmentation. If the unifying role of Arab culture 
is given enough time to function it will lead to Arab unity. 123 
Therefore, as far as the relationship between the state 
121 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, Ishkaliyyaat al-Fikr, op. cit., p. 80. 
122 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, "Mustaqbal al-Fikr", on. cit., p. 20. 
123 Ibid, pp. 17-20. This is also the view of Muhammad Saiyyd 
Sa'iyd, who views Arab culture in a functionalist prospective; interview with the author. 
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system and the aim of Arab unity is concerned the new 
contributions reflect the new trend in Arab nationalist thought. 
The state system does not intrinsically impede Arab unity. The 
deepening insoluble crisis of the Arab state would oblige it to 
accept the need for an Arab unity of some sort. Arab states have 
proved the logic underlying their existence "otherwise they would 
have collapsed long ago. , 124 This logic has, so far, "outweighed 
that of the unionists. Therefore, it is up to the hour 
winning. "125 If the call for Arab unity is ever to win the battle 
pan-Arabists must "carefully review this logic and attempt a 
patient dismantling of it. " Arabists will have to "accommodate 
it in their project. This involves refraining from viewing it 
only as an obstacle. It involves approaching it as political 
entities that have their own logic. "126 
The contributions discussed above reflect the emergence of 
a new trend in Arab nationalist thought. The new paradigm does 
not despise or disdain particularistic territorial states. It is 
based on a discernment of reality, attempts to explain it, and 
make use of it to achieve the aim. A clear expression of the new 
paradigm is the work of Arab intellectuals discussed above. These 
contributions reflect a sincere attempt at explaining the state 
system and its complex relation with society. It filled an 
epistemological gap in Arab nationalist thought vis-ä-vis state 
in general and Arab particularistic territorial state in 
124 Gassan Salame, " 'Auwaiq al-Waqi' al-'Arabiy" op. cit., 
p. 473. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid, p. 473. 
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particular. The studies express a clear effort to abandon the 
traditional thesis. The new paradigm calls for transcendence, 
assimilation and accommodation. 12' 
"' Examples include: Elbaqi Hermassi, al-Muitama wa al-Duwla 
fiy al-Maghrib al-'Arabiy, First Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat 
al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1987); Khalduwn Hasan al-Naqiyb, al- 
Muitama' wa al-Duwla fiy al-Khaliyj wa al-Jaziyra al-'Arabiyya: 
Min Manzur Mukhtalif (State and Society in the Gulf and the 
Arabian Peninsula) First Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda 
al-'Arabiyya, 1987); Naziyh al-Aiyuwbiy, Turath al-Duwla al- 
Markaziyya fiy Masr (the Heritage of the Central State in Egypt) 
First Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-Arabiyya, 
1987); Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym, al-Mujtama wa al-Duwla, on. cit. and 
Gassan Salame, al-Muitama wa al-Duwla fiy al-Mashriq al-'Arabiy, 




Arab Nationalist Thought: The 
Premises of the New Paradigm 
6-1: The Developments of the 1980s and the Revision of Arab 
Nationalist Thought 
The 1970s ended in what F. Ajami considered the prevalence 
of raison d'etat and the end of pan-Arabism. The developments 
that the Arab World witnessed in this period certainly seem to 
support Ajami's conclusion that Arab states were making great 
inroads into consolidating themselves. But to say that Arab 
nationalism died would be an exaggeration that overlooks certain 
realities of Arab politics and contributions to Arab thought in 
the 1980s. As argued in chapter three Arab nationalism has 
decreased in its power and hold over Arab politics. The Arab 
nationalist movement suffered a great defeat after 1967 
particularly after the death of Nasser, but as an ideology or a 
nationalist thought that conceived of an Arab nation Arab 
nationalism seems to have defied the death prognoses. 
In the 1970s raison d'etat prevailed. Oil and the kind of 
political and economic relations accompanying its boom played an 
important role in enhancing the particularistic tendencies. This 
paved the way for the emergence of a new kind of particularism. 
This particularism was essentially an oil-based one. Therefore, 
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the issue of Arab unity was viewed in a perspective different 
from that of the 1950s and 1960s. Oil-rich countries considered 
their particularism, even though running counter to Arab unity, 
as a way of protecting their oil wealth which, otherwise, would 
be threatened by the pan-Arab unity. 
This was clearer in the Gulf where the establishment of 
states was linked to oil. Reference to the achievement of the 
state and the high level of per capita income were employed to 
justify the state and its particularism. ' The prevalence of 
raison d'etat was significantly evident when Egypt decided to go 
its own way in making peace with Israel. Egypt signed the Camp 
David accord with Israel in September 1978 amidst wide Arab 
disapproval that resulted in the isolation of Egypt. The Arabs 
froze Egypt's membership of the Arab League and moved the 
headquarters of the organisation to Tunis as a sign of dismay and 
disapproval of Egypt's abandonment of the pan-Arab cause. ' 
The 1970s also witnessed trends that sought to deny any 
values that may be attributed to the achievements of the pan- 
Arabist project. This was obvious through the attempt at 
discrediting all economic, political and social achievements of 
this project especially in countries where Arab nationalist 
1 The effects of oil wealth on the ideas of Arab nationalism 
and the consolidation of state particularism are well explained 
in Mahmuwd 'Abdullfadiyl, al-Naft wa al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya" 
Tathiyr al-Naft al - 'Arabiy ' ala Mustagbal al-Wahda wa al - 'Alagaat 
al-Iatiysadiyya al-'Arabiyya (Oil and Arab Unity: The Effect of 
Arab Oil on the Future of Unity and Arab Economic Relations) 
First Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 
1979) Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation). 
2 Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, First 
Edition (London; Faber and Faber, 1991) p. 421. 
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regimes ruled before. 3 This meant putting an end to Arab 
radicalism and the emergence of an Arab system dominated by 
reactionary conservative tendencies. In the words of the Egyptian 
journalist Mohammed H. Heikal, that implied the transition from 
the age of revolution to that of wealth, and "the doctrine of 
cashism" that " knows the price of every thing and the value of 
nothing. o14 
Although there was an upsurge of the Palestinian fedayeen 
action, which for a time represented the revival of radicalism, 
this was short-lived. It was obvious that the pan-Arabist project 
suffered from theoretical deficiencies as well as societal 
problems. The Arab world appeared to be suffering from 
fragmentation, disunity and challenged by forces that not only 
hindered Arab unity but also put national unity in each country 
at risk. However developments seem to have followed two 
directions. On the one hand Arab states were united, verbally at 
least, in condemning Egypt's policies in not sticking to the pan- 
Arab policy of not recognising Israel. On the other hand they 
showed willingness to see to their particular interests. 
A kind of pragmatism evolved in Arab politics. This 
pragmatism did not mean, however, that the Arabs are no longer 
affected by ideology. But does this mean that, in the Arab world, 
ideology is no longer relevant? On the contrary, ideology is 
3 In Egypt, for example, the Aswan Dam, a project that was 
hailed by Arab intellectuals as a sign of development and 
freedom, was now to receive criticism as destroying Egypt's 
agricultural potentials. 
a Mohammed H. Heikal, "The Future Arab World: An Overview", 
in Hani A. Faris (ed) , Arab Nationalism and the Future of the Arab World, First Edition (Belmont, Massachusetts; Association of Arab 
American University Graduates Inc., 1987) pp. 3-4. 
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still as relevant as ever. As Jabiriy explains, 
if the west does 
not need ideology any more it is because it may rely on science 
and technology and their ideological content as an alternative, 
the Arabs do not own science and technology. Therefore, ideology 
still has an important role to play in the Arab world. This role 
is that of theorising for the future. 5 
Arab nationalist thought is essentially part and parcel of 
Arab ideology and since Arab nationalist dreams were shattered 
after the 1967 defeat the obvious role of ideology would be to 
rebuild this dream. In the words of Jabiriy, the function of 
ideology is that it begins from 
rebuilding the world of the present, and ending the state 
of frustration by viewing things through revolutionary 
realism; the realism that faces the reality as it stands in 
order to transform it. The building of a future renaissance 
project requires, today, a little of dream and more 
rationality and criticism. 6 
The event of the Iranian revolution in February 1979 had the 
effect of bringing ideology to the fore of Arab politics. So, as 
Ajami put it, if the 1970s was a period of ideological retreat 
of Arab nationalism, the Iranian revolution with its heavy 
Islamic orientation and employment of Islam, especially after war 
erupted between Iran and Iraq in September 1980, reopened 
questions of ideology and identity. The Iranian revolution played 
the important role of reviving Islam in politics. ' The Iranian 
M. 'Abid Jabiriy, interview with the author. 
6 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, Ishkaliyyaat al-Fikr al-'Arabiy al- 
Mu'asir, (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1989) p. 
180. 
James P. Piscatori provides a concise analysis of the 
different approaches in studying Islam in politics. He, rightly, 
raises the issue of how difficult it is to study Islamic politics 
and therefore to evaluate Islamic fundamentalism. James P. 
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attempts at exporting their brand of Islam to the Arabs 
contributed to a great degree to consolidating existing religious 
movements. It also played a vital role in the emergence of a new 
fundamentalist trend that sought the reconstruction of Arab 
society on an Islamic basis. 
That meant creating an environment in which, particularly 
in the Gulf, political regimes felt threatened by the effects 
this would have on the social order in countries of strong 
Islamic sentiments especially Shi'a Islam. The Iran-Iraq war may 
be viewed in this respect as an attempt by the Arab states to 
contain the effects of Iranian Islam. Although the war itself 
ended with a UN- negotiated cease fire in 1988, its effects were 
strongly felt in all Arab states. 8 The revival of political Islam 
was evident in countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Bahrain, Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Sudan. 9 In 
Egypt President Sadaat was assassinated at the hands of a 
fundamentalist militant Islamic group that opposed his policies 
and sought the restoration of an Islamic foundation in Egypt. 
The Iranian revolution also had the effect of raising the 
issue of the relationship between Arabism, Arab nationalism, 
secularism and Islam. The Iranian revolution was also detrimental 
in bringing to the centre of thought and politics the distinction 
Piscatori(ed), Islam in the Political Process, (Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 1983) pp. 1-10. 
433. 
8 Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab, op. cit., pp. 432- 
9 In Saudi Arabia, the Great Mosque in Mecca was seized in 
1979 by a group led by Juhaiymaan al-'Utaiybiy while civil unrest 
and riots erupted among the Shi'a of the Eastern Province. In 
Bahrain, a group led by Hadiy al-Mudarris was active. in Syria 
the Muslim Brotherhood was active against the government. 
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between two interpretations of Islam and their role in the 
political process. Therefore, the interpretation of Islam 
employed by countries like Saudi Arabia was divorced from that 
advocated by the new fundamentalist movements. A major difference 
is that the fundamentalists would now emphasise and employ the 
slogans that were employed by Arab nationalist thought. These 
included the struggle against imperialism and Zionism and the 
call for social justice, though within an Islamic framework. 
The effect of this on the debate was marked by the change 
of position held by some Arab intellectuals, such as Muhammad 
'Amarah. From being secular Arab nationalists or from the 
position of interpreting Islamic history in favour of Arab 
nationalism some intellectuals moved to the view that attempted 
to Islamicise Arab nationalism. As Faleh 'Abdulljabbar notes, 
this intellectual change of position was not difficult at all. 
Since Arab nationalist thought employs the concept of 
distinctiveness (khususiyya) of the Arabs a switch to the 
direction of the fundamentalist position would be easier for the 
same emphasis on distinctiveness is also employed by the 
fundamentalists. " 
Some scholars attempt to explain this in that political 
Islam relies on modern global, of European origin, ideological 
frames. This is seen by Aziz Azmeh in that political Islam's 
interpretation of society resembles some concepts of Arab 
10 Faleh 'Abduljabbaar, "al-Naz'a al-Qawmiyya al-'Arabiyya 
wa al-Islam: 1890-1990"(Arab Nationalist Trend and Islam), in 
Faleh 'Abduljabbaar(ed), al-Oawmivva Marad al-'Asr am Khalasuhu 
(Nationalism: A Disease of the Age or its Emancipation) First 
Edition (London; Dar al Saqi, 1995)Arabic Text (Present Author's 
Translation) pp. 114-119. 
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nationalist thought. " Azmeh explains that both political Islam 
and Arab nationalist thought view society as that of a closed net 
and a communal harmonic association without the existence of any 
internal actual differences that may impinge upon the unity of 
its will or direction. Azmeh goes further to suggest that 
political Islam is closely similar to other movements and 
ideologies. He argues that 
if we took away its heritage ancestral (salafiy) frame of 
reference and its salafiy utopia which it employs, 
political Islam would be the ideological mate of all 
populist movements ... and particularly peripheral and 
sieged nationalist movements: like Slavonic nationalism, 
German and Italian nationalisms in the twentieth century, 
Hindu nationalism that provokes the killing of Muslim 
Indians, and the fascist conceptions that Arab nationalism 
had. 12 
This point is well raised by Sami Zubaida. He argues that 
despite their hostility political Islam and Arab nationalism 
share some characteristics. There exists "fundamental facets of 
similarity in the structure of thought and politics between 
nationalism and political Islam. j13 This is because despite the 
emphasis of the Islamists on the internationalism and 
inclusiveness of Islam the argument on which political Islam 
depends remains, in practice, essentially "within a nation-state 
or a group of nation-states. 1114 What Zubaida is implying is that 
while political Islam rejects concepts like nationalism and 
11 Aziz Azmeh, "al-'Ilmaniyya wa Tahuwlaat al-Mujtama'aat 
al-'Arabiyya", Dirasaat 'Arabivva, vol. 11\12 (1994) pp. 17-18. 
12 Ibid, pp. 17-18. 
13 Sami Zubaida, "al-Naz'a al-Qawmiyya wa al-Islam al- Siyyasiy" (Nationalism and Political Islam), in, Faleh 
'Abduljabbaar(ed), al-Oawmiyya: Marad al-'Asr, op. cit., p. 84. 
14 Ibid, p. 84. 
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nation-state as alien to Islam, it calls for the building of an 
Islamic nation, umma, based on religion. This is to say that 
political Islam does not reject nationalism per se or the 
imagined eternity of nationalism and nation itself but a 
particular brand of it that rests upon ethnicity or culture and 
not religion. 15 
The 1980s was a period of disarray in Arab politics. The 
divisions of Arab states, along the lines of the peace with 
Israel or the Iran-Iraq war, and the division between the rich 
and poor states were growing. A gap also existed within each 
society between the rich and poor. 16 Coupled with a population 
growth problem each society polarised more than had previously 
been the case. 17 These issues further raised those of justice and 
democracy. This environment was the right one for the development 
and strengthening of a political Islam. The Islamists capitalised 
15 Ibid, p. 84. This view is shared by Faleh 'Abduljabbaar 
who argues that the new Islamic fundamentalism is a "reproduction 
of nationalist movements of the middle classes which we witnessed 
in the 1950s" since it is centred on the concept of 
distinctiveness which marks it as cultural nationalism; Faleh 
'Abduljabbaar, " al-Naz'a al-Qawmiyya al-'Arabiyya wa al-Islam: 
1890-1990", on. cit., p. 117. 
16 This was evident in many events that took place in 
countries like Algeria, Tunisia, The Sudan, Egypt, Jordan and 
Lebanon where civil unrest known as `bread revolutions' took 
place in 1988,1987,1987-88,1987-88-89,1989 and 1987 
respectively. 
17 Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym refers to what he calls the class 
conflict in the Arab world. He presents data that suggests the 
existence of extreme class social divisions in incomes. For 
example, 47 0-o of the Arabs only get 14% of Arab gross product. Per 
capita incomes also vary considerably. These fluctuate from US$ 
15840 in Kuwait to US$ 14000 in United Arab Emirates to reach 
only US$ 320 in Egypt and US$ 110 in Somalia. See his, al-Nizam 
al-'Arabiy al-Ijtima'iy al-Jadiyd (The New Arab Social Order) 
First Edition, (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 
1982) Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) pp. 213-214. 
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on these problems and the inability of Arab states, especially 
after the rapid decline of oil prices, to provide solutions to 
social and economic problems. "' 
These problems bore witness to the crisis of particularist 
territorial states. They revealed the extent of their structural 
crisis that touched upon all aspects of state -building. 19 
Furthermore the developments in Europe towards more integration 
made it more difficult for many Arab states especially in the 
Maghrib to find assistance from individual states abroad . 
20 The 
whole picture was to demonstrate the inabilities of Arab states 
and their weaknesses. No more was this weakness and the weakness 
of Arab nationalism in the political arena evident than during 
the second Israeli invasion of Lebanon. 
In 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon for the second time (the 
first was in 1978) to destroy the PLO militarily and politically. 
Arab states stood silent before the event and the massacres of 
Palestinians either at the hands or unprevented by the invading 
power. After that the PLO moved its HQ to Tunis and the 
Palestinian National Council expressed its willingness to 
recognise Israel and negotiate peace with her. It was clear that 
the Palestinian problem had become just that, a Palestinian one, 
and no longer a driving force behind the call for Arab unity. 
This was further consolidated when the Palestinians under 
18 Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab, op. cit., p. 447. 
19 Mas'uwd Daher, al-Duwla wa al-Mujtama' fly al-Mashriq al- 
'Arabiy: 1840-1990 (State and Society in the Arab East: 1840- 
1990) First Edition (Beirut; Dar al-Adaab, 1991) Arabic Text 
(Present Author's Translation) p. 454. 
20 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, interview with the author. 
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occupation erupted in a popular uprising in the end of 1987 and 
the beginning of 1988.21 The Intifada as it became known was 
another expression of the national Palestinian option and the 
retreat from the pan-Arab one as far as the Palestinian problem 
was concerned. 
Jamiyl Mattar summarised the state of Arab nationalism and 
its movement in the beginning of the 1980s by saying "a quick 
look at the political literature published in the Arab homeland 
during the last period reveals the depth of the crisis that the 
Arab nationalist movement suffers. " He recognised the extent of 
the crisis that "prompted results and actually engraved on the 
Arab land obvious marks and swept into the Arab soul to 
disintegrate its national components. "22 
The spread of the Iranian brand of political Islam did not 
result in destroying the Arab system of states. However, it 
managed to awaken the Arab states to the fragility of their 
positions. Arab states felt it necessary to find appropriate 
formulas to tackle the problems associated with the Iranian 
phenomenon and the effects of the failure of the state-led 
development in checking social disorder. A certain reassertion 
of Arab unity seemed to provide the potential of getting rid of 
the imbalance. The Arabs felt the need to clear the air among 
themselves and devise a formula that would simultaneously 
preserve the identity of the particularistic territorial state 
433. 
21 Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab, op. cit., pp. 431- 
22 Jamiyl Mattar, "Intikasat al-Haraka al-Qawmiyya al- 
'Arabiyya" (The Setback of the Arab Nationalist Movement) Shoun 
Arabiyya(Arab Affairs) vol. 10 (December 1981) Arabic Text 
(Present Author's Translation) p. 4. 
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and do the job of defeating political Islam. Therefore the Arab 
World saw the initiation of some carefully crafted and limited 
unions between Arab states. 23 
The developments in the 1970s and 1980s had enormous effects 
on the balance of wealth and power in the Arab world. They also 
were instrumental in effecting political orientations and played 
a vital role in conceiving new approaches towards unity. Factors 
of neighbourhood and integration began to be valued as a driving 
force for unity. This implied the need for giving proper credit 
to these factors in designing any unity. The establishment of the 
regional cooperation councils reflects a clear change in Arab 
nationalist thought, a fact that is clearly demonstrated by the 
welcome these councils received from Arab intellectuals. 24 
Albert Hourani summed up the characteristics of the Arab 
world in the 1980s by saying: 
an observer of the Arab countries in the 1980s would have 
found societies in which ties of culture, strong and 
perhaps growing stronger as they were, had not caused 
political unity; where increasing wealth, unevenly spread, 
had led to some kinds of economic growth but also to a 
wider gap between those who profited most from it and those 
who did not, in swollen cities and the countryside, .. 
where the urban masses were calling in question the justice 
of the social order and the legitimacy of governments out 
of the depths of their own inherited culture, and the 
educated elite was showing a deep disturbance of spirit. 25 
" Peter Mansfield, The Arabs, (London; Penguin Books, 1992) 
pp. 491-492. 
24 'Abd Ilah Belqaziyz reviews the debates on the 
relationship between these councils and the aim of Arab unity. 
See his, Ishkalivvat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya: Khitab al-Raghba wa 
Khitab al-Mumkin, First Edition (Casablanca; Afriqiyya al-Sharq, 
1991) pp. 64-65. 
25 Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab, op. cit., p. 447. 
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(i) Arab Nationalism: Abandonment and Creativity 
The developments of the 1980s were instrumental in bringing 
considerable changes that affected Arab nationalist thought. On 
the intellectual level Arab nationalists saw in the revival of 
Islam a chance that they ought to exploit. They attempted to do 
so by giving proper attention to the mass dimension of Arab 
nationalist thought. This they saw vital in avoiding the 
repetition of the collision between Islamic fundamentalism and 
Arab nationalism that marked the politics of the 1950s and the 
1960s. Arab nationalist thought began to reconsider Islam as a 
mass ideology that they could not neglect for fear of collision 
with its followers and organisations, and this was to avoid 
putting the Arabist ideal at risk. As Bassam Tibi put it a "need 
has emerged to modify Arab-Islamic views on nationalism. 1126 Arab 
nationalists felt the need to reevaluate their views on Islam and 
its relation with Arab nationalism. 27 
Indicative of this trend is the congress Arab nationalist 
intellectuals held in Beirut under the auspices of the Centre for 
Arab Unity Studies on Islam and Arab Nationalism. The papers 
delivered at the congress reveal that many Arab nationalist 
thinkers were willing to abandon their secular views. This may 
be seen as an attempt to absorb the effects of the Iranian 
revolution by emphasising the link between Arabism and Islam. 
26 Bassam Tibi, Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry, Second 
Edition (London; Macmillan, 1990) p. 5. 
27 Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym, "Qiyas Itijahaat al-Raiy al-'Aam al- 
'Arabiy Nahuww Masalat al-Wahda: 'Ard lil al-Dirasa al- 
Maidaniyya" (Measuring Arab Public Opinion Attitudes Towards The 
Issue of Unity: An Overview of the Empirical Study), in Waliyd 
Qaziyha etal, al-Oawmivva al-'Arabivva fiy al-Fikr wa al-Mumarasa 
(Seminar Papers) First Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda 
al-'Arabiyya, 1980) p. 192. 
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However, they all affirmed their belief in Arabism and aspired 
for Arab unity. 28 It is clear that the rise of political Islam 
had the effect of grouping together ideological streams of Arab 
thought that hitherto had been divided and in conflict. Thanks 
to the strength of political Islam Marxists, Ba'thists, 
Nasserites and Liberals had to run to one shelter. 
Despite the ambiguity surrounding the concept of secularism 
and the fact that many Arab nationalists abandoned their belief 
in a clear-cut secularism, secularism became the unifying slogan 
of many Arab intellectuals. As Burhan Ghalliyun explains, all 
these forces had to rally to each other for fear of being swept 
away by the force of political Islam. Therefore, "secularism 
became the only idea able to provide a common ground for this 
conglomerate which is bound and united by one fear. "29 This is 
clearly demonstrated in the contributions discussed in this 
thesis which shows the unclear nature of secularism in Arab 
nationalist thought. This secularism suffers from 
great ambiguity that allows all those who have no echo of 
their thought or life in religious values, those who are 
enemies of religion or those who fear the competition of 
the Islamic movements, in government and opposition, to 
feel that they belong to one thought and to rally around a 
collective basic principle. 3o 
Even the Arab left had to come to terms with Arab 
nationalism. Arab Marxist political thought was obliged to 
28 The papers and discussions are published in Muhammad A. 
Khalafallah etal, al-4awmiyya al-'Arabiyya wa al-Islam (Seminar 
Papers) Second Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al- 
'Arabiyya, 1982) 
29 Burhan Ghalliyun, al-Mihna al-'Arabiyya" al-Duwla Did al- 
Umma, First Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al- 
'Arabiyya, 1993) p. 261. 
30 Ibd, p. 261. 
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approach Arab nationalism and to admit Arab unity into its 
ideology. Anouar Abdel-Malik, for instance, moved towards 
recognising Arab unity and presented his thesis of "a nation of 
two levels that aims at reconciling a nation's distinctiveness 
and an identification with a historical and cultural whole that 
is wider. , 31 This thesis was advocated by Abdel-Malik to 
accommodate the nation in its particularistic and pan-Arab 
expressions so that a country like Egypt "would not cease to be 
itself 
... nonetheless nothing would override the 
fact that Egypt 
has been an Arab country since the year 640. "32 The same applied 
to the stance of the Sudanese and Lebanese communist parties that 
modified their Marxist view of Arabism. This was also clear in 
the writings of Arab Marxists like the Egyptians Lutfiy al-Khuliy 
and Isma'iyl 'Abdullah who among many other Arab Marxists 
admitted the nationalist idea into their ideology. 33 
The developments that took place in the 1980s led Arab 
nationalist thought not to die as many would think. It had the 
effects of directing it into new paths that it hitherto had 
evaded while sunk in its own romanticism. Arab nationalist 
thought found itself facing the challenge of theoretical and 
practical problems that sprang from the realities of Arab 
society. That led to a new thinking about the intellectual 
premises of Arab nationalism and the fundamentals of the Arabist 
31 Anouar Abdel-Malik, al-Fikr al-'Arabiy fly Ma'rakat al- 
Nahda, First Edition (Beirut; Dar al-Adaab, 1978) p. 57. 
32 Ibid, p. 41. 
33 Ghaliy Shukriy, "Ta'liyq" (A Comment), in A. Duri etal, 
al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya Tajarubuha wa Tawaqu'atuha, (Seminar 
Papers) First Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al- 
'Arabiyya, 1989) pp. 665. 
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project . 
Jabiriy summarises the developments that Arab nationalist 
thought has known in the 1980s as reflecting this change in its 
thinking. He explains that 
for example, we came to accept the particularistic 
territorial state and talk about it while any such talk 
before was ridiculed since this state was seen as an 
embodiment of fragmentation and falsified entities. Today 
we talk about the particularistic territorial state as an 
international, social, economic, political and 
psychological reality. Moreover, we see the desired Arab 
unity as only being possible through this same territorial 
Arab state not through jumping over it. Therefore, we came 
to accept regional unions whereas in the 1950s and the 
1960s we considered it a distortion of the idea of unity. 
On the other hand, all came to assign Islam its place in 
our understanding of Arabism and Arab nationalism... In sum 
we came to think in terms of the relative not the 
absolute . 
34 
This argues Jabiriy is a concrete evidence of the changes 
affecting Arab nationalist thought. Arab thought has reached the 
stage wherein it differentiates between "political reality and 
the ideological dream. Therefore, we ended up assigning priority 
to the political above the ideological. j3S 
The nagging questions were on how, in face of the 
consolidation and not the withering away of the particularistic 
territorial state and the Islamic challenge, to revive the pan- 
Arabist idea? How to make this idea compatible with realities of 
the contemporary age and how to equip it with the necessary tools 
by which it would be more realist and effective? How to deal with 
the societal facts of every day life and how to present itself 
as a valid alternative to both political Islam and the 
34 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, Ishkaliyyaat al-Fikr, op. cit., pp. 
178-179. 
35 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, interview with the author. 
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particularistic territorial state? How to tackle the issues of 
national unity in each state and how to deal with sectarianism, 
and minorities involved in the troubles in countries like 
Lebanon, Iraq, and the Sudan? 
As an editorial in Al-Wahda illustrates, Arab nationalist 
thought attempted this revision on three levels. The first is 
that of the relationship between the objective and the subjective 
conditions that affect the realisation of any Arab unity. The 
second concerns the relationship between the nationalist 
principles and the changing realities. These realities determine 
the efficiency of the nationalist factors in deciding on the 
possibility of uniting the Arabs in any conceivable political 
form. And the third reflects the need to redevise the 
relationship between the particularistic and the pan-Arab. Arab 
nationalist thought felt the urgency of this need. 36 
Discussion and analysis of the contributions of Arab 
intellectuals dealing with the issues related to Arab nationalism 
and unity provided in this research attest to the emergence of 
a new trend. This trend may be seen as that of the unionists or 
functionalists which came to be spread among many Arab 
intellectuals especially in the Maghrib. This trend establishes 
its stand on the needs of reconciling the mutual and common 
interests of the Arab countries. This trend in contrast to the 
classical trend does not see unity as solely based on Arab 
nationalism but as something that common interests dictate. 37 
36 Al-Wahda, "al-Iftitahiyya"(Editorial) Al-Wahda, vol. 7 
(April 1985) Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) p. 4. 
37 This trend is clear in the contributions of intellectuals 
like: Gassan Salame, Jabiriy, Turkiy Hamad, Antuwn Masarrah and 
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Indicative of these developments in Arab thought also is 
what may be seen as a dialectic of Maghribi and Mashriqi 
approaches regarding the issue of Arab unity. As the discussion 
shows the traditional Mashriqi approach had focused on the 
primacy of Arab nationalism and the idea of uniting the Arabs 
based on romantic nationalism, especially until the defeat in the 
war with Israel in 1967. The Maghribi approach has been more 
pragmatic and bounded by the realities of Arab politics and 
society. This is evident in its attitude towards the state 
system. Arab particularistic territorial states were seen by the 
Mashriqi approach with scepticism and distaste. The Maghribi 
approach, however, looked at them as a necessary development and 
historical step towards the achievement of any possible form of 
Arab unity. Jabiriy, for example, considers the particularistic 
territorial state as the basic prerequisite for the 
transformation of the Arab world from disunity to unity. 
The difference in approaches was clear during the 
discussions and symposia that the Centre for Arab Unity Studies 
held during the 1980s. In these gathering the Maghribi approach 
received an unwelcome reception from the Mashriqi intellectuals. 
The extent of this reached a point wherein some of the latter 
attempted to look down upon the first and undermine the 
significance of their efforts at reconstructing Arab nationalist 
thought. Some Mashriqi participants maintained that the Maghrib 
in general and its intellectuals in particular have always been 
on the periphery of Arab politics and thought. This was an 
Burhan Ghalliyun and it is shared by individuals and groups of 
a multitude of ideological and intellectual schools. 
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attempt to establish that because of their geographical position 
Maghribi intellectuals are prone not to understand the issues at 
stake. 11 
However, the response of Mashriqi intellectuals to Maghribi 
contributions may be explained in other terms. The dialectic of 
these Maghribi and Mashriqi approaches may be explained by the 
paradigm hegemony of the Mashriqi Arab nationalist ideal that 
tries to maintain its intellectual authority and centrism. The 
Mashriqi approach is the real father of Arab nationalism and the 
Mashriqi intellectuals, despite the sincere desire of many of 
them to renew Arab nationalism, see in the Maghribi approach a 
challenge to their established hegemony as far as Arab unity and 
nationalism are concerned. 39 It is very hard for them to abandon 
their approach in favour of another that comes from what they see 
as a very remote part of the Arab world and from countries like 
Morocco that are without the credentials of Cairo or Damascus. 
The new approach can be recognised in its distinctiveness 
and it seems to have had the effect of converting many Mashriqi 
intellectuals to it. However, some of the Mashriqi and Arab Gulf 
intellectuals who admitted the Maghribi approach into their 
thought were also severely criticised by the Mashriqi 
38 Moroccan Intellectuals interviewed by the author like 
Jabiriy, Bensa'id, Belqaziyz and 'Abdullatiyf argue that the 
major loophole of the Mashriqi approach is its tendency to 
generalise. Therefore Mashriqi intellectuals apply the 
distinctive Mashriqi situation to the totally different Maghribi 
one. 
39 The Maghribi approach is trying to end this paradigm 
hegemony by calling for a new Arab nationalist thought and a new 
paradigm that, in the words of Sa'id Bensa'id, achieves "the 
fertile and innovative breakaway from traditional Arab political 
theorising. " interview with the author. 
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intellectuals to the point of having some of their contributions 
discredited as anti-Arab nationalism. 40 If this, as argued, shows 
the reluctance of Mashriqi traditional Arab nationalist thought 
to accept rivalry from a new paradigm threatening its 
intellectual centrism it also expresses a theoretical and 
methodological transformation of Arab nationalism as has been 
argued in this research. The contributions of the 1980s discussed 
in this research made it possible to evaluate the nature of this 
transformation and its role in reconstructing Arab nationalist 
thought. 
The study carried out by a group of Arab academics in 1978- 
79 gave clear indications as to the state of pan-Arab ideology 
at the grass root level. Conducted in the form of a survey of the 
attitudes of Arab public opinion towards Arab unity in ten Arab 
countries in the east and the west of the Arab world, the study 
allows an examination of the Arab nationalist thesis at the grass 
roots level. 41 The study reveals how Arab nationalist thought in 
the 1980s had to admit this into its paradigm. The findings of 
the research establish two facts: the first concerns the 
nationalist feeling of the Arab and the second touches the 
premises of Arab nationalist thought in its classical brand. 
40 This was evident at the conference on: Arab Unity: Its 
Experiments and Expectations organised by the Centre for Studies 
of Arab Unity in 1988. The papers presented by Turkiy Hamad and 
Gassan Salame were severely criticised because they argued for 
the centrality of the particularistic territorial state to Arab 
unity and maintained that, as Turkiy Hamad did, the 
particularistic territorial state is not a fragmentary force but 
a unifying one. See the discussions of Hamad's paper in A. Duri 
etal, al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, op. cit., pp. 188-202 and Salame's 
paper, pp. 494-522. 
41 Sal d Diyn Ibrahiym, "Qiyas Itijahaat al-Raiy al-' Aam", 
op. cit. 
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As to the issue of Arab nationalist consciousness that the 
researchers raised, their samples in the ten Arab countries 
provided a clear answer: 
The sweeping majority believes that the population of the 
Arab homeland is in fact one nation-even though half of 
those believe in the total homogeneity of the sons and 
peoples of this nation. The other half affirms that inside 
the one nation there is diversity among its peoples. About 
one tenth of those researched recorded the existence of 
nations and peoples that are only weakly linked while 
another tenth supported an in-between concept that neither 
refuses nor acknowledges the concept of a single Arab 
nation. 42 
The research also establishes that Arab unity has not been 
forsaken at the grass-root level: 
Despite all the cases of failure and handicaps in past 
experiments at unity, the majority of those researched from 
the ten countries that the study covered is still keen on 
demanding one form or another of political unity among the 
parts of the nation ... The hierarchy of the ten countries 
on the scale of the indicator of unity preference makes it 
clear that inclination in any of them is not less than 
Jr%ö. 
43 
However the important fact to register in this respect is 
that the need for a form of political unification was not 
justified on clear-cut pan-Arabist grounds. Rather the problems 
facing Arab particularistic territorial states and the challenges 
of social and economic issues are seen as urging some form of 
unification or cooperation among Arab states. 
960-. of the researched registered that their countries face 
enormous economic, social and political problems. Three 
quarters of them (7796) said that their countries cannot 
handle or solve these problems on their own and that they 




Ibid, p. 119. 
Ibid, p. 128, p. 132. 
Ibid, p. 128. 
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This means that Arab unity is no longer viewed in a romantic 
or solely nationalist perspective but that interdependence of 
interests is seen as the pillar of political unification. This 
realism is a clear indication of the need to transcend the 
romanticism of Arab unity as there exists, as evident from the 
study, an "increasingly large sector that views unity as a means 
for territorial (particularistic) development and for the 
realisation of individual aspirations. 1145 But what about the 
other theses of Arab nationalist thought concerning Arab unity 
and how to achieve it? What about the idea of indimajiyya 
(inclusive unity that builds a single entity in replacement of 
Arab states) unity and what are the indications of the results 
as to the conception of Arab unity itself as presented in Arab 
nationalist thought? 
The research team that undertook the task of evaluating Arab 
public opinion attitudes towards Arab unity could draw 
conclusions through which Arab nationalist thought would examine 
its theory. The conclusions of the study can be seen as shaking 
the foundations of Arab nationalist thought and awakening it to 
the deficiencies in its traditional structure. This can be 
understood in that "the hopes of Arab unity became more pragmatic 
than it had been. 1146 Arab public opinion has reached the stage of 
abandoning its extreme romanticism in its view of 
nationalist issues and the issue of unity ... Political unification of this great homeland cannot be achieved 
between a day and a night ... The age of national 




Ibid, p. 193. 
Ibid, p. 135. 
Ibid, pp. 193-194. 
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These results described in the quotations above would herald 
the death of the indimajiyya unity and show the importance of 
domestic development as a determinant factor in viewing Arab 
unity. The conclusion is that the Arab of the 1980s is opting for 
Arab unity as an appropriate tool that meets his needs and 
aspirations. His view stems from the understanding and evaluation 
he applies to his social, economic, and political status. The 
real force behind the Arab belief in Arab unity is related to the 
problems he associates with his situation. It has to be viewed 
in light of the failure of the Arab state to carry out its duties 
towards the society it asks for its allegiance. Obviously these 
results could not claim that the Arab is opting for unity because 
he is only loyal to the premises of Arab nationalist thought or 
that his support of unity could be explained in the reasons 
traditional Arab nationalist thought presents. 
The developments in the Arab world after 1967 made clear the 
problems inherent in Arab nationalism. As the 1980s began it was 
evident that Arab nationalist thought had to reconstruct itself 
to meet the new conditions. Arab nationalist thought in the 1980s 
made real attempts at criticising the old concepts and rethinking 
the question of the Arab nation. Despite the occurrence of some 
traditional views mainstream Arab nationalist thought in the 
1980s did not remain imprisoned in the old concepts derived from 
the nineteenth century. However, it is as yet early to suggest 
that Arab nationalist thought in the 1980s reached an 
intellectual stand where it could construct Arab nationalism 
completely anew. 
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6-2: The New Paradigm: The Underlying Factors 
The contributions of the 1980s discussed in this research 
are a continuation of the criticising trend that began after the 
collapse of the Egyptian-Syrian union in 1961 and the 1967 
defeat. It was clear that Arab nationalists failed in achieving 
Arab political unity. Those who claimed that Arab unity was their 
aim did not actually act in accordance with that. They employed 
Arab nationalism to achieve their own goals . 
48 The conflict among 
Arab nationalists was manifest in the events of the 1960s. 49 
There was the disagreement between Nasser's Egypt and the new 
revolutionary government that came to power in Iraq in 1958. The 
civil war in the Yemen became an Arab-Arab one when Saudi Arabia 
and Egypt became heavily involved in it. 
The confrontation between Arab nationalist regimes had 
serious repercussions on Arab nationalist thought and Arab 
nationalist movement. 
The pan-Arabist political organisations (parties) were 
scattered. The Arab people were confused because of the 
disagreements and the differences in the interpretations of 
the pan-Arab leadership. Some pan-Arab parties preferred to 
be active within the boundaries of their respective 
particularistic territorial states and not the wider Arab 
context. This led to the planting of the first seed of 
contradiction in Arab nationalism. " 
That also had the serious effect of confining Arab 
nationalism to the boundaries of some Arab states where political 
regimes employed the idea to further their own programmes. That 
48 Eberharad Kienle, "Afaaq al-Qawmiyya al-'Arabiyya" 
(Horizons of Arab Nationalism), in Faleh 'Abduljabbaar (ed), al- 
Oawmixya: Marad al-Asr, op. cit., pp. 74-77. 
49 
50 
Burhan Ghalliyun, al-Mihna al-'Arabi, on. cit., p. 64. 
Jamiyl Mattar, "Intikasat al-Haraka", op. cit., p. 6. 
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confinement of Arab nationalism and its attachment to the 
fortunes of regimes "inflicted harm on the nationalist trend and 
was a fundamental factor underlying its setback. 1151 Arab 
nationalism was misused. "Now and then, the ideology suffers from 
this while people become more doubtful and sarcastic of this 
ideology itself. X52 
However, that and the defeat in the war with Israel in 1967, 
even though it signified the crisis of Arab nationalism at its 
peak, was not to announce its death. Arab nationalism was 
suffering a major crisis when it was realised that the bid on 
"achieving unity reached a clear historical crisis and that the 
idea of unity became a slogan used to camouflage a process of 
consolidating particularist territorial states and regimes. "53 
This deadlock became even more evident when Arab nationalist 
thought from the 1970s onwards lost all the support political 
regimes had lent it in the past. 
In the 1980s Arab politics were as remote as they could be 
from attachment to Arab unity. This was particularly clearer when 
the regime of Sadaat embarked on a process of liquidating 
Nasserism and its achievements in Egypt. The problem was further 
aggravated when other countries that were pan-Arab in 
orientation, like Syria and Iraq, became immersed in internal 
problems or in wars with neighbouring states. That was very 
51 Ali E. Hillal Dessouki and Jamiyl Mattar, al-Nizam al- 
Ialivmiv al-'Arabiy: Dirasa fly al-'Alagaat al-Siyyasiyya al- 
'Arabiyya, Fifth Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al- 
'Arabiyya, 1986) pp. 249-250. 
52 
53 
Eberhard Kienle, "Afaaq al-Qawmiyya", op. Cit., p. 76. 
Burhan Ghalliyun, al-Mihna al-'Arabiyya, op. cit., p. 76. 
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significant and effective as far as Arab nationalist thought was 
concerned. 
Though Arab nationalist thought lost political support and 
was being discredited in official circles it received some 
indirect rewards. Arab nationalist thought was no longer 
expressing official ideology or used to bestow legitimacy on 
political regimes. That meant it had to battle for itself and to 
enter into intellectual and theoretical struggle against other 
ideological trends. This was particularly the case with political 
Islam which had been kept behind bars or at least outside the 
arena by the pan-Arab regimes before. If traditional Arab 
nationalist thought relied heavily on these regimes and their 
security apparatus in checking the Islamists, that had a negative 
effect on the development of Arab nationalist ideology. It was 
not able to counter and confront other ideologies on its own 
merit. 
However, Arab nationalist thought in the 1980s had to battle 
on its own. It found itself before new circumstances wherein it 
had to challenge other ideologies without the support of regimes 
but, quiet often, in a confrontation with them. This implied the 
need to transcend old concepts and to transcend the boundaries 
of particularistic territorial states and appeal to the wider 
Arab audience. This, as the contributions discussed show, meant 
that Arab nationalist thought in the 1980s became the concern of 
intellectuals and social scientists and no longer the mouth-piece 
of state propaganda. 
The contributions of the 1980s discussed in this research 
represent an attempt at reestablishing the historical and 
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epistemological aspects of Arab nationalist thought. There is a 
clear attempt at the foundation of new interpretations of Arab 
history and reality that divorces itself from the old 
romanticism. These contributions were made in the 1980s which was 
a period of considerable change in the Arab world. The 1980s, as 
outlined earlier on, brought to the attention of Arab 
intellectuals issues that had an Arab context. These were related 
to democracy, political participation, equality, dependency, 
development, and the need to accommodate modernity while 
preserving authenticity and identity. That implied the important 
task of abandoning generalisations and approaching the real 
nature of these problems. This in turn meant that traditional 
views and concepts that find their logic in a romantically 
conceived history are no longer appropriate. 54 
Arab nationalism had to be seen not as an abstract idea but 
in its social and economic contexts. All that was taking place 
in what Arab intellectuals agree was an Arab crisis that also 
involved issues of minorities, sectarianism, the relationship 
between Arabism and Islam, human rights and an Arab crisis at the 
level of inter-Arab relations. 55 The feeling that there was an 
Arab crisis was shared by all Arab intellectuals. Some even 
54 Sa'id Bensa'id, interview with the author. 
55 The Egyptian daily al-Ahraam for a whole year(February 
1985-January 1986) devoted a page to a dialogue among more than 
one hundred Arab intellectuals from many countries. The dialogue 
was centred on the issue of how to reconcile Arab reality with 
nationalist aspirations. It is important to note that all 
participants agreed on the state of crisis the Arab world was 
undergoing. The articles and the responses are published in: 
Lutfiy al-Khuliy(ed), al-Mazag al-'Arabia (the Arab Deadlock 
(Crisis)) First Edition (Cairo; Markaz al-Ahraam, 1986) Arabic 
Text (Present Author's Translation). 
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thought that the crisis had been an on going condition of the 
Arabs since their separation from the Turks . 
56 Arab intellectuals 
consider that the crisis is a major characteristic of 
contemporary Arab society. Arab society is seen as one that 
accumulates crises and the crisis of the 1980s was one of thought 
and reality together. 57 This crisis was a driving force behind 
Arab nationalists feeling that Arab nationalist thought had to 
be restructured anew. 
There was an obvious need for rejuvenating Arab nationalism 
so it might respond to the challenges of changed circumstances 
and the political, economic and social variables in the Arab 
world. The commitment to this new nationalist thought reflects 
the feeling of Arab intellectuals that 
the call for unity has so far lacked rational and human 
bases, it looked as though it was a call for unity on the 
basis of language, culture, history and interests similar 
to the nationalist unification in Europe, or looked as 
though it was a call for the revival of the Arab empire 
(Ummayed, Abbasids, or Fatimids) therefore our call was 
lost between the past of the unity of others and the past 
of the unity of ourselves. We did not enrich it with a call 
for a new Arab order, new Arab rationalism. 58 
Given these developments that took place within the wider 
framework of the 1980s alluded to earlier, it was clear that Arab 
56 Kamil Saalih Abujadir, "al-Qawmiyya wa al-Wahda: Nahuww 
Mafhuwm Jadiyd lil Wahda al-'Arabiyya"(Nationalism and Unity: 
Towards a New Concept of Arab Unity) Al-Fikr Al-'Arabiv, vol. 59 
(1990) Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) p. 161. 
57 Al-Wahda, "al-Iftitahiyya"(Editorial) A1-Wahda, vol. 
46\47 (1988) Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) pp. 3-5. 
58 Hasan Sa'bb, "al-Muqaraba al-'Aqlaniyya lil Mu'dila al- 
Siyyasiyya al-'Arabiyya° (A Rational Approach to Arab Political 
Problem), in Antuwan al-Maqdisiy etal, al-'Aglaniyya al-'Arabiyya 
wa al-Mashruw' al-Hadariy al-'Arabiy (Arab Rationalism and the 
Civilisational Project) (Seminar Papers) First Edition (Rabat; 
al-Majlis al-Qawmiy lil Thaqafa al-'Arabiyya, 1992) Arabic Text 
(Present Author's Translation) p. 317. 
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nationalists had to respond to the challenge or else risk their 
ideology being swept away by the tide. The intellectual premises 
of Arab nationalist ideology had to be renewed to cater for these 
developments particularly after the 1980s witnessed the rise in 
the activities and popularity of political Islam. Despite the 
fact that the relationship between Arabism and Islam, their 
historical attachment and their political unity had predated the 
advent of nation-states, the challenge of political Islam made 
these the subject of an intense debate. 
By putting forward the religious identity as an alternative 
to the nationalist one political Islam would hit nationalist 
thought at its heart. Therefore it was necessary that Arab 
nationalist thought defend its thesis. It was evident that 
sticking to the primacy of Arab identity would not be enough to 
check political Islam. This was because, as Burhan Ghalliyun 
states, identity in itself 
has no value on its own and has no efficiency but in what 
it does in resolving the personality's real contradictions 
and assisting it to settle and be balanced and have clear 
goals, i. e. to be an active member in the arena of 
international relations. To succeed in that it must take 
into consideration its own actual abilities and therefore 
match conception and reality. 59 
It was clear that the collapse of the Egyptian-Syrian union, 
the 1967 defeat and the developments of the 1980s enforced the 
failure of Arab nationalism in its traditional form. It failed 
in resolving "many theoretical and material issues and 
contradictions at the level of theory and doctrine and at the 
level of practical reality and its psychological, political, 
59 Burhan Ghalliyun, al-Mihna al-'Arabiyya, op. cit., p. 80. 
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class and geopolitical facts. 1160 The pan-Arabists had a lesson to 
learn. They realised that if Arab nationalism was ever to recover 
its position and become "a doctrinal guide to nationalist action 
in the Arab world" the Arabs must become a "maker of history" 
which is the critical mission behind the birth of Arabism. 61 
Arab nationalist intellectuals realised that this mission 
is yet to be achieved. It still needs devotion and, more than 
anything else, requires the successful completion of the "battle 
of putting this homeland above its own contradictions ... and the 
confirmation of its unity that is dictated by culture, history 
and its geopolitical position. , 62 That implied opening the door 
for an intellectual effort that rereads and reinterprets the 
system of concepts of Arab nationalist thought. This need is the 
more urgent since the Arabs of today are "a complicated social 
phenomenon and reality. "63 
6-3: The Premises of the New Paradigm 
(i) Arab Nationalism and the State System: From Collision 
to Accommodation 
From the contributions discussed in the preceding chapters 
it is clear that the study of state figures prominently. Arab 
thought in the 1980s had concerned itself with the issue in 
contrast to what amounts to a complete neglect of state issues 





Ibid, p. 80 
Ibid, p. 80. 
Ibid, p. 81. 
Ibid, p. 93. 
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issues concern themselves with all historical, social and 
political aspects of the state. This is even clearer as far as 
the Arab particularistic territorial state is concerned. In 
contrast to the old paradigm of Arab nationalist thought the 
1980s show a sincere attempt at understanding the phenomenon. 
The contributions discussed in chapter five reflect this 
trend as they approach the state system and study the relevant 
issues of the relationship between particularistic territorial 
states and the desired pan-Arab state. As demonstrated in chapter 
five works like those carried under the auspices of the Beirut- 
based Centre for Arab Unity Studies reveal a clear effort at 
abandoning traditional views and concentrating on difficulties 
and the crisis the Arab states encounter and the relationship 
between state and society. This was to herald a new form of Arab 
nationalist thought while showing the incompetence of state 
ideology to become the heir of Arab nationalism. The crisis of 
the particularistic territorial state was an evidence that the 
Arab state system was unable to be the alternative since the void 
left by Arab nationalist ideology was to be filled by the 
Islamists. 
As argued in chapters two and three the birth of traditional 
Arab nationalist thought coincided with the establishment of the 
Arab state system. The realisation on the part of the pan- 
Arabists that the Arab world became politically fragmented into 
independent political units led them to embrace concepts that 
disdained the state system. The contributions of the 1980s 
discussed in chapter five are no longer affected by this disdain. 
This was being made while the state system was not showing any 
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sign of withering away despite its enduring crisis. Therefore 
Arab nationalist thought in the 1980s had to spring from reality. 
The Maghribi trend in the 1980s is worth noting for its 
significant position. The Maghribi intellectuals consider the 
particularistic territorial state as having a historical function 
and role to play. It is considered as a national unifying step 
and therefore an indispensable step on the road to any form of 
Arab unity. It is significant, in detecting the change in Arab 
nationalist thought in the 1980s, to discover that, as chapter 
five has shown, this Maghribi interpretation of the historical 
function of the particularistic territorial state gained 
acceptance by many Mashriqi intellectuals. It therefore claimed 
to be the mainstream trend in Arab nationalist thought in the 
1980s. 
The contributions of the 1980s see the state in the light 
of its historical function. That implies an acknowledgement of 
the nature of the sociological base that traditional Arab 
nationalist thought ignored. Arab nationalist thought has reached 
the stage wherein it is willing to acknowledge the state system 
and allow for its relevant weight in designing any Arab unity 
scheme. This is clearly demonstrated in the studies on the future 
possible scenarios of the Arab world discussed earlier. That is 
a clear abandonment of romanticism and dreams of Arab indimajiyya 
unity. The new paradigm attempts "reconciling the unity dream 
with reality. il 64 The new paradigm springs from the conception 
that the "particularist reality is not a false one that may 
64 'Abd Ilah Belgaziyz, interview with the author. 
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easily be uprooted once will is there. , 65 It considers it 
solid and consolidated due to causes that go beyond its 
mere support by imperialism and Zionism but to those 
realities that were achieved and fostered by the 
particularistic territorial state. These include the 
development of economic and political particularist 
interests and the development of closed particularistic 
feelings fed by state-provided educational and media daily 
material . 
66 
It is obvious that the state system is now a fact of Arab 
politics that no wishful thinking or "ideology can, at will, 
cancel at a stroke of a pen. 1167 
However, the relationship between Arab nationalist thought 
and the Arab state system reveals a dichotomy. As Hasan Nafa 
explains, Arab nationalism had protected the particularistic 
territorial state and participated in the process of its internal 
integration. If Arab nationalism had completely disappeared from 
the scene, even in its most formal form that the Arab League 
represents, the particularistic territorial state would have 
faced great dangers. Pressures would have been against the state 
and would have led to the disintegration of its social 
components. Loyalties would have been attached to lower levels 
such as those of sects, tribes etc. This is because the state has 
not yet become a nation-state in the real sense of the concept. 68 
The relationship between Arab nationalist thought and the 
particularistic territorial state reveals a strange dichotomy. 
While traditional Arab nationalist thought had looked upon the 
56. 
6s 'Abd Ilah Belqaziyz, Ishkaliyyat al-Wahda, op. cit., p. 
66 Ibid, p. 57. 
67 Ibid, p. 57. 
68 Hasan Nafa, interview with the author. 
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state as having been a foreign implant, had no legitimacy and its 
boundaries were cartoonic in nature, Arab nationalist thought and 
movement found the state at their assistance. The particularistic 
territorial state helped in making Arab nationalist thought and 
movement spread and gain strength particularly during the heyday 
of Arab nationalism in the 1950s and the 1960s. The Arab state 
was the instrument that Arab nationalism employed to maintain a 
kind of ideological, and sometimes political, hegemony and to 
realise the first Arab unity between Egypt and Syria in 1958.69 
Nevertheless, the particularistic territorial state, that 
had, through its adoption as an official ideology by some Arab 
regimes in the 1950s and the 1960s, lent Arab nationalism 
strength, represents the living proof that Arab nationalism has 
failed in achieving its goals. On the one hand, Arab nationalism 
developed thanks to the particularistic territorial state and 
against it simultaneously. The achievements of the state in 
development, education, and communication made the Arabs discover 
their common heritage and culture and realise the factors that 
bind them together. On the other hand, Arab nationalist thought 
was always, especially in the 1950s and the 1960s, equating Arab 
nationalism with revolution and challenging the status quo and 
particularly the state of Arab political fragmentation of which 
the state system was the great marker. Hence, the animosity 
traditional Arab nationalist thought had towards the state 
system. 
" Ghaliy Shukriy argues that despite this success in 
achieving this unity its breakup was more to do with Arab 
nationalist thought inability to transform Arab nationalism into 
an identity of the Arabs than anything else; interview with the 
author. 
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This led the Moroccan historian, 'Abdullah Laroui, 
astonished at this dichotomy, to exclaim that while 
the particularistic territorial state equips the country, 
educates, employs, organises and this is the sphere of the 
sociologies of the state. All these achievements do not 
give her loyalty nor do they create a consensus around her 
particularly if propaganda constantly brings to memory that 
this is only a step on the road of achieving the grand Arab 
unity. And where is the Arab state that does explicitly 
advocate isolation and separation?! 70 
It is important to note that Arab thought on the 
particularistic territorial state is influenced by the central 
issue of identity. As has been demonstrated in the previous 
chapters, the Arab is divided between loyalty to three levels of 
identity. There is the Arab identity, the Islamic identity, each 
with a pan conception of the nation, and the level of social 
solidarities identity attached to social formations like tribe, 
religious sects and minorities. The political identity that is 
based on being subject to the jurisdiction of a particular state 
is yet another identity. It reflects the political reality which 
the individual has no alternative but to live with and accept. 
The contributions of the 1980s discussed in chapter four 
offer significant development in Arab nationalist thought upon 
these vital issues. However it remains to be seen whether the 
Arab would be able to reach a compromise with himself. However, 
Arab nationalist thought has not paid appropriate attention to 
the fact that Arab states are attempting to undergo a process of 
nationalisation or becoming nation-states. This means that the 
debate on the issue of nation in the Arab world is not over yet. 
The fact that Arab states are attempting to foster their own 
70 'Abdullah Laroui, Mafhuwm al-Duwla, (Casablanca; al- 
Markaz al-Thagafiy al-'Arabiy, 1981) p. 169. 
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nations puts into question the theory of a nation's factors. It 
is clear that the concept of the nation and its factors need to 
be dealt with in the light of the experience of the Arab states. 
(ii) Arab Unity: History or Future? 
The contributions discussed in this research though faithful 
to the idea of the Arab nation do not ascribe to this nation a 
role that is more than it could play in politics. The existence 
of a nation does not guarantee its political unification. Factors 
of nationhood are not the only prerequisite for unification as 
they had not been sufficient to safeguard Arab political unity 
in the past nor to be able to achieve it. The new thought 
believes that since in the Arab world forces of unity and 
fragmentation are all at work in a dialectical relationship unity 
can not be considered to result automatically. Therefore social 
integration within each Arab state is more important than any 
reliance on the factors of nationalism in realising any Arab 
unity. 
This is seen as particularly vital since many Arab states 
encounter problems of societal and political integration and face 
the risk of social and political atomization. The contributions 
of the 1980s do not call for any form of Arab unity solely on the 
basis of unity having been realised in the past nor on the idea 
that similar nations had been able to realise their political 
unification. Arab unity is considered as a desired future state 
of affairs in the Arab world that reflects a dynamic changing 
social and historical reality that is different from those that 
had taken place before. 
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Arab unity therefore becomes a dialectical concept affected 
by circumstances. No longer is Arab unity a static desire that 
is immune to the changing circumstances. Arab unity is more than 
the affectionate reproduction of a conceived glorious Arab 
history. It is not just an embodiment of Arab identity or the 
mere unification of a politically fragmented nation. Arab unity 
is seen in future terms. It is a requirement for development. It 
is clear that the new Arab unionist is future-oriented and not 
occupied by past nostalgia. " 
The contributions of the 1980s considerably depart from the 
romantic views of Arab nationalism and are centred on this new 
concept of Arab unity. The frame of reference of historical 
unities (either Arab-Islamic or European), according to the new 
contributions, is not an acceptable premise. These historical 
references are not employed any more to justify the call for any 
future Arab unity. This is particularly true if the quest for 
democracy in the new contributions is taken into consideration. 
The new contributions see that the violence and terror associated 
with the historical unification experiences may not be justified 
even for a cause as good as national unification. Therefore the 
quest for democracy and the centrality of democratic discourse 
in the contributions of the 1980s reflects a desire to refute any 
call for unification that does away with democracy and also 
rejects unification by force. " 
" Ism. a'iyl Sabriy 'Abdullah, interview with the author. The 
same view is advocated by Jabiriy, Bensa'id, Belqaziyz and 'Abdullatiyf, interviews with the author. 
" This is a point of agreement among all intellectuals interviewed by the author. However, few Arab intellectuals still 
consider the achievement of Arab unity possible if what they 
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Generally speaking the new contributions agree on the 
importance of achieving any form of Arab unity. However, they do 
not consider this desired unity a determined result of the 
existence of the Arabs as a nation. The nation is not seen as an 
eternal entity with a sacred mission as the Ba'thists used to 
argue. Arabism is seen as an identity that faces the challenge 
of other identities that make the personality of the Arab. 73 The 
Arab identity is not the all homogeneous one. Rather, it is 
liable to be affected by the existence of particularist and 
different levels of identity. It also encompasses within itself 
multiplicity and differentiation. Therefore Arab unity is not to 
destroy this rich multiplicity within the Arab culture and 
personality as it is not to make an Arab nation of a single 
dimension. Arab unity does not necessarily lead to the building 
of one nation-state. 
(iii) Arab Unity: Its Nature and Form 
The contributions of the 1980s offer a new understanding of 
the goal of achieving Arab unity. Intellectuals have expressed 
a strong tendency towards realising this goal. However the new 
paradigm seeks to provide a new rational for this central goal. 
consider as the unification rules that had worked together to 
bring about historical unification in Europe could work in the 
Arab case. This is the view of Nadiym al-Biytar. As discussed in 
chapter four Biytar argues that Arab unity is possible only if 
some rules are available. Biytar still repeats some of his old 
convictions that Arab unity needs a charismatic leader who can 
lead the masses towards this goal. He even goes on to suggest 
that democracy may be sacrificed for the achievement of unity. 
73 Constantine Zurayq, Matalib al-Mustagbal al-'Arabiy" 
Humuwm wa Tasauwlaat, First Edition (Beirut; Dar al-'Ilm lil 
Malaaiyyin, 1983) p. 205. 
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If any form of Arab unity or political integration is sought- 
after, it is not based on the sole factor of nationhood. There 
are factors that contribute to the call for unity or integration 
more than does the national factor. Therefore there is to be 
found in the contributions of the 1980s a strong emphasis on 
functionalism. 
The contributions of the 1980s dealt with in this research 
are eager to emphasise the important role functionalism may play 
in preparing the way for any form of Arab unity or integration. 
It is clear that the contributions are affected by the 
achievement in Europe towards more integration. The fact that, 
without having the qualities of one nation, the Europeans have 
been able to achieve and sustain a working formula for 
cooperation or integration has struck Arab nationalist thought 
in the 1980s. It has been very effective in bringing 
functionalism into the intellectual and ideological premises of 
Arab nationalist thought. 74 
As the Lebanese Antuwn Masarrah argues, traditional Arab 
nationalist thought and the ways it thought relevant to achieving 
Arab unity proved to be irrational and not pragmatic. 75 
The Arabs are still occupied with issues of nation, 
nationalism, religions and unity. These are factors that 
time has transcended in an age of conflicting interests. 
The mere talk about issues of nation, nationalism, 
religions and unity may be a disuniting factor in itself. 76 
74 This tendency is clearly detected in the debates 
particularly among Moroccan intellectuals like Jabiriy, Bensa'id 
and Belqaziyz; interviews with the author. 
75 Antuwn Masarrah, "Ta'liyq", in A. Duri etal, al-Wahda al- 
'Arabixva, op. cit., p. 782. 
76 Ibid, p. 782. 
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The study of unification experiences in the world (in Europe for 
example) shows that unity is possible without having unity of 
"nation, nationalism, language, or religion or even without the 
existence of a common history but by virtue of common interests 
and danger. 1177 
It is important to note that functionalism as an approach 
towards Arab unity was almost completely ruled out in traditional 
Arab nationalist thought. Husry, for example ruled out economics 
as a factor in national formation. Now the functionalist approach 
is gaining a wide support and having considerable appeal to 
Arabists. Therefore an emphasis on the importance of establishing 
material links between Arab states and creating mechanisms of 
integration is a common thesis in the contributions of the 
1980s. 78 
If functionalism is clearly reflected in the contributions 
of the 1980s this is not to suggest that they undervalue the 
important role of spiritual or cultural factors in justifying the 
call for pan-Arab unity. The contributions discussed and the 
intellectuals interviewed believe that these factors have so far 
kept a reasonable degree of Arab cohesiveness and solidarity. 
However, these factors should be cemented by establishing 
material links and institutions or, otherwise, the Arabs will 
risk the erosion of these factors themselves. 
77 Ibid, p. 782. 
78 Saiyyd Yasiyn, in an interview with the author, goes as 
far as to suggest that the main feature of the new Arab 
nationalist thought is its functionalist approach. Though the 
functionalist approach is clearly detected in the contributions 
discussed in this research there is still to be found some 
arguments against the relevance of functionalism to the Arab 
case. Hasan Nafa, interview with the author. 
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Taking some steps on the road of functionalism is seen as 
necessary in order that the model of Arab unity may be relevant 
to the modern age. It is also vital to safeguard and protect the 
ideal itself. Moving towards establishing closer links among Arab 
states is seen to be as important as keeping the ideal alive 
within the consciousness of the Arab himself. As the Moroccan 
politician-scholar 'Abdullhadiy Abu Talib argues, the first step 
among the priorities of Arab unification is the 
willingness to embark on a lengthy work of creating an Arab 
citizen who believes in unity and in its relevance and 
efficiency in developing his particularist society and as 
a way of improving his own living conditions and 
transforming his destiny. 79 
The new contributions agree that the form and nature of any 
future Arab unity should be based on reestablishing the Arab 
consciousness itself. Arab nationalist thought must be 
restructured to cater for the needs of the present and the 
challenges of the future and not on the reproduction of the past. 
As Belqaziyz argues Arab nationalist thought must, therefore, 
abandon its nostalgia with the past. It must leave aside any 
illusion of recapturing identity and move towards the horizon of 
an identity that requires construction. 80 
This is to believe that the particularist territorial states 
are the nuclei of any future Arab unity attempt. The state, as 
Jabiriy argues, is the corner stone of any unification structure. 
This is because the existence of a state with all its relevant 
79 'Abdullhadiy Abu Talib, Nazaraat fiy al-Oadiyya al- 
'Arabiyya(Ref lections on the Arab Issue) First Edition(Casablanca; 
Dar al-Kitab, 1987) Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) 
p. 94. 
80 'Abd Ilah Belqaziyz, interview with the author. 
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qualities is a prerequisite without which the flame of any unity 
may not ignite. There is a widespread agreement in the new 
contributions that Arab unity may not be achieved or even thought 
of before Arab states become equipped with all the qualities of 
modern states. The new contributions argue that Arab states have 
not yet reached this stage. They are seen as projected states 
till they acquire qualities such as like those of maturity, 
establishments, traditions and complete formation. 
In the words of Jabiriy any Arab unity may not be achieved 
or thought of before the Arab particularistic state realises 
satisfaction of itself. 81 This is particularly important since 
all Arab states have not yet completed the process of state- 
building. Therefore it is conceivable that any attempt at Arab 
unity should wait till this task is accomplished. As 'Abdullah 
Laroui explains, the particularistic state's existence as a full- 
fledged state, despite its apparent strength, is still "subject 
to doubt and questioning. , 82 This is to emphasise the importance 
of completing the building of state institutions since "it is 
necessary to achieve unity to have a state apparatus. "83 
The contributions discussed in this research depart from the 
romantic views of traditional Arab nationalist thought discussed 
in chapters two and three. Arab intellectuals now deal with the 
issue of Arab unity in a more pragmatic way. They are almost free 
from imagination based on romanticism. As Constantine Zurayq put 
it "the true nationalist idea must look first and foremost 
81 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, interview with the author. 
82 'Abdullah Laroui, Mafhuwm al-Duwla, op. cit., p. 146. 
83 Ibid, p. 170. 
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towards the future. " Arab nationalism has to choose between two 
paths. 
The first does not see of the present and the future but 
what the past allows, the second does not consider of the 
past but what future and present allow. The first path is 
memorial, nostalgic and is like a fiction story. The second 
is creative and constructive. The first is mystical and 
sentimental and the second is rational and wilful. 
The future of Arab nationalism and the Arab nation depends on how 
the question is answered and on the choice made. Obviously, as 
Zurayq argues, there is no hope for the Arabs unless they choose 
the second option. 84 
However, the state of frustration and gloom made some Arab 
intellectuals lean towards romanticism and imagination. This may 
be understood since any future conception is bound to have some 
romanticism and imagination as parts of its composition. Once 
ideology is at the centre of this conception the occurrence of 
romanticism and imagination becomes an important part of 
ideology. 85 Though Arab intellectuals whose contributions are 
portrayed in the preceding chapters agree that Arab unity is the 
best conceivable future for the Arabs, the project still suffers 
from ambiguity and generalisations. It, perhaps, still lacks a 
coherent framework and structure that clearly disassociates it 
from the old romantic one. 
Arab unity conception in the contributions of the 1980s 
still has not reached the stage wherein it can be safely said 
84 Constantine Zurayq, "Muqifuna Min Tariykhuna", in Ahmed 
Hasan al-Zaiyyat etal, Oiraat fly al-Fikr al-Oawmiv al-'Arabiv" 
al-Kitab al-Thalith: al-Oawmivva al-'Arabiyya al-Islam. al- Tariykh wa al-Insaniyya, First Edition (Beirut; Markaz Dirasat 
al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1994) pp. 84-86. 
a5 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, interview with the author. 
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that it has entirely become the creative heir to the heritage of 
a theoretical project and able to respond to the challenges of 
Arab reality. However, it is clear that the new contributions are 
attempting to respond to the challenges that the Arab state 
system involves. As Gassan Salame explains, 
the existing entities have a logic of some sort otherwise 
they would have collapsed long ago. This is not necessarily 
to imply that it has to be accepted or to fear its 
transcendence. It is a logic that is stronger than that of 
the unionists so it is to the hour winning. It will remain 
so if the unionists do not carefully and discreetly try to 
dismember it. Its total rejection is an evidence of the 
failure to confront it . 
86 
What characterises the new contributions is the attempt to 
transform Arab nationalism from a history of the past to become, 
in the words of the Lebanese writer Gassan Twiyniy, a "history 
of tomorrow. " It is an attempt to make Arab nationalism an 
"aimful nationalism" that has clear-cut goals, scientifically and 
practically, in order that it becomes able to seek loyalties to 
a conceivable and practical nationalist project. "' 
6-4: End of Arabism or a New Arab Nationalism 
From the discussion of the development of Arab nationalist 
thought provided in the previous chapters it is clear that Arab 
nationalist thought and Arab ideology in general have been 
undergoing a crisis since the 1967 defeat in the war with Israel. 
However, to say that Arab nationalism is in a crisis is 
86 Gassan Salame, 11 'Auwaiq al-Wagi' al-'Arabiy", in A. Duri 
etal, al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, op. cit., p. 471. 
87 Gassan Twiyniy, Oiraa Thaniyya lil Oawmiyya al- 
'Arabiyya(A Second Reading of Arab Nationalism) First Edition 
(Beirut; Dar al-Nahar, 1991) Arabic Text (Present Author's 
Translation) p. 20. 
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completely different from saying that it is already dead. It is 
clear that the crisis is paving the way for the birth of a new 
breed of Arab nationalist thought. The study has shown that there 
are many indications that this new breed is developing into a new 
paradigm of Arab nationalist thought that significantly differs 
from the romantic Arab nationalism of the 1950s and the 1960s. 
As an editorial in Al-Wahda argues, Arab nationalist thought 
is bound to change its nature as a result of the crisis it 
suffered and as a measure towards catering for the realities in 
Arab politics and society. 88 Given the nature and content of the 
contributions discussed in this research, it is not difficult to 
note what these contributions carry of new concepts and theses. 
Obvious of these are concepts and theses of democracy, 
minorities, human rights, rationalism, pragmatism, and a 
conception of Arab unity that relies most on common interests 
more that it does on the idea of the nation. 
This reflects a sincere attempt on the part of Arab 
intellectuals to change the focus and content of Arab nationalism 
and to devise new concepts and ideas based on the logic of 
criticism. It is clear that the new paradigm attempts to make use 
and benefit from the developments in social sciences as well as 
to draw lessons from the frustration of the past experiences. 
Therefore, criticism is the main marker of the new trend. This 
is because, as the editorial of Al-Wahda points out, criticism 
is a relevant and necessary approach towards refurbishing the 
08 Al-Wahda, "al-Iftitahiyya"(Editorial) Al-Wahda, vol. 75 
(December 1990) Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) pp. 
3-5. 
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self and its reconstruction. 89 
The contributions of the 1980s show a strong belief that the 
failure of Arab nationalist thought after 1967 was the outcome 
of its theoretical and epistemological deficiencies. The defeat 
that Arab nationalism had in the arena of Arab politics after 
1967 is closely linked to the weakness of its ideology. This is 
a main point of emphasis in the new contributions. The thrust of 
the new trend is to try to avoid any undue confidence, 
romanticism and the simplicity that obscures realities. These 
factors are seen as underlying the defeat of the old version of 
Arab nationalist thought. The fact that these structural 
deficiencies were in action while the Arab world lacked any 
democratic practices made the matter even worse for Arab 
nationalism. This is particularly true because of the association 
of Arab nationalism with political regimes that had no room for 
democracy . 
9° 
What is significant in the new paradigm is its realisation 
of the deficiencies of its ancestor. This realisation is probably 
what justifies its consideration as new. It lays doors open for 
a new and fresh reading of the problematique of Arab reality and 
therefore a revision of the structure of the pan-Arab project and 
ideal itself. But despite the agreement that traditional Arab 
nationalist thought has failed, and perhaps has ended, the new 
contributions do not see any reason to believe that Arabism or 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ghaliy Shukriy, interview with the author. Similar views 
are expressed by Jabiriy, Belqaziyz, Sa'd Diyn Ibrahiym and 
Bensa'id; interviews with the author. 
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Arab nationalism is dead. 91 
As argues Jabiriy, even if traditional Arab nationalist 
thought reached a "bottle-neck" this is not to prove the 
irrelevance of Arab nationalist thought per se nor does this 
prove that Arab nationalism is illogical. Rather, explains 
Jabiriy, this is only to suggest that traditional Arab 
nationalist thought was unable to provide a theory that can 
scientifically explain Arab reality and design the appropriate 
way of changing it. 92 That traditional Arab nationalist thought 
failed in realising these aims does not imply that its content 
and goals are not legitimate or logical. Rather, this illustrates 
the "inability of the mind that produces this discourse to make 
it a coherent theoretical structure able to explain reality and 
provide the relevant theoretical capabilities for its 
transformation. " This is to say that Arab nationalist though was 
not able to become a `scientific' ideology that "employs the 
reality in order that it changes it. ""93 
This view is shared by Arab intellectuals whose 
contributions are studied in this research and by those 
interviewed. They agree that what ended was traditional Arab 
nationalist thought and a version of the pan-Arabist idea. The 
version of idealist and romantic Arab nationalist thought of the 
1950s and the 1960s failed and its failure is echoed in the new 
91 It is important to register that all Arab intellectuals 
interviewed by the author adhere to this view. 
92 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, interview with the author. 
93 M. 'Abid Jabiriy, al-Khitab al-'Arabiy al-Mu'asir: Dirasa 
Tahliyliyya Naadiyya, Third Edition (Beirut; Dar al-Tali' a, 1988) 
p. 131. 
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contributions. The intellectuals interviewed agree on rejecting 
the idea that Arab nationalism is dead. They argue that if Arab 
nationalism had lost its power and hold over Arab politics this 
is because of the failure of its ideology and this ideology is 
now undergoing a process of regeneration. 
Arab intellectuals argue that the developments in Eastern 
Europe and the ex-Soviet Union testify to the vitality and 
relevance of nationalism. The fact that nationalist identities 
have reemerged again in this region through the regeneration of 
nationalist myths and ideas is a clear indication that 
nationalism cannot die. Despite about seventy years of communist 
ideological manipulation and indoctrination, nationalism is back 
again and it is making the headlines in Eastern Europe and the 
ex-Soviet Union republics. Arab intellectuals interviewed 
consider these developments as bringing to the fore yet again the 
issue of national unification. 94 However, while these 
developments may bring to the fore the issue of unification it 
is clear that this is being done not on the line of heritage or 
romanticism but rather on the lines of political reason which the 
new contributions in Arab thought are eager to emphasise. 
The contributions of the 1980s are attempting to revitalise 
the content of Arab nationalism. The contributions stress the 
need to rejuvenate Arab nationalism to accommodate the changes 
that the Arab world has undergone during the last two or three 
decades. But does this mean that Arab nationalism has lost its 
real content and became an Arab pragmatism wherein reality is the 
94 Hammad, Belqaziyz and Jabiriy; interviews with the 
author. 
355 
independent variable whereas Arab nationalist thought is the 
dependent one? This is not a sound hypothesis since nationalism 
is in the end a theoretical base for practical politics. This 
base may not, even if it does want to, become a reality unless 
it reconciles itself with the circumstances or otherwise remain 
romantic texts. 95 
The revision of Arab nationalist thought and the attempt by 
its advocates to rebuild its concepts is in line with what Burhan 
Ghalliyun considers as the Arab society entering "a stage of a 
painful search for itself, and an environment where it questions 
its past, identity, the basis of its erection and destiny that 
it had not done before. 1196 The contributions of the 1980s were 
affected by the surge of political Islam. Political Islam has 
been a very decisive factor that made Arab intellectuals realise 
how important it is to lighten their nationalist Arabist 
interpretation of Arab-Islamic history. This is particularly true 
as far as the enquiry into the issues of nation and state is 
concerned. This is clearly demonstrated in the contributions 
discussed in the previous chapters. The interest in the issue of 
the state is a significant marker of these contributions of Arab 
nationalist thought. As Ghalliyun explains, the inquiry into 
state and the 
understanding of its problems represents the essential 
approach towards analysing and interpreting the inclusive 
social, political, economic and cultural crisis in which 
95 Mustafa al-Faqiy, Tajdiyd al-Fikr al-Oawmiy(The Renewal 
of Nationalist Thought) First Edition (Cairo; Dar al-Shuruwq, 
1994) Arabic Text (Present Author's Translation) p. 75. 
96 Eurhan Ghalliyun, al-Mihna al-'Arabiyya, op. cit., p. 27. 
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Arab societies live. 97 
Ghalliyun assigns the Arab particularistic territorial state 
a great role in bringing about this development. He explains that 
the endurance and consolidation of this state has created new 
social and material interests. It also led to the development of 
particularistic tendencies in the form of particularistic 
`nationalist' doctrines. However, that does not reflect the 
emergence of "a nationalist popular movement in the real sense 
of the word in these independent countries. 1198 Ghalliyun argues 
that the attempt at crystallising these particularistic 
tendencies is nothing more than an 
expression of functionalist nationalisms that are necessary 
for the employment of the state's institutions and to give 
it the modern official character and make it formally look 
as a crystallisation of national will. 99 
Ghalliyun argues that these particularistic `nationalisms' 
will not transform into real nationalist doctrines, i. e. 
into sources of values and principles of cultural and 
imaginary identification for those individuals under its 
jurisdiction or those who speak about it. l°° 
This is because despite the obvious hold these local nationalist 
doctrines have over the state and its politics they still 
live under the trusteeship of the pan-Arab nationalist idea 
and cannot stand without pretending to have affinity with 
it, as is proved by the preservation of the Arab League as 
a centre of this nationalism despite the lack of any real 
efficiency of its institutions . 
10' 
The view expressed by Ghalliyun supports the argument 
97 Ibid, p. 27. 
98 Ibid, p. 97. 
99 Ibid, p. 97. 
ioo Ibid, p. 97. 
ioi Ibid, p. 97. 
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underlying this study. If Arab nationalism as a political 
movement lost its hold over Arab politics since 1967 this is not 
to announce the death of Arab nationalism as an ideology or the 
disappearance of pan-Arabist themes in Arab thought. Arab 
nationalist thought is still alive as shown by the debates 
discussed here. However, Arab nationalism is not, given the 
developments in the Arab world alluded to earlier, bound to play 
the same role it played during its heyday in the 1950s and the 
1960s. 
As Ghalliyun foresees, Arab nationalism, in its new form, 
may incline to "form a kind of a general and uniting frame of 
reference to the smaller and sub- nationalism. j102 However he 
acknowledges that the Arabs of today have competing identities. 
A reconciliation of these is not bound to take place until the 
debate concerning the place of each of these identities and its 
"role in the self-conception of identity and the political 
priorities is resolved and the feeling of contradiction between 
them is transcended. , 103 This is particularly clear if the heavy 
concentration on creating a particularistic nationalism in Arab 
countries is noted. 
The tendency of Arab states to create their own 
nationalisms that often tend to narrow chauvinism towards 
neighbouring Arab countries expresses the failure in 
forming the particularistic state as a nation; i. e. a state 
that has institutions, and the need, therefore, for a 
psychological substitution more than it does express, as 
some may think, the formation of particularist nations and 
the development of real local nationalism. lo4 
102 Ibd, p. 98. 
103 Ibid, p. 98. 
104 Ibid, P. 100. 
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Ghalliyun affirms that 
there is no handicap that prevents Arabism, in an upcoming 
stage and if relationships between regional powers change, 
from again occupying the first position in the rebuilding 
of political identity. 1°5 
This is also the view of many other Arab and non-Arab writers. 
There is a wide agreement among the investigators of the subject 
that Arab nationalism is not dead. What is deemed dead are those 
metaphysical concepts which give room for the emergence of new 
concepts based on rationalism. This rationalism assigns priority 
to interests and draws lessons from history. 106 Although there is 
an agreement that traditional and romantic ideas of Arab 
nationalism are now a spent force writers still consider that 
Arab nationalism (I believe) will remain in existence but 
in a form that is greatly different from what it used to be 
during the 1930s, 1940s, 1950s and the 1960s. There will be 
an entirely new Arab nationalism. "' 
The analysis of the contributions of the 1980s clearly 
establish what Erharad Kienle argues, that the "future will not 
allow room for things, such as a one Arab nation with an immortal 
mission or any thing similar to that since these puritan or sufiy 
names will disappear. "108 Although there are still to be found 
some contributions that emphasise the supremacy of the idea of 
the nation the new paradigm falls in line with what Ghalliyun 
points to, that 
the success in building the wide space that civilsational 
development requires rests more on developing the 
105 Ibid, pp. 98. 
106 'Abdulmun' im al-Saiyyd Sal iyd, interview with the author, 
(Cairo; 1995) 
107 Eberhard Kienle, "Afaaq al-Qawmiyya", op. cit., p. 73. 
108 Ibid, p. 74. 
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fundamentals and theses that help in building a great 
federal gathering than it does by relying on inventing a 
theory of the oneness of nation. 109 
The Arabist idea is not the reflection of the "continuation 
of the old conception of identity or the hope of yet again 
renewing this conception. 11110 This is related to what Constantine 
Zurayq considers to be the inseparable link between issues of 
civilisation and those of reason and creativity. "' He argues that 
the Arab nation is simultaneously involved in the battles of 
nation-building and civilisational awakening. These are "linked 
and inseparable battles. There is no true national-building 
without an active and rich civilisational content and there is 
no civilisational awakening without a national-building. 11112 The 
contributions of the 1980s confirm these new concepts and ideas. 
The discussion has outlined the premise of the new paradigm in 
Arab nationalist thought. Compared to those of the traditional 
old paradigm outlined in chapter three the nature and content of 
the new premises are obvious to note. 
105. 
i09 Burhan Ghalliyun, al-Mihna al-'Arabivva, op. cit., p. 
... Ibid, P. 106. 
111 Constantine Zurayq, Matalib al-Mustagbal, op. cit., p. 
180 and his, Nahnuw wa al-Mustagbal, (Beirut; Dar al-'Ilm lil 
Malaaiyyin, 1980) op. cit., pp. 227-239. 
112 Ibid, pp. 227-239. 
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Conclusion 
The new contributions analysed in the previous chapters show 
that Arab nationalist thought was obliged by circumstances and 
frustration to rethink its concepts and ideas and hence 
restructure its problematique. The contributions that are the 
subject of this study are a continuation of the process of 
revision and criticism that Arab nationalist thought has been 
undergoing since the late 1960s. The discussions in the previous 
chapters focused on establishing the nature and content of the 
intellectual discourse in Arab nationalist thought in the 1980s 
and to see to what extent they differ from romantic Arab 
nationalism. 
The analysis reveals that in contrast to earlier decades the 
1980s witnessed the emergence of a new thinking. This new thought 
founds its concepts on reality and not on nostalgia. It is clear 
from the discussion that there is a significant retreat from 
metaphysical concepts and ideas. Therefore, the new contributions 
investigate unification rather that preach unity. Clearly, there 
is still to be found in the new trend a clear-cut emphasis on 
Arab unity as the desired state of future of the Arabs. 
However, Arab unity is no longer seen as the reproduction 
of the past. Rather it is conceived as a project that is dictated 
by needs more than by identity and history. Unity is no longer 
seen as the contradiction of the state system. it is believed 
that such unity may not be accomplished through the destruction 
of the state system but by the democratic choice of these states 
whereby they maintain their existence and not wither away. The 
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new paradigm calls for assimilation and accommodation. 
The discussion and analysis reflects an agreement that Arab 
nationalism is not dead but is undergoing an intellectual and 
ideological restructuring. The contributions of the 1980s are a 
continuation and renewal of Arab nationalist thought and 
therefore revitalise it among the ideological trends in the Arab 
world. The rise of political Islam and the attempt at building 
a new paradigm of Arab nationalist thought show that ideology in 
the Arab world still does have a role to play. However it is 
clear that this new Arabism is not aimed at inventing yet another 
ideology or doctrine that while affirming harmony of the Arabs 
does away with all the differences and particularism. 
This in turn means that the new paradigm faces a fundamental 
challenge. The challenge is that of building on its ability to 
continue the process of renewal and bypassing or overcoming the 
contradictions. The new paradigm still has a long way to go. It 
has to rid itself of all the theoretical, epistemological and 
ideological deficiencies that characterise the old paradigm which 
some of its residue can still be traced in the new one. It 
remains to be seen whether the new paradigm would be able to 
overcome the two-fold difficulty of abandonment and creativity. 
If the interest and concern in issues of democracy, civil 
society and minority reflects the waning of ideological dogma it 
is important that further research addresses the question of 
whether this trend will be consolidated. This is particularly 
important in view of the intense struggle between elements of 
democracy and secularism and those arguing for theocratic rule 
associated with the strong onslaught of political Islam. These 
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issues are closely linked to that of modernity and the relevance 
of Islam and Arab unity to the Arab aim of taking an active part 
in the modern world's development and indeed the development of 
themselves. 
Given the nature and the magnitude of recent developments 
in the Arab world it is important to investigate the intellectual 
response of Arab nationalist thought to the changing nature of 
its environment. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing 
Gulf War as well as the developments on the front of the Arab 
Israeli conflict with the prospect of establishing a Palestinian 
state and the eventual liquidation of the Palestinian problem, 
the central question of the Arab nation as traditional Arab 
nationalist thought had maintained, have been the most dramatic 
developments that impinge upon the nature of Arab nationalist 
thought. 
Further enquiry is needed to investigate the effect these 
would have on the debates on issues of democracy and its 
relationship with unity. The Palestinian issue was used as an 
ideological camouflage that hindered the prospect for democracy. 
The goal of achieving Arab unity was also employed to camouflage 
dictatorship. It is important to determine the nature of the new 
paradigm to analyse the contributions of the 1990s to see whether 
issues of societal nature stand the chance of being dealt with 
on their own merit and without any ideological camouflage. 
The Arab world today faces the challenge of yet many 
societal problems. The last decades have increased the level and 
intensity of communications between Arab states to an 
unprecedented level which in turn strengthen the idea of Arabism. 
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However, problems are well evident in the fields of politics, 
economy and development. Their most obvious presence is felt in 
the problems the contemporary Arab faces and the difficulties he 
encounters while trying to attain some of his aspirations. It is 
important that some research is undertaken to test the ability 
of Arab nationalist thought to respond to the needs of the 
contemporary Arab. This would help in evaluating the prospect of 
consolidating the elements of rationalism and pragmatism within 
its paradigm. It is also vital to confirm the essential component 
of realism if Arab thought deals with the real issues or problems 
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